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PRECIS 
This thesis has five parts: general introduction, current 
law, argument for reform, proposals, and constitutional avenues of 
reform. 
PART 1 
Chapter 1 
This is the only chapter in this part. It explains the 
writer's general approach and describes the terms used in the thesis 
topic. In particular, it states that only employees* interests in 
recognition of their services, job security, responsibility, 
advancement and 'reasonable* supervision will be considered. These 
interests were selected basically because job satisfaction surveys 
suggest that they are important to employees. 
PART II 
This part examines how the law recognises and protects the 
interests selected. 
Chapter 2 
Here the writer traces the development of the director's 
duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company with particular 
reference to cases involving employees* interests. Most of these cases 
involve payments or proposed payments from company funds to employees 
in recognition of services. It appears that the extent of corporate 
philanthropy permitted by the law depends upon the predicament of the 
company and the generosity of the shareholders. 
(v) 
Chapter 3 
This chapter also deals with recognition of service. It 
points out the deficiencies of the law governing the rights of an 
employed inventor to the benefits of his inventions. 
Chapter 4 
Long service leave is discussed in this chapter. Here again, 
recognition of service is involved. Defects appear in the long service 
leave provisions themselves and also in the approach of the tribunals 
charged with their interpretation. The factors which may disqualify 
an employee from becoming entitled to long service leave are discussed 
in some detail. 
Chapter 5 
This is the first of four chapters dealing with the current 
law of job security. It examines the law governing dismissal with 
notice, summary dismissal, and unlawful dismissal. The informality of 
dismissal procedures and the grounds on which a dismissal can be 
justified are criticised. 
Chapter 6 
The peculiar rules relating to the effect of liquidation, 
receivership and take-overs on the contract of employment are analysed. 
The writer points out that employees not conversant with these 
technical rules may forfeit their job without knowing that they have 
been dismissed. 
Chapter 7 
Here the writer examines the remedies available to employees 
unjustly, wrongfully or unlawfully dismissed. It is pointed out that 
the common law remedies of an action for damages, quantum meruit. 
(vi) 
a declaration or an injunction promise little reward for an employee 
wrongfully dismissed and none whatsoever for an employee who has been 
lawfully, although unjustly, discharged. In some jurisdictions, re-
instatement is now available. Indeed, in New South Wales and South 
Australia this remedy is well established. On the other hand, it 
appears that federal tribunals may not order reinstatement of a 
dismissed employee. 
Where the employee is dismissed in breach of the *victimis-
ation provisions', he is entitled to reinstatement but this may not be 
an adequate remedy in all cases. 
Chapter 8 
This chapter deals with the topical and developing area of 
redundancy law. The writer examines the role industrial tribunals 
have played in resolving redundancy disputes and traces the timorous 
approach of many tribunals to doubts about jurisdiction. 
Chapter 9 
This examines the law relevant to employees* interests in 
promotion, advancement and^reasonable supervision*. In general, 
the law has not begun to recognise these interests. In fact, industrial 
tribunals have expressly refused to interfere with management's right to 
deal with these issues as it thinks fit. 
Chapter 10 
Here the writer discusses the legal machinery available for 
the settlement of plant-level disputes. This issue is important as 
most of the interests studied in this thesis arise at the work place. 
The writer concludes that, while the available machinery might be 
adequate, there is a need for local bodies better-equiped to handle 
problems arising at plant level. 
Cvii) 
PART III 
Chapter H 
Chapter 11 looks at the history and theory behind the law. 
By examining this issue at this point, the writer is able to place the 
current law in its historical perspective. Three main themes emerge 
from this analysis: paramountcy of shareholder interests, freedom of 
contract and respect for property rights. The modern significance of 
each of these is considered in the light of the changes in the scope 
of economic organization and company management. 
Chapter 12 
The main purpose of this chapter is to indicate that reform 
is necessary. Thus, the writer looks at the dimensions and causes of 
plant-level problems. 
Chapter 13 
Here the prospects for reform are examined. In particular, 
the critical issue of whether reform would disturb the market 
mechanism is discussed. The writer concedes that many of the necessary 
reforms would place a substantial restraint on managerial freedom and 
would possibly be more than some companies could afford. On the other 
hand, this traditional argument against reform is questioned and 
suggestions are made for reducing the impact of the reform measures. 
Chapter 14 
Here the writer explains why the law should implement reform. 
The practical answer is that unless the law plays a role, the measures 
needed will not be introduced. The theoretical justification for 
advocating a more active role for the law in industrial relations lies 
in the writings of Roscoe Pound. 
(viii ) 
PART IV 
In this division the writer outlines proposals for reform. 
Chapter 15 
This recommends a redefinition of the director's duty to act 
bona fide in the interests of the company so that directors would be 
allowed, but not obliged, to take employees* interests into account 
in running the company^whatever its predicament. 
Chapter 16 
This suggests measures which would give the employed inventor 
recognition and reward for his creative efforts. 
Chapter 17 
This chapter considers certain amendments to Australian long 
service leave provisions. In particular, it proposes measures to 
overcome problems caused by transmission of a business and interstate 
service. 
Chapter 18 
Reforms relating to dismissal procedure, the type of dismissals 
the law will sustain, onus of proof and remedies are suggested in this 
chapter. The writer draws upon a great deal of overseas material to 
support his recommendations. 
Chapter 19 
This chapter examines reform of redundancy law under three 
major headings: criteria for selection, redundancy procedures, and 
the assistance and compensation provided for retrenched workers. Here 
again, overseas experience with these issues is discussed in detail. 
(ix) 
Chapter 20 
Here the writer discusses ways of enhancing employees* 
responsibility in and over their work through workers* participation 
in management. The West German scheme of co-determination is 
considered at length and the lessons to be learned from this model 
are analysed. Finally, the writer discusses the local obstacles to 
a co-determination scheme and suggests what can be done to overcome 
these obstacles. The writer*s overall conclusion is that co-
determination could be a useful way of satisfying workers* interests 
in responsibility but he concedes that much remains to be done before 
this measure would be a viable proposition in the present industrial 
context. 
Chapter 21 
Proposals designed to protect employees* interests in 
advancement and reasonable supervision are discussed in this chapter. 
PART V 
This part deals with constitutional avenues for reform. 
Chapter 22 
The writer briefly describes the potential of the «corporations 
power*. 
Chapter 23 
This contains a short analysis of the limits inherent in the 
industrial power. It also suggests a way in which reinstatement 
jurisdiction could be legitimately exercised in the federal sphere. 
Chapter 24 
Here the writer examines the scope of the external affairs 
power and the trade and commerce power and points out that these placita 
(x) 
could be used to implement many of the proposals outlined in Part IV. 
In addition, the writer briefly analyses the potential of the taxation 
power and the patents power. 
In the Conclusion the writer submits that the thesis is 
established and attempts to explain briefly the reasons for the law*s 
failure to impose adequate duties and responsibilities upon company 
management for the protection of employees* interests. 
Volume 2 contains five appendices. 
Appendix 1 is a brief survey of important job satisfaction 
studies. It supports the proposition that the interests selected in 
Chapter 1 are important to employees. 
Appendix 2 contains a report of the writer*s mail questionnaire 
which surveyed certain aspects of the employer-employee relationship 
in 350 large companies operating in Australia. 
A copy of the writer's questionnaire appears in Appendix 3. 
In Appendix 4, the writer examines certain aspects of 
superannuation law in great detail. Particular attention is directed 
to protecting the employees* rights to receive the benefits promised by 
their employers' superannuation scheme. The writer also considers the 
impact of the proposed national superannuation scheme upon occupation 
superannuation. 
The primary purpose of Appendix 5 is to support the submissions 
advanced in Chapter 22 which deals with the potential of the 'corporations 
power'. 
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
In a period of sharp down-turn in the labour market, when 
local and international conditions make for uncertainty in future labour 
demand, when claims that workers be given a say in decisions that affect 
their working lives are becoming more widespread and insistent, when 6.3 
million working days are lost in one year through strikes,^ when 
absenteeism costs Australian industry an estimated 1,000 million dollars 
2 
a year in lost production, it is timely to consider the role the law 
has played, and could play, in the protection of employees* interests. 
Are the legal foundations on which our forefathers built still relevant 
to our modern industrial society? Do the changes in the composition of 
the work force, in the expectations and aspirations of employees, in the 
scope of industrial organization and in social norms demand revision of 
the law's approach to the employment relationship? These fundamental 
issues lie at the heart of this thesis. 
Traditionally, protection of employees* interests is studied 
from the industrial law end of the legal spectrum. This thesis approaches 
the subject initially from a company law standpoint. With this 
perspective, the writer hopes to present a fresh insight into certain 
areas of law. 
To keep this thesis within reasonable bounds, it was necessary 
to concentrate upon certain interests of company employees, namely: 
recognition, job security, responsibility, advancement and 'reasonable* 
supervision. This strategy will be explained below.^ 
2. Why Company Employees? 
The inevitable query is: why focus upon company employees* 
2 
3 
interests? Is not this, after all, only part of the whole picture? 
Why should company employees be treated any differently from other 
workers? 
It is true that a significant proportion of employees are 
engaged in the public sector. But there, some of the interests to be 
considered are already adequately protected. This will be seen, for 
example, in the statutory provisions which regulate dismissal, 
4 
retrenchment and promotion in the public service. Further, the 
public superannuation schemes have avoided some of the defects which 
appear in the private schemes.^ Apart from this formal protection, 
there is the vague, but nevertheless significant, factor that the 
Australian Public Service has traditionally been a responsible employer. 
It is more difficult to justify the exclusion of those who 
work for small firms or partnerships or a sole trader. The main reason 
is that, today, companies are the big employers.^ Reforms directed at 
companies, therefore, will affect the major proportion of the work force 
in the private sector. Moreover, in companies, the potential for reform 
is greater than in other business forms. Companies exist and enjoy 
limited liability by virtue of what is essentially a State privilege. 
This gives the State a powerful instrument for regulating the company*s 
affairs which is simply not available for other forms of private 
enterprise. The State can, of course, regulate partnerships and sole 
traders but there its weapons are not as potent as the threat of 
withholding the twin privileges of incorporation and limited liability. 
When the scope of industrial and economic organization was 
small there was less need to question the basic assumptions of the law 
regulating the employment relationship. With the emergence of the large 
corporatio n, the employment equation has changed. The size and growth 
of companies, more than anything else, have destroyed the presumed 
equality of bargaining power between an employer and his individual 
employees. ^  
Where the employer is a partnership or a sole trader, the 
owners are more often involved in the active management of the business; 
both the owners and the employees invest their labour in the enterprise. 
Shareholding, on the other hand, commonly gives rise to a form of passive 
ownership involving a minimal investment of labour in the enterprise and 
a minimal amount of personal responsibility towards the company's 
employees. In these circumstances, it is interesting to compare the 
legal protection afforded employees' interests with that provided for 
shareholders* interests, and to consider the relative merits of these 
two groups* claims to this protection. This is an important issue, but 
it is only relevant to company employees. 
g 
The Concrete Pipes Case has provoked much interest and a keen 
9 
controversy about the scope of the * corporations power*. As yet, few 
have considered whether this placitum would enable Federal Parliament 
to regulate conditions of employment in the corporations described. If 
it does have such a potential certain restrictions inherent in the 
*industrial power*^^ might be avoided. Industrial law (at least in 
relation to the corporations described) would no longer be hamstrung. 
But any legal reforms could only relate to companies of a certain 
description. 
Further, in some Western European countries the distinction 
between company law and labour law has become slightly blurred by the 
emergence of 'enterprise law*. West Germany is probably the classic 
example. There, a system of worker participation in management is 
integrated with company structure to allow employees representation 
in vital organs of the company.^^ Should this scheme be adopted in 
Great Britain it might become more palatable in Australia. Such a 
development would, of course, have a direct impact upon company law. 
In addition, it would make the position of company employees distinct 
5 
from that of their colleagues in the private sector. 
Finally, the exclusion of employees in the public sector and 
in small firms and partnerships can also be justified by restrictions 
of time and space. The decision to exclude these employees was deliberate 
and, indeed, necessary. It imposes a somewhat artificial fetter upon the 
scope of the inquiry but without this limit the task would be unwieldy. 
In any event, the writer's approach does have some attractions which are 
not apparent at first glance. It allows sufficient latitude to consider 
a broad range of legal issues pertinent to a substantial section of the 
work force. Only when these issues are integrated is it possible to 
assess whether the law adequately protects these employees* interests. 
This thesis examines shortcomings and defects in the law, the 
latitude given to unscrupulous employers, what happens and what might 
happen to employees whose interests are not safeguarded. In essence, 
it looks at the negative side of the law. This approach produces a minor 
distortion of the overall effect of the law but it can be justified by 
the nature of the topic. 
3. General Comments 
Two further comments are necessary. This thesis is written 
from a background of law, not industrial relations. These disciplines 
are by no means co-terminous or co-extensive. Indeed, some would argue 
that they are, at time, incompatible! By concentrating on legal 
solutions, this thesis neglects social, economic or political solutions 
which may be equally, if not more, appropriate. On the other hand, the 
law may not always be able to stand on the sideline of industrial 
relations. When it is called into the fray, it must be equal to the task. 
Moreover, in the writer's view the non-legal forces will only achieve 
their potential for reform within a legal framework providing certain, 
reliable and comprehensive protection for employees* interests. 
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As will soon be apparent, it was necessary to step across the 
boundary between law and the social sciences to ascertain what interests 
are important to employees. Here again the writer was forced to tread 
warily. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts to present a balanced view 
of the relevant research material and to be conservative in its 
deductions therefrom, 
4. A Note on Terms 
At this point it will be convenient to describe the principal 
terms in the thesis topic. 
Firstly, * the law* shall be taken to include case law, 
1 P 
legislation and award provisions. There are sanctions for breaches of 
awards, and awards do make rules which regulate conduct. Therefore it 
seems legitimate, for present purposes, to regard award provisions as 
The phrase * to impose* will be used primarily in the sense of 
placing an obligation upon company management. 
*Duties and responsibilities* in this paper shall simply mean 
*legal duties and responsibilities*. 
The term *company management* presents a greater difficulty. 
Management involves two primary functions: policy formulation and 
administration. In this thesis, it will be assumed that the board of 
directors and controlling shareholders play a role in policy formulation, 
Thus, these persons fall within the category *company management*. 
A different group may carry out the administration of company 
policy. It would probably not be going too far to describe this group 
as all those who have executive authority in the organization. Persons 
of foreman rank and above would on this basis form part of management. 
These two units then, comprise company management. 
The expression *employee* when used herein shall bear the 
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meaning ascribed to this term by the common law. In effect, this means 
that workers of all ranks are employees provided they are engaged under 
a contract of service. To some extent this description begs the question. 
But the problems associated with identifying the employer-employee 
14 
relationship are well-known; they need not detain us here. Several 
industrial statutes^^ have wrestled with these problems but as yet they 
have not evolved a comprehensive definition of 'employee*. In some 
cases they are merely crude attempts to restate the common law. Even 
when the statutory definitions go further, the context limits their 
general relevance. 
There is one small problem with the definition of 'employee* 
adopted above: persons may fall within the category 'company management' 
and still be 'employees*. In other words, the groups overlap. This is, 
to some extent, inevitable. If the categories were defined in mutually 
exclusive terms many managerial employees would be excluded from the 
scope of the thesis. This is a high price to pay for simplicity. It 
would seem preferable to persist with the descriptions mentioned earlier 
despite the minor conceptual difficulty. 
The term 'interests* requires a more detailed analysis. 
It could refer to those matters which are not yet legally secured but 16 
which are the subject of negotiation between employees and management. 
But this is not the meaning used herein. In this thesis, 'interests' 
will be used to describe matters of concern to employees. This is 
clearly a broad compass and some limitation is necessary, but where 
should the line be drawn? Perhaps the most rational course to adopt is 
to examine those 'interests* which employees themselves consider important. 17 . 
Job satisfaction surveys suggest that recognition, job 
security,^^ responsibility, reasonable and decent* supervision,^*^ and 
advancement^^ are prominent features of a job. There is no definitive 
catalogue of factors which affect job satisfaction. Nevertheless, the 
•interests* selected keep recurring in discussions of this issue. 
This is not to say that all employees seek all these factors 
at any one time. On the contrary, it seems that different employees 
are satisfied by different factors. Thus, on the slender evidence 
available, women may be primarily interested in job security and 
22 supervision while men may tend to focus more upon responsibility and 
23 
opportunities for advancement. Another variable is the age and status 
of the employee. One survey suggested that younger, better-educated 
employees aspire to promotion and interesting work whereas older 24 
tradesmen are more interested in job security. Again, the personal 
characteristics of the employee and even the state of the labour market 
might influence job satisfaction. One cannot generalise on this topic. 
Perhaps the most that can be inferred from the available evidence is 25 
that all employees are interested in one or more of the factors listed. 
Statistics showing the causes of industrial disputes provide 
another clue to the scope of employees* interests. These figures suggest 2 6 
that at least some of the selected factors are important to employees. 
Let us now consider how the law fosters and protects employees* 
interests. Only the law up to 1 October 1974 will be examined. 
PART 11 
CURRENT LAW 
SECTION l; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN RECOQ^ITION 
OF THEIR SERVICES 
CHAPTER 2 THE DIRECTOR'S DUTY TO ACT BONA FIDE IN 
THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY 
1. Introduction 
Recognition ranks highly among employee^' interests. In one 
sense, this desire for approval relates to the actual work performed by 
the employee. On a broader view, it concerns the employee's overall 
contribution to the enterprise. 
The following chapters in this Section explore ways of 
recognising employees' efforts through law. Chapter 2 discusses the 
very basic issue of recognising an employee's existence in the company. 
True, this is not recognition of employees' services. It is much more 
fundamental: how can the law purport to foster or protect employees' 
interests in recognition of their services if it ignores their existence? 
In any event, the company law cases which raise this basic issue have 
almost invariably involved gratuitous payments or benefits to employees 
as a reward for their services. Chapter 3 analyses the law governing an 
employee's rights in inventions made during the course of his employment. 
Here, direct recognition of the employee's output is at stake. The 
fourth chapter examines the law regulating the provision of long service 
leave. This benefit rewards an employee for long service in an enterprise, 
It involves, therefore, some recognition (albeit general and remote) of 
an employee's contribution. 
2. Is Company Management Obliged to Recognise Employees' Interests? 
The speculation which occurred in commercial investment from 
the enactment of the Bubble Act^until long after its repeal in 1825 
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impressed parliament and the courts with the need to protect investors 
from unscrupulous promotions and hazardous business ventures. 
The following extract from the judgment of Lord Langdale M.R. in 
Colman v. Eastern Counties Rly. Co. reflects this protective policy: 
A railway investment should not be considered a wild speculation, 
exposing those engaged in it to all sorts of risks, whether they 
intended it or not. Considering the vast property which is now 
invested in railways, and how easily it is transferable, perhaps 
one of the best things that could happen to them would be, that 
the investment should be of such a safe nature, that prudent ^ 
persons might, without improper hazard, invest their monies in it. 
Against this background it is perhaps not surprising that, 
when the director's duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company 
became established, company law was preoccupied with the interests of 
shareholders. While the duty to act bona fide is owed to the company, 
the law, in searching for natural persons who may be the beneficiaries, 
looks no further than the present and future shareholders of the company.'^ 
Thus management is not legally obliged to recognise employees* interests. 
But does it have the power to take these interests into account? 
3, The Power to Recognise Employees' Interests 
Ci) Section 19 (a), U.C.A. 
Section 19 (a) of the Uniform Companies Act^ empowers a company 
to 'make donations for ... charitable purposes*. This power may not be 
excluded or modified by the memorandum or articles of association. The 
phrase 'charitable purposes' has acquired a definite legal meaning.^ It 
y includes the relief of poverty and the advancement of education. 
Further, to be charitable, a purpose must have an element of public g 
benefit. Clearly this technical legal meaning of 'charitable purposes' 
does not coincide with its popular connotation.*^ Nevertheless, it appears 
that the phrase 'charitable purposes' in section 19 (a) would take on its 
special legal meaning. 
12 
Thus, a company has power to make donations towards employees* 
interests provided the purpose of the gift is charitable in the technical 
sense and the requisite public benefit element is established. This 
appears true whether the company's contribution is granted directly or 
through a trust. 
The public benefit requirement presents a major obstacle to 
corporate generosity. Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd ^^ 
is an example of the problems involved. There the House of Lords decided 
that an educational trust for the children of employees and ex-employees 
of the British Tobacco Company Ltd was not charitable because the class 
of beneficiaries could not be considered a section of the public: the 
connecting link between the members of the class was purely personal. 
The trust was, therefore, a private trust and, since it offended the 
rule against perpetuities, it was void. 
Lord Simonds succinctly expressed the reasoning of the majority: 
These words 'section of the community* have no special sanctity, 
but they conveniently indicate first, that the possible (I 
emphasize the word "possible") beneficiaries must not be 
numerically negligible, and secondly, that the quality which 
distinguishes them from other members of the community, so that 
they form by themselves a section of it, must be a quality which ^^ 
does not depend on their relationship to a particular individual. 
As the number of employees involved in the class of beneficiaries 
exceeded 110,000, it was the relationship of the beneficiaries to the 
particular company which proved decisive. 
Lord MacDermott dissented. He suggested a more flexible 
approach which took into account all the surrounding circumstances. On 
this basis His Lordship concluded that the public benefit requirement 
was satisfied.^^ 
14 
After Oppenheim it appeared that trusts for the benefit of 
employees of a particular company would not be entitled to the advantages 
of a charitable trust. Dingle v. Turner^^ demands a revision of this 
assessment. There,the House of Lords unanimously held that a trust to 
13 
apply the income from the investment of £10,000 'in paying pensions 
to poor employees' of a particular firm was a valid charitable trust. 
In so doing, Their Lordships granted trusts for the relief of poverty 
among employees of a particular company an exemption from the requirement 
of public benefit, 
Oppenheim^^ involved an educational trust, not a trust for 
the relief of poverty. Thus it might be argued that the Oppenheim 
principle has survived Dingle v. Turner.^^ It is true that Dingle v. 
1 19 Turner did not overrule Oppenheim, but it did question its rationale. 
Lord Cross of Chelsea, with the concurrence of the other Lordships, 
expressed dissatisfaction with the distinction between a personal and 
an impersonal relationship with a particular entity. His Lordship 
20 thought that this was not a valid basis for defining a charitable trust. 
21 Dingle v. Turner is not the first example of a trust upheld 
as a valid charitable gift despite the absence of a public benefit 
22 element. In Re Gosling a testamentary gift to establish a pension 
fund for •old and worn-out clerks' of a banking firm was upheld as a 
23 
valid charitable trust. Dingle v. Turner says nothing inconsistent 
with this. 
Further, in some cases the public benefit requirement has 24 been relaxed. Thus in Hall v. Derby Sanitary Authority a trust for 
persons following a particular trade or profession qualified as a 
charitable trust since it was for the benefit of a section of the 
25 
community. Again, where the trust defines the class of beneficiaries 
by reference to a geographical area, the public benefit element is 
satisfied,^^ 
From the authorities, it appears that certain company donations 
towards employees' interests will be valid. Trusts or direct dispositions 27 
for the relief of poverty among the company's employees will be upheld. 
With trusts or direct contributions for other charitable purposes it may 
14 
be necessary to define the class of beneficiaries by reference to a 
geographical area or require that all the beneficiaries be members of 
a particular trade or industry. If either of these conditions is 
satisfied, it does not appear to matter that company employees are 
given preference over other members of the particular trade or profession 
28 or other residents of the particular district. 
(ii) Section 19 Cc) U.C.A. and the Third Schedule Powers 
In addition to the power conferred by section 19 (a), U.C.A, 
a company may have power to recognise employees* services through section 
19 (c), U.C.A. or by virtue of an express clause in the company's 
constitution. 
By section 19 (c) the powers set forth in the Third Schedule 
to the Uniform Companies Act are automatically incorporated unless these 
powers are expressly excluded or modified by the memorandum or articles 
of association of the company. This holds true whether the company was 
29 
incorporated before or after the Uniform Companies Act came into force. 
The Third Schedule powers are very broad. For example, clause 
7 includes power to establish or support benefit schemes for employees 
and their dependants, to grant pensions and allowances and to subsidise 
i n s u r a n c e . W h e r e the company establishes any of these schemes through 
trust machinery the question arises: is the trust charitable or non-
charitable. If it is for a charitable purpose, and if it has the 
requisite public character, it will qualify for the privileges of a 
charitable trust. On the other hand, if it fails to satisfy either of 
these two requirements it may be void. Its chances of survival depend 
on two factors: certainty of objects and beneficiaries^^ and compliance 
with the rule against perpetuities. 
In some states non-charitable trusts for the benefit of 
employees are granted a statutory exemption from the rule against 
15 
32 perpetuities. When he introduced the New South Wales provision, the 
Honourable Mr L.O. Martin, Minister for Justice, explained: 
Some years ago in England it was held that moneys in the hands 
of a company which had been transferred to a superannuation 
account to provide benefits for its employees on retirement 
became available for the benefit of the general creditors of 
the company on its liquidation owing to [the rule against 
perpetuities].,. The Superannuation and Trust Funds (Validation) ^^ 
Act 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. V, c.4l was passed to remedy this position. 
Section 382, U.C.A. provides the local remedy. The apparent 
purpose of this section is to ensure that certain trusts for the benefit 
of employees are independent of the company's life and beyond the reach 
of the company's creditors. 
Section 382 defines 'fund or scheme' as including 'any 
provident, superannuation, sick, accident, assurance, unemployment, 
pension, co-operative benefit or other like fund, scheme, arrangement 
34 
or provision'. The Full Court of the High Court considered this 
definition in Oesterlin v. Sands.^^ A testator provided that, subject 
to the cessation of three life interests, the trustees of his will were 
empowered to apply any or all the income from a parcel of shares in a 
family company 'in the interests of the whole staff*. The trustees 
were also authorised to award the income to individuals from time to 
time. Unfortunately, the will provided only vague guidelines for the 
trustees to follow in applying the proceeds of the trust fund: the 
proportions for distribution were not specified; nor were the trustees 
directed as to what purposes were to benefit from the fund. As the 
power Infringed the rule against perpetuities it could only be saved 
from extinction by the statutory exemption. 
Notwithstanding the 'extensive' import of the word 'includes* 
in the definition clause, Mr Justice Kitto ruled that the words 'or 
other like fund, scheme, arrangement or provision' exclude by necessity 
any fund, scheme, arrangement or provision which is not'"like" those that 3 6 are specifically described*. His Honour continued: 
16 
A fund or scheme, it seems to me, could not properly be described 
as "like" those to which the titles apply unless it be governed 
by rules or prescriptions which limit its purposes to benefiting ^^ 
or assisting an employee of the company in defined circumstances. 
The High Court unanimously decided that the section did not 
save the trust because the trustee's powers to benefit the company 
employees were not limited to the type of fund or scheme protected by 
3 8 
the section, Oesterlin v. Sands was an exceptional case. Most 
superannuation, profit-sharing or other benefit schemes for company 
employees define the duties of the trustees quite extensively. Thus 
these schemes would easily qualify for the statutory exemption. 
39 40 South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have 
a provision equivalent to section 382 of the Companies Act, 1971, as 
amended (N.S.W.). But in Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia and 
Tasmania some non-charitable trusts for the benefit of enployees must 
41 
comply with the rule against perpetuities. If the rule is infringed, 
the trust will be invalid and no benefits would be conferred upon 
employees. It is true that the duration of the trust can be confined to 42 
the perpetuity period but it is surely preferable for the trust to be 
independent of the company's life. 
Leaving aside the difficulties encountered by non-charitable 
trusts created under the Third Schedule powers, it is interesting to 
speculate upon the general effect of these powers. 
(iii) Nature and Effect of the Third Schedule Powers 
43 Walsh expressed the view that the Third Schedule powers are 
incidental to the business of the company and are 'not to be taken as an 
44 
extension of the objects clause'. He argued that the Third Schedule 
•merely prevents the possibility of it being argued that the powers 45 mentioned cannot be incidental to the pursuit of the company's objects'. 
He conceded that clause 1 in the Third Schedule clashes with this inter-
. , . 46 pretationo 
17 
Clause 1 empowers a company to ^ carry on any other business 
which may seem to the company capable of being conveniently carried on 
in connection with its business or calculated directly or indirectly 
to enhance the value of or render profitable any of the company's 
property or rights'. It is difficult to see how a power couched in 
such broad language can be merely incidental to the company's principal 
objects. Much turns on the word 'conveniently* in clause 1. To Walsh, 
it seems to imply that the power to expand and diversify the company's 
business is confined to fields which are related to the company's 
47 
principal business. But perhaps Walsh underestimates the import of 
the adverb. 48 
H.A. Stephenson & Son Ltd v. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. 
suggests alternative constructions. There the High Court considered the 
effect of the following clause in the company's memorandum: 'To carry 
on any other business whether manufacturing or otherwise as the company 
may deem expedient*. This object is broadly similar to the first limb 
of clause 1 in the Third Schedule. 
Mr Justice Starke decided that the correct way to interpret 
the clause was 'to confine the object to businesses allied to or connected 49 with the particular businesses specified in the memorandum*. Mr 
Justice Dixon took a slightly different view. His Honour commented: 
The true meaning of the object would appear to be to authorize 
the Company to carry on any business found to be connected or 
associated with any existing business of the Company. When it 
speaks of such business as the Company may deem expedient, it 
fails to supply in terms any criterion of expediency. The rest 
of the memorandum suggests that it does not simply mean such 
business as the Company may choose to carry on, but such business 
as it may consider convenient to carry on because they are 
connected with or arise out of the course of business adopted by 
the Company. 
It appears that Walsh's interpretation of Clause 1 of the 
Third Schedule is somewhat narrower than that which Starke and Dixon 
JJ. would favour. While Walsh's construction apparently depends on the 
company's 'principal business', Mr Justice Starke construed a similar 
18 
clause by reference to the 'particular businesses specified in the 
memorandum', and Mr Justice Dixon referred to *any existing business 
of the company*, 
Thus, the word 'conveniently* does admit a wider meaning 
than Walsh would attribute to it. For example, it may be convenient 
for a company to diversify its business because a particular commercial 
opportunity is available at the time or because the financial resources 
of the company at a particular time warrant expansion into another 
business. 
Mr Justice Menhennitt recently remarked that the power contained 
in clause 1 of the Third Schedule is 'not confined to matters that are 
incidental or conducive to other p o w e r s H i s Honour thought that 
if this was not the proper construction of clause 1, clause 26 of the 
52 
Third Schedule would be redundant. 
It is not entirely clear whether Menhennitt J,, when he used 
the words 'incidental or conducive to other powers*, was referring to 
other powers in the Third Schedule, or other powers, whether in the 
Third Schedule, the memorandum or the articles of association. The 
fact that the learned judge did not use the words 'the other powers' 
suggests that he was referring to powers wherever contained. On this 
construction, clause 1 has, indeed, acquired an independent status. 
And so, it seems, have other powers in the Third Schedule. 
In Hawkesbury Development Corp*n Ltd v. Landmark Finance Pty Ltd, ^^ Mr 
Justice Street concluded that the defendant company had power to issue 
a joint debenture over its assets and undertaking by virtue of clauses 
12, 13, 25 and 26 of the Third Schedule even though this power was not 54 
contained in the company's objects clause. 
Perhaps the true interpretation of the nature and effect of 
the Schedule powers is as follows: a company which has not excluded 
or modified the Third Schedule shall have all the powers listed therein 
19 
whether or not they are incidental to the pursuit of the company's 
objects, unless, of course, the Schedule powers themselves are expressly 
limited by reference to these objects. 
Only four of the Third Schedule powers are of direct relevance 
to employees* interests: clauses 7, 12, 22 and 10. The first three in 
this group are not limited by reference to the company's objects; they 
are, therefore, 'independent* powers. Clause 10 empowers a company to 
undertake certain building and construction ventures but only if these 
'seem calculated directly or indirectly to advance the company's 
interests'. Yet this proviso does not rob clause 10 of an independent 
status for a transaction may advance the company's interests without 
necessarily being merely incidental to the pursuit of its objects. 
Turning from the nature of the Third Schedule powers, let us 
consider for a moment the limits placed upon their exercise. 
Professor Parsons suggests that 'an independent object'^to 
make gifts"taken by way of an express provision in the memorandum must 
be exercised in the interests of the company as determined by reference 
to all its objects'.^^ Similar reasoning could be applied to the Third 
Schedule powers. The logic of this theory seems to be quite sound but, 
as a guiding principle, it provides little assistance. If a company's 
objects clause includes power 'to carry on any other trade or business 
whatsoever which can, in the opinion of the board of directors, be 
advantageously carried on by the company in connection with or ancillary 
to any of the above businesses or the general business of the company',^^ 
it is pointless to insist that the powers granted in the memorandum, as 
well as those inserted by section 19, be interpreted by reference to all 
the objects of the company. The objects of a company may be so widely 
phrased that it may not be clear whether or not the interests of the 
company will be served by actions in purported exercise of the powers 
in the Third Schedule. While the validity of Professor Parsons' theory 
20 
is not questioned, its utility has been diminished by draftsmen 
conscious of the spectre of ultra vires. 
4. Does the Board of Directors Have Power to Recognise Employees* 
Interests? 
A company's power to recognise employees* services may spring 
from section 19 (a) U.C.A., the Third Schedule or a clause in the 
memorandum or articles of association. The company may then delegate 
this power to the board of directors through Article 73, Table A, U.C.A. 
or a similar provision. Article 73 allows the board to *exercise all 
such powers of the company as are not, by the Act or by these 
regulations* required to be exercised by the company in general meeting. 
Thus, company powers which are not reserved for the members in general 
meeting may be vested in and exercised by the directors. This is 
simply a recognition of the fact that a company can only act through 
57 directors. 
The next section involves an analysis of cases in which 
management has either allocated company funds in recognition of employees* 
services or acted, in some other way, in response to employees* interests. 
In some instances the directors acted on their own initiative; 
in others they sought the approval of the company in general meeting. 
For the present, this factual difference matters little. The key issue 
is: to what extent is corporate generosity towards employees permitted 
by law? 
Corporate altruism is a fairly elastic concept. Its legal 
boundaries are, to a large extent, determined by the company's 
predicament. 
21 
5, Exercise of the Power to Recognise Employees* Interests 
(i) Where the Company is a Going Concern 
A viable company has a great deal of latitude in recognising 
employees* services and interests. 
(a) Gratuities for Current Employees 
One of the earliest decisions in this area was Hampson v. 
5 8 
Price*s Patent Candle Co. From the undivided profits of the company 
(some £1,500) the directors paid a gratuity to each worker in the 
company's factory who had served faithfully throughout the year. The 
bonus represented one week's wages for each factory worker. 
The Master of the Rolls considered the payment a reasonable 
exercise of the powers of 'management and superintendence* conferred 
on the directors by section 90 of The Companies Clauses Consolidation 
59 
Act 1845. The Court of Appeal regarded the bonus as an inducement 
to better efforts. It stressed that the amount allocated was intended 
to be shared only among those workmen who were currently employed by was AH 
a bona fide payment, and a question of factory management* 
the company and concludeds *It is quite plain that [the gratuity 
60 
Hardy v. Wilson^^ is the first reported decision in Australia 
dealing with the powers of directors to reward company officers. In a 
brief judgment, Mr Justice Molesworth ruled that directors may pay a 
deserving officer more than he is legally entitled provided the 
directors do not desire unduly to benefit the officer at the expense of 
the company. It seems a fair inference from this case that the law 
frowns upon excessive payments to company employees. 
6 2 
Re William Brooks St Co. Ltd and Companies Act confirms this 
suspicion. The case involved an application for compulsory winding up 
on the ground that the managing director of the company, with the 
concurrence or acquiescence of the board of directors, was deliberately 
limiting the dividends payable to shareholders without their approval 
22 
so that large amounts of the company's profits and liquid funds could 
be allocated to an annual bonus scheme for the company's employees. 
Despite this excessive altruism, the company was an expanding, 
efficient and prosperous business. 
Mr Justice Hardie had no hesitation in deciding that the 
managing director had breached his fiduciary duty to the company. On 
the facts this conclusion was perhaps inevitable as, at one stage, the 
annual bonus paid to each employee reached £700. The learned judge 
found that *this particular bonus scheme, with the extravagant amounts 
paid away out of profits year by year, was in no sense essential for the 
success and prosperity of the business*.^^ This reasoning appears to 
64 follow a stricter line than other decisions in this field. Yet 
later in his judgment, Hardie J. stated that the board of 
directors were entitled to meet all proper and reasonable expenses of 
the business before giving the shareholders the benefit of any increase 
in efficiency or profit-earning capacity of the company.^^ Here, 
Mr Justice Hardie seems to be more consistent with the other authorities. 
Apparently Mr Justice Hardie did not regard the bonuses as 
essential to the prosperity of the business nor as a proper and 
reasonable commercial expense. In the result, he ordered that the 
company be compulsorily wound up on the grounds specified in sections 
208 (2) and 208 (l)(f) of the Companies Act.^^ 
(b) Gratuities for Retired Employees 
It will be recalled that the gratuitous payments upheld in 
Hampson^^ and Hardy^^ were made to current employees. Indeed, in 
69 Hampson, the Court of Appeal emphasised this point in their judgments. 
But corporate generosity towards retired servants was approved in a 
70 
series of cases beginning with Henderson v. Bank of Australasia. 
There Mr Justice North considered a company resolution to 
pay a retired official in a banking company a substantial pension. 
23 
After hearing evidence of the practice of granting pensions among 
other companies of similar character, His Honour concluded; * what 
has been done has been done for the purpose of giving effect to the 
objects of the company, and promoting the prosperity of the company*. 
No doubt the company's resolution approving the pension influenced his 
decision. Yet when he came to consider the amount of the benefit he 
72 
decided that this was entirely a matter of internal management. 
The next year, a more formal staff superannuation scheme 
established by a mutual life assurance society with the approval of 
the society's members was sanctioned in McEIhone v. Australian Mutual 73 
Provident Society. The Chief Justice in Equity held that the creation 
of the fund was a valid exercise of the general powers of management 
conferred on the board of directors by the Act which incorporated the 
society. In itself, this finding is not surprising. What is startling 
is the fact that the Chief Justice reached this conclusion in the face 
of a by-law of the society which declared that *the granting of pensions 
and gratuities to retiring officers is inconsistent with the principles 
and objects of the society, and shall in no case be allowed without the 
consent of a special general meeting*. Although the scheme was approved 
by the members in a ballot, there was no evidence that a special general 
meeting had been called. 
Much of the argument centred on the excessiveness of the amount 
allocated. In fact, it was proposed to pay £25,000 into the fund. His 
Honour found that the society's contribution was not excessive in the 
circumstances. The small liability of each member of the society, the 
necessity of ensuring that the society retained its officers, and, in 
particular, the scope of a scheme of assisted assurance and superannuation 
available to the society's officers formerly, proved the decisive factors. 
The final case in the trilogy, Cyclists* Touring Club v. 
Hopkinson,approved the provision of a gratuitous annuity for a retired 
24 
servant of the club. Swinfen Eady J. upheld the annuity because he 
thought it furthered the best interests of the club by encouraging 
faithful service amongst the officers and servants. It made no 
difference that the employer was a club and not a trading company; 
the same principles were applied. 
(c) Internal Management Rule 
In matters of internal management the courts are reluctant 
to interfere. This judicial policy of non-intervention was seen in 
75 76 Hampson and Henderson. It reappeared in Miles v. Sydney Meat-
77 
Preserving Company (Ltd) where the High Court declined to restrain 
the management of a company which declared and pursued a policy of 
operating for the benefit of the pastoral industry generally. 
There are two reasons why this case cannot be regarded as a 
relaxation of directors* fiduciary duties. The first is that the 
declared policy was approved by the majority of the shareholders, most 
of whom were engaged in the pastoral industry. In addition, the High 
Court found that without such a policy the company would not have been 
economically viable. 
What is significant for present purposes is the following 
extract from the judgment of Griffith C.J.: 
If the contention of the appellant is sound ... a trading 
company which thought fit to expend part of its income upon 
providing good and wholesome residences for its employes 
instead of distributing it in dividends could be enjoined from 
doing so. In my judgment, such matters are entirely matters 
of internal management with which the Court has no authority 
to interfere.^^ 
And again: 
The law does not require the members of the company ... to 
maintain the character of the company as a soulless and 
bowelless thing, ... or forbid them to carry on its operations 
in a way which they think conducive to the best interests of 
the community as a whole, or a substantial part of it c. 
These passages, albeit obiter dicta, suggest that the interests of the 
company may encompass employees* interests and that management should 
25 
be given some latitude in recognising employees* services. 
(ii) Where the Company is being Wound Up 
Where the company is in the course of a winding up do the courts 
take a more restrictive view of corporate generosity towards employees? 
80 
Hutton V. West Cork Railway Company raised this issue directly. 
The railway company sold its undertaking to another company for a price 
to be determined by arbitration. The Act authorising the transfer 
provided that, when the transfer was complete, the railway company was 
to be dissolved except for certain internal matters, in particular, the 
winding up of the business and the division of the purchase money among 
the debenture holders and shareholders. 
Soon after the transaction was finalised, the general meeting 
resolved to approve payment of a £1,050 gratuity as terminal compensation 
to certain officials of the company, and a further £1,500 to the 
directors for past services. No remuneration had been paid to the 
directors since the inception of the company and there was no provision 
in the articles authorising such a payment. 81 
The majority in the Court of Appeal promptly distinguished 
82 
Hampson on the ground that there the company was a going concern. The 
West Cork Railway Company, on the other hand, had a 'special and limited 
business, and that business was to preside at its own funeral, to wind 
itself up and carry on its own internal affairs until it had distributed 83 
the purchase-money in the way the Act of Parliament prescribed'. 
In the majority's view, the proposed payment was not reasonably 
incidental to the pursuit of the business of the company in its qualified 
form. Thus the resolution authorising the gratuities was invalid. Lord 
Justice Bowen stated in a colourful and much-quoted dictum: 'The law 
does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be 
no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the 
26 
t 84 
company*. 
(a) Re Lee, Behrens & C o . Ltd 
85 
Like Hutton v . West Cork Railway Company, Re Lee, Behrens & Co. 
Ltd^^ involved a winding up, albeit through a different procedure. 
There, a private company granted a pension to the widow of a former 
managing director five years after his death. The annuity was 
established in purported exercise of an express power which authorised 
directors to provide for the welfare of employees and their widows. 
Three years later, the company went into liquidation and the widow 
lodged a claim for the capitalised value of the pension. The 
liquidator rejected her claim. 
Confirming the decision of the liquidator Eve J . found, on the 
evidence, that the directors were preoccupied with providing for the 
applicant, and that they neglected to consider what, if any, benefit 
would accrue to the company. In a seminal statement, Eve J . observed: 
But whether they be made under express or implied power, all 
such [welfare] grants involve an expenditure of the company's 
money, and that money can only be spent for purposes 
reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's 
business, and the validity of such grants is to be tested, as is 
sh3wn in all the authorities, by the answers to three pertinent 
questions: (i.) Is the transaction reasonably incidental to 
the carrying on of the company's business? (ii.) Is it a 
bona fide transaction? and (iii.) Is it done for the 
benefit and to promote the prosperity of the company?^? 
This statement of general principles was applied in Ridge 
88 
Securities Ltd v . Inland Revenue Commissioners and Re W . & M . Roith 
89 
Ltd, and was expressly endorsed in Parke v . Daily News_ L t d . 
Notwithstanding this judicial approval, several learned 
writers^^ believe that the 'pertinent questions* should only be applied 
92 
in cases involving implied powers. This is the 'orthodox view* and 
it has some merit. In only one of the cases which have applied the 
93 tests did the company have express power to make the payment challenged, 
94 
And none of the cases Eve J . cited in support of his formulation were 
concerned with express powers. In fact, in Re Lee, Behrens & C o . Ltd95 
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itself, the express power in the company«s articles related to the 
welfare of employees and their dependants; it did not cover managing 
directors. The issue could have been resolved on this ground alone. 
Thus Mr Justice Eve»s dictum, so far as it relates to express powers, 
96 may be regarded as obiter dicta, 
(b) Rationale of Mr Justice Eve*s Tests 
97 Bastin recently suggested that the tests still represent 
a general ruleVnich is applicable to all gratuitous payments made by 
Q R 
companies whether they be made under an express or implied power*. 
He contends that the 'orthodox view* is the result of «a failure to 
comprehend the true juridical basis of the statement*.^^ In his view, 
the theoretical foundation of Mr Justice Eve's dictum lies in the 
following passage from Lord Justice Bowen»s judgment in Hutton v. 
West Cork Railway Company; 
The money which is going to be spent is not the money of the 
majority. That is clear. It is the money of the company, and 
the majority want to spend it. What would be the natural limit 
of their power to do so? They can only spend money which is 
not theirs but the company's, if they are spending it for 
purposes reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the 
business of the company. That is the general doctrinec Bona 
Jides cannot be the sole test ... The test must be what is 
reasonably incidental to, and within the reasonable scope of 
the carrying on, the business of the company^^ 
Certainly dicta in Re Clifford Deceased^ lend support to 
Bastin's theory. Further, the majority judgment in Miles v. Sydney 
4 
Meat-Preserving Cbnpany (Ltd) turned on the powers of the majority to bind 
the minority to a scheme designed to benefit the pastoral industry 
generally. And Vaughan Williams L.J. in Kaye*s Case ^ thought that 
a payment could be challenged on the ground that it was ultra vires the 
majority of shareholders. Indeed, His Lordship believed that Lord 
Justice Bowen's statement in Hutton's Case^ embodied this principle. 7 
Parke v. Daily News Ltd may also be cited as inferential support for 
Bastin's thesis. 
28 
In essence, Bastin argues that the tests relate to *the 
g 
making of the payment* rather than *the power to make the payment*. 
In other words, Mr Justice Eve's requirements are conditions imposed 
upon the exercise of the power. He submits the invalidity of the 9 
payments in Hutton v. West Cork Railway Company and Parke v. Daily 
News Ltd^*^ is attributable to the inability of the majority of the 
shareholders to authorise the payments. In Bastin*s view, the 
•pertinent questions' are of general application to gratuitous payments 
whether authorised by the general meeting or the directors,^^ 
While Bastin's analysis is useful in that it questions the 12 foundation of Mr Justice Eve's tests, it has one fundamental flaw. 
12 
This appears in Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd itself. There, it will be 
recalled, no general meeting had been called to ratify the pension. 
Thus the issue of majority power had not arisen on the facts. Further, 
if the correct interpretation of the tests is that they relate to 
limitations on the power of the majority to bind the minority, one 
question remains unanswered; why did Eve J. suggest that a general 
meeting could have ratified the annuity even though it offended his 
13 14 three requirements. This aspect of Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd is 
difficult to square with Bastin's theory. One is left with the 
impression that Eve J, himself would not have agreed with Bastin*s 
explanation of the three 'pertinent questions'? 
In Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Ltd,^^ 
Pennychuick J. poured a broadside into Mr Justice Eve's statement of 
general principles, and there remains some doubt about the present 
scope of the tests. Nevertheless, it is conceded that Mr Justice 
Eve's dictum embodies the general rules on which all gratuitous 
payments will be judged. But the mystery of its rationale persists. 
It is submitted, somewhat tentatively, that the 'pertinent questions' 
involve a confusion of the issues of ultra vires and directors* duties. 
Th is is perhaps understandable in this area of law where these issues 
29 
often become entangled and little attempt is made by the authorities 
1 7 
to differentiate them. 
Cc) Are the Rules Different for Non-gratuitous Payments? 
Hutton*s Case^^ and Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd^*^ involved 
gratuitous payments or benefits. The final case in this series, Re 
20 W. & M. Roith Ltd departs from this pattern. 
Roith controlled two companies, W, & M. Roith Ltd, which 
manufactured ladies* clothing, and Michael Wayne Ltd, which marketed 
these products through mail orders. He held more than two-thirds of 
the issued capital of the manufacturing company, while the balance was 
held by three shareholders: his wife. Miss Leah Roith and a Mrs 
Lawrence. Since 1934, the date of incorporation, Roith had been a 
director of Roith Ltd and received remuneration from the company. He 
was also general manager of Roith Ltd but he had no service agreement 
with either company. 
In August 1957 Roith, realising he was in poor health, consulted 
his solicitor about provision for his wife and family, and arrangements 
for continuity of the business after his death. He was at that time 
fifty-seven years old. His solicitor advised him to make a service 
agreement *with one or other of the companies*. 
Some fifteen months later Roith acted on this advice. He agreed 
to devote the whole of his time and abilities to the business of Roith Ltd. 
There was no specific provision for remuneration, this being left to 
the parties to agree upon from time to time. In return, the company 
covenanted to provide an annuity for Mrs Roith in the event of Roith*s 
death.^^ 
Before the agreement was settled, a precaution was taken. 
The company inserted a new clause in its memorandum of association. 
This clause empowered the company to grant pensions to the wife, children 
and dependants of any person who had 'served the company in business*. 
30 
The service agreement was indeed timely: it was dated 
3 December 1958 and Roith died of cancer less than a month later, 
Roith*s widow received the pension for nearly four years beforeRoith 
Ltd went into a creditor's voluntary winding up. Roith*s executors 
lodged a proof for the capitalised value of the pension but the 
liquidator rejected the claim. The executors then challenged this 
ruling by an originating summons which came before Plowman J. 
Mr Justice Plowman applied the tests in Re Lee, Behrens & 
22 Co. Ltd without exploring their rationale or questioning their 
utility. He inferred from the evidence that the real purpose of the 
23 
service agreement was to benefit, not the company, but Mrs Roith. 
He reasoned that the agreement gave the company no benefit which it 
did not already enjoy; the service contract was a sham. Thus, although 
it was alleged that here the pension was part of a transaction for 
value rather than a gratuitous payment, this appeared to make no 
difference to the result. 
It appears that Roith wished to avoid dividing his shareholding 
among his dependants since they might not be interested in the continuity 
of the business. The service agreement was designed to allow Roith to 
provide for his widow without dividing up his shareholding. It was at 
least arguable, therefore, that the contract was for the benefit of the 
company as its underlying purpose was to preserve the continuity of the 
24 
business. Unfortunately, no evidence was adduced to support this 
contention. 
Further, Mr Justice Plowman's finding that the company gained 
no real benefit from the pension agreement is open to question. Before 
the contract, Roith was clearly entitled to relinquish control of the 
company and resign as general manager; after the agreement, Roith was tied 
to the position of general manager and director for life and was legally 
bound to 'devote the whole of his time and abilities to the business of 
the company*, to serve the company faithfully and to use his best 
31 
endeavours to promote the company's interests. This is an essential 
change in Roith*s legal relationship with the company, Roith's pledge 
to the company could, it is submitted, constitute adequate consideration 
for the provision of the pension.^^ 
2 6 But, accepting the result in Re W. & M. Roith Ltd, how may 
27 
the decision be classified? Is it an ultra vires case or a directors* 
duties case? Clearly the company and the directors had power to grant 
the pension. Express clauses in the memorandum and articles of assoc-
iation put that beyond dispute. Thus the key issue was not ultra vires. 
The tenor of the judgment suggests that the case was more in 
the realm of directors* duties. But it was not that the power to grant 
pensions was exercised from an improper purpose. Rather the directors 
had simply failed to consider the interests of Roith Ltd. 
28 29 In both Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd and Re W. & M. Roith Ltd 
the validity of the pensions was determined by reference to the company's 
position at the time of the original grant. In principle, the fact 
that in each case the company was being wound up was of no consequence; 
it simply provided the opportunity for challenging the payments. But it 
is difficult to ignore the innuendo that courts are likely to adopt a 
fairly circumscribed view of corporate philanthropy when creditors* 
claims clash with employees* interests.^^ 
(iii) Where the Company Disposes of a Substantial part of its 
Business 
If a company disposes of the major part of its business, it may 
wish to compensate employees retrenched by the transfer. Can it recognise 
the services of the employees dismissed? The answer lies in two cases: 
31 32 Re Clifford Deceased and Parke v. Daily News Ltd. 
33 
(a) Re Clifford Deceased 
In the first case, the major asset of the testator's estate 
was a parcel of shares in a limited company which owned and operated a 
32 
circuit of cinemas. The trustees of the estate carried on the 
business of the company with the help of its officers and staff for 
four years after the testator*s death. During this period, the 
company's shares steadily appreciated so that when the cinema circuit 
was sold it realised a handsome profit far in excess of its estimated 
value at the time of the demise. 
After the transaction, the company continued as an investment 
company with the trustees holding the majority of the shares. Yet, as 
a result of the sale a number of the company's employees were retrenched. 
The trustees proposed to submit to an extraordinary general meeting of 
the company a resolution for payment of certain gratuities to the 
retrenched employees in recognition of their services since the testator's 
death. They sought directions from the court. 
The summons came before Chief Justice Napier. His Honour 
noted that the proposed payments would require only £3,000 out of the 
sale price of £282,314. High ranking officers were to share £2,150 of 
the grant with the balance to be divided among seventeen employees. 
The Chief Justice wasted no time in distinguishing Hutton v. 
34 35 West Cork Railway Company" and Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd on the 
ground that, here, the company was not being wound up. He also pointed 
out that in the present case it would be the shareholders, not the 
directors, who would be acting generously towards the officers and 
servants if the resolution were carried. 
On the amount of the proposed gratuities, Chief Justice 
Napier commented: 'I cannot assent to the view that equity countenances 
a breach of trust so long as it is only a little one, I think that 
there must be some principle upon which cases like this can be reconciled 
with the duty of a trustee*.^^ The Chief Justice found this 'principle* 
in the 'social and moral obligations' which require that trustees act 
37 
as 'ordinary decent people'. 
33 
But how would the beneficiaries of the trust benefit from 
the proposed grants? Napier C.J. believed that this generosity would 
3 8 
enhance their reputation and standing in the community. On the 
other hand, he thought *it would be niggardly and churlish, upon the 
part of those who take this windfall, to refuse some substantial 
recognition of the services without which it would never have been 
39 
realised*. Accordingly, he sanctioned the severance payment scheme. 
The company had an express power to remunerate employees for 
services rendered in the conduct of the business but Napier C.J. 
founded his conclusion more on general principle and the particular 
circumstances of the case than the express power. 
It appeared to be crucial that the suit did not involve a 
dissentient shareholder. Indeed, the Chief Justice proceeded on the 
assumption that the shareholders would unanimously approve the proposed 
^ 40 gratuities. 
Although the'salvage'effect of the employees' services after 
the testator's death makes the fact situation distinctive, it should 
not be allowed to detract from Mr Justice Napier's general proposition: 
with the approval of the shareholders, company management of a going 
concern may recognise the services of the firm's employees through 
gratuitous severance payments. 41 
The second case, Parke v. Daily News Ltd, took a narrower 
view of a company's obligations to employees dismissed when the company 
sold its major assets. This landmark decision warrants a detailed 
analysis. 42 
(b) Parke v. Daily News Ltd: the Facts 
Associated Newspapers Ltd opened negotiations with Daily News 
Ltd with a view to purchasing the major part of its business, namely, 
the premises, plant and goodwill of two newspapers. The News Chronicle 
and The Star. These negotiations were of an 'exploratory' nature as 
34 
Daily News Ltd hoped that its business would improve so that it would 
be once again economically viable. Unfortunately these hopes were not 
well founded and Daily News Ltd was compelled to proceed with the sale. 
The terms of the take-over offer provided, inter alia, for a cash 
payment of approximately £2 million to the offeree company. It was 
agreed that the offeror company would attempt to retain as many of the 
Daily News staff as possible but it was expressly provided that the 
purchaser was not liable for pension and/or compensation to employees 
displaced by the take-over. 
It appeared in the course of negotiations that Daily News Ltd 
intended to distribute the bulk of the proceeds of the sale among its 
employees. The company planned to provide gratuitous compensation for 
the loss of employment to each employee at the rate of one week's basic 
pay for each year of service with the company over the age of 21o 
This proposed payment was to be in addition to payments in 
lieu of notice and holidays and provision of a half a million pounds 
in respect of accrued pension entitlements. The amount of the gratuitous 
compensation exceeded £l million. This was to be paid to the 2,700 
workers dismissed. The scheme was designed, at least in part, to 
placate the employees* trade unions, and the terms of the proposed 
payments were revealed to these unions before the take-over was completed. 
The directors disclosed the nature of the deal to the share-
holders in a circular issued on the day the take-over was finalised. 
Certain shareholders disapproved of the proposed payment of terminal 
compensation and the directors, on legal advice, called a general meeting 
to ratify their proposal. 
Parke, a minority shareholder of Daily News Ltd, sued on behalf 
of himself and all other shareholders of the company, except the directors, 
seeking a declaration that the proposed payment of compensation was 
ultra vires the company and illegal, and an injunction to restrain the 
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company distributing the balance of purchase monies (after deducting 
the costs of the sale) in the suggested manner. He challenged the 
scheme on the basis that it was designed to compensate the company's 
employees whether or not they were retained by Associated Newspapers Ltd. 
He imputed 'bad faith* to the directors by suggesting that they were 
concerned with salvaging their reputation and standing in the community 
from a deal which would provoke a public controversy, 
43 (c) Parke v. Daily News Ltd; the Judgment 
Plowman J. pronptly disposed of the argument that Daily News Ltd was 
44 
contractually bound to pay the proposed compensation. 
Having rejected this contention, he got down to the main issue 
of whether the payments were intra vires. The plaintiff relied on 45 Hutton V, West Cork Railway Company (particularly the judgment of 
46 
Bowen L.J.) and Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd. His Lordship endorsed the 
principles embodied in these cases but added a fourth requirement to Mr 
Justice Eve's 'three pertinent questions* namely, 'the onus of upholding 47 
the validity of such payments lies on those who assert it*. 
The defendants maintained that here there was an arrangement 
to dispose of part of the defendant conpany's assets. They relied on 48 
Kaye v. Croydon Tramways Co. Plowman J. had little difficulty 
distinguishing the latter case from the facts before him: in the 
present case there was no contract between Daily News Ltd and Associated 
Newspapers Ltd for the payment of compensation by Associated Newspapers 
Ltd. If this reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion, it would 
appear that His Lordship would have no objection if Associated Newspapers 
Ltd had agreed to pay the bulk of the purchase price direct to the 
Daily News employees. In this event, would not the financial detriment 
suffered by the shareholders be as great? 
Paragraph 19 of the defence alleged that it *is and will be' 
in the interests of the company to make the proposed payments on the 
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grounds, inter alia, that failure to do so would be a breach of good 
faith with the employees and the employees' trade unions, that the 
company's reputation as a fair employer would be lost or damaged, that 
the hostility of the employees* trade unions would be incurred and, 
finally, that the company*s reputation and future activities would suffer. 
Unfortunately, the defendant company's efforts to support 
this defence were half-hearted."^^ The only director called to give 
evidence was Mr Crosfield. Representatives of the employees or the 
trade unions involved were not called. These witnesses could have 
given some indication of the likely repercussions for the defendant 
company if the gratuitous compensation were not paid.^^ It was not 
pressed that Daily News Ltd intended to continue with the television 
and publishing sector of its business; no evidence was adduced concerning 
the morale of the employees retained by the defendant company; nor was 
it argued that Daily News Ltd was having, or would have, difficulties 
securing staff for its continuing business. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Plowman J. ruled: *the 
defendants have failed to satisfy me that there is any substance in 
this* defence.^^ His Lordship regarded paragraph 19 of the defence as a 
retrospective attempt to justify an arrangement actuated by a *desire 
to treat the employees generously, beyond all entitlement, and to 
52 
appear to have done so®. Clearly, Plowman J. would not have been 
persuaded by the considerations which influenced Napier C.J. in Re 53 
Clifford Deceased. Mr Justice Plowman would be reluctant to allow 
directors 'to act as ordinary decent people are in the habit of acting*. 
Apparently His Lordship would not be impressed by the argument, accepted 
by Napier C.J., that a gratuitous payment may be for the benefit of a 
beneficiary (in this case the defendant company) *in so far as it is for 
the protection of his reputation or standing in the community 
54 
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Plowman J. expressly rejected the view that directors, in 
having regard to what is in the best interests of their company, are 
entitled to consider employees* interests irrespective of any 
consequential benefit to the company. To interpret the phrase 
'benefit of the company', His Lordship relied upon the statement of 
Sir Raymond Evershed M.R. in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd^^ that 
this term meant the benefit of the shareholders as a general body. 
57 
Plowman J. conceded that Greenhalgh's Case concerned a different 
situation; and indeed the case was related to the duty of shareholders 
in general meeting, not the duty of directors. 
The total amount of the compensation was estimated at 
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£1,500,000. This factor alone would have made Plowman J. confident 
in his conclusion that the 'defendants were prompted by motives which, 
however laudable, and however enlightened from the point of view of 
industrial relations, were such as the law does not recognise as a 
sufficient justification'.'^*^ The unfortunate implication in the judgment 
is that no gratuity, however small, would be permissible where the 
company has curtailed its operations to a substantial extent. 
Although Parke v. Daily News Ltd^'^ has clarified the legal 
position of companies making gratuitous payments to its employees in 
the absence of an express power to do so, the case itself is a very 
shaky foundation for any general principle prohibiting attention to the 
interests of employees, Cd) Parke v. Daily News Ltd;^"^ its Effect and Aftermath 
6 2 
In essence, the decision in Parke v. Daily News Ltd allowed 
a dissentient shareholder holding less than 3% of the issued ordinary 
shares and less than 1% of the total issued share capital, to abort a 
transaction 'approved* by the overwhelming majority of shareholders for 
the benefit of some 2,700 employees whose jobs were in jeopardy. Parke,^^ 
in this respect, is reminiscent of the statement of Blackburn J, ninety-
38 
five years earlier: 
Any shareholder has a right to object to any act being done which 
is in contravention of the rights [created by the 'trust* which 
arises when the management of a trading concern is committed to 
the body corporate].., Though the majority of the shareholders, 
or even all but himself approve, yet he has a right to object to 
the making or the enforcing of any contract to do any unauthorized 
act which would affect his individual interest, 
In fact, the majority of the shareholders in Daily News Ltd 
avoided the obstacle presented by Mr Justice Plowman's decision. The 
ordinary shareholders were invited to transfer to a compensation fund 
their share o± the £1,141,650 which was distributed to shareholders by 
way of reduction of capital.^^ In response to this request many share-
holders waived their claims to a repayment of capital. Ultimately, on 
5 April 1963 (nearly two-and-a-half years after the retrenchments^ 
£984,753 was shared among the employees dismissed.^^ This figure 
represented 86% of the total capital distributed - a generous effort, 
but unfortunately much too late to cushion the immediate hardship of 
retrenchment. 
As a result of Parke v. Daily News Ltd an employee's 
entitlement to terminal compensation is made to depend, not on the law, 
but on the philanthropy of shareholders and the predicament of the 
company. 
(iv) Where the Company is Under Threat of Take-over 
When a company becomes the target of a take-over bid, the 
board of directors often resorts to defensive tactics to discourage 
the raider. May the board justify this action by asserting that a 
take-over would displace or unsettle the staff? Here a recurring and 
fundamental issue is involved: can directors take employees' interests 
into account and still comply with their fiduciary duty. 
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(a) Savoy Hotel Case 
The celebrated Savoy Hotel inquiry sheds some light upon 
the boundaries of directors® duties in a take-over situation. 
The directors of the company which owned the hotel successfully 
thwarted a take-over raid by a somewhat devious strategy which became 
known as the *Worcester scheme*. The details of the scheme and the take-
over battle need not detain us here. The upshot of it all was that the 
Board of Trade appointed an inspector, Mr Holland Q.C., to report, in 
particular: 
... whether or not in his opinion, the persons concerned with the 
management of the hotel companies in entering into or promoting 
the Worcester Scheme] ... committed any breach of their duty to 
the hotel companies or the members thereof. 
After a thorough inquiry in which the legal issues were fully 
argued by counsel, Mr Holland found that the directors had acted bona 
fide. He, nevertheless, found that the directors had exercised their 
powers for an improper purpose, namely to entrench their position and 
frustrate the take-over bid. In his view, the directors* action went 
beyond matters of internal management. They tried to place a substantial 
fetter upon the discretion of a future board and, in these cases, the 
courts will intervene. 
Mr Holland noted in passing that the directors *also considered 
that the discontinuance of the Berkeley as an hotel and restaurant would 
be injurious to the interests of employees since it would involve a 
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reduction of staff although this was not the ground on which the 
directors sought to justify their actions. On this clearly peripheral 
issue Mr Holland concluded that the interests of employees were 
considerations *which, however meritorious, would not seem to me to form 
part of a true legal definition of the interests of the companies, except 
that indirectly a substantial reduction of staff might have unsettled 70 the staff remaining at the other hotels and restaurants'. It appears 
40 
that Mr Holland would equate the interests of the company with the 
•interests of shareholders, present and future, balancing a long term 
71 
view against the short term interests of present members*. True, he 
does not state this expressly but it seems a fair inference from his 
report. 72 
The Savoy Hotel inquiry did not, and could not, decide 
authoritatively that the phrase «interests of the company* excludes 
employees' interests. It simply raised the issue and suggested 
that these interests may only be considered by directors in performing 
their duties where the long term interests of shareholders will be 
served, 73 (b) Hogg V. Cramphorn Ltd 
74 
Like the Savoy Hotel case, Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd touched on 
the issue of directors® duties toward employees during a take-over 
struggle. Once again, the incumbent management devised a defensive 
scheme which frustrated the efforts of the raider. 
The scheme was ingenious, A trust for company employees was 
created and this trust was allotted a substantial parcel of unissued 
preference shares each of which was weighted with ten votes. The board 
financed the transaction by an interest-free loan to the trust out of 
the company's reserve fund. And, as if this was not enough, the 
directors decided to lend the balance of the reserve fund to the trust 
to enable the trustees to bid in competition with the raider for the 
preference shares already issued. 
In the face of this opposition, the raider's bid lapsed. 
Subsequently, a minority shareholder brought a representative action 
seeking to have the directors' scheme declared void. The case came 
before Buckley J. 
The learned judge conceded that the directors had acted bona 
fide throughout. He accepted the directors® evidence that the staff 
41 
would be unsettled by the raider's bid, that the board genuinely 
desired to give the staff a voice in the company®s affairs, and that 
the board thought it would be advantageous to the customers, the staff 
and the shareholders to retain the existing management. Thus, Buckley 
J. was apparently persuaded that some employees* interests may be 
included in the phrase 'interests of the company®. The directors* 
strategy was impugned not because it was contrary to the interests of 
the company, but rather because the directors exercised their power 
for the improper purpose of preserving their control. 
This may seem to be a victory for the shareholder. In the 
long run, it was not. Curiously, Buckley J. suggested that the general 
meeting could ratify the special issue of the preference shares to the 
trust. Indeed,he gave the company the chance to do just that by granting 
75 
an adjournment. One month after the judgment the general meeting 
approved the directors' scheme in toto. 
(c) Anpol V. Miller 7 6 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd v. R.W. Miller (Holdings) Ltd is the 
final chapter in this analysis of the director's duty to act bona fide 
in the interests of the company. It is just one of the many recent 
Australian cases on the director's fiduciary duty but it does have 
several interesting features. 
77 7 S Like Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd, Ampol v. Miller involved a 
take-over battle. Ampol and Bulkships, an associated company, held 
between them a majority (nearly 55%) of the issued shares in Miller, 
Ampol made a bid for all issued shares in Miller. Eight days later, 
Millers board met and considered the offer but much happened in the 
interim. 
For some time Howard Smith had been interested in purchasing 
two tankers which were under construction for Miller. Negotiations fell 
through but an alternative plan evolved: that Howard Smith make an offer 
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to take over Miller in toto. In fact, Howard Smith made a formal 
offer on the day before Miller^ board considered Ampol's bid. The 
offer was more generous than that proposed by Ampol, and the board of 
Miller unanimously decided to recommend rejection of Ampol*s bid as 
too low, 
Ampol and Bulkships closed ranks. They publicly announced 
that they would decline any offer for their shares 'whether from 
Howard Smith Ltd or from any other source*. Faced with this strategem, 
Howard Smith*s bid was doomed. 
Once again Howard Smith and Miller's management team 
conferred. They devised a plan to convert the majority shareholding 
of Ampol and Bulkships into a minority holding. This would then allow 
the Howard Smith offer to proceed unhindered. Thus, just over 33% 
of Miller's issued shares were allotted to Howard Smith. 
The purchase price and the number of the shares issued were 
determined by Miller's capital need. Miller solved its liquidity 
problem and Howard Smith obtained a substantial shareholding. Ampol 
and Bulkships, on the other hand, were incensed. They challenged the 
allotment, 
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After an exhaustive review of the evidence in the twenty-
eight day trial, Street J, concluded that Miller's management team acted 
in response to the take-over struggle. He was not prepared to accept 
that their dominant purpose was to obtain capital. This was a smoke-
screen, Rather it appeared that the directors* strategy was to facilitate 
the take-over bid made by Howard Smith Ltd and to destroy the majority 
holding of Ampol and Bulkships. 
In the result, Street J. held that the allotment was an abuse 
of the directors' power to issue shares. Further, since Howard Smith 
knew the true purpose of the transaction, the allotment was void. 
Howard Smith appealed direct to the Privy Council but Mr Justice 
43 
Street's decision and reasoning were affirmed. 
Lord Wilberforce, delivering the advice of Their Lordships, 
agreed that the purpose of the disputed allotment was to dilute Ampol 
and Bulkships'majority block and to induce Howard Smith to proceed 
with its take-over offer. In reaching this conclusion, Their Lordships 
applied the following approach: 
it is necessary to start with a consideration of the power 
whose exercise is in question, in this case a power to issue 
shares. Having ascertained, on a fair view, the nature of this 
power, and having defined as can best be done in the light of 
modern conditions the, or some, limits within which it may be 
exercised, it is then necessary for the court, if a particular 
exercise of it is challenged, to examine the substantial purpose 
for which it was exercised, and to reach a conclusion whether 
that purpose was proper or not. In doing so it will necessarily 
give credit to the bona fide opinion of the directors, if such 
is found to exist, and will respect their judgment as to matters 
of management; having done this, the ultimate conclusion has to 
be as to the side of a fairly broad line on which the case falls. 
81 In consequence of Ampol v. Miller, Australian courts may be 
more prepared to review directors* actions even if the directors act bona 
82 fide and in pursuance of an express power. This is certainly true 
where the court is put on inquiry by unusual or extreme managerial 
83 
decisions. But it may also occur where there is a suggestion that 
directors have exercised their powers for an improper purpose. And 
this issue will be determined by the court's objective assessment of 
the whole situation not simply the directors'^ testimony in the witness 
box. 
This development is important in the present study because it 
now appears that dispositions by directors in favour of employees may be 
challenged on two grounds apart from ultra vires: first, that the 
directors did not act bona fide in the interests of the company; and 
second, that the directors have not exercised their powers for a proper 
purpose. In other words, the ^proper purpose* limb of directors' duties 
has now been formally recognised by Australian law. 84 Before leaving Ampol v. Miller, it is interesting to note 
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Mr Justice Streefs reply to the suggestion that he should take the 
interests of the Australian economy into account when considering the 
take-over struggle: 
The important economic or national consequences of takeovers 
are matters for the legislature or the Government to consider. 
The court cannot, as the law stands, take regard of these 
considerations in a context such as the present.§5 
Thus, like Plowman J. in Parke,^^ Street J. eschewed any consideration 
of the community's interests. Presumably, he would rule out employees* 
interests on similar reasoning. 
6. The Cases in Retrospect 
(i) Does an Express Power Make any Difference? 
Of the cases discussed in the foregoing analysis, Cyclists'' 
87 
Touring Club v. Hopkinson, Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd, Re Clifford 
Deceased^^ and Re W. & M. Roith Ltd^'^ involved a consideration of an 
express power relating to employees. None of these cases can be regarded 
as firm authority for the view that the mere existence of an express 
power precludes an inquiry into the validity of its exercise, 91 
In Cyclists*Touring Club v. Hopkinson, Swinfen Eady J. saw 
the main issue as whether the club had the power on a true construction 
of its memorandum to make provision for an annuity for a retired 
servant. In deciding that the club had this power. His Lordship 
pointed out that the gratuity would be conducive to the best objects 
of the club as it would encourage the officers and servants to serve go faithfully. Thus, Swinfen Eady J. did not rely on the express power 
in the memorandum to reward employees for services rendered to the club. 
93 
In Re Lee, Behrens & Co. Ltd, the managing director did not 
fall within the scope of the express power. Strictly speaking, Mr 
Justice Eve*s tests, so far as they relate to express powers, may be 
classified as obiter dicta. 
45 
94 Moreover, Re W, & M.Roith Ltd assumed, rather than decided, that 
Mr Justice Eve*s tests applied where an express power existed. Further, 
95 
in Re Clifford Deceased, Napier C.J. was at pains to confine his 
decision to the particular facts of the case. 
In these circumstances it is difficult to define the precise 
limits which may be placed upon the exercise of express powers relating 
to the interests of employees. The Jenkins Committee, on a cognate 
issue, thought that *the directors, at least, might be in breach of 
their duties, and liable to account for donations that were "unreasonable" 96 in amount notwithstanding the existence of an express power*. 
In Harlowes Nominees Pty Ltd v. Woodside CLakes Entrance) Oil 
97 
Co. N./L., the High Court was more definitive. It referred to the 
'undoubted general proposition that a power vested in directors to 
issue new shares is a fiduciary power which the directors are not 
entitled to exercise otherwise than bona fide for the benefit of the 98 
company as a whole®. More recently, in Ashburton Oil N./L, v. Alpha 
99 Minerals N./L., Windeyer J. endorsed the following statement of Dixon 
J, in Mills V. Mills:^ 
Directors of a company are fiduciary agents, and a power conferred 
upon than cannot be exercised in order to obtain some private 
advantage or for any purpose foreign to that power,^ 
This passage was again expressly approved in Ampol Petroleum Ltd v. 
R.W. Miller (Holdings) Ltd,^ 
On this basis it is submitted that the dispositions of 
corporate assets by directors in favour of company employees in the 
exercise of an express power are still subject to the restriction that 
directors must exercise the power bona fide in the interests of the 
company and for a proper purpose. 
46 
(ii) The Effect of Referring the Matter to the Members in 
General Meeting 
An interesting feature of many of the cases in the above 
study was that the directors sought the approval of the general meeting 
before appropriating funds towards employees* interests. What are the 
implications of this? 
For one thing, the duty of members in general meeting is 
much less stringent than the directors* duty to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company. Shareholders are not obliged to disregard 4 
their own interests when exercising their votes. Generally the mood 
at a general meeting of the members is likely to be much less 
altruistic than the atmosphere at a board meeting,'^ At board level, 
the issue may be simply whether the directors can reconcile the 
proposed payments with their rather vague fiduciary duty. Further, 
directors are, to some extent, disinterested parties: they often have 
no direct financial 'stake* in the decision. And even where their 
investment is substantial, they may be more prepared to disregard 
their own interests. 
On the other hand, shareholders in general meeting are being 
asked to sacrifice their own short term interests. Put simply, if they 
authorise dispositions in favour of employees, there will be less money 
available for dividends. 
There is nothing wrong with allowing shareholders to consider 
their own interests when voting in a general meeting. The error lies 
in the law*s failure to redefine directors* duties to include employees* 
interests. It is this failure which forces directors to seek the 
approval of the general meeting - a forum which, by its very nature, 
may not be disposed towards employees* interests. 
Shareholders are not, however, permitted to allow their 
*selfish* interests to dominate their vote. While they are not 
47 
fiduciaries, they must nevertheless vote *bona fide for the benefit 
of the company as a w h o l e I n a recent explanation of this mis-
leading phrase Lord Evershed M.R. stated: 
In the first pi ace 1 think it is now plain that "bona fide for 
the benefit of the company as a whole" means not two things 
but one thing. It means that the shareholder must proceed upon 
what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company 
as a whole. The second thing is that the phrase "the company 
as a whole" does not^.mean the company as a commercial entity 
distinct from the corporators : it means the corporators as a 
general body."^ 
In other words, the shareholders* duty is not to be dissected into two 
limbs: one subjective, the other objective. 
The search for a single comprehensive principle defining the 
parameters of the members* duty in general meetings seems a futile g 
exercise. However, Dixon J. suggested a positive criterion in Peters^ 
g American Delicacy Co. Ltd v. Heath; 
But, whatever may constitute bad faith, it is evident that, if a 
resolution is regularly passed with the single aim of advancing 
the interests of a company considered as a corporate whole, it 
must fall within the scope of the statutory power to alter the 
articles and could never be condemned as male fides. 
Lord Evershed also attempted to formulate some guidelines in Greenhalgh 
V. Arderne Cinemas Ltd.^^ He proposed two basic tests: the 'individual 
hypothetical shareholder test* and the 'discrimination test*.^^ 
None of these tests is satisfactory. Mr Justice Dixon's 
formula seems to be nothing more than a restatement of the phrase 
*bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole*. And the Master 
of the Rolls* hypothetical shareholder test raises more problems than 
it solves: who is an individual hypothetical member?; how does one 
determine what is for this member's benefit? Further, the difficulty 
with Lord Evershed's 'discrimination test' were highlighted by Greenhalgh 
13 
v.,Arderne Cinemas Ltd itself. There, the majority shareholders 
amended the articles. The amendment prevented the minority selling 
its shares to a non-member without approval of the majority. The majority 
was not so restrained. Yet the Court of Appeal upheld the majority*s 
resolution since it was non-discriminatoryl 
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It would seem preferable to identify the grounds on which 
a resolution will offend the shareholders* duty. The authorities 
suggest several criteria: fraud or trickery, oppression, 'extravagance*, 
deliberate injury to the minority, discrimination, male fides, 
14 
reprehensible appropriation of property beyond the company's powers. 
These essentially negative tests, then, sketch the ambit of the members' 
duty in a general meeting. 
Given that shareholders in general meeting have a certain 
duty, how may this duty affect corporate dispositions in recognition 
of employees* services? The issue arises in two ways: expropriation 
of company funds by the general meeting and ratification of a breach 
of directors* duties. 
(a) Expropriation of Company Funds 
Where the company is in the course of a winding up^^ or where 
it has disposed of the major part of its business,^^ the general meeting 
may not prospectively approve an appropriation of company funds for 
employees. A single dissentient member may challenge such an expropria-
tion. ^ ^ 
By contrast, if the company is a viable, prosperous business 
the general meeting may approve the allocation of company funds in 
recognition of employees' interests.^^ The resolution will virtually be 
unimpeachable because, in these circumstances, it would be open to the 
members to conclude that the payments would benefit the company as a 
whole. 
(b) Ratification by the Members in General Meeting 
The directors may not bother to consult the general meeting 
before allocating funds for employees* interests. If they go ahead 
without the members* approval they may nevertheless seek to have their 
49 
actions retrospectively ratified by the general meeting. 
It seems that ratification will be invalid where the 
directors have breached their fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company. This may be inferred from Parke v. Daily 
IQ 20 News Ltd and, arguably, Re W. & M. Roith Ltd. In contrast, when 
the directors exercise their powers for an improper purpose their 
21 actions may be sanctioned ex post facto by the general meeting. 
7. Members* Duty Outside General Meeting 
Shareholders* duties outside the general meeting are obscure 
and, possibly, non-existent. The issue usually arises when controlling 
shareholders are offered a price for their shares. If they sell there 
will be a change in the control of the company. Should they be obliged 
to consider the offer bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole? 
Gower believes they should. He contends that control is an 
asset of the company and that it should not be transferred to the 
22 detriment of the company as a whole. But he cites no direct authority 
, . . . 2 3 for his view. 
Indeed, what little authority there is points to the opposite 
24 
conclusion. In United Trust Ltd v. South African Milling Co., Kuper 
J. stated unequivocally that there is no authority which suggests that 
*a decision of majority shareholders, taken outside a meeting of the 
company, can be impeached on the ground of the duty of the majority 25 
to vote for the benefit of the company as a whole*. Further, Gower*s 
view that control is a corporate asset seems open to question. It is 2 6 perhaps more accurately described as an 'attribute of corporateness*. 
And Gower*s conclusion seems to be inconsistent with shareholders* 
27 proprietary rights in their shares. 
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8. Conclusion 
To sum up, neither a company nor its directors are obliged to 
recognise employees' interests. On the other hand, the company may 
have power to pay tribute to employees' services either through the 
powers incorporated by section 19 or through an express power inserted 
in the memorandum or articles of association. Such a power might also 
be inserted in the articles or be implied from the directors' general 
power to manage the company. 
Both the directors and the general meeting are subject to 
certain duties in exercising these powers. A number of propositions 
emerge from the above analysis and it may be convenient at this point 
to draw them together. 
(i) Where the company is a going concern, directors have an 
implied power to grant gratuitous bonuses to employees in recognition 
28 29 of their services provided the payments are not excessive. It would 
30 
appear that the members in general meeting also have this power. 
(ii) As an incident of their general power to manage, directors 
of a viable business may pay a pension to the family of a former 
employee in recognition of his services.^^ And certainly the members 
in general meeting have power to reward retired workers for their 
efforts.^^ 
(iii) If a company disposes of the major part of its business, or 
substantially curtails its operations, for example, in the course of a 
winding up or in a take-over, the directors may not make gratuitous 33 payments to employees as compensation for their loss of employment. 
Such a transaction will be invalid even if it is confirmed by a majority 
34 
of the shareholders in general meeting. In these situations it is 
difficult to identify a consequential benefit for the company, and the 
transaction may be impeached at the suit of a single dissentient share-
holder.^^ 
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(iv) On the other hand, where the employees' services greatly 
enhance the value of the company and provide a handsome profit for 
shareholders, the directors, with the concurrence of the general 
meeting, may be allowed to pay terminal compensation to employees 
retrenched by a sale of a substantial portion of the company's business.^^ 
(v) The director's duty to act bona fide in the interests of the 
company requires that directors act bona fide in the interests of the 
37 shareholders as a general body. The 'interests of the company* 
encompass the 'interests of shareholders, present and future, 
balancing a long term view against the short term interests of present 
3 8 
members'. The interests of employees are not to be considered unless 
shareholders will gain a consequential benefit. The directors may not 
be excused from a breach of this duty by a majority vote in general 39 meeting. 
(vi) Directors must also not exercise their powers for an improper 
40 purpose, although actions in breach of this duty may be ratified by 
41 
the general meeting, 
(vii) As the law stands, company funds can only be expended for 
purposes reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's 
business, and the validity of such grants is to be tested by the answers 
to three 'pertinent questions' posed by Eve J, in Re Lee, Behrens & Co. 
Ltd. 
(viii) The onus of upholding the validity of such payments lies on 
43 those who assert it. 
SECTION 1; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN RECOGNITION 
OF THEIR SERVICES 
CHAPTER 3 THE LAW RELATING TO EMPLOYEES* INVENTIONS 
The legal rights of the employed inventor to the benefits of 
his invention further illustrate how the law has responded to employees* 
interests in achievement and recognition of their services. 
1. Absence of Australian Authority 
In Australia, there have been no reported decisions on the law 
governing the rights of an employed inventor. This absence of local 
authority is puzzling. Perhaps Australian research and inventive 
activity in the private sector does not have the scope and sophistication 
of the projects undertaken in the major industrialised countries.^ This 
suggestion gains support from the relatively small percentage of patents 
2 
obtained each year for local inventions in Australia, On the other 
hand, it may well be that competing claims to the benefit of an invention 
made in the course of an employment are resolved by the contract of 
service or informally settled without litigation. Whatever the 
explanation, the absence of local authority allows one to seek guidance 
from English decisions. 
2, Two Extremes 
Where the employee is hired to invent, or to engage in research, 
patent rights in any invention he makes in the course of his employment 
will belong to his employer.^ There can be little quarrel with this. 
In modern inventive activity the employer is often a large 
4 company, in some cases a multi-national corporation. It will provide 
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both the opportunity for its employees to engage in research and the 
expensive equipment required for this purpose. It will usually bear 
the considerable expense involved in discovering, developing and 
patenting an invention. 
Moreover, often the invention is not the product of one 
enployee's inventive activity. Research teams financed by the company 
may undertake protracted investigations and experiments prior to the 
ultimate discovery. Indeed, it may be difficult to identify an individual 
employee's contribution. 
Finally, the invention may simply be a modification of the 
employer's existing equipment or formulae rather than an independent 
creation in its ovm right. All these considerations militate against an 
employee's claim to beneficial ownership of the invention. 
At the other extreme, an employee will be entitled to the 
patent rights where, on his own initiative, he makes an invention which 
is not derived firm his anployofs business.^ It is mainly in cases falling 
between these two extremes that courts have failed to provide adequate 
protection for the interests of the employed inventor, 
3. Where There is an Express Clause 
If, by an express term in the contract of service, the 
employer is given the right to the employee's inventions, then this 
clause will normally govern the issue. This will be so even where the 
contract deprives the employee of rights he would otherwise obtain at 
common law. 
On the other hand, an employer may not claim all inventions 
made by his employee. Courts are inclined to curtail the application 
of restraint of trade clauses or to treat them as unenforceable.^ Thus, 
7 
in Electric Transmission Ltd v. Dannenberg, a contract which required 
an employee to disclose and assign future inventions in return for 
54 
remuneration to be agreed upon was held to be in restraint of trade 
and void. 
Yet the failure of a restraint of trade clause does not leave 
a vacuum. The employee is not thereby absolved from his common law 
g 
duty of good faith towards his employer. Even if the restrictive 
covenant is unenforceable, the employee might be obliged by an implied 
term in the contract of service to hold the benefits of his invention 9 
in trust for his employer. This is a curious result, seemingly 
inconsistent with ordinary contractual principles, 
4. Where There is No Express Clause 
In the absence of an express clause determining rights to an 
invention, some of the early decisions turned on an independent equitable 
obligation derived from the employee's duty of good faith.^^ 
12 
Later authorities establish that the employee's obligation 
is contractual, not equitable. In other words, it depends upon an implied 
term in the contract of employment that the employee is trustee for his 
employer of any invention made in the course of his duty as an employee.^ 
In most cases, either test would produce the same result. 
Both rely on inferences drawn from the circumstances in each particular 
case. Many factors must be considered but two are of cardinal importance: 
the nature of the employment and the circumstances in which the invention 
was made, 
5. Nature of the Employment 
The nature and quality of the employment is determined not 
only by the contract of service but also by the relative positions and 
responsibilities the parties assume thereunder. 
To a large extent, the particular terms of the employment 
14 contract define the employee's duties. Re Selz's Limited's Application 
55 
is an illustration. Charles Selz Ltd, lampshade manufacturers, 
advertised for a manager 'conversant with design* and business routine. 
Warren-Smith applied, and was appointed as a factory manager. In the 
course of his work, he attended a packaging exhibition. One particular 
display of spray-plastic packaging inspired him. He conceived the idea 
that a similar process might be used to produce advertising signs. It 
could also be used in the manufacture of lampshades. He applied for a 
patent and his employer contested the application. 
Mr Justice Lloyd Jacob noted the word 'design' in the original 
advertisement. He felt that this word implied 'artistic designs', not 
designs in the nature of inventions. This was an important factor in 
his decision that the factory manager could retain his beneficial 
interest in the invention. 
The degree of responsibility assumed by an employee under the 
contract of service is often crucial. The authorities provide several 
guidelines. 
In Worthington Pumping Engine Co. v. Moore,^^ the defendant 
was employed by the plaintiff company as its agent and manager in 
England. His relationship with his employer was of an extremely 
confidential nature. Indeed, the presiding judge described the 
defendant as 'in effect the alter ego of the plaintiff corporation outside 
the United States',^^ The degree of good faith owed by the defendant 
17 
to his employer was akin to that owed by a partner to his firm. During 
his employment the defendant took out three patents and used them in 
the business of his employer. When he was dismissed from his employment, 
he sought to restrain the company using the patents in its business. 
Predictably, his attempt failed, 18 
The defendant in Edisonia Ltd v. Forse was engaged initially 
as a workman, and later as the manager of the department in charge of 
moulding cylinders for the company's phonograph records. He regularly 
56 
attended conferences of the department managers at which suggestions 
for improving the quality of the cylinders were discussed. The defendant 
and the general manager of the plaintiff company obtained patents for 
cylinder mouldings devised wholly or partly by the defendant. The 
general manager later assigned his interest to the company but the 
defendant was not so compliant. He disputed the company's claim that 
he held his interests in the patents in trust for his employer. 
Warrington J, concluded on the evidence that the defendant 
had been expressly or impliedly directed to use his best endeavours to 
improve the mode of sale and manufacture of the moulding cylinders. 
The learned judge inferred this from the nature of the defendant's 
position and responsibilities. Since the defendant had been admitted 
to confidential conferences about the cylinders, the product of his 
ingenuity belonged to his employer. 
19 
In British Syphon Co. Ltd v, Homewood, the quality of the 
defendant-inventor's employment again tilted the balance in favour of 
the employer. There, the inventor was employed as a technical adviser 
in relation to the design and development of anything connected with 
any part of the plaintiff's business. The enployer's business could 
be described as the distribution of soda water in containers. On his 
own initiative, the defendant invented a device for dispensing soda 
water. 
Roxburgh J. decided that the defendant's duty of good faith 
required him to avoid putting himself in a position where his personal 
interests would conflict with his advisory role. Thus, the employer 
was entitled to the patent. 
Contrast these cases with Mellor v. William Beardmore & Co. 
Ltd.^^ There, the pursuer invented and patented a process and 
apparatus for extracting sulphate of ammonia from producer gas. He 
allowed the defendant to install and use the process and apparatus in 
57 
its gas plant but later alleged that there was an implied contract to 
remunerate him for this 'licence*. The defendant argued that the 
pursuer made the invention during the course of his employment, and, 
therefore, held the patent as trustee for the company. 
Giving judgment for the pursuer, Lord Constable stressed that 
the pursuer was merely the superintendent of the defendant's plant, a 
relatively subordinate position. It appears, therefore, that the nature 
and quality of the inventor's position again proved to be a decisive 
factor. 
Compared with the responsibilities of the managerial employee 
21 in Mellor v. William Beardmore & Co. Ltd, the duties of the defendant 
22 
in Barnet Instruments Ltd v. Overton were menial. Yet, in the latter 
case, the employer was declared sole owner of his employee's invention. 
The defendant was a tool room foreman at the plaintiff's factory. His 
duties included tool designing but it appeared that this obligation was 
limited. In the course of his employment, the defendant invented a new 
machine of general application. 23 Romer J. relied upon Adamson v. Kenworthy and British 
24 Reinforced Concrete Engineering Coy Ltd v. Lind to reach his conclusion 
that the invention was made in the discharge of the employee's duties, 
25 
and, hence, belonged to the employer. Now, both Adamson's Case and 
Lind's Case involved employees who were specifically instructed by 
their employers to design a solution to a particular problem. With 
respect, neither of these decisions should have determined Overton's 
claim. 
The authorities show that occupations are not automatically 
classified into two categories: those in which employees are entitled 
to their inventions, and those in which employees hold their inventions 
in trust for their employer. On the other hand, where the employee is 
a subordinate with limited responsibilities and humble duties, it will 
58 
be difficult to persuade a court to deprive him of an invention even 
27 if it was made in the course of his employment. Conversely, the 
invention of an employee with confidential or advisory duties will 
28 29 normally belong to his employer. But in Yokes Ltd v. Heather, 
the appellant's employment in a drawing office was not fatal to his 
claim. Moreover, the factory manager-designer in Re Selz*s Limited*s 
30 
Application was allowed to retain his interest in his invention. The 
nature and quality of the employment is a material factor, but it is 
not the sole consideration. To quote Eve J. in Lind*s Case;^^ 
it is necessary to regard not only the contract of service and 
the relative positions which the servant and the employer occupy 
thereunder, but the circumstances in which the particular invention 
was made.^^ 
6. Circumstances Surrounding the Creation of the Invention 
(i) Genesis of the Idea 
Where the employer conceives the original idea, and the 
employee is simply engaged in developing or perfecting the details of 
33 its implementation, the invention will belong to the employer. In 
fact, the employee's ancillary suggestions and modifications may be 
34 
included in the enployer*s patent. On the other hand, if the employee's 
contribution amounts to a distinct invention he will be entitled to a 
patent in his own right.^^ A few examples of this principle will 
suffice. 
In Re Marshall and Naylor's Patent,^^ the patentees requested 
one of their workmen to invent a tap which would, through a certain 
process, provide hot, warm,or cold water as required. After the invention 
was perfected, the workman was paid for his overtime work on the project. 
Nevertheless, he petitioned for revocation of his employer's patent. 
Farwell J. held that the workman was the proper patentee since 
he was the first and true inventor. Accordingly, the employer's patent 
was revoked. 
59 
37 In Lind*s Case, the plaintiff company assigned the 
defendant the task of drafting designs for suitable lining headings 
in a client's colliery. Without any personal experience of similar 
underground work and reliable data on the character and effects of 
earth pressure experienced at the particular colliery, the defendant 
found it impossible to prepare a satisfactory design. At his own 
suggestion he was allowed to visit the colliery to overcome this 
problem. On his return, he submitted a report outlining the essential 
features for the design. He also prepared several designs but none 
satisfiei 2.II the ssser.tial ccr.diti or.s. Hcw^ver. clii.rf rr.zir-r-zr 
considered that one of thes^ e desigris was practicable. The defendant 
then advised the chief engineer that he had invented a model which 
embodied all the essential features. He applied for, and was granted, 
a pater.t. His employer sought a aeclaraticr. that he held the pate~t 
in trust for the company. 
The defendant argued that he had not been hired to invent; 
he claimed he was simply engaged to perform duties ordinarily carried 
out by a draftsman or an assistant engineer. Eve J. did not agree. 
His Honour stated: 
In my opinion the terms of his particular employment imposed upon 
him a duty and obligation, and it is inconsistent with that duty 
and obligation that he should be allowed to retain for his benefit 
the results of the skill and inventive activity which, in the 
discharge of his duty to his employers, he applied to this 
particular m a t t e r , 
39 
How does one reconcile Re Marshall and Naylor's Patent and 
40 
Lind's Case? 
In the former, the idea for the invention originated with the 
employer; in the latter, the idea germinated from a problem posed by a 
client of the employer. Yet can this be a basis for distinguishing the 
two authorities? One would have thought that if the employer conceives 
the original concept his claim to the patent would be reasonably secure, 
60 
41 Yet, in Re Marshall and Naylor's Patent, beneficial ownership of the 
invention was awarded to the employee. 
It might also be argued that Lind was hired to invent whereas 
42 the workman in Re Marshall and Naylor*s Patent was engaged for more 
modest duties. Unfortunately this does not appear to be the basis on 
43 which Lind*s Case was decided. Rather, the decision seems to turn upon 
the nature and quality of Lind*s employment, not at the time of engagement, 
44 but after the visit to the colliery. 
(ii) Use of the Employer's Time, Equipment and Materials 
The fact that an employee uses his employer's time, materials 
and equipment in creating or developing an invention will not necessarily 
defeat his claim to the patent. This principle follows from Re Marshall 
and Naylor's Patent"^^ where the workman invented a tap in the employer's 
time and with the use of the employer's materials, yet retained the right 
to patent the invention, 
7, The Utility of the Invention 
One further factor may be important: the relevance of the 
invention in the employer's business. The cases show that this is 
indicative, but not decisive. Thus, in some cases, employees have been 
46 held to be entitled to inventions germane to the employer's business 
while, in others, employers have been declared beneficial owners of 
47 
patents which have uses beyond the scope of their business. Nor is it 
conclusive that the employee has allowed his employer to use the invention 
in the business,^^ 
In general, the courts determine the beneficial ownership 
of an invention made in the course of employment by the circumstances 
of each particular case. This is a familiar, but elusive, criterion. 
iVhile it allows the court to take a global view of the situation, it 
61 
also leaves a great deal of latitude for what is essentially a value 
49 
judgment. To quote Vaisey J. in Riber v. Marsden-Smith: *0f course, 
it is, I suppose, in every case, a matter of degree*. In theory, 
this may not be a bad thing; in practice, the employed inventor will 
consistently find himself on the wrong side of the line drawn by the 
courts. 
8. Consequences of Granting Beneficial Ownership to the Employer 
Assuming the employer is declared to be beneficial owner of 
the invention, what are the consequences for the employed inventor? 
Firstly, the employee will be entitled to recoup any out-of-
pocket expenses properly incurred in developing the invention and 
obtaining the patent.^^ Secondly, the employee will be liable to 
disgorge any amounts or advantages he has obtained through legal ownership 
5? of the patent. Thirdly, a judgment for the employer might extend to 
53 
rights in respect of the employee's improvements to the invention 
unless, of course, the refinements amount to a distinct invention. 
In some cases, these last two consequences can be quite harsh 
upon the employee. An employer is under no obligation to develop and 5 4 
exploit an invention. He may allow his rights to lie dormant for 
several years and then assert his entitlement just when the invention 
is perfected and popular.^^ It matters not that, by this time, the 
employee may have undertaken personal financial commitments for the 
manufacture or distribution of the invention,^^ 
If the employer does decide to dispute the employee's claim 
to a patent, he may obtain an order that the employee assign the foreign 
patent rights to him, or an order that the employee sign all the forms 57 necessary to enable him to obtain those rights. 
62 
In addition, beneficial ownership of the patent entitles the 
employer to exploit all the possible applications of the inventions, not 
simply those which are relevant to his business. This is of vital 
importance when the invention has a general application as in Barnet 
58 
Instruments Ltd v. Overton. There seems to be little justice in this 
principle. True, the employer may legitimately claim that he bought 
the use of the products of his employee's labour. But where is the 59 
equity in allowing him the exclusive right to exploit these products? 
The final, and perhaps most significant, consequence of giving 
the patent rights to the employer is that the employed inventor is 
entitled to no reward for his creative efforts. In general, courts 
will not entertain a claim for apportionment of the benefits of an 
invention. In Barnet Instruments Ltd v. Overton,^^ Romer J. considered 
that such a calculation would involve an 'impossible task*. This is 
62 a curious feature of the law in this field: courts almost invariably' 
decide that the beneficial ownership of the invention resides in either 
the employer or the employee. The legislature, on the other hand, has 
taken a few hesitant steps towards recognising that more than one party 
may be entitled to the patent rights. 
9. The Co-ownership Provisions of the Patents Act 
The Patents Act 1952-1969 (Cth) provides for co-ownership 
of patents. It permits a joint application for a patent and allows a 
6 3 patent to be granted to two or more persons. 'Persons*, in this 
64 context, may include a 'body c o r p o r a t e T h e Commissioner is empowered 
to give co-owners such directions upon certain matters as he thinks 
65 
fit. 
Section 153 (l) of the Act provides: 'Where a patent is granted 
to two or more persons, each of those persons is, unless an agreement to 
the contrary is in force, entitled to an equal undivided share in the 
63 
patent*. The section reflects the attitude of the Australian Patent 
Law Committee whose report in April 1952 preceded the present legislation. 
The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Dean, felt that 
disputes between employers and employees as to ownership of inventions 
should be settled in the courts as the Commissioner was not thought to 
be an appropriate authority to deal with this type of dispute. Hence 
the Act presumes an equal division of benefits between co-owners- There 
is no need for an adjudicated apportionment. 
It may be noted that section 153 (1) only applies where a 
patent is granted to two or more persons. An employer may be content 
to allow the employee who is the actual inventor to apply for a patent, 
and then contest the beneficial ownership of the patent in subsequent 
proceedings. If the employer adopts this course of action, section 153 
(l) will not apply. 
Even if the employer company and the employee held the patent 
jointly, an agreement giving beneficial ownership of the invention to 
the employer would exclude the section. It is not entirely clear what 
type of 'agreement* is contemplated. An 'agreement* could possibly be 
inferred from the express or implied terms of the employee*s contract 
of service. On the other hand, 'agreement* in section 153 (l) might 
denote a contract relating to the respective shares of the patentees -
an agreement reached after the invention was discovered. On either 
interpretation, the section is founded on a myth of equal bargaining 
power between employer and employee. 
Let us now turn to the duties and responsibilities imposed 
upon company management in the provision of long service leave. This 
is at once more general and less direct than the type of recognition 
discussed in this chapter. 
SECTION l; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN RECOGNITION 
OF THEIR SERVICES 
CHAPTER 4 LONG SERVICE LEAVE 
1. Purpose of Long Service Leave 
In Kennedy v. Board of Fire Commissioners,^ the New South Wales 
Industrial Commission in Court Session described the basic social 
purpose of the long service leave legislation in that state as 'reward 
2 3 for long service'. More recently, the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission expressed the view that long service leave should 
be treated as a respite from work and not as a 'reward for loyal service 
4 5 given over an extended period*. Certain provisions in long service 
leave statutes and awards emphasise this recreational aspect of long 
service leave.^ But long service leave has a character distinct from 
that of annual leave. In the words of the Privy Council, 'it is a 
7 
separate item in industrial relations'. 
Whatever may be the fundamental purpose of long service leave, 
both employers and employees would agree that it is a means of recognising 
and rewarding employees' long term contribution to an enterprise. It is 
for this reason that long service leave provisions are pertinent to the 
present study. 
The terms of long service leave entitlement are prescribed by 
8 9 statutes and awards in each state and the federal long service leave 
•code'.^*^ Entitlement is based upon a certain qualifying period of 
service under an 'unbroken contract of e m p l o y m e n t o r in a 'continuous 
12 
employment*. A variety of factors and events could sever a contract 
of employment or interrupt a continuous employment. Unless the law 
excuses these interruptions, employees would, in many cases, be deprived 
of an opportunity to qualify for long service leave, 
64 
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2. Interruptions Excused by the State Statutes and the Federal 'Code' 
(i) Absence on Annual Leave or Long Service Leave 
In Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia, it is expressly 
provided that the taking of annual leave or long service leave shall not 
13 interrupt the continuity of employment. 
The Queensland provision excuses 'absence from work on leave 
14 
granted by the employer', while in South Australia an 'absence of the 
worker from work in accordance with the contract of service' and an 
absence by leave of the employer do not break the continuity of service.^^ 
In both these states the provisions are broad enough to cover absence on 
annual leave or long service leave. 
Entitlement under the New South Wales statute and the federal 
•code* depends upon an 'unbroken contract' of employment. Since normal 
absences from employment such as the taking of annual leave or long 
service leave do not sever this contract it has not been necessary to 
exempt these absences in those jurisdictions. 
(ii) Absence on Account of Illness or Injury 
Short absences on account of illness or injury are expressly 
or impliedly excused by the statutes in each state and the f ederal •code*.^^ 
In Tasmania, the illness or injury must be certified by a qualified 
1 7 medical practitioner. In Queensland, the absence is excused only if 
1 the employer grants leave. Where the absence is caused by an injury 
arising out of or in the course of his employment, it appears that the 
19 
Victorian and Tasmanian statutes grant an unlimited exemption. 
In Victoria, a woman's absence from work for a period not 
exceeding twelve months through pregnancy does not interrupt her period 
20 of 'continuous employment'. In the other jurisdictions, however, 
there is no express provision of this nature, and it would seem that 
21 pregnancy cannot be classified as an 'illness'. It appears, therefore, 
66 
that in most jurisdictions a lengthy absence through pregnancy will 
rob an employee of the chance to qualify for long service leave unless 
the employer grants the employee leave during such absence. 
(iii) Attempted Evasion of Award or Statutory Obligations 
The relevant statute in each state and the standard federal 
long service leave award expressly provide that any interruption or 
termination of an employee's employment engineered by an employer for 
the purpose of avoiding his award or statutory obligations will not 
22 
deprive the employee of his accruing entitlement; the employee's 
contract of service remains unbroken, and the employment continuous, 
notwithstanding the employer's action, 23 
Australian Society of Engineers v, Rogers Meat Co. Pty Ltd 
illustrates the evidentiary problem raised by this type of provision. 
Wharton was employed by the company as a fitter and turner at the time 
of his dismissal less than a fortnight before the completion of a ten 
year period of qualifying service with the company. It appeared that 
Wharton had been dilatory in carrying out work assigned to him over a 
week-end. Because of his lack of progress he used the services of an 
assistant on the Sunday without justification or authorisation. The 
company thereby incurred expensive penalty rates which could have been 
avoided. When questioned about the incident by the company's engineer, 
Wharton replied in improper and abusive language. The Industrial 
Commission of New South Wales found that the applicant union had not 
discharged the onus of proving that the dismissal was unjustified. 
Accordingly the application for reinstatement was rejected. 
It is possible to argue from this case that, provided the 
dismissal can be justified on technical legal grounds, continuity of 
employment and the contract of service will be broken. Where there is 
a clear proximity between the interruption or termination of the 
67 
employment and the time at which the employee becomes entitled to long 
service leave it may be easier to prove the illegitimate motive of the 
employer. It would appear much more difficult to impugn a dismissal 
with notice, say, one or two years before entitlement accrues. 
In those jurisdictions where reinstatement is available on 
the ground that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unconscionable, the 
employee in such a case may still forfeit his opportunity to qualify for 
long service leave because the contract of service has been lawfully 
terminated. 
(iv) Interruptions Arising Directly or Indirectly from an Industrial 
Dispute 
The federal »code' and the relevant statutes in Western 
Australia, South Australia and Tasmania provide that this type of 
interruption does not break the continuity of employment or a contract 
of service provided the employee returns to work in accordance with the 
24 terms of settlement of the dispute. Unfortunately it is often difficult 
to discern the terms of settlement of an industrial dispute; in many cases 
25 
the employees simply return to work without negotiation. The Queensland 
and South Australian provisions have overcome this difficulty to some 
extent by providing that such an interruption is not taken into account 2 6 where the striking employees are re-employed by their employer. The 
27 
New South Wales and Victorian Acts also avoid this problem. 
It may be noted that only interruptions arising directly or 
indirectly from an industrial dispute are excused by the state statutes 
and the federal*code'. Since in most jurisdictions the concept of an 
industrial dispute is linked with the term *industrial matter*, 
interruptions caused by disputes over non-industrial matters may not 
be excused. Further, it is often extremely difficult to determine in 
advance whether a dispute relates to an industrial matter or not. 
Matters regarded by a union as legitimate issues for negotiation with 
68 
an employer may fall outside the scope of 'industrial matters*. 
Strikes over ecological or political issues or managerial matters may 
well interrupt the continuity of an employee's service or the contract 
28 
of employment. 
In New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia and in the 
federal*code*, any determination arising directly or indirectly from an 
industrial dispute does not interrupt continuity of service or terminate 29 
the contract of employment. The Victorian and Tasmanian provisions 
do not excuse such determinations.^*^ The term 'interruption* in these 
states' long service leave legislation seems to contemplate a temporary 
suspension, rather than a termination, of the contract of employment. 
At common law an employer is legally entitled to treat a striker's 
withdrawal of labour as conduct justifying summary dismissal.^^ If this 
course is open to employers, employees who participate in strikes could 
prejudice their chances of qualifying for long service leave, at least 
in Victoria and Tasmania, 
The relevant provisions in New South Wales, Queensland and 
South Australian statutes and the standard federal award would seem to 
be broad enough to cover this situation. The provisions relate to 
determinations arising indirectly from an industrial dispute. This 
could cover summary dismissals in response to strike action. But once 
again the salutary effect of these provisions is confined to disputes 
over industrial matters. 
(v) Dismissal followed by Re-employment 
In most jurisdictions the dismissal of an employee followed 
by a re-employment of the employee within two months of the dismissal 
will not disrupt the continuity of service or the contract of employment 
32 
for the purposes of long service leave. The term »re-employment' means 
a re-engagement by the former employer; it does not cover the 'fortuitous 
69 
employment* of the dismissed employee within the two month period 
33 
by another employer at a different wage and on different work. 
(vi) Stand-down or Dismissal on account of Slackness of Trade 
Most of the state statutes and the federal code provide that 
the standing-down of employees on account of slackness of trade will 
not interfere with the continuity of employment or the contract of 
34 
service. The Western Australian provision is slightly broader in 
scope since it excuses stand-downs in accordance with a federal award 
or an award of that state. In some jurisdictions the exemption is 
only available if the employee is re-employed by the employer within 
• ^ 36 
a certain period. 
Only the federal, New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australian provisions expressly cover dismissals on account of slackness 
37 
of trade. In Victoria, it has been held that continuity of employment 
is interrupted by a dismissal for slackness of trade followed by a 
3 8 
re-employment three months later. Under the federal *code'and the 
New South Wales and Queensland statutes such an absence would not have 
disentitled an employee. 
The termination of a worker's employment in a particular 
capacity because of slackness of trade does not necessarily mean that 
the continuity of his employment will be broken. In Crennan v. Oliver 39 
Furniture Pty Ltd a foreman was advised that the economic situation 
of the company made it necessary to dispense with his position. He 
forthwith accepted the company*s offer of a re-classification as a 
pattern maker on a lower rate of pay. The Industrial Appeals Court 
held that the worker's continuity of employment was maintained 
notwithstanding the re-classification. 
The phrase 'slackness of trade* admits several interpretations. 
It could refer to a general economic recession. Again, the overall 
70 
economic position of the employer might reflect a 'slackness of trade*. 
Alternatively the phrase might relate to a down-turn in one aspect of 
the particular employer's operations. In Amalgamated Engineering 
40 
Union of Employees, Queensland v. Evans Deakin & Co. Ltd, the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission of Queensland chose the latter 
interpretation. Thus, if one sphere of the employer's business is 
experiencing a down-turn, it matters not that the other sectors of the 41 business compensate for this depression. 
(vii) Absence through Service in the Armed Forces 
In all jurisdictions absence through service in the naval, 
military or air forces does not interrupt continuity of employment or 
42 sever the contract of employment. 
(viii) Absence on Union and Related Business 
Any reasonable absence on union business is excused in 
43 Western Australia if the employer refuses leave. In Tasmania, 
absences through attendance at meetings of the Apprenticeship Commission 
44 
or a wages board are exempted. In the other states which rely on the 
concept of continuous employment or continuous service as a basis for 
long service leave entitlement, there are no express provisions dealing 45 
with this type of situation. In these jurisdictions an employee who 
plays an active role in legitimate union or industrial activities will, 
in certain circumstances, jeopardise his accruing entitlement. 
(ix) Absence by Leave of the Employer 
Many of the oversights or omissions of the long service leave 
provisions can be corrected by the sections which excuse any absence by 
leave of the employer. Provisions of this nature are not necessary in 
the New South Wales Act or the standard federal award because such 
71 
absences would not sever the contract of employment. In the other 
states, employers are, of course, free to grant leave for reasons 
other than those specified in the relevant statute and for periods in 
excess of those s t i p u l a t e d . I n either case continuity of service will 
47 
be preserved. However, it does seem that in many cases the legislature 
has left the employee's accruing entitlement to the mercy of the 
employer's discretion and disposition. 
3. Do the Excused Absences Count as Qualifying Service? 
Although the interruptions excused by the state statutes and 
the federal*code»do not break the continuity of a worker's employment 
or his contract of employment, such absences are not always taken into 
AO 
account in calculating the employee's long service leave entitlement. 
In other words, the length of qualifying service in some cases is the 
sum of the period of service before the interruption and the period of 
service after the interruption, 
4. Service with Related Companies 
The interruptions or determinations discussed above are not 
the only factors which could interfere with an employee's 'continuous 
employment' or an 'unbroken contract of employment'. A simple transfer 
/ 
of an employee from one company to another company in the same group 
could defeat an employee's chance of qualifying for long service leave. 
To safeguard an employee's interests in this situation, the state 
statutes deem any period of employment with a company related to the 
•initial employer* to be a period of service with the 'initial employer'. 
The periods of service with the 'initial employer' and subsequent 
periods with related companies are, therefore, aggregated to calculate 
the period of qualifying service. 
49 
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5, Interstate Service 
(i) Jurisdiction 
A more complex problem arises from interstate service with 
the one employer or with companies related to the employer. It is 
50 
sufficient for present purposes to refer to some of the anomalies. 
In Queensland long service leave entitlement is based upon 
a certain period of 'continuous service with one and the same employer 
(whether wholly within or partly within and partly without Queensland)».^^ 52 
This provision was applied in Re Federal Hotels Ltd. There^ the 
claimant was engaged by the company in Melbourne around August 1954. 
He then worked for the company in Victoria and New South Wales before 
being transferred to Queensland as the company's state general manager. 
In September 1964, after four years* Queensland service, he resigned. On 
these facts the Industrial Court of Queensland upheld the employee's 
claim for a payment in lieu of proportionate long service leave ruling 
that his service fell literally within the terms of the local Act. 
The Federal Hotels Case^^ did not consider whether the 
Queensland Parliament was competent to enact such a provision but it 
would appear that it can be justified on private international law 
- • 54 principles. 
In New South Wales, jurisdiction in these cases may be invoked 
where the service on which the claim is based has a substantial 
connection with that state. Australian Timken Pty Ltd v. Stone (No. 
established that proposition. There the New South Wales Industrial 
Commission in Court Session stressed that it is not necessary for the 
terminating event to occur within the state. Rather^ at the time of the 
employee's resignation, dismissal or death, the Commission will look 
at the service as a whole and ascertain whether it may fairly be said 
to be substantially New South Wales service.^^ Since the Act was 
designed to provide a 'reward for long service* the Commission felt 
73 
57 that the locality of the service was irrelevant. It decided that 
entitlement to leave or a payment in lieu thereof accrued as an 
58 
incident of enployment in New South Wales. 
If the locality of the service is to be disregarded in 
applying the 'substantial connection* test, what factors may be taken 
into account? In the Commission's view, the fact that the terminating 
event occurred within the state is significant, but not conclusive, 59 
evidence that the service had a substantial connection with the state. 
Yet in Australian Timken Pty Ltd v. Stone (No. there were few 
other factors linking the service with New South Wales. 
The Commission concluded, nevertheless, that the service had 
a substantial connection with New South Wales. Notwithstanding their 
comment early in their judgment that 'locality of service appears 
irrelevant*,^^ Their Honours seemed to rely heavily upon the fact that 
the employee served for eight years in New South Wales prior to his 
resignation. Indeed, in their view, the employee's period of service 
in New South Wales was 'far longer than would have been sufficient to 
meet the test which we have formulated'. 
The Commission provided no further guidelines for the 6 3 
application of its test. And their 'pragmatic* analysis may raise 
difficulties in marginal cases. 
In the other states the principles on which the tribunals 
will assume jurisdiction in these cases await definition. It has been 
suggested that jurisdiction could be invoked in the state where the 
employment is located even though during some periods the employee was 64 
engaged in service outside that state. The suggestion probably 
derives from the judgments of Rich and Dixon JJ. in Mynott v. Barnard,^^ 
a case involving the construction of the Workers' Compensation Act 1928 
(Vic.), However, the basic nature of long service leave legislation 
differs substantially from workers* compensation legislation. Under 
74 
the former, benefits are conferred not by reason of an isolated event 
or incident but because of a prolonged period of service.^^ In many 
cases the situs of employment approach would produce a result similar 
to the 'substantial connection test' but this may not always be the 
case especially if locality of service is regarded as a significant 
factor in determining the nexus. 
(ii) Can Periods of Interstate Service be Aggregated? 
Assuming the employee can overcome the first obstacle of 
persuading a state tribunal to entertain his claim, an even more 
difficult issue arises: what periods of interstate service can be 
aggregated for the purpose of calculating long service leave entitlement? 
The answer depends, to some extent, upon the effect of the full faith 
and credit provisions.^^ 
The diversity of opinion on the effect of these provisions 
6 8 
falls outside the scope of this paper. On one view the provisions 
have a substantive effect and require a state tribunal to recognise 
•rights* conferred by the statutes of sister states. Even if this view 
is correct the state tribunal is only obliged to recognise 'rights*. 
Under long service leave legislation, an absolute right to long service 
leave normally accrues after, say, fifteen years' service, while a contingent 
right to pro rata long service leave is usually earned after a shorter 
period of service of five or ten years. 
Thus a company employee who completes twenty years' continuous 
service consisting of nine years*service in the company's Western 
Australian branch, nine years* service in the Tasmanian branch and 
finally two years* service at the Head Office in Victoria, may not 
qualify for long service leave. This anomaly results from the fact 
that he has not become entitled to any rights under the long service 
leave legislation in Western Australia, Tasmania or Victoria. Although 
75 
the enployments in Tasmania and Victoria might be viewed as being 
undertaken by leave of the employer, the term of those employments 
may not be taken into account in calculating the period of 'continuous 
employment* under the Western Australian statute. Similar reasoning 
would defeat any attempt to combine the periods of service in Tasmania 
and Victoria. 
If the situs of the employment is the proper test of juris-
diction it would appear that the employee would be unable to establish 
that his employment was 'Victorian*. If the 'substantial connection 
test'established in Australian Timken Pty Ltd v. Stone (No. were 
applied, the employee would probably be no better off. Could it be 
said that the service as a whole had a substantial connection with 
Victoria? The answer would probably be 'no*. After all, the contract 
of service was made in Western Australia, and eighteen years' service 
was performed outside Victoria. 
Where the period of service includes a term of service in 
New South Wales, further anomalies appear. Consider the following 
example:-
An employee was engaged in New South Wales by a national 
company. He worked with the company's New South Wales office for 
nine years, and was then sent to the Tasmanian branch for a period of 
eight years. After completing that period of service he was transferred 
back to the New South Wales office where he worked until his resignation 
some four years later. 
When the enployee was transferred to Tasmania it would appear 
that his New South Wales contract of employment was broken for the 
purposes of the long service leave legislation. The New South Wales 
Act does not excuse absences by leave of the employer. Moreover, a 
lengthy absence interstate could not be regarded as one of the normal 
70 breaks in the continuity of employment. 
76 
Assuming the New South Wales contract of employment is 
severed, the right to pro rata long service leave accrues as the 
employee has served for more than five years and he has not been 
71 
dismissed for *serious and wilful misconduct', But there is no 
obligation placed upon the employer to grant long service leave as 
soon as it accrues. It may be taken *as soon as is practicable* 
after accrual 'having regard to the needs of the employer's establish-
72 ment*. In the example, the employee would forfeit his civil remedy 
against his employer for failure to grant long service leave after he 
73 had served in the Tasmanian office for over two years. His civil 
remedy in New South Wales would be statute-barred by the expiry of the 
74 
two year limitation period prescribed by the New South Wales Act. 
When the employee returns to New South Wales and eventually 
resigns he will clearly be able to satisfy the 'substantial connection 
test', but with what period of service will he be credited? As noted 
above, the initial period of New South Wales service may well be 
excluded because the employee's civil remedy in respect of that service 
has lapsed. No 'rights' are conferred by the Tasmanian statute in 
respect of the service in Tasmania so there is no room for the operation 
of the full faith and credit provisions. Moreover, his final term of 
four years' service in New South Wales, taken by itself, is not 
sufficient to qualify for pro rata long service leave under the state 
75 
Act. In the result, after twenty-one years* service for one employer, 
the employee has failed to qualify for long service leave? 
Some lack of uniformity in the state statutes is perhaps 
inevitable but disparities causing injustices of this nature are inexcus-16 
able. The limitation periods prescribed by the state statutes are 
simply inadequate to cope with the problem of multi-state service. 
77 
(iii) Interstate Service in Related Companies 
The examples considered above involved service for national 
companies with branches in each state. Under these circumstances it 
may be easier to conclude that the period of service is continuous 
employment with one and the same employer. What is the position if 
the periods of interstate service are undertaken for companies 'related* 
to the original employer? 
77 
In the Federal Hotels Case, the Industrial Court of 
Queensland took into account a period of some five years* service in a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the appellant company. Again, in Australian 78 
Timken Pty Ltd v. Stone (No. 2), service with the appellant 
company's parent company in the United States was added to a period of 
New South Wales service to calculate long service leave entitlement. 
It thus appears that state tribunals may be prepared to give extra-
territorial effect to the provisions of the state statutes deeming 
service with a related company to form part of the continuous service 
with the initial corporate employer. 
To this point, the rights of an employee transferred within one 
company or to a related company have been discussed. When the business 
itself is transferred, a different set of problems arise. 
6. Effect of Transmission on Continuity of Employment 
If an employer acquires the business of another employer, and 
the employees remain in the service of the business as employees of the 
new employer, there is a technical break in the continuity of the 
79 
employees* service. In theory, the former employer has terminated 
the services of his employees who are then engaged by the new employer. 
To safeguard the interests of employees in this situation, the state 
statutes and the standard federal long service leave award contain 
80 provisions preserving an employee's continuity of employment if the 
78 
employer transmits his business to another employer and the employee 
is engaged by the purchaser. There are slight differences in the 
wording of the relevant provisions in the state statutes and the 
federal 'code*.^^ 
Where a person who was an employee at the time of the 
transmission becomes an employee of the transmittee his continuity of 
employment is deemed not to have been broken by the transmission. In 
addition, any period of service by the employee with the transmittor 
or any prior transmittor is deemed to be service with the transmittee. 
In New South Wales the provision relates to the transmission 
of a 'business, undertaking or establishment or any part thereof*. 
These words were considered by the Full Bench of the New South Wales 
82 
Industrial Commission in Hayman v. Neill. It was held that the terms 
•business, undertaking or establishment* should be construed as ejuisdem 
generis; each term is intended to refer to the whole of the enterprise 
carried on by the transmittor. Further, the Full Bench placed a 
restrictive interpretation on the words *or any part thereof*. In 
their view, *to be a part of a business the part must itself constitute 
83 a business*. Both these points were recently affirmed in Manley v. 
84 Gazal Clothing Co. Pty Ltd. 
(i) What is a Transmission? 
In most jurisdictions * transmission* is defined as including a 
•transfer, conveyance, assignment or succession, whether by agreement 
Q C 
or operation of law*. This technical definition provides little 
assistance for determining whether a transmission has occurred. Guidance 
must be sought in the authorities. It appears that a transmission 
within the meaning of the sections comprises two essential elements: 
transmission of a business and transmission of the employees. 
79 
(ii) First requirement: Transmission of the Business 
The ultimate test of a transmission of a business appears to 
be: has the transferee been put in possession of a going concern?^^ 
Usually this test will be satisfied by evidence that there has been a 
87 transfer of the goodwill associated with the business. Clearly if 
88 there is no business and no goodwill there can be no transmission. 
It may often be difficult to ascertain whether the 
business had any goodwill and,if so, whether the parties intended it 
89 to be assigned. But if the vendor covenants not to compete with 
the purchaser, this will be cogent evidence of a transmission of the 
90 business. Again, the tribunal may find that a transmission has taken 
place if the transferee agrees to perform all the outstanding contractual 
91 obligations of the transferor. 
(a) There must be a Transaction 
There must be a transaction involving some legal nexus or 
92 privity between the transferor and the transferee. This transaction 
must concern the acquisition of the business, not just shares in the 
94 . 95 business or the assets of the business, Hayman v. Neill clearly 
illustrates this point. There, Styl-Master, a partnership, acquired 
all the issued shares in a company and later purchased some of the 
company's plant. In the meantime, the firm moved some 150 employees 
and 100 machines into factory premises leased and occupied by the 
company. Styl-Master*s partners operated the company until December 
1954 when it was decided that the company would cease manufacturing. 
The company's employees were advised by a notice posted on a notice 
board that their services would no longer be required after 22 December 
1954, On the same day and on the same board Styl-Master published a 
notice stating that all employees dismissed from the company could 
apply for employment with the firm. In fact, all but seven of the 
80 
employees applied and were accepted. These employees ceased working 
for the company on 22 December 1954 and started work for Styl-Master 
about three weeks later. 
On these facts the Full Bench of the New South Wales Industrial 
Commission concluded that a transmission had not occurred. Their 
Honours stated: 
It is plain, in our view, that there was no transfer, conveyance 
or assignment from the Company to Styl-Master of the Company's 
business or any part thereof. There was no transaction at all 
between the Company and Styl-Master, In particular there was no 
transfer of goodwill, no transfer of assets (except an isolated 
sale of machinery for a particular purpose), no transfer of 
liabilities.96 
Hayman v. Neill^"^ demonstrates that the technical requirements 
of a transmission must be satisfied before an employee's continuity of 
enployment will be preserved. Employees not familiar with these 
requirements may forfeit their accruing entitlement to long service 
leave. To allow a break of three weeks, especially in the dubious 
98 
circumstances in Hayman v. Neil, to erase this accruing benefit is a 
travesty of justice. 
(b) Can a Transmission Occur in a Liquidation? 
In certain circumstances a transmission may occur in the 
99 
course of a company liquidation. In Rayner v. Joseph Haskin & Co., 
two former directors of a company in liquidation purchased a substantial 
part of the company's business and set up an enterprise in separate 
premises. An employee of the company was instructed to report to the 
new premises for work. Under the new arrangement, the nature of the 
employee's work was the same and she worked under the same supervisor. 
It was held that in these circumstances continuity of employment had 
been maintained. 
On the other hand, a liquidator incurs no personal obligations 
in respect of the long service leave entitlement of employees whose 
81 
services he has continued in the course of a voluntary winding up.^ 
This follows from the fact that a liquidator is not deemed to be a 
2 
transmittee of the business of the company. 
If an employee qualifies for a long service leave entitlement 
during or at the completion of his service with the liquidator, his 
entitlement is given priority as one of the costs and expenses of the 
winding up.^ 
(iii) Second Requirement; Transmission of Employees 
The acquisition of a business without a transfer of staff 
cannot amount to a transmission. The transaction must involve the 
4 
transmission of the employees as well as the business. Thus, where 
the engagement of the employee by the purchaser of a business amounts 
to an independent employment, the transaction will not be a transmission. 
In most states and under the standard federal award, the re-
engagement of the employees by the purchaser of the business must take 
place at the time of transmission.^ If the employee decides to take a 7 
holiday, or is directed to take a holiday, before taking up employment 
g 
with the transmittee, his continuity of employment will be broken. The 
only break in the continuity of employment which is excused by the 
transmission provisions in most jurisdictions is the gap caused by the 9 
very fact of transmission. 
In Tasmania and Queensland an employee's continuity of 
enployment is maintained if he is engaged by the transmittee up to 
two and three months after the transmission.^^ This type of provision 
would curtail some abuse of the transmission sections but it does not 
protect an employee's continuity of employment from transmittors and 
transmittees who act in collusion to minimise long service leave 
liabilities.^^ 
5 
82 
The transmission provisions appear to have been interpreted 
in a legalistic manner. As a result, the technical requirements of a 
transmission are difficult to establish. In many cases the employee*s 
continuity of employment will be severed even though the employee himself 
12 
believes on reasonable grounds that his employment is continuous. The 
requirement that there be a transmission of employees has been so 
strictly interpreted that it is relatively easy for employers acting 
in concert to defeat the purpose of the transmission provisions. 
The factors and events which affect the employee's continuity 
of service for the purpose of long service leave entitlement have been 
considered. Prior to the completion of a basic period of qualifying 
service the employee acquires, after a certain period of continuous 
employment, a contingent right to pro rata long service leave. This 
contingent right may be forfeited where the employee is dismissed by 13 
his employer for 'serious and wilful misconduct*. It remains to 
consider this topic. It should be emphasised at the outset that a 
dismissal for *serious and wilful misconduct* can only affect a pro 
rata entitlement; it has no effect upon the absolute entitlement earned 14 by the basic periods of qualifying service*. 
7. Effect of Dismissal for *Serious and Wilful Misconduct* upon Pro 
Rata Long Service Leave Entitlement 
(i) Meaning of the Term 
The term ®serious and wilful misconduct® was considered by 
the Industrial Appeals Court of Victoria in Knott v. Carlton & United 
Breweries Ltd.^^ Gamble J. found that the word «misconduct« in this 
context referred to a particular type of breach of the contract of 
service. His Honour suggested that the breach must be one which 
'according to the current and generally accepted moral standards of the 
community would be regarded as reprehensible and deserving of censure in 
83 
the circumstances®,^^ 
In his view, the word 'serious® was intended to be a gauge 
17 
of the gravity of the employee's offence. To determine whether the 
misconduct is 'serious® all the elements of the impugned conduct must 
be taken into account. The likely effect of the conduct upon the 
safety and well-being of the employer's business, his property, and 18 
other employees will be considered. For example, in Tucker v. 
.19 
Benoit the court concluded that the employee's actions in borrowing 
his employer's tools without permission for intended use in a 
competitor's business did not constitute 'serious misconduct* since 
the employer's business was not prejudiced by the conduct and the 
tools were returned unused and undamaged. In a recent South Australian 
case, the probable effect of the employee's conduct upon other employees 20 was treated as a vital factor. 
The term «wilful« denotes that the employee's conduct must 
21 amount to a deliberate repudiation of the contract of service. It 
allows the appropriate authority to consider subjective factors such 
22 as the motivation and general attitude of the worker at the time. 
Thus, a spontaneous reaction to an increased workload will rarely amount 
23 to wilful misconduct. On the other hand, if an offender adopts a 
24 
defiant attitude this will aggravate the seriousness of his conduct. 
When deciding whether the employee's actions justified 
dismissal for 'serious and wilful misconduct', the appropriate authority 25 
will, it seems, disregard the employee's length of service and the 
grave consequences for an employee who forfeits his pro rata entitle-
ment. The fact that the employee provided good service over a lengthy 27 period prior to his dismissal is immaterial; the sole issue is: has 
28 the employee been dismissed for serious and wilful misconduct? 
84 
(ii) Some Examples 
The authorities shed some light upon the nature and degree 
of misconduct which may defeat an employee*s pro rata entitlement. 
29 
Dishonesty may amount to 'serious and wilful misconduct*. Similarly, 
an unauthorised use of the employer®s property may constitute 'serious 
misconduct*.^^ 
Moreover, refusal to obey a lawful instruction may, in certain 
circumstances, substantiate a dismissal for 'serious and wilful 
31 
misconduct'. In Gvozdenovic v, Mallabones Pty Ltd the claimant was 
summarily dismissed for his failure to comply with a lawful order to do 
spray painting. When a management representative questioned the claimant 
over his refusal of duty, he produced a medical certificate which stated 
that he was unfit for spray painting. Later the same day the foreman was 
instructed to insist that the claimant perform the work. The employee 
again refused and was dismissed. 
The Western Australian Industrial Commission in Court Session 
found that the employee was an unsatisfactory worker and it doubted the 
bona fides of the medical certificate obtained by the employee. It 
concluded that the employee was not entitled to a pro rata long service 
leave payment. 
A refusal to load and shift bricks without the assistance of 
another worker was held to constitute 'serious misconduct* in Ford v. 32 
C.S.P.P. & Farmers Ltd, It appeared that the particular task had 
been performed without assistance in the past and that, though an 
assistant would expedite the completion of the work, he would not lessen 
the effort required by the claimant. On the other hand, an employee 
who declined to perform work declared 'black' by his union did not lose 33 his pro rata entitlement. 
Closely related to the disobedience cases are those involving 
a neglect of duty by the employee. For example, where an employee 
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deliberately absented herself from her employment for two days in 
the face of two definite refusals of permission for leave,her action 
constituted 'serious misconduct® and also probably amounted to 'serious 
34 and wilful misconduct®. 
Conduct prejudicial to the employer'^s business or inconsistent 
with the employee's duty of good faith will normally be classified as 
•serious misconduct*. Forwood Down W.A. Pty Ltd v. Brandis^^ provides 
an interesting illustration. A mass meeting of the workers decided 
to press for a wage increase by restricting factory output in accordance 
with a 'working to regulation plan'. Brandis participated in this 
•go-slow* campaign along with the bulk of the company's workers. As 
a result the level of production had fallen drastically by 18 June 1964, 
the date of the dismissal, and it appeared that the company might be 
compelled to retrench certain employees in sectors not involved in the 
'go-slow* policy. 
The foreman advised Brandis prior to 18 June that other 
workers were dependent upon his output for their work. Moreover, it 
was not disputed that he had exceeded a reasonable time for the 
completion of the job on which he was engaged. On 17 June the foreman 
advised Brandis that he *would have to get on with the job' and another 
worker W3.S a,ssignGci "to h.dp ]rii.m, TtiG next ci3,y Bira,nd.is W3,s some tGn ox* 
fifteen minutes late in starting his work. The foreman dismissed him 
but made no mention of the fact that the dismissal was for misconduct. 
The Western Australian Industrial Commission in Court Session 
was convinced that Brandis* actions amounted to *serious misconduct' 
within the meaning of the relevant long service leave award. The fact 
that Brandis W3,s net proved to be an instigator or a *ring—leader* of" 
3 6 the 'go-slow* campaign was irrelevant. Along with the mass of the 
workers, Brandis had, in the Commission's opinion, taken a direct part 
in the demands on the employer. Mr Commissioner Schnaars dismissed 
the contention that Brandis was no more implicated in the campaign 
86 
than any o£ the bulk of the company's employees: *This case concerns 
one particular worker and it is his conduct which is under consideration 
37 
and not the conduct of the other workers*. 
Once the employee establishes that he has served his employer 
for a period sufficient to qualify for pro rata long service leave, it 
is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the dismissal was for 
•serious misconduct® or ®serious and wilful misconduct*, as the case 
3 8 may be. Whether the employee has been guilty of this type of 
misconduct is a question of fact which will turn on the particular 
39 circumstances ox each case, 
(iii) Conclusion 
The range of factors which the appropriate authorities are 
allowed to take into account in determining whether the employee's 
actions amount to 'serious and wilful misconduct® appears to be too 
restricted. Where an important issue like long service leave entitlement 
is at stake, the authorities should be permitted to consider the 
employee's previous record and length of service. Perhaps the proper 
inquiry should be: is the employee's 'serious and wilful misconduct* 
grave enough to deprive him of his pro rata entitlement, rather than 
simply, is the employee's action'serious and wilful misconducts? 
While the authorities state that 'serious and wilful 
misconduct' involves actions of much greater gravity than mere misconduct, 
it appears that some cases have set a low standard for the former 
40 concept. It is submitted that Myer Emporium (S.Ae) Ltd v, Clemens, 
41 42 Forwood Down W,A, Pty Ltd v« Brandis, Singer Aust. Ltd v. Cardigan 
43 and Gvozdenovic v. Mallabones Pty Ltd fall in this category. Indeed, 
44 
in Forwood Down W,A, Pty Ltd v» Brandis the employer's action in 
dismissing the claimant had undertones of discrimination against a 
46 
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particular employee. Yet the employee forfeited his pro rata entitle-
ment. There can be little doubt that the employers in each of the 
above cases were justified in dismissing the employees for misconduct. 
What is disputed is the finding in each case that the misconduct was 
•serious misconduct*. 
8. Effect of Death and Resignation on account of Illness or Domestic 
or Other Pressing Necessity upon Pro Rata Long Service Leave 
Entitlement 
Entitlement to a payment in respect of pro rata long service 
45 
leave accrues upon the death of the worker. In addition, provided 
an employee resigns 'on account of illness® or 'domestic or other 
pressing necessity* he will not be denied his proportionate entitlement. 
The interpretation of the terms 'illness' and 'domestic or other pressing 
necessity' will now be examined. 
Ci) Has the Employee Resigned 'on account of illness'? 
The tribunals have adopted a subjective test in determining 
47 48 this issue. This is so even in those jurisdictions where the illness 
49 
must be 'of such a nature as to justify termination of employment®. 
But, although an objective test has been rejected as too restrictive, 
it appears that the resignation must be reasonable in all the circum-
stances.'^ *^  The motive of the employee in terminating his employment 
is considered from the point of view of such an employee in his 
particular circumstances.'^^ 
The 'illness' must be actually relevant to the employee's 
resignation but it need not necessitate the termination of the 
52 
employment. It must, however, be shown that the 'illness' caused 
the termination.^"^ Thus, evidence of the 'illness* should permit the 
tribunal to draw a reasonable inference that the sickness caused the 54 termination of employme nt. Medical advice that the employee should 
change jobs because of his health will, of course, place the employee 
in a strong position.^^ On the other hand, the employer may be able 
to discredit the medical evidence submitted on behalf of the employee 
by proving that the doctor made an incorrect diagnosis,^^ Furthermore, 
the medical evidence adduced by the employee may be unacceptable for 
57 some other reason. 
The illness relied on as justification for the resignation 
58 
need not be a drastic complaint. In one case the Victorian Industrial 
Appeals Court held that a state of mild nervous tension was sufficient 
to justify an employee resigning on account of illness. Further, it is 
not necessary for a claimant to establish that the illness alleged 
prevented him from performing his work; it is sufficient if the illness 59 hinders the employee carrying out his normal duties. 
(ii) Has the Employee Resigned ^on account of ... domestic or 
other pressing necessity^? 
In resolving this issue the tribunals again resort to a 
subjective test.^'^ Nevertheless, a tribunal is entitled to consider 
whether a reasonable man would feel that the situation warranted 
resignation,^^ The phrase 'domestic necessity® imports a serious problem,not 
necessarily a crisis. VVhile specious or trifling matters will not 
normally constitute domestic necessities, the tribunal should be careful 
63 ™ 
not to apply a too restrictive interpretation of the term. The 
adjective 'pressing* does not qualify the phrase 'domestic necessity*. 
Thus, the legislature has apparently indicated that a 'domestic 
necessity' is automatically to be regarded as a pressing matter. 
Where an enployee faced with heavy financial commitments resigns 
in order to secure a position on higher pay involving less travelling, 
65 . 66 he will not be denied his pro rata entitlement. Indeed, in one case, 
a saving in travelling expenses and car maintenance was sufficient 
89 
justification for an employee who resigned because of his economic 
worries, 
A normal healthy pregnancy does not of itself amount to a 
6 7 
•domestic or other pressing necessity' in its early stages. Thus, if 
an employee resigns at this stage of a pregnancy, medical evidence will 
probably be required to establish that the pregnancy amounted to a 
•domestic or other pressing necessity®,^^ During the later stages of 
a pregnancy it appears that the tribunal will allow the employee to 
decide in her own discretion whether her condition justifies resignation. 
Some cases appear to have adopted a stricter attitude to 
employees* claims for pro rata long service payments. In Hill and 70 
Dalgety and N.Z. Loan Ltd, an employee resigned because of his 
apprehension that a proposed interstate transfer would disrupt his 
domestic situation. It appeared that the employee and his wife 
intended to adopt a child and the employee's wife was firmly opposed 
to the transfer. Indeed, the employee alleged that his marriage would 
be jeopardised by the transfer. The chairman of the board of reference 
which heard the claim concluded that the employee had over-estimated the 
threat to his marriage. He considered that the degree of inconvenience 
caused by the proposed transfer fell considerably short of a domestic 
necessity which would justify the employee terminating his employment. 
It would seem that the Chairman strayed from the subjective test of 
•domestic necessity', 71 
Again, in Brindley v, Melesco Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd, 
a restrictive interpretation of the term ^necessity* was employed. The 
tribunal decided that ^necessity* denotes something unavoidable or an 
unavoidable compulsion. Accordingly, an employee who resigned from his 
job because it involved excessive travelling, loss of overtime and site 
allowances, and disruption of his domestic life forfeited his pro rata 
69 
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entitlement. These causes of distress did not fall within the 
relevant provision because the employee need not have purchased a 
house so far from his work place, or having bought it, he could have 
72 
sold it! 
If the term ^necessity® is to denote ®an unavoidable compulsion* 
what interpretation should be attached to the word 'pressing*? On the 
tribunal's view the term ^pressing* would seem to be tautological. It 
is submitted, with respect, that the adjective *pressing* indicates 
that Parliament did not intend a literal interpretation of the word 
•necessity* to be applied. 
More recently in Zussa v. Bent; Re Industrial Concrete and 73 
Terrazzo Pty Ltd (in liq.) the Victorian Supreme Court ruled against 
an employee who had resigned from a company some three weeks before its 
compulsory winding up. The employee's doubts about the solvency of the 
/ 
company and the security of his position in those circumstances 
precipitated the resignation. The Supreme Court rejected the employee's 
claim since he had not established that the termination of employment 
was caused by a 'domestic or other pressing necessity*. This decision 
appears to be particularly harsh in view of the fact that, in a 
compulsory winding up, an employee's entitlement to a pro rata long 
service payment accrues at the date of publication of the winding up 
order. It thus appears that to qualify for a pro rata payment an 
employee must remain with the company until the winding up order is 
published. He will then have to compete with his fellow employees 
for a position elsewhere and he will not be receiving an adequate 
regular income to sustain himself and his family during his search for 
alternative employment. In view of Australia's increasing unemployment, 
this could present a problem for the individual worker. 
Although there is no authority on the point, it has been 
91 
to get married would be denied pro rata long service leave entitlement 
since the resignation would not be caused by a ^domestic or other 
74 pressing necessity®. 
(iii) Effect of Delay, Failure to State Reason at Time of 
Resignation and Mixed Motives 
Apart from the isolated cases mentioned above the tribunals 
have consistently adopted a liberal attitude to employees* claims for 
pro rata entitlement after a resignation on account of illness or 
domestic or other pressing necessity. The mere fact that an employee 
delays his decision to resign because of one of those reasons for a 
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considerable period of time does not defeat his entitlement. Again 
there appears to be no necessity for an employee to advise the employer 
of the reason for his resignavionc His failure to do so will not 
defeat his claim for a pro rata payment although it will be a factor 
which the tribunal can take into account. Moreover, if the employee's 
resignation is caused by 'illness' or ^domestic or other pressing 
necessity*, it matters not that some other factor contributed to his 
77 decision. But the termination of the employment by the employee 
must be attributable to 'illness® or 'domestic or other pressing 
78 
necessity* and not some ulterior motive such as better pay or 
conditions in another position. 
9» Prohibition of Contracting Out 
Having imposed obligations upon employers in respect of long 
service leave, the legislature and the tribunals would be neglecting 
the interests of employees if they allowed employers to contract out 
of the provisions of the relevant statute or award. In some states, 
79 contracting out is expressly prohibited. 
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In Queensland, state long service leave awards will prevail 
over provisions in contracts of service unless the contracts provide 
80 
more favourable conditions of employment. Employees who are not 
covered by state long service leave awards in that state must fall 
back on section 19 (1) of the Industrial Concilation and Arbitration 
Act, 1961-1974 (Qld). That section governs the entitlement of «any 
and every employee* in respect of whose employment there is no current 
federal or state long service leave award or industrial agreement. 
In a similar vein, section 4 (l) of the Long Service Leave 
Act, 1967-1972 (S.A.) provides: «Subject to this Act, every worker shall 
be entitled to long service leave or payment in lieu thereof, in respect 
of service with an employer.® It remains to be seen whether the words 
•any and every employee® in the Queensland provision, and 'every worker® 
in the South Australian section, will be sufficient to preclude 
contracting out. If they cannot be so interpreted an interesting question 
arises: can an employer stipulate in a contract of service that, say. 
South Australian law shall be the proper law of the contract and then 
provide that the provisions of the South Australian long service leave 
legislation shall not apply to the contract? Chief Justice Latham's 
judgment in Mynottv. Barnard^^ would probably demand a negative answer 
to this question. 
(i) Exemptions 
While in most jurisdictions an employer will be prevented from 
contracting out of the provisions of the long service leave legislation, 
he may apply for an exemption from the obligations imposed by that 
legislation. The grounds on which such an exemption will be granted 
are carefully scrutinised. In most states, to qualify for an exemption 
an employer must establish that a scheme conducted by him or on his 
93 
82 *not less favourable* than those specified in the relevant Act. 
Provided the employer meets this condition, and the appropriate 
tribunal is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the workers, 
8 3 an exemption will be granted. In most states, there are provisions 
84 for review of exemptions. 
(ii) New South Wales Approach 
In New South Wales, it appears that the appropriate tribunal 
will determine the employer«s application by comparing the provisions 
of the employer's scheme as a whole with the provisions of the statutory 
85 
scheme as a whole. It will attempt to decide upon a final balance 
on an overall basis. Thus in Kennedy v. Board of Fire Commissioners^'^ 
the fact that the employer*s scheme gave no rights on termination of 
employment to those employees with less than ten years* service and 
that between ten and fifteen years* service the enployer's scheme gave 
no rights upon dismissal for misconduct did not persuade the Industrial 
Commission that the scheme was less favourable than the statutory 
requirements. The Commission in Court Session was clearly swayed by a 
provision in the scheme which gave employees with fifteen years* service 
an entitlement more generous than that prescribed by the statute. Its 
reference to the relatively permanent features of the particular 
employment involved does not dispel doubts that it failed to protect 
an employee's entitlement to long service leave prior to the completion 
of fifteen years* service. It appears then, that the Commission 
neglected the rights of the individual employee in favour of a scheme 
which would provide a more generous entitlement for the bulk of the 88 
workers taken, as the Commission indicated, on overall basis. 
94 
(iii) Victorian Approach 
In Victoria, the appropriate tribunals have evinced a somewhat 
stricter attitude to exemption applications. It is not sufficient 
simply to compare the benefits provided by the employer's scheme with 
those required by the relevant statute. The appropriate tribunal is 
obliged to examine the basis on which the schemers benefits are provided 
including the length of service necessary to qualify, the duration of 
the leave, the terms upon which it is granted and the conditions under 
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which it may be forfeited. The tribunal should also consider any 
benefits which the employees may lose if the exemption is withheld and 
the employer abandons the scheme as a result.^^ It is entitled to take 
into account the position of an individual worker or group of workers 
whose entitlement under the employer*s scheme is substantially less 91 than the corresponding statutory benefits. 
(iv) Election 
The prejudicial effect of a «global« approach to exemption 
applications so far as the individual employee is concerned is off-set 
in two states by allowing employees to elect to be covered by the 
92 statutory or award scheme rather than their employer's scheme. Tne 
93 position in the other states is far from clear. The Tasmanian and 
South Australian^^ provisions allow exemptions to be granted to 
95 
employers in respect of their employees or 'any of them*. The 
Victorian statute*^^ contains a similar provision. Presumably these 
sections would enable the appropriate tribunals in those states to 
make allowances for the position of an individual employee who may not 
benefit as much from the employer®s scheme as he would under the 
statutory provisions. 
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10. Conclusion 
Certain aspects of an employee's long service leave 
entitlement under the state statutes and the standard federal award 
have been analysed. Defects both in the legislation and the tribunal's 
approach have appeared under almost every heading discussed. It is 
difficult to share Mr Justice Sheldon's confidence that, by virtue 
of the long service leave legislation, 'a social policy without 
97 loopholes has been made operative*. 
Before leaving aside the issue of recognition of employees* 
services it is convenient, at this point, to note some of the principal 
98 
conclusions which Appendix 4 draws from the law regulating private 
superannuation schemes. 
At the outset, the law does not oblige company management to 
provide superannuation for their employees. Further, by questionable 
reasoning the High Court has decided that superannuation is not an 
arbitrable matter. However, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1974 
(Cth) offers powerful inducements to employers to grant this form of 
fringe benefit. 
Unfortunately, the taxation concessions in respect of 
superannuation schemes may be obtained even though the members' rights 
under the schemes are far from secure. Thus, there is no guarantee 
that en^loyees will receive a 'vested' superannuation benefit upon 
resignation, dismissal or retrenchment. Indeed, an employee's rights 
may be 'fully secured' within the meaning of the income tax provisions 
even if he will forfeit his own contributions to his employer's scheme 
in the event of dismissal. It is also possible for a company to provide 
in its superannuation scheme that a member will forfeit his own 
contributions if he participates in a strike. Such a clause will not 
disqualify the company from taxation concessions in respect of the scheme, 
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Moreover, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1974 (Cth) 
provides a positive incentive to employers to disregard the position 
of an employee who resigns or withdraws from the employer's scheme, 
or who is dismissed. The 'benefits foregone* by the former member 
may be applied in such a way as to reduce some of the employer's 
costs of running the scheme. 
An employer may be granted a greater taxation deduction than 
that specified in section 82 AAE of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936-1974 (Cth) if the Commissioner is satisfied that 'special 
circumstances' warrant more generous treatment of the employer's 
contributions. But an employer is given no incentive to reward an 
industrious employee or to recognise an employee's past pioneering 
services by increasing his contribution beyond the statutory formula. 
To this extent, the law actually discourages recognition of employees' 
efforts through generous superannuation benefits. 
Taxation concessions are more generous for funded super-
annuation schemes but the complexity and administrative discretion 
inherent in the relevant legislation may, in fact, persuade employers 
to provide superannuation on an informal, ad hoc, unfunded, and, 
therefore, insecure basis. 
In the field of superannuation, as in the field of long 
service leave, the central issue is whether the law secures the 
employee's rights to receive the benefits promised by his employer. 
In both areas the law can do much more to safeguard these rights. 
SECTION 2; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
INTRODUCTION 
A man's job, to a great extent, determines his income and 
his standard of living, his social status and self-respect. In our 
industrialised society a worker without a job is a 'misfit' with a 
low morale and an inadequate income. Job security, then, is 
fundamentally important. In overseas countries it is coming to be 
regarded as a right rather than a privilege. On a related point, 
Lord Denning declared in Nagle v. Fielden;^ 
A man's right to work at his trade or profession is just as 
important to him as, perhaps more important than, his rights 
to property. Just as the courts will intervene to protect 
his rights of property, they will also intervene to protect 
his right to work,^ 
The following chapters in this Section show that Australian courts and 
tribunals are a long way from recognising proprietary rights in 
employment. 
CHAPTER 5 DISMISSAL 
1. Background 
At the root of the individual employee's relationship with 
his employer lies the contract of employment. This contract may be 
in writing or oral and may be amplified by custom, statute, collective 
4 agreement or award® 
Often the parties simply enter into the relationship of 
employer and employee leaving some of the essential terms of the 
employment obscure and uncertain. 
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In industrial employment the provisions of awards, 
collective agreements and wages board determinations incorporated 
into the contract of service are negotiated by third parties and 
may be unknown to the individual employee.^ Indeed, the foundation 
of the employment relationship often appears to be conduct rather 
than contract. Yet contractual principles determine the formation 
of the employment relationship. 
Common law also directly governs the dismissal of employees 
whose working conditions are not regulated by industrial agreements 
or awards. Approximately 12% of Australian employees are in 
this category.^ 
The overwhelming majority of workers in Australia are engaged 
7 
in 'award employment*. Yet the standard award clause dealing with the 
duration and termination of the contract of service preserves the 
employer*s common law right of summary dismissal for 'malingering, g 
inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct*, These terms are 
9 
interpreted in the light of common law principles. 
In addition, where the award is silent, the common law applies. 
Thus, an employer retains his right of instant dismissal where the 
employee breaks one of his common law duties, for example, the duty 
to obey lawful and reasonable c o m m a n d s , T a k e a recent example. 
On 19 November 1973, Mace Denheld, a Fokker Friendship Captain 
employed by T,A,A. was dismissed over an incident which occurred during 
a flight from Melbourne to Wynyard, Tasmania on 27 October 1973. The 
airline alleged that Denheld breached Department of Civil Aviation 
navigational regulations by descending below the minimum altitude 
(366 m, or 1,200 ft) prescribed for limited visibility flying. In view 
of Denheld*s thirteen years' service (the last three as a Captain), 
T.A,A, offered him a ground job but it rejected his claim to re-
instatement. 
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The sacked pilot complained to his union, the powerful and 
strategic Australian Federation of Air Pilots, The Federation stressed 
that the dismissal was unduly severe. It argued that a demotion to 
First Officer for a period would be more appropriate punishment for 
the admitted breach of safety regulations. The union also pointed out 
that Denheld became accustomed to this method of flying during his 
recent New Guinea service for the airline. Denheld himself asserted: 
•During my period in New Guinea it was company policy to practise 
limited visibility approaches into coastal airports. It was encouraged 
by the check and training section of T,A,A, in New Guinea and to my 
knowledge was condoned by the Department of Civil Aviation*.^^ 
The union backed up its stand with strike action beginning 
on 15 November 1973. Nearly a week later, faced with threats of further 
lightning strikes, T.A.A, shut down its services indefinitely. 
At this point, the Minister for Civil Aviation (Mr Jones) 
and the Minister for Labour (Mr Cameron) became embroiled in the 
dispute, Mr Jones accused the Federation of trying to substitute 
12 
•muscle for safety^. Mr Cameron also came down firmly in support 
of the airline. He stated: 'It will always put the safety of its 13 
passengers above the private motive or above monetary considerations*. 
Other unions entered the fray. The A.C.T.U, and the Transport 
Workers^ Union supported the Government's stand. The Assistant 
Secretary of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots explained the 
T.W.U.'s position thus: •They work beside us in the same industry, 14 
and they are in awe of our industrial power*. On the other hand, 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the Amalgamated Postal Workers^ 
Union aligned themselves with the Air Pilots' Federation. 
Meanwhile, the Federation applied to the Flight Crew Officers* 
Tribunal for an order compelling T,A,A, to employ the airliners pilots 
who continued to report for work, Mr Justice Coldham refused to make 
10 0 
this order. Upholding the airline's stand on the discharge. His 
Honour stated: 'The recent history indicates that T.A.A, dismissed a 
pilot who breached D.C.A. regulations. The right of the airline to 
take this action cannot be disputed*. ^ ^ He also pointed out that the 
severity of the dismissal was in issue but declined to consider this 
point. 
At this stage one may wonder what was happening about 
Denheld*s dismissal. As one union official put it: 'Denheld became 
buried in the broader issue of Government versus union*, ^ ^ 
The Department of Civil Aviation reviewed the alleged breach 
of safety regulations and ordered the suspension of his first class 
licence. Under pressure, the Government agreed to appoint a board 
of review to hear Denheld*s appeal against the cancellation. The board 
comprised Mr R.E. McGarvie Q.C., Captain R.J. Smithwell, a Qantas pilot 
and former president of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, and 
Mr R.M, Seymour, the Queensland regional director of the Transport 
Department's air transport group, Mr McGarvie was the chairman. The 
board unanimously decided that Denheld*s first class licence should be 
suspended for two years. It also recommended that T.A.A. re-employ 
him as a First Officer. On 17 May 1974, it was reported that T.A.A. 
17 had agreed to comply with the recommendation. 
What are the results of this saga? Hie dispute cost T.A.A. 
18 
nearly $1.8 million in lost revenue, and long after it resumed 
normal services it was struggling to regain its share of the domestic 
air travel market. The proceedings before the Transport Department's 19 
Board of Review cost the Federation $25,000. And the litigation did 
not end there. The Federation later sued the airline for back-pay 
during the period 23 November to 29 November 1973 alleging that in 
this period the airline locked-out its pilots. Before he was 
dismissed Denheld was earning $17,255 per annum; in August 1974, his 
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20 salary was $14,650 per annum. All the parties seem to bear some 
scars of the battle. 
In some respects, Denheld's dismissal case may be regarded 
as atypical. The Federal Secretary of the Federation gives one reason 
for this view. 'This would never have happened with Ansett. T.A.A. 
would rather lose a quid than lose face. They are more concerned with 
21 
firm administration than making money.* Nevertheless, the case does 
illustrate a few general points. Firstly, a dismissal of one employee 
can spark off a dispute of national proportions. Secondly, even with 
the support of a powerful union, an employee will not always be able 
to secure reinstatement. Thirdly, this was a case where the *award*, 
actually the Airline Pilots* (Domestic Operators) Agreement 1972, did 22 
not cover the dispute. In effect, the dismissal was caused by the 
pilot's breach of the airline's orders to obey D.C.A. navigational 
regulations. In other words, the sacked Captain had breached his duty 
to obey his employer's lawful commands - a common law duty. The 
Airline Pilots* Agreement did not affect the employer's right of 
summary dismissal on this ground. 
Fourthly, Denheld*s contract of service was made up of several 
components: an industrial agreement, common law and statutory regulations. 
Low-level flying was not consistent with the duties under this contract; 
it was at most a practice, not a custom. 
Finally, the case demonstrates that the employee's interest 
in job security may become obscured when powerful forces such as the 
Government, a large corporation and a union become involved in a 
dispute. In the Australian context, job security is not a simple issue 
between an employer and an employee. 
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2. Duration of the Contract of Service 
Before turning to dismissals with notice, it will be 
convenient to describe the duration of the different forms of hiring: 
in many cases, the period of hiring gives some indication of the 
length of notice required by law to terminate the contract, 
(i) Yearly Hiring 
It was once widely recognised that an employment for an 
indefinite period was a yearly hiring in the absence of evidence to the 
23 contrary. Moreover, if employment was initially for a year certain, 
and the employment continued over that period, the presumption of 
24 yearly hiring was again raised. The genesis of the rule can probably 
be seen in section 3 of the Statutes of Labourers which commenced in 
25 1562. 
While it was frequently stated that the presumption was not 
2 6 an inflexible rule of law and was capable of being rebutted by 
27 evidence inconsistent with a yearly hiring, the presumption has shown 
surprising tenacity. Despite the efforts of the English Court of Appeal 
28 to limit the application of the presumption in De Stempel v. Dunkels, 
29 30 Jackson v. Hayes Candy & Co. Ltd and Vernon v. Findlay reaffirmed 
that the presumption could be applied to modern employment contracts. 
As late as 1950,^^ English judges paid lip service to the presumption. 
But Richardson v. Koefod,^^ a recent decision of the English 
Court of Appeal rejected the presumption of yearly hiring in 
unequivocal language. Lord Denning M.R. stated firmly: 
The time has now come to state explicitly that there is no 
presumption of a yearly hiring. In the absence of express 
stipulation, the rule is that every contract of service is 
determinable by reasonable notice.^^ 
The presumption was not applied because «it has ceased to be valid in 
, 34 our modern industrial society*. 
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While the presumption has been swept away entirely in 
England, the position in Australia is not yet clear. Early Australian 
authorities such as Mackenzie v. Union Fire & Marine Insurance Co. of 
35 36 New Zealand and Manners v. Denny Bros clearly recognised and 
applied the presumption. In Healy v. Law Book Company of 
37 
Australasia Pty Ltd Latham C.J. regarded the presumption as well-
established but he declined to apply it because of the express notice 
provision in the plaintiff's contract of employment. However, since 38 Arlesheim Ltd v. Werner, it appears reasonably clear that the 
presumption will not apply to the 'type of employment regulated by 
39 
wages boards and industrial courts*. As the law stands at present, 
the rule may still be relevant in other sectors of employment. It 
remains to be seen whether Australian courts will follow the Court of 40 Appeal in Richardson v. Koefod and abandon the presumption. 
(ii) Hiring at Will 
The contract of general hiring must be distinguished from a 
hiring at will, A hiring for *so long as the master wants a servant*, 
though indefinite as to time, is not a general hiring, but a hiring at 
41 will. This type of tenure may take the form of an employment for a 
42 period subject to satisfactory service or subject to the performance 
43 
of duties to the satisfaction of the employer or the board of 
44 
directors. Courts construe these provisions literally and grant no 
redress to employees dismissed in accordance with the clause. Further, 
courts will not inquire into the reasonableness of the employer's 
dissatisfaction provided the employer is honestly and genuinely dis-45 
satisfied with the employee's service. However, the terms of a hiring 
at will must appear clearly from the contract. Thus, employment on 
an annual salary for 'at least three years' at the option of the 46 employer was held not to b  a hiring at will. 
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(iii) Hiring for a Fixed Term 
Hiring may be for a fixed term. This form of hiring is 
47 common among managerial employees. Contracts providing employment 
48 •for 2 yrs at a salary at or over the rate of £250 a year^, *for 
49 50 a period of not less than 3 years', 'for one year only* have been 
held to be hirings for a fixed term. In one case the fact that salary 
was to be %.500 per annum* persuaded the court that the agreement was 
r ^ • 51 for a year certain. 
52 
In Salt V. Power Plant Co. Ltd the appellant's employment 
was expressed to be 'permanent* after four years, subject to an express 
provision that the performance of the employee's duties should be to 
the satisfaction of the directors. Some eleven years after the employee 
was engaged, the employer purported to terminate the contract by notice. 
It was held that, provided the employee performed his duties to the 53 satisfaction of the directors, his contract was for life. That this 
may be regarded as a rare and exceptional case appears from McClelland 
54 
V. Northern Ireland General Health Services Board. There the House 
of Lords decided by a narrow margin that there was no magic in the word 
'permanent' in the appellant's contract: it did not preclude the right 
to issue notice of dismissal. 
Contracts of service which are stated to expire at retiring 
age are almost as rare as contracts for life. In Orr v. University of 
Tasmania^^ the University statute provided that the appointment of any 
person would determine on the last day of the year in which the 
appointee attained the age of sixty-five. The High Court unanimously 
ruled this clause did not prevent the University terminating an appoint-
ment prior to this retiring age. Rather, it simply provided that the 
appointment was not to continue beyond that time.^^ 
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(iv) Periodic Hirings 
The majority of employees in Australia are covered by 
periodic hirings. In blue collar employment, hiring is normally by 
57 the week, but periodic hiring in other sectors may be for weekly, 
monthly or yearly intervals. The reservation of a weekly salary may 
58 raise a presumption of a weekly hiring but this presumption can be 
rebutted by the particular nature and incidents of the service 
59 
arrangement. If an employee is entitled to his wage or salary weekly, 
the fact that he receives his pay monthly^*^ or at irregular intervals^^ 
will not be sufficient to rebut a presumption of weekly hiring. Again, 
mere reference in a contract of service to a period of anticipated service 
longer than that by which the remuneration is to be calculated or paid 
does not necessarily mean that the hiring is for a fixed term rather 
than a periodic hiring.^^ 
These then are the different types of hiring. What periods 
of notice are required by law to terminate these forms of tenure? 
3. Notice Required to Terminate the Contract of Service 
(i) Yearly Hiring 
6 3 
Contrary to the view in some authorities, there is no 
necessary link between the period of the hiring and the length of 
notice appropriate to terminate it. Where the presumption of yearly 
hiring still applies, it is established that the hiring must continue 
for the entire year and that notice purporting to terminate the 64 
agreement earlier will be ineffective. This rule, however, admits 
an exception: where the contract is subject to a stipulation either 
express or implied by custom, enabling either party to determine the 
agreement by notice, then this clause applies.^^ 
When the yearly hiring runs on over the first year, what 
notice is required to terminate the arrangement? The authorities are 
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singularly obscure on this point.^^ In most cases the issue did not 
arise because the employer's notice was defective in any event since 
6 7 it was not timed to expire on the last day of the relevant year. 
However, the better view appears to be that a yearly engagement may be 
terminated by reasonable notice due to expire on the final day of the 
68 relevant year. 
(ii) Other Forms of Hiring 
Fortunately, there is little controversy about the length of 
notice required to terminate the other forms of hiring. A hiring at 
will may be terminated at any time by either party; no notice is 
69 required. In the absence of an express provision as to notice, a 
70 hiring for a fixed term does not require any notice of termination: 
the hiring terminates automatically when the term expires. 
The general rule applicable to periodic hirings and hirings 
71 
for an indefinite period (other than those subject to the presumption 
of yearly hiring) is as follows: in the absence of a custom or an 
express stipulation as to notice, the contract may be terminated by 72 reasonable notice. 
Ciii) Customary Notice 
A practice hardens into a custom when it is general, of 
reasonable antiquity and standing, uniform and so notorious and well-
understood that people make their contracts on the assumption that it 
73 . 74 exists. In other words the alleged custom must be well recognised, 
^ • 75 ^ - 4. .. certain and consistent. 
When reliance is placed upon custom to determine the notice 
76 77 required, it must be expressly alleged and clearly made out. If 
there is an express or implied term of the employment contract dealing 
78 with notice of dismissal, the alleged custom will be displaced for a 
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custom will only be imported into a contract when it accords with 
79 the tenor of the agreement as a whole. 
An ancient and well-established custom in England requires 
80 
that menial servants be given one month's notice of dismissal. 
The rationale of this custom is that, since menial servants are brought 
into such frequent and close proximity with their employers, it is 
desirable, in their own interests, that the intimate employment 81 
relationship be speedily terminable. Such considerations do not 
apply to the typical industrial worker. Yet, ironically, his contract 
may be discharged by a much shorter period of notice. 
(iv) Express Provision as to Notice 
Where the contract of service makes express provision as to 
82 notice that clause will govern the amount of notice required. And 
an express notice clause will not be overridden by an industrial award 
83 
providing a shorter period of notice. 
The vast majority of workers in award employment are entitled 
to one week's notice or one week's wages in lieu thereof by virtue of 84 the standard 'contract of employment* clause in awards. However, 
85 in some awards the prescribed notice increases with seniority. 
(v) Reasonable Notice 
If the contract of employment is silent as to notice and a 
custom cannot be implied, reasonable notice is required. Contrary to 
8 6 the assumption made in some cases, there is no essential link 
between the periodic hiring interval and the period of notice which 
87 will be deemed reasonable. In resolving the issue of what amounts 
88 to reasonable notice, the jury is entitled to consider the duration 
of the hiring together with many other factors such as the rate of pay 
89 and mode of payment, the length of service and seniority, the character of 
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90 91 the service, the actual responsibilities of the job, the period 
92 which the parties themselves regarded as reasonable notice, the 
93 convenience of the employer and the difficulty the dismissed employee 
94 would have in procuring other employment. 
The jury may also seek guidance in the findings of other 
95 juries in similar cases. But these will usually be of little 
assistance. A few examples illustrate this point. A journalist who 
contributed weekly notes to a newspaper was entitled to one month's 
96 notice, whereas a photographer-journalist was found to be entitled 
97 to six months* notice. Six months' notice was deemed to be reasonable 
98 for a foreign correspondent to The Times and also a sub-editor of a 
99 1 newspaper. In Fox-Bourne v. Vernon & Co. Ltd a newspaper editor was 
held to be entitled to six months' notice, while twelve months' notice 
2 3 was sufficient for another newspaper editor. The variety of factors 
which may be considered by a jury in reaching a finding on what is 
reasonable notice makes it virtually impossible to predict with 
certainty the period of notice to which a particular employee is 
entitled. But for the typical industrial employee it appears that 
4 
one week's notice will be deemed reasonable. 
(vi) Validity of Notice 
Notice must be clear and definite.'^ A vague warning that 
the employee may be dismissed in the near future is not a valid notice 
of dismissal.^ On the other hand, a discharge is effective even if 
it is communicated to the employee in polite, rather than peremptory 
language.^ And once given, notice may not be withdrawn without the 
g 
consent of the other party. 
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(vii) No Reason Necessary 
An employer is not obliged to furnish a good reason for 
9 
dismissing an employee with notice or with wages in lieu of notice. 
Provided the notice is lawful the courts will not inquire into the 
employer's grounds for terminating the employment c o n t r a c t . T h e 
rationale of this principle is that the right to hire and fire is *as 
fundamental in the relationship of an employer and employee as is the 
right of an employee to leave the employment*. ^ ^ 
(viii) Restrictions upon Dismissal with Notice 
An employer may restrict his right to determine the contract 
of service by notice. McClelland v. Northern Ireland General Health 
1 0 
Services Board provides an illustration. The appellant applied for 
a position advertised as a 'permanent and pensionable* post and was 
selected. Clause 12 of the formal employment contract which followed 
the appellant's appointment provided that the Board could dismiss any 
officer for gross misconduct, unfitness or inefficiency. Save in the 
case of gross misconduct, the Board was obliged to give at least one 
month's notice of its intention to dismiss an officer. Faced with a 
redundancy of staff, the Board purported to retrench the appellant with 
six months' notice. 
The House of Lords declared that the contract had not been 
validly terminated as the Board had limited its right to discharge the 
contract to the circumstances specified in clause 12 of the agreement. 
Thus, Their Lordships resolved the issue by a construction of the 
contract,^^ Again,the contract of employment may require that a certain 
procedure be followed before dismissal. If the contract does so 
14 
provide, the prescribed procedure must run its course. Otherwise 
the dismissal will be a breach of contract. 
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By contrast, the common law does not, in general, prescribe 
a dismissal procedure. Principles of natural justice are more easily 
imported into an employment relationship regulated by statute.^^ Yet, 
even in that case, natural justice will not be required where the 
relationship is essentially one of an ordinary master and servant,^^ 
An employer must comply with the principles of natural justice when 
dismissing an office holder^^ but company employees do not fall within 
18 that category. 
1 9 
Australian Trading Co. Pty Ltd v. Jones causes a slight 
ripple in this relatively clear picture. The plaintiff's contract of 
employment provided that he could be dismissed by written notice, if, 
in the opinion of the chairman of the company, the plaintiff's actions 
rendered his continued employment prejudicial to the interests of the 20 
company. McArthur J. relied heavily upon Fisher v. Jackson in 
reaching his conclusion that the chairman was given a quasi-judicial 
function which required him to give the plaintiff a hearing before 
dismissal.^^ 
This case runs counter to a host of distinguished authorities. 
The general rule is that natural justice principles will be confined to 
22 
employment with a statutory status or, at least, a statutory flavour. 
Moreover, Mr Justice McArthur predicated his conclusion upon 
the chairman's quasi-judicial or judicial function. Such a function 
will be rare in the ordinary master and servant relationship. Some 
employers have established internal dismissal procedures providing for 
review of a dismissal at various levels in the enterprise. But 
generally it will not be necessary to observe the principles of natural 
justice in this type of procedure. 
Ill 
(ix) Conclusion 
The employment relationship is often founded upon an informal 
arrangement which the law is at pains to classify as a contract. This 
contract contains certain essential terms but unfortunately the 
individual employee may be left completely in the dark about his 
particular duties. 
The duration and termination of the employment of the typical 
industrial worker are normally covered by awards or wages board 
determinations. These provisions commonly entitle an employee to no 
more than one week's notice or wages in lieu of notice. Employees 
outside the category of *award employment* must fall back on custom 
or express provisions in their contracts, an obsolete presumption of 
yearly hiring or the vagaries of reasonable notice. 
In general, an employer is under no obligation to give an 
employee a reason for his dismissal or to allow the employee a hearing 
before he is discharged. Perhaps more importantly, the employee does 
not require a legitimate reason for the dismissal. Subject to the 
•victimisation provisions* of the industrial arbitration and wages 
board statutes, a dismissal with the proper period of notice or with 
wages in lieu of notice is lawful. It matters not that management 
has exercised its right of dismissal capriciously or arbitrarily; 
the dismissal is effective nevertheless. Thus, an employee dismissed 
with notice because of his race, creed, colour, marital status, 
political views or even the colour or length of his hair may not 
complain that the dismissal is wrongful. This is a disgrace to the 
law. When freedom of contract carries the freedom to discriminate, 
it is time to modify the law regulating this aspect of the employment 
relationship. 
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4. Summary Dismissal 
(i) Definition 
Summary dismissal may be defined as a discharge without 
notice or wages in lieu of notice. This is its normal form. It may, 
however, involve a dismissal with notice or wages less than that 
23 
prescribed by the contract of service. In either form, the 
dismissal is wrongful if it is unjustified. 
(ii) The Basic Test of a Justified Dismissal 
What conduct on the part of an employee will warrant summary 
24 
dismissal? An ancient authority suggested that 'moral misconduct, 
either pecuniary or otherwise, wilful disobedience, or habitual 
neglect*^^ would be adequate grounds. Rather than elaborate upon these 
grounds by piecemeal additions, the common law evolved a contractual 
test: does the employee's conduct show a 'complete disregard* of a 
•condition essential to the contract of service*.^^ In other words, 
does the employee's behaviour amount to an express or implied 27 repudiation of the fundamental terms of the contract? 
What constitutes a fundamental breach varies with the nature 
28 
of the business and the position occupied by the employee. Thus, 
when the alleged misconduct involves a senior employee in a responsible 
or confidential position, courts will inquire whether the employee's 29 
conduct is inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duties or 
incompatible with the continuance of the confidence or trust inherent 
in the relationship.^^ 
Clearly, the second limb of this inquiry is virtually useless 
where more menial workers are involved. It seems unrealistic to speak 
of an industrial worker on the shop floor breaking the confidence or 
trust in his relationship with his employer. At this level, a more 
functional test is often applied: does the employee's conduct hamper 
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or prejudice the safe and proper conduct of the employer's business?^^ 
Beneath this verbiage, the basic test remains: is the employee's 
32 behaviour repudiatory? 
(iii) General Considerations 
(a) Question of Fact or Law 
33 34 There is no fixed rule of law, nor even a rule of thumb, 
which defines precisely what degree of misconduct warrants summary 
dismissal. Whether there is sufficient justification is generally a 
question of fact for the jury.^^ Yet in some cases the employee's 
conduct will, as a matter of law, justify his summary dismissal.^^ 
Bowen L.J. provides the explanation in Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice 
Company v. Ansel1:^^ 
in cases where the character of the isolated act is such as of 
itself to be beyond all dispute a violation of the confidential 
relation, and a breach of faith towards the master, the rights 
of the master do not depend on the caprice of the jury, or of 
the tribunal which tries the question. Once the tribunal has 
found the fact - has found that there is a fraud and breach of 
faith - then the rights of the master to determine the contract 
follow as a matter of law.^^ 
Where the employee's conduct is such that his summary dismissal is 
justified as a matter of law the trial judge must direct the jury to 
39 enter a verdict for the employer. Offences of this nature are not 
40 
uncommon. For example, a flagrant breach of trust, the receipt of 
a secret commission'^^ or a distinct refusal to be bound by the terms 
of the contract of service"^^ would almost certainly, as a matter of 
law, warrant summary dismissal. 
(b) Suspicion and Inquiry 
If an employer suspects that one of his employees is guilty 
43 
of misconduct he is allowed to investigate the facts. Indeed, the 
employer should review the position carefully before taking action; 
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mere apprehension of a breach of duty is not enough to justify a 
44 
summary dismissal. 
As mentioned earlier, natural justice principles will only 
apply to the ordinary master and servant relationship where the person 
authorised to inquire into the employee's conduct is vested with a 45 
judicial or quasi-judicial function. The situation may be entirely 
different where an inquiry is prescribed in an award or industrial 
agreement. There, if a certain procedure is prescribed it must be 
followed. 
Similarly, an industrial agreement may provide that disputes 
over dismissals must be referred to an independent arbitrator. But 
an adverse finding at that level does not preclude the employee bringing 47 an action for wrongful dismissal at common law. 
(c) Waiver and Warning 
After investigating a complaint against an employee, an 
en^loyer may forfeit the right of summary dismissal if he elects to 
continue the employment relationship in spite of the employee's 
AQ 
misconduct. Waiver does not, however, prevent an action for damages 
against the employee.^^ Where the condoned misconduct consists of 
repeated offences, each new act of misconduct revives the earlier 
infractions.^*^ But it appears that an employer who discovers misconduct 
warranting dismissal should exercise his right to discharge within a 
reasonable time.'^^ A delay of three hours^^ or until the evening of 5 3 the day on which the offence occurred may amount to condonation. 
Once the employer reaches his decision to dismiss he may 
54 
exercise his right without prior warning or admonition. The common 
law does not inquire into the justice of the dismissal; it simply 
requires proof of actual misconduct.One can appreciate the 
vulnerability of the employee's position: he may be instantly dismissed 
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even though the offence was committed innocently and was done without 
knowledge that it was w r o n g . I n fact, an employee cannot rely 
upon an honest and reasonable belief in the correctness of his 
conduct to excuse a breach of an essential term of his contract of 
57 service. 
(d) Employee is not Entitled to Reason for Dismissal 
The law does not oblige an employer to give a reason for a 
5 8 
dismissal. It is true that if an employee brings an action for 
wrongful dismissal, the employer may put forward evidence justifying 
the dismissal or in mitigation of damages. Yet, at the time of 
discharge, the employee may be left completely in the dark. 
Further, the reason submitted by the employer at the hearing 
need not be the original reason for the dismissal. A discharge can be 59 
justified on grounds discovered after the dismissal or on grounds 
different from those declared at the time of the discharge, Thus, 
if an employee hears that his employer intends to dismiss him without 
notice, and if he reacts in an insulting or abusive manner towards the 
employer, there is ground for summary dismissal. This is so even if 
the employer had no justification for the discharge before the 
employee's outburst. That an employee can be dismissed without 
notice under these circumstances is patently unjust. But in law the 
key issue is whether the employee is guilty of misconduct justifying ^ - , 62 instant dismissal; the motive behind the discharge seems immaterial. 
(e) Effect of Summary Dismissal upon the Contract of Service 
The effect of summary dismissal upon the employment contract 
is far from clear. The better view appears to be that a summary 
dismissal, even if wrongful, terminates the employment relationship 
6 3 but leaves the contract of service intact. The general contractual 
116 
principle that recission requires repudiation by one party and 
acceptance of the breach by the other is, however, modified by the 
particular incidents of the employment relationship. Though the 
contract of service survives, courts will not grant specific 
performance of the contract; the contract subsists mainly for the 
purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach. 
Whatever the theoretical effect of summary dismissal, its 
practical impact is clear: the employee is banished from the work 
place. In clerical, and particularly confidential, employment, the 
en^loyee may not even be allowed to return to his desk immediately 
after the dismissal, A recent case, Sharston Engineering Co. Ltd v. 
64 
Evans, highlights the finality of dismissal. An employer sought 
an order excluding dismissed employees from the work place. In 
granting an order for possession, the Lancaster Chancery Court ruled 
that a dismissed employee is not entitled to remain on his employer*s 
premises as his discharge terminates his licence to go upon or remain 
on the premises. 
(f) Wages for the Broken Period 
The general rule is that if a weekly servant is lawfully 
discharged before the end of the week he cannot recover payment for 
that fraction of the week he has worked.^^ A similar rule is applied 
to employees engaged by the month.^^ Much, however, depends upon the 
6 7 particular terms of the contract of service. If payment of wages is 
by the day, an employee dismissed in the middle of the week is entitled 
6 8 
to wages for the expired portion of the weekp Similarly, the standard 
award clause provides that in the case of a dismissal without notice 
for certain offences *wages shall be paid up to the time of dismissal 
. . 69 only*. 
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Where the employee engaged to complete a certain task is 
summarily dismissed he may not sue on the contract for the work 
70 performed prior to the dismissal. He may, of course, claim a 
71 quantum meruit but his chances of success are remote. 
(g) Loss of Accruing Benefits 
Summary dismissal for misconduct may defeat an employee's 
72 
claim to payment of pro rata annual leave and, in some cases, long 
73 service leave. Further, an employee justifiably dismissed for 
74 misconduct may forfeit valuable fringe benefits such as superannuation 
or low interest housing finance. In addition, immediate dismissal may 
75 
cancel the employee's seniority rights under the relevant award. 
These are just some of the important consequences of summary dismissal 
for the employee. In some instances, they flow from the dismissal 
itself; in others, from the fact that the dismissal was for misconduct. 
To quote Wright J. in Savage v, British India Steam Navigation Company 
Limited; *If the dismissal was justifiable in law it was immaterial 77 that it might be a decision of great severity*. 
Civ) Grounds for Summary Dismissal 
Having sketched the general principles relating to summary 
dismissal it will be convenient to consider some of the recognised 
grounds for this form of discharge. This section will not attempt a 
78 comprehensive catalogue of these grounds. Rather, it describes how 
the general principles are applied. Tne authorities reflect the social 
attitudes of judges as much as a rigid application of contractual 
79 
rules. For this reason, one must approach the early cases with 
caution, .80 Courts have described summary dismissal as "a strong measure* 
81 and 'altogether a severe penalty®. One industrial tribunal called it 
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82 an 'extreme step*. The inplication is that summary dismissal 
should not be taken lightly, that it should be used as a last resort. 
It will be interesting to test this theory against the decided cases. 
Another theme which may be explored in the following analysis 
is the conviction that 'the general concepts relating to the right to 
hire and fire have materially changed under modern industrial 
83 relationships 
(a) Insolence 
84 85 
Insolence and impertinence have long been recognised as 
sufficient justification for summary termination of the contract of 
service. Moreover, the use of insulting and objectionable language 
towards the employer^^ or the employer*s representative^"^ is gross 
misconduct providing a good reason for dismissal without notice. The 
words used by the employee must not be considered in isolation. The 88 circumstances surrounding the confrontation, in particular the 
persons present and the manner and tone of the exchange, are vitally 
89 important. If man-to-man discussions were encouraged by the employer 
90 
this may be a mitigating factor. Again, where the employer provokes 
the outburst, he may not be justified in dismissing the insolent 
employee without n o t i c e , I n a recent dictum, Lord Justice Edmund 
Davies boldly asserted: «We have by now come to realise that a contract 92 of service imposes upon the parties a duty of mutual respect*. 
In general, the decided cases have adhered to the guideline 
93 
laid down in Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Shroff: 
their Lordships would be very loath to assent to the view that 
a single outbreak of bad temper, accompanied, it may be, with 
regrettable language, is a sufficient ground for dismissal. 
Sir John Beaumont, C.J., was stating a proposition of mere good 
sense when he observed that in such cases one must apply the 
standards of men, and not those of angels, and remember that 
men are apt to show temper when r e p r i m a n d e d . 9 4 
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Unfortunately courts and tribunals in dismissal cases have, 
at times, tended to forget that employees are mere mortals. In one 
case,^'^ a hotel employee criticised the manager of the hotel in the 
presence of the licensee. During this confrontation the employee 
said to the manager: »Who do you think you are, God Almighty?*. As 
a result of this incident, the employee was dismissed without notice. 
An industrial tribunal sustained the dismissal ruling that the 
employee's conduct was insubordination. 
Again, the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
96 
Commission thought that the dismissal of a waterside worker was 
justified when he replied to his foreman®s order with the plea: 
•Hang on a bit, Gunga, give us a go *. Do these cases apply the 
standards of men or of angels? 
(b) Disobedience 
Disobedience and insolence often go hand-in-hand. The 
general rule is that an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee 
summarily for wilful refusal to obey any lawful and reasonable order 
which falls within the terms and scope of the contract of service. 
In fact, mere delay in complying with an order may justify immediate 
dismissal. 
Where the employee refuses to do work outside the express 
98 
terms of his contract, the employer must establish a custom or 
implied term obliging the employee to do the work, before an instant 
dismissal is warranted. 
In Allen v. Commissioner of Railways,^ a coaching porter 
was instructed to do work normally done by lumpers who were on strike. 
The employee refused and was dismissed. Upholding the dismissal, 
Parker C.J. (with whom Rooth J. concurred) found that the employee 
had done this work before at Yalgoo without objection, and that apparently 
120 
it was not unusual for a coaching porter to be asked to assist in 
2 
unloading trucks . The Chief Justice also pointed out that a 
document purporting to outline Allen®s duties was conspicuously 
displayed at the work place and that it concluded with the words 
•any other duties as instructed®. 
With respect, the fact that an employee has done the same 
work before at another location does not import a term into his 
contract of employment. And the observation that it was not unusual 
for a coaching porter to do this type of work falls far short of 
establishing a custom which would require the employee to comply with 
the employer*s order. Further, the concluding words of the document 
defining the appellant's duties could be interpreted as relating only 
to the incidental duties of a coaching porter. On the authority of 3 Allen V. Commissioner of Railways an employee who refuses to do 
strikers* work through fear of the *scab« label and union reprisals 
is liable to be dismissed without notice thereby forfeiting valuable 
4 accruing rights. 
An employee is justified in refusing to obey an unlawful'^ 
or unreasonable order,^ An instruction to work in a subordinate 
7 
position at a lower rate of pay is unreasonable. But an employee 
8 . . 
who refuses a transfer which is consistent with the express or implied' 
terms in his contract of service may be instantly dismissed. On the 
other hand, if the contract contains no transfer clause, and the 
surrounding circumstances suggest that such a provision is not to 
be implied, the employee will be entitled to disregard a direction to 
10 transfer. 
An employee may also disobey an order where compliance would 
jeopardise his own safety.^^ Such disobedience will not warrant 
12 
summary dismissal. Yet, in a recent case it was held that an 
employee's refusal to perform a certain task was unreasonable even 
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though he had not been shown the safe way to do the job. It was 
enough that he would have seen the task performed and known that the 
work could be done safely. With respect, there is a considerable 
difference between knowing the task can be executed safely and 
knowing the safe way to execute the task. The decision appears even 
more unjust when it is realised that the plaintiff*s ignorance was 
partly caused by a language difficulty. 
Where an employee refuses to obey because illness prevents 
him from complying, his employer is not entitled to dismiss him 
13 instantly. But the onus is on the employee to notify the employer 
14 
that his sickness is the reason for his refusal. 
Subject to the foregoing, a distinct refusal to obey a 
lawful instruction will be a valid ground for dismissal. Such a 
refusal does not of itself terminate the contract of service; it 
merely gives the employer the option of continuing the employment or 
accepting the employee*s repudiation and terminating the contract.^^ 
The refusal must strike at the foundation of the employment relationship. 
In other words, the disobedience must be wilful in the sense that it 
must be a 'radical breach of the relation, and inconsistent with its 
continuance* 
Take a modern example. In Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator 
17 
Newspapers) Ltd, an advertising representative was summarily dismissed 
following an incident in an editorial conference. The conference 
erupted when Delderfield (the appellant's immediate superior) and the 
company chairman became involved in an altercation. Delderfield left 
the room inviting the employee to accompany him. The company chairman 
directed her to stay. Embarrassed and confused, she disregarded this 
direction and left the room. Did her conduct justify summary dismissal? 
The English Court of Appeal answered in the negative. Here there was no deliberate flouting of the essential conditions of her 
122 
contract of service. She was simply a victim of divided loyalties. 
18 Thus, not every act of disobedience will justify instant dismissal. 
Examples of disobedience which warrant immediate dismissal 
19 include: a wilful refusal to do any further work for the employer; 
a gardener*s refusal to plant certain plants;^^ and a crane driver's 
21 
repeated refusal to obey a lawful instruction. 
In some cases there are extenuating circumstances. Does 
the law take these into account? In Federated Storemen and Packers* 22 
Union, on Behalf of Bell v. Swift Australian Co. Pty Ltd, an employee 
was dismissed for breach of a company rule which prohibited employees* 
clocking out for workmates. It seems that one of Bell's fellow 
workers wanted to leave thirty minutes early to go home to his pregnant 
wife who was sick. He approached Bell and asked if he would clock 
out for him. Although Bell was aware that the penalty for this 
infraction was instant dismissal, he agreed. 
The Industrial Magistrate who first heard the matter 
described Bell's action as ®an unprecedented act of compassion for a 
fellow employee®. Nevertheless, he found that the dismissal was 
justified. On appeal, the Industrial Court of Queensland sustained 
this decision. Bell's thirteen years* continuous service counted 
for nothing against the thirty minutes' working time lost by the 
employer. 
Again, in Federated Miscellaneous Workers* Union v. Tip Top 
23 
Laundries and Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd the tribunal seemed to overlook 
the extenuating circumstances. A mother and her daughter both worked 
for the company. One pay-day, the daughter was absent, and the mother 
collected the daughter's pay packet on her behalf. At this time no 
objection was raised. Later, the employer demanded the daughter's pay 
packet back, but the mother refused to hand it over. The mother 
considered she was entitled to do what she did. Nevertheless, she 
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was dismissed and her dismissal was upheld. 
If an employer devises rules of conduct for his employees, 
these must be obeyed to the letter provided,of course, the general 
24 
orders contained therein are lawful and reasonable, in one case, 
the company rule directed employees to observe the speed limits 
strictly. A truck driver employed by the company drove at 32 m.p.h. 
in a 30 m.p.h, zone and had an accident. He was dismissed and his 
discharge was sustained. Further, an employer was held to be 
entitled to dismiss an employee who failed to observe a company rule 
that all items foundinti-ie rubbish were to be handed over to the supervisor, 
The tribunal accepted that the employee intended to return the items 
to his employer, although not by the correct channel. In spite of 
this finding, the dismissal was not held to be harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable.^^ 
These cases make one wonder whether the law has come very far 
2 6 since Turner v. Mason. 
(c) Absence without Leave 
Absence from employment without leave is almost invariably 
27 sufficient justification for instant dismissal. Persistent 
absenteeism is really just one form of unauthorised absence. It is 
28 clearly a valid reason for dismissal without notice, 
29 
In one early case, a domestic servant absented herself 
from her employment overnight even though her request for leave was 
denied. The employee went to visit her mother who, allegedly, was in 
imminent danger of death. The pleading did not disclose whether the 
servant had notified the master of the reason for the proposed visit. 
It was held that, even if the servant had so advised her master, she 
would not be justified in absenting herself when the leave was refused. 
Alderson B. stated: 
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the replication is informal, because it does not show that 
the mother was likely to die that night, or that it was 
necessary to go that night to see her, or to stay all night. 
But if this were otherwise these circumstances would amount^^ 
only to a mere moral duty, and do not shew any legal right. 
Laws V. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd^^ mitigated the 
harshness of this precedent but it still survives as an authority. 
It appears that an employee is obliged to obtain positive 
permission before absenting himself from his employment; notifying 
32 
an employer through a fellow employee will not suffice. Even where 
an employee leaves his employment through illness he is expected to 
report his reason to his employer. Failure to do so will afford 
33 grounds for summary dismissal. The employee®s supervisor need not 
34 inquire the reason for the absence; he may dismiss on the spot. 
(d) Punctuality 
35 
Habitual lateness will also justify instant dismissal. 
But even an isolated instance of lateness may warrant summary dismissal, 
for employers are entitled to demand an exacting standard of 
36 37 punctuality. In a Queensland case, an employee who was unable to 
provide a satisfactory explanation when he returned fifteen minutes 
late from his half-hour lunch break was held to be guilty of misconduct 
justifying instant dismissal. The Industrial Court of Queensland 
considered it important that the dismissed employee was engaged on 
penalty rates on that particular occasion, and that his absence would 
have disrupted his employer®s business since only forty workers were 
employed at the foundry. The employee dismissed had served his employer 
for twenty-nine years in broken periods and forfeited his long service 
38 leave entitlement because of the dismissal. Moreover, there was no 
evidence that the dismissed employee had an unsatisfactory service 
39 
record. The adoption of a legalistic approach by the courts, in 
such cases, upholding the managerial prerogative to hire and fire 
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causes grave hardship to individual employees. 
Ce) Negligence 
An employee who holds himself out as possessing a skill 
will be liable to summary dismissal if he fails to demonstrate the 
40 
degree of skill professed. But where the employee does not expressly 
or impliedly promise that he has the skill to perform the task assigned 
to him he may not lawfully be dismissed without notice for incompetence 41 in the execution of the task. As Avins puts it: *an employee who 
42 
claims little need exhibit little to keep his job Thus an 
unskilled worker will be almost immune from dismissal on grounds of 
incompetence provided of course he displays an ordinary standard of 
care. For other employees, the standard varies with the nature of the 43 job and the degree of responsibility vested in the employee. 
Whether negligence by an employee is a valid reason for 
44 instant dismissal is a question of degree. In Savage v. British 
45 
India Steam Navigation Company Limited it was suggested that the 
gravity of the negligence should be weighed by considering the nature 
of the act rather than its consequences. Where an isolated act of 
negligence is involved, however, it appears that the consequences of 
the act are vitally important. Thus, in Easter v. London & County 
Printing Works,Darling J. upheld the immediate dismissal of a 
servant whose forgetfulness caused damage to an expensive machine. 
The servant's absent-mindedness was so fundamental as to amount to 
neglect. It is difficult to avoid the implication that the resulting 
damage influenced Darling J., for His Lordship stated: «I do not say 
that [forgetfulness] would be a good ground for dismissal in every 
case*.'^ '^  It appears, then, that an isolated act of negligence by a 48 skilled worker may warrant summary dismissal. 
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(£) Dishonesty 
49 Dishonesty during service also warrants summary dismissal. 
Thus, the receipt of a secret commission was held to justify instant 
dismissal even though the dishonesty was not discovered by the employer 
until some months after it occurred, and in spite of the fact that the 
culprit had served faithfully in the meantime. 
An isolated act of dishonesty may justify immediate dismissal. 
In Re Brown and Australian Iron and Steel Limited,^^ an employee was 
summarily dismissed for filing a false claim for sick leave. The 
employee planned to spend the leave period holidaying at an island 
resort. Unfortunately for him, his deception was discovered and he 
was thereupon dismissed. The Industrial Commission of New South Wales 
sustained the dismissal on the ground that the dishonest claim was 
filed with intent to defraud the employer. There can be little 
quarrel with this finding. Here was a clear case of premeditated 
misconduct. But consider for a moment the position of the employee. 
As a result of the dismissal he forfeited his entitlement to long 
service leave in respect of nearly twenty years* service. He lost 
all this because of a single indiscretion. 
It is not always necessary to establish an intent to defraud 
52 
in order to justify a summary dismissal for lack of probity. In 
Sinclair v. Neighbour,^^ the plaintiff was manager of a betting shop 
owned by the defendant. He borrowed £l5 from the till, putting an 
I.O.U, in its place. He used the money to place a private bet with 
another betting shop. He did not ask his employer's permission because 
he knew that his employer would not approve borrowing from the till for 
gambling. When the employer learnt what had transpired he sacked the 
plaintiff without notice. The trial judge took the view that the 
plaintiff's conduct was not dishonest, and awarded damages for wrongful 
dismissal. 
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The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling. Whether or not 
the conduct was dishonest, it was inconsistent with the plaintiff's 
duty as manager of the business. It was incumbent upon him to keep 
the till inviolate. By abusing the till the plaintiff set a bad 
example for his subordinates, one of whom was the defendant's grandson. 
Only Sachs L.J. expressly found that the plaintiff was dishonest; the 
other members of the Court of Appeal were content to base their 
judgments on the ground that the defendant®s behaviour was of such a 
grave and weighty character as to breach his duty to his enployer. 
Some relatively trivial acts of dishonesty may justify 
54 
summary dismissal. In Re Avon Products Pty Ltd v. Reillv the New 
South Wales Industrial Commission sanctioned the dismissal of an 
employee who was detected removing company property with a retail 
price of $1.50 from the company premises. Again, an employee may be 
instantly dismissed if he borrows his employer's property without 
permission even if he returns the property unused the next day.^^ 
Further, an employee who uses the firm^s equipment without permission 
to spray his private car with his own paint is guilty of misconduct 
even though the exercise is done during his lunch-break and near the 
plant.Charging private long distance telephone calls to one's 
employer is clearly misconduct. But is an employee liable to instant 
dismissal for charging private local calls to his employer? Where 
will the courts and tribunals draw the line? If all employees who 
made away with items of their employer's stationery were dismissed, 
the labour market would be flooded® Yet technically this is an 
offence punishable by dismissal. 
Cg) Drunkenness 
Drunkenness will be a valid reason for dismissing an employee 
summarily where the inebriety directly interferes with the employer*s 
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57 business or impairs the employee's ability to provide due service. 
58 
Once again, justification is a question of fact for the jury. An 
employee who claimed that the use of drugs prescribed for her use 
intensified the effect of the alcohol she consumed was, nevertheless, 
held to be justifiably dismissed as the standard of her work had 
59 
deteriorated. Accordingly, her claim for payment in lieu of long 
service leave in respect of fourteen years nine months' service was 
defeated. 
(h) Dismissal for Illness 
Whether an employee's absence from work because of illness 
warrants termination of the contract of service without notice depends 
upon two factors: the nature of the illness and the terms of the 
contract. 
Permanent incapacity attributable to an illness justifies an 
employer in discharging the employee. In one case^^ the Industrial 
Court of Queensland held that an incapacitating injury which forced 
an employee to be absent from his work for five years frustrated the 
contract of service at the time the employee sustained the injury. The 
rationale of this approach is that the incapacitating injury seriously 
62 
interferes with or frustrates the business purposes of the contract. 
In cases of temporary infirmity much turns on the duration of 
the hiring. Where a servant was engaged for a month and was unable to 
attend his employment shortly thereafter it was held that the employer 
was entitled to regard the agreement as cancelled after a reasonable 
^ o 
time had elapsed. In the circumstances one week was deemed reasonable, 
On the other hand, it appears that an absence of two days through 
illness after five months' service is not sufficient justification for 
discharging an employee.^^ Further, in Leake v. Holdsworth,^^ the 
dismissal of an employee because of a temporary infirmity at the end 
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of the first year of a five year term was held to be wrongful. 
The continuance of the employment relationship during 
absence through illness depends, in some cases, on whether the employee 
is ready and willing to perform the contract, while, in other cases, 
actual performance of the terms of the contract is required. 
Confusion arises where cases fail to differentiate between the 
continuance of the relationship and the right of the employee to wages 
during his absence.^^ 
In award employment the emphasis is usually upon actual 
performance of work,^'^ This is particularly true where the employee 
is paid for piece work. Thus, in the absence of an appropriate 
provision in an award, an employer would probably be entitled to 
regard the contract of service as terminated after one week's absence 
A 
through illness. Sick leave clauses in awards do not grant the 
absent employee immunity from dismissal; they merely determine the 
wages to be paid to the employee during the leave period if the employer 
chooses to continue the employment relationship. Thus, an employer 
may dismiss with notice before the expiration of the leave period 69 conten^jlated by the award. 
(i) Conduct Incompatible with the Employment Relationship 
Conduct inconsistent with the continuance of the employment 
relationship warrants summary dismissal. This broad residual category 
of misconduct includes; conauct which places the employee in a position 
70 where his duty to his employer conflicts with his own interests, 
71 conduct which destroys the confidence between the parties, conduct 
72 which would be detrimental to the employer'-^ s business, and violations 
73 
of the employee's duty to work in an orderly and proper manner. 
130 
O ) Conduct outside wg Hours 
Improper conduct outside the employment will not always 
justify summary dismissal. But where there is a sufficient nexus 
between the alleged misconduct and the employee*s ability to perform 
his work in a proper manner, the discharge will be valid. Thus, the 
summary dismissal of a confidential clerk for vast speculative 
dealings on the stock exchange was justified because the employer, 
a firm of merchants, frequently consulted the clerk about proposed 
investments in securities, 
If the employee's moral conduct off-duty is of such a nature 
as to render him unfit for his position, his employer is entitled to 
75 
dismiss him instantly, Qrr v. University of Tasmania provides an 
illustration, Orr, a university professor, became involved in an 
intimate relationship with a teenage student enrolled in his philosophy 
class. Although the High Court considered that the student was 'passing 7 6 
through a period of turbulent eroticism®, and was eager for an 
assignation with the appellant, it unanimously held that the professor's 
conduct provided ample ground for summary dismissal: the appellant was 77 
unfit to perform his duties to the university. 
Where an employee intimidates or assaults his workmates or his 
superiors outside working hours, this is clear justification for 
immediate dismissalo Thus, a vjorker who disrupted a canteen committee 
which the company management had established for the benefit of its 
employees was held to have no ground for complaint against his summary 
dismissal even though the misconduct occurred outside his normal hours 
^ ^ ^ 78 of duty. 
(v) Conclusion 
Even this cursory analysis of the law on summary dismissal 
reveals major obstacles to job security. 
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AFL employer may dismiss an employee without notice where 
the employee«s conduct is calculated to repudiate the essential conditions 
of the contract of service. But the employee may not be aware of these 
essential terms. And even if he knows that he is liable to dismissal 
for misconduct he may have no idea what his employer regards as 
misconduct. This is important because the courts do not inquire whether 
a reasonable employer would have exercised his right of summary 
discharge; they merely ask: is the employer legally entitled to dismiss 
the employee instantly. 
Moreover, an employer may discharge a worker suspected of 
misconduct without warning and without giving the employee an opportunity 
to state his case. Further, the employee is not entitled to a reason 
for his dismissal. And the employer may justify a dismissal on grounds 
discovered since the discharge after a petty witch-hunt through the 
employee's record. 
Summary dismissal banishes an employee from the work place 
even if there is no justification for the discharge. It will deprive 
the worker of valuable accruing benefits and make it difficult for him 
to obtain fresh work. He may challenge the dismissal in the courts or 
urge his union to press his claim before an industrial tribunal. In 
either forum, common law principles may defeat his claim. An isolated 
or trivial act of misconduct, a first offence, an oversight, a past 
indiscretion or an innocent act honestly and reasonably believed to be 
correct, might all justify summary dismissal. Even the employee*s 
private life is not beyond scrutiny. And here Victorian standards of 
morality may govern the employer's right of discharge. Further, an 
absence caused by a temporary infirmity of, say, two weeks, may put 
an end to the contract of servxce. 
In practice, industrial tribunals have, of course, mitigated 
the harshness of some common law principles but it is perhaps fair to 
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say that these bodies have not realised their potential as a buffer 
against the unbridled use of dismissal as a disciplinary measure. 
Although some ancient authorities are buried, they continue 
to rule from their graves. Revision of obsolete common law principles 
evolved in the nineteenth century has scarcely begun. And the 
persistence of a contractual approach to matters of discipline stifles 
reform. It hides the fundamental element of subordination inherent in 
the employment relationship and entrenches management's right to hire 
and fire. Thus a technical breach of the contract of service may 
justify summary dismissal. The employer is free to exercise his 
disciplinary power of dismissal inconsistently and indiscriminately. 
In short, the employer may make an example of an employee who steps 
just outside his contract of service. The foregoing analysis suggests 
that the law has not entirely abandoned the 'attitude of Czar-serf* 
found in some of the dismissal cases decided in the last century, 
5. Unlawful Dismissal 
Another form of dismissal is penalised by the various 
industrial arbitration and wages board statutes throughout Australia, 
79 
The relevant legislation prohibits victimisation on grounds of 
legitimate trade union or industrial activity. In most jurisdictions, 
it covers not only dismissals but also lesser forms of discrimination 
such as injuring a person in his employment. These lesser forms of 
victimisation may stop short of discharge but they nevertheless 
threaten an employee's job security. 
(i) The 'Victimisation Provisions* 
Section 5 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1973 
80 
(Cth) *may be regarded as typical* of these *victimisation provisions* 
It will be convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the section 
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in full. It provides as follows: 
81 (1) An employer shall not dismiss an employee, or injure him 
in his employment, or alter his position to his p r e j u d i c e , S 2 by-
reason of the circumstances83 that the employee -
(a) is or has been, or proposes, or has at any time proposed, 
to become, an officer, delegate or member of an organiz-
ation, or of an association that has applied to be 
registered as an organization;^^ or 
(b) is entitled to the benefit of an industrial agreement 
or an a w a r d ; o r 
(c) has appeared, or proposes to appear, as a witness, or has 
given, or proposes to give, evidence, in a proceeding 
under this Act;86 or 
(d) being ii member of an organization which is seeking better 
industrial conditions, is dissatisfied with his condit® 
ions? 87 Qj-
Ce) has absented himself from work without leave if -
(i) his absence was for the purpose of carrying out his 
duties or exercising his rights as an officer or 
delegate of an organization; and 
Cii) he applied for leave before he absented himself and 
leave was unreasonably refused or withheld;88 or 
(f) being an officer, delegate or member of an organization, 
has done, or proposes to do, an act or thing which is 
lawful for the purpose of furthering or protecting the 
industrial interests of the organization or its members, 
being an act or thing done within the limits of authority 
expressly conferred on him by the organization in accord-
ance with the rules of L:he organization, 89 
90 Penalty? Four hundred dollars. 
(lA) An employer shall not threaten to dismiss an employee, or 
injure him in his employment, or to alter his position to his 
prejudice -
(a) by reason of the circumstance that the employee is, or 
proposes to become, an officer, delegate or member of an 
organization, or of an association that has applied to 
be registered as an organization, or that the employee 
proposes to appear as a witness or to give evidence in a 
proceeding under this Act; or 
(b) with the intent to dissuade or prevent the employee from 
becoming such officer, delegate or member or from so 
appearing or giving e v i d e n c e o r 
(c) with intent to dissuade the employee, being an officer, 
delegate or member of an organization, from doing an act 
or thing of the kind in relation to which paragraph (f) 
of sub-section (l) applies. 
Penalty: rour hundred dollars. 
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(3) A reference in this section to an organization shall be 
read as including a reference to a branch of an organization. 
(4.) In any proceeding for an offence against this section, if 
all the facts and circumstances constituting the offence, other 
than the reason for the defendant's action, are proved it shall 
lie upon the defendant to prove that he was not actuated by the 
reason alleged in the charge.^^ 
(5.) Where an employer has been convicted of an offence against 
this section the court by which the employer is convicted may 
order that the employee be reimbursed any wages lost by him and 
may also direct that the employee be reinstated in his old 
position or in a similar position. 
(ii) Lack of Uniformity 
The victimisation provisions of the various industrial 
arbitration and wages board statutes provide a mosaic of distinguishing 
features. In some cases the differences in the sections relate to 
substantive, rather than procedural, issues. It will be sufficient 
to highlight just a few of the gaps in these provisions. 
Only the Queensland section penalises a refusal to employ 
95 
any person on the prohibited grounds of victimisation. Thus, in 
most jurisdictions, an employer recruiting labour after a temporary 
lay-off may refuse to re-engage employees who have been active in 96 legitimate trade union affairs. 
No state prohibits discrimination against candidates for 
union office or for the position of job delegate. Further, no state 
penalises discrimination against former officers, delegates or members 
of a trade union. And in those jurisdictions where boards of reference 
operate, the trade union representatives on these bodies are given no 
protection against victimisation. These are serious defects. Only in 
New South Wales are employees who complain to their union officials 
97 about their working conditions shielded from discrimination. 
Again,employees who are simply dissatisfied with their working conditions 
98 
are exposed to victimisation without redress in most jurisdictions. 
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99 1 Only the Queensland and federal statutes have made any 
attempt to prohibit intimidation which falls short of discharge. And 
2 
the Queensland provision itself is defective. 
No state protects shop stewards from discrimination even 
where the steward's actions are lawful, legitimate and authorised by 
the union. 
Taken overall, the sections most urgently in need of amendment 
are the Victorian and Western Australian provisions. Perhaps the law's 
failure to re-model the Victorian provision can be attributed to the 
small percentage of employees in that state who fall within the juris-3 
diction of the local statute. The same excuse cannot be pleaded for 
Western Australia: in that state the overwhelming majority of employees 4 
fall within the local jurisdiction. 
This lack of uniformity is appalling. In many cases employees 
are deprived of protection which the law could quite easily provide. If 
the industrial arbitration systems are to function effectively a total 
prohibition against all forms of victimisation on grounds of legitimate 
trade union or industrial activity is vital. In reference to a fore-
runner of the present section 5 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1904-1973 (Cth), Evatt J. pointed out: 
If an employee can be dismissed or prejudiced because, by joining 
a union, he becomes entitled to better conditions contained in an 
award of the Federal court, the whole system of industrial arbit-
ration would be threatened with destruction,^ 
In theory the unlawful dismissal provisions are a bulwark 
against victimisation; in reality many procedural and substantive pitfalls 
lie in the path of justice. It remains to consider these defects in 
greater detail. 
(iii) Who May Institute Proceedings? 
In federal jurisdiction, any person^ may institute proceedings 
in the Australian Industrial Court"^  challenging an unlawful dismissal. 
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The aggrieved party has an individual right of complaint, and an 
application for leave to prosecute is not necessary, 
(iv) Onus of Proof; The Prosecutor*s Onus 
In the Conunonwealth jurisdiction the complainant must prove 
the facts and circumstances constituting the alleged offence beyond 
g 
reasonable doubt. For example, a party who complains that he was 
discharged because of his trade union membership must establish, 
firstly, the fact of dismissal, and, secondly, that he was a trade g 
unionist. The Registrar's certificate confirming that the aggrieved 
party was a member of a trade union at a certain date is prima facie 
evidence of such membership at the date of dismissal^*^ but the issue 
of membership will be resolved upon the whole of the relevant 
11 
evidence. 
Again, where the complainant alleges that he was discharged 
because of his award entitlement, he must prove convincingly that the 12 
award was operative at the material time and that he was entitled to 
the benefits of the award. This will present no problem for employees 
who are members of a union which is a party to the award. But a 
non-unionist may not be 'entitled to the benefit' of the award which 13 governs his employment. Certainly he enjoys the benefit of the award 
14 but he has no right to enforce the award. 
(v) Onus of Proof; The Defendant's Burden 
A defendant charged with an offence under section 5 of the 
Commonwealth Act must prove on the balance of probabilities that he 
was not actuated by the reason alleged in the charge.^^ Thus, his onus 
is negative^ not positive; he need not prove why he dismissed his 
employee.^^ Nor is it necessary to show reasonable grounds for the 
dismissal 
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On the other hand, if the defendant chooses to submit 
evidence of the actual reason for the discharge, he will not be 
1 8 constrained in any way by the section. Where the reason advanced 
by the employer is petty or trivial, the tribunal will be all the 
19 more careful in scrutinising his motives. Nevertheless, the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of any doubt that remains in 
20 the mind of the court after reviewing the whole of the evidence. 
This brief account of the defendant's onus hints at the 
evidentiary obstacle faced by the complainant, Pearce v. W.D. Peacock 
21 
& Co. Ltd is a classic example of this problem. The case arose out 
of the dismissal of a unionist who, the employer alleged, was 
•dissatisfied*. It appeared that when the employer received a log 
of claims from the appropriate union a director of the company asked 
the unionist to sign a paper stating that he was satisfied with his 
working conditions. The unionist refused and was dismissed. 
The magistrate who first heard the matter accepted evidence 
from a director of the employer company to the effect that the employee 
had previously been content with his working conditions. Accordingly, 
the magistrate found that the employer was not motivated by the reason 
alleged in the charge. The employer was acquited. 
On appeal, the High Court sustained the magistrate's finding. 
Isaacs J., however, dissented. To Isaacs J. the facts were clear: 
the employer tried to coerce his employee into 'doing what might have 
been thought a disloyal act to the union, and might have caused him to 22 leave it - a step injurious both to the man and the union, .. . * . In 
fact, in His Honour's view, the employer's demand meant simply 'give 
23 
up your claim or your billet'. With respect, this conclusion seems 
to be a realistic appraisal of the evidence. 
Normally an appellate court will be reluctant to interfere 
with the trial judge's findings of fact. But in this case the evidence 
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on which the magistrate relied appears to be rather tenuous to say 
the least. The result is unsatisfactory: an employer escaped 
penalty for a blatant act of victimisation against an employee. 
More disturbing is the implication of the decision. It seems that 
an employer may simply assert that a dismissal was caused by the 
employee's general attitude, and the employer's subjective assessment 
of this attitude will determine the matter. While the specific 
24 problem raised by Pearce v. W.D. Peacock & Co. Ltd has been 
25 26 removed by amendments in the federal and Queensland spheres, this 
more general, evidentiary problem remains in all jurisdictions, 
(vi) Defences 
The tribunals have recognised that certain dismissals are 
justified even if the employee makes out a prima facie case of 
victimisation. Thus, where a dismissal can be attributed to misconduct, 
27 
28 29 incompetence, persistent absenteeism or even a general unco-operative 
attitude^^ the employer will not be penalised. Further, the tribunals 
have repeatedly affirmed that management has the right to reorganise 
31 
and reduce staff when an award increases operating expenses. The 
unlawful dismissal provisions are not intended to encroach upon this 
right. Nor are they designed to prevent an employer dismissing staff 32 because his operations have become unprofitable or because there is 
33 no suitable work available for his employees, 
34 
In one case, a company successfully pleaded the ignorance 
of one of its officers as a defence. The officer dismissed a union 
delegate on the ground that the delegate's involvement in certain union 
activities seemed to be inconsistent with the delegate's duties as the 
company's industrial officer. The company was able to establish that 
the officer was not aware the employee was a union delegate. Accordingly 
the charge was dismissed. 
139 
On the other hand, the circumstances of the case may raise 
an inference that the employer has infringed the victimisation 
provisions. Thus, where an employer peremptorily dismissed two 
experienced, efficient and satisfactory employees with long service 
records for refusing to carry out certain duties which the employer 
35 
did not, in fact, desire them to perform, the employer was penalised. 
Furthermore, evidence of the employer's opposition to the spread of 
unionism in his factory may tilt the scales in favour of a dismissed 
employee who was believed to be promoting union membership.^^ 
If an employer alleges that the dismissal is caused by a 
need to reduce staff, the fact that the aggrieved party is replaced 37 
immediately after his discharge may tell against the en^loyer. And 
it is not sufficient to claim blandly that the dismissal was motivated 
by economic reasons: the tribunal will normally expect the employer 3 8 to provide some evidence of the need for the cut-back. 
In some cases the inference from the facts is clear. Thus 
39 
in O'Gradey v. Cunliffe an employer was successfully prosecuted for 
discharging an enployee at 5.00 p.m. on the last day of the employee's 
testimony in proceedings against the employer for recovery of wages 
due under an award. The close contemporaneous connection between the 
employee's action in testifying and the employer's action of dismissal 
made this conclusion inevitable. But where there is a long time lapse 
of, say, three months, between the testimony and the dismissal it may 
be more difficult to draw an inference against the employer. 
(vii) Penalties 
A dismissal which defies the victimisation provisions is a 
40 . . 41 matter of grave concern to tiielegislatures. In a recent decision 
42 
Smithers J, described it as 'quite a serious offence*. Yet the 
penalties imposed upon offenders do not reflect this concern, A 
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monetary penalty of $ 2 0 0 o r even $400^^^ can hardly be 
expected to deter an unscrupulous employer from discrimination against 
employees on grounds of legitimate industrial activities. 
And even where victimisation is established some tribunals 
seem to be reluctant to impose the maximum penalty. In King v. Hickson's 
Timber Impregnation Co. (Aust.) Pty Ltd"^^ the Commonwealth Industrial 
Court levied only half the maximum penalty against an employer who 
dismissed six employees because they proposed to join a trade union. 
Spicer C.J. seemed to be impressed by the fact that the employer became 
tractable in the later stages of the proceedings. This persuaded him 
47 to impose a moderate penalty. Dunphy J. agreed with his decision. 
Smithers J., on the other hand, took a firmer stand. 
I think that the company went through this with a great deal of 
determination and has only repented at the end because of the 
inevitability of the position in which it found itself, faced 
with the prospect of incurring a serious penalty unless it 
changed its attitude. 
Although Smithers J. was inclined towards a harsher penalty, he ultimately 
agreed with the figure proposed by Spicer C.J. 
The gravity of an offence against the victimisation provisions 
cannot be overstressed. The penalty should fit the »crime*. 
(viii) Conclusion 
The unlawful dismissal provisions are not intended to confer 
upon employees who engage in legitimate trade union and industrial 
activity an immunity from dismissal. Rather they are designed to 
penalise employers who offend the provisions. These sections are 
hesitating steps towards ensuring that those who choose to play a role 
in the arbitration systems or who enjoy the benefits of those systems 
are not prejudiced in their employment. However a close scrutiny of 
the various victimisation provisions reveals alarming gaps and a 
distressing lack of uniformity in the protection afforded. In general, 
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the tribunals have interpreted these provisions in favour of the 
employer. The onus of proof sections make this inevitable. Further, 
the penalties imposed by the relevant legislation are grossly 
inadequate. 
SECTION 2; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
CHAPTER 6 EFFECT OF LIQUIDATION, RECEIVERSHIP AND TAKE-OVERS 
ON THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
Misconduct, inefficiency and disobedience are not the only 
causes of summary dismissal. Under certain circumstances, if a 
corporate employer goes into liquidation or receivership its employees* 
contracts of service will be instantly discharged. Again, the sale of 
a company*s business in a take-over may involve the summary dismissal 
of company employees, 
1. Liquidation^ 
The effect of company liquidation upon the contract of service 
depends upon the type of winding up involved. 
(i) Compulsory Winding Up 
In a compulsory winding up, the liquidation order serves as a 
notice of dismissal to all the company's servants as from the date of 
publication of the order. This rule originated in Re General Rolling 
2 
Stock Co. (Ltd), Chapman's Case where Lord Romilly M.R, took cognizance 
of the chamber's practice which treated the winding up order as 
equivalent to notice. Although Chitty J. in Re Oriental Bank Corpn; 
MacDowall*s Case^ conceded that the rule was 'founded upon good sense*, 4 
the judiciary has never offered an explanation of the principle. 
The automatic dismissal effected by a compulsory winding up 
order may expose the company to a claim for damages for breach of 
contract if the employee is entitled to a period of notice or was 
guaranteed a fixed period of employment in his contract.^ 
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A liquidator may waive the automatic notice of dismissal and 
require certain employees to continue in employment. If he does so, 
the employee's contract of service may be revived.^ But waiver is 
difficult to establish. The evidence of waiver must be unequivocal. 
7 
To quote Chitty J. in MacDowall*s Case; 'something must be done in 
g 
a clear and unmistakeable way*. There the liquidator simply allowed 
MacDowall to continue rendering to the corporation services analogous 
to those he provided before the liquidation order. This was not 
sufficient to establish a waiver. 
The duration, character and incidents of an employee's 
g 
employment after the winding up order may indicate that he was engaged 
by the liquidator under a fresh contract. But, once again, clear 
evidence is required. 
These rules are technical. The ordinary enployee could be 
excused if he were ignorant of the significance of a compulsory winding 
up order. 
(ii) Voluntary Winding Up 
A resolution to wind up a company does not, ipso facto, 
operate as a notice of dismissal to the company's employees,^^ Warrington 
J. established this principle in Midland Counties District Bank Ltd 
V, Attwood,^^ He sought to distinguish the effect of compulsory and 
voluntary liquidation upon contracts of service on the basis that, in 
the former there is an essential change in the personality of the company 
since the business is carried on by the court, not the company. 
12 
In Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. (Rams bottom) Ltd Scrutton L.J. 
exposed the weakness in this reasoning: in neither form of liquidation 
is there any change in the personality of the employer company until 
it is finally dissolved; in both forms, the company, not the liquidator, 13 employs the company's servants before and after the winding up. 
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It appears, then, that the explanation for the distinctive 
rule as to the effect of a compulsory winding up must lie elsewhere. 
Graham sees the rationale in the fact that: 
the effect of an order for winding up is to take the power of 
dealing with the assets of the company and carrying out any 
obligation of the company out of the hands of the company and 
to put them into the hands of an officer of the court.^ 
A voluntary winding up resolution, on the other hand, does not transfer 
this power to the court, it merely vests the power in the hands of a 
liquidator. Tlius, Graham's thesis revolves around the ability of the 
company to perform its contractual obligations: in a voluntary 
winding up this ability survives the resolution; in a compulsory 
winding up it ceases with the issue of the liquidation order. 
This theory ignores the fact that, in a voluntary winding 
up, the liquidator's power to honour the company's obligations under 
a contract of service is severely limited because the company's 
property is clearly trust property.^^ With the passing of the 
resolution, the company ceases to be beneficial owner of its assets.^ 
But this change in beneficial ownership may not deprive the 
liquidator of the power to carry out the obligations of the company 
in a contract of employment. The liquidator may, after all, carry on 
the business of the company so far as is necessary for its beneficial 
winding up.^^ And to quote Simonds J. in Re Great Eastern Electric 
18 Company Limited; 
If in the proper exercise of this statutory power he incurs 
obligations, those to whom he incurs them are entitled to be 
paid out of the assets of the company in priority to its 
creditors at the commencement of the winding up.^ 
Graham's theory meets a more formidable obstacle in U.C.A., 
section 227.^° This section provides that, in a compulsory winding up, 
the company is divested of the power of dealing with its assets from 
the date of presentation of the petition. Thus, the company may be 
unable to perform its contractual obligations after that date. But the 
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automatic discharge of company servants dates from the publication 
of the compulsory winding up order. 
Perhaps this discrepancy can be explained on the ground 
that the company's inability to perform its contracts becomes public 
and official when the winding up order issues. At this point the 
employees are deemed to know that the company has repudiated or will 
21 
repudiate its contracts. Before the order is published the 
company's repudiation has not, in theory, been communicated to the 
company servants. 
Furthermore, although the company's powers to perform its 
contracts are generally in abeyance after the presentation of the 22 
petition, some activities may be approved by the court both before 
and after the winding up order issues. Thus the company is not 
completely crippled by the presentation of a winding up petition. 
With the approval of the court, the company may still have the ability 
to perform its contractual obligations. It is the winding up order, 
not the petition, which ultimately paralyses the company. 
With the above qualifications, Graham's theory has some merit. 
It goes a long way towards explaining the reason for the peculiar rule 
applicable to a compulsory winding up. 
Given that there is a different rule for the effect of a 
resolution for voluntary liquidation, how may that rule be stated? 
Perhaps the best formulation is as follows: where it is clear to the 
employee in the light of all the surrounding circumstances that the 
resolution repudiates the company's obligations under the contract 
23 of service, then the resolution operates as a notice of discharge. 
If the company is unable to perform its contractual obligations this 
24 will be cogent evidence of repudiation. But the insolvency of the 
• • 25 ^ ^ . . 26 company is indicative, not decisive. 
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2. Receivership 
The impact of the appointment of a receiver or a receiver and 
manager upon contracts of service depends largely upon the mode of 
appointment. A receiver may be appointed by a court or by the company's 
debenture holders. 
Where a court appoints a receiver and manager at the instance 
of the debenture holders in an action by these creditors to enforce 
their security, the appointment itself automatically dismisses the 
27 company's employees. Similarly, if a receiver and manager is 
appointed by, and acts on behalf of, the debenture holders, the 
appointment operates as an automatic notice of discharge to the company's 
28 employees. 
By contrast, the appointment by debenture holders of a receiver 
and manager as agent of a company does not automatically terminate a 
29 
subsisting contract between the company and an employee. However, 
this contract will be automatically discharged in at least three cases. 
First, where the appointment was accompanied by the sale of the 
company's business,Second, where the appointee negotiates a fresh 
contract with the employee soon after his appointment provided the new 
agreement is inconsistent with the continuance of the employee's 
original contract with the company^ Finally, where the receiver and 
31 manager's role is inconsistent with the continuance of the employee's 
-u 32 contract. 
3. Take-Overs 
When the business of a company is taken over the assets of the 
company are normally transferred to the purchaser. But, apart from 
statute, a contract of employment cannot be assigned to the transferee 
without the consent of the employee^, Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated 
Collieries Ltd^^ makes this clear. There Lord Atkin stated firmly: 
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I confess it appears to me astonishing that apart from overriding 
questions of public welfare power should be given to a court or 
anyone else to transfer a man without his knowledge and possibly 
against his will from the service of one person to the service of 
another. I had fancied that ingrained in the personal status of 
a citizen under our laws was the right to choose for himself 
whom he would serve: and that this right of choice constituted 
the main difference between a servant and a s e r f . 3 4 
It follows that a transfer of the business of a company as the 
result of a take-over terminates the contracts of service of the company's 
employees. If this technical break in the employees' service is effected 
without the appropriate notice or wages in lieu thereof it will amount 
to a wrongful dismissal of the company's payroll. 
On the other hand, a transfer of the control of the company 
does not itself discharge the employees' contracts of service,^^ In 
effect, the identity of the employer has changed. Yet, in this case, 
the courts do not inquire whether the company employees have agreed 
to work under the new arrangement. 
4, Conclusion 
The rationale of the peculiar rule that a compulsory winding 
up order operates as a notice of dismissal to the company's servants is 
obscure. If the employee was entitled to a period of notice or 
employment for a fixed period his right to claim damages against the 
3 6 
company is preserved. The adequacy of this remedy will be considered 
37 
elsewhere. Where an employee's contract of employment is discharged 
by a compulsory winding up order but the employee agrees with the 
liquidator to continue in his employment, it may not be clear whether 
the employee is working under a revival of his former contract or a 
new contract with the liquidator. If an employee is confused as to the 
effect of the new arrangement he could suffer the fate of Mr MacDowall 
and lose both his right to notice and the right to claim damages in 
3 8 lieu thereof. The effect of a voluntary winding up upon contracts of 
148 
service appears to depend on an arbitrary standard - the particular 
circumstances of the case. In either type of winding up, an employee 
may have his contract terminated with little or no forewarning. 
Contracts of service may be discharged perfunctorily in 
consequence of a take-over or by the appointment of a receiver or a 
receiver and manager. Finally, a change in control may have a material 
effect upon an employee's future with a company but he has no right to 
be consulted about this development. 
SECTION 2; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
CHAPTER 7 REMEDIES 
1. Action for Damages 
An action for damages for breach of contract is the 
ordinary common law remedy of an employee wrongfully dismissed. Where 
the contract of service is due to commence at some future date and the 
employer indicates that he does not intend to honour his contractual 
obligations, the enployee may accept this repudiation and sue for 
damages immediately: the employer's conduct is an anticipatory breach 
of contract,^ In fact, the employee must sue promptly; he may not 
delay his action until the end of his term of hiring in order to 
2 claim the balance of the wages promised. 
(i) The Measure of Damages 
In the absence of an express provision stipulating an amount 
of liquidated damages,^ the measure of damages for wrongful dismissal 
is the pecuniary loss which flows naturally from the employer's breach 
of contract."^ To be included in the measure of damages an item must 
be of such a nature that it would have been contemplated by the parties 
as a possible result of the breach.^ 
(ii) The Scope of Damages 
Damages are intended to compensate the employee for loss of 
rj 
his wages or salary, not to punish the employer for breach of contract. 
Thus, the fact that the employer does not have a good reason for the Q 
discharge is immaterial. It will not warrant an increase in damages. 
Wages or salary will often be the sole factor for consideration 
g 
in computing the damages. This loss will be measured at the rate the 
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plaintiff was receiving at the time of his d i s c h a r g e . W a g e s earned^^ 
12 but not paid may also be taken into account. 
(a) No Damages for Personal and Financial Hardship 
Only in exceptional cases^^ will an employee be entitled to 
damages in respect of the loss of reputation occasioned by the 
14 15 dismissal. Nor will the manner of the dismissal or the injured 
feelings of the employee enter into the assessment. This remains 
true even where the manner of the employee's dismissal carries an 
17 imputation of dishonesty or incompetence. Further, damages will not 
be granted to compensate for the difficulty of obtaining fresh 
18 
employment nor the loss of prospects for advancement in the former 
19 position. 
(b) Fringe Benefits 
20 21 22 Benefits such as tips, commission, board and lodging, 
23 24 travelling expenses, the chance of winning a bonus and the loss 
25 
of an opportunity to make a profit on company shares may be considered 
in assessing the damages provided they were promised in the contract of 
service or were reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of ? 7 
entry into the contract as part of the possible loss resulting from a 
wrongful dismissal. Where the benefit is made contingent upon the 
employee serving the full term of his engagement he will not be 
entitled to damages in respect of the benefit even though the wrongful 2 8 dismissal prevented him from qualifying. 
(c) Supe rannuat ion 
Whether damages may be awarded for loss of superannuation 
benefits is a vexed question. Clearly, where the superannuation scheme 
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is founded on a discretionary basis and the employee has no contractual 
right to the benefits, he will not be entitled to damages for the loss 
29 of these benefits. If, on the other hand, the contract of employment 
provides for superannuation benefits, it seems that the employee may 
30 
recover damages for the benefits foregone. The actual amount of 
damages attributable to loss of superannuation benefits will depend 
upon the particular terms of the employer's scheme. The courts will 
examine these terms to ascertain what benefit the employee would receive 31 if he were lawfully dismissed. An amount equivalent to that benefit 
32 
is then included in the award of damages. This approach is consistent 
with the general rule that the plaintiff is entitled to an assessment of 
damages which represents the difference between his financial state at 
the time of the breach and what it would have been if the contract had 
been performed.^^ 
Where the employee's entitlement under his employer's scheme 
is 'vested* the award of damages will include the employer's 34 
contributions on behalf of the employee up to the time of dismissal. 
But the vast majority of schemes do not provide vested benefits.^^ In 
such cases damages for wrongful dismissal will merely reflect the 
employee's own contributions with or without interest.^^ In fact, the 
employee may be obliged, in some schemes, to prove that the dismissal 37 was unjustified in order to obtain a refund of his own contributions. 
It may be difficult for the dismissed employee to establish 
his entitlement to damages for these fringe benefits. Normally damages 
will be restricted to the amount of wages or salary the employee would 
have earned during the notice period. Even this meagre sum may be 
reduced in certain circumstances. 
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(iii) Mitigation of Damages 
In estimating the damages the jury may consider all that has 
happened, or all that is likely to happen, to increase or mitigate the 
38 
plaintiff's losses down to the day of trial. 
If the employee could have obtained almost immediately after 
his discharge alternative employment which a reasonable man would have 39 accepted, only nominal damages will be awarded. However, an employee 
is entitled to decline an offer of employment in a different capacity 
40 
and at a lower salary without reducing the amount of damages. Further, 
an employee may, in certain circumstances, reject an offer of re-
employment with his former employer on the same terms and still obtain 
41 42 more than nominal damages. In Yetton v. Eastwoods Froy Ltd a 
managing director who, after his dismissal, turned dowa his employer's 
offer of another position as an assistant managing director with his 
former emoluments was held to have acted reasonably in refusing the 
offer. The history of the relationship and the lower status of the 
position justified his refusal. 
On the other hand, the employee has a positive duty to 
43 mitigate the loss he sustains from the wrongful dismissal. He must 
44 
seek other suitable employment with reasonable diligence. 
Any wages or salary earned by the dismissed employee after 
the dismissal and before the expiry of the notice period will be taken 45 
into account in calculating damages. Moreover, if the wrongful 
dismissal gives the employee the time and opportunity to profit from 
a transaction, the profit will be deducted from the damages due to the 
employee. This is so even if the transaction involved an investment of 46 capital and the grant of a security by the employee. The onus of 
47 
establishing factors in mitigation of damages lies upon the employer. 
An employee who complies with his duty to minimise his damages 
and obtains other employment may ruin his chances of reinstatement. 
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Thus the law places the employee in a dilemma: if he finds another 
job he may be denied reinstatement; if he does not seek other 
employment his damages may be reduced. 
(iv) Damages; a Matter for the Jury 
Normally, assessment of damages is the province of the jury, 
but their award may be set aside if it appears that they have taken 
improper factors into account.^^ 
(v) Should Tax be Deducted from the Award of Damages? 
In Australia, damages for loss of wages or salary as a result 
of wrongful dismissal retain the character of income under section 25 
49 50 (l) or, arguably, section 26 (j) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936-1974 (Cth). Thus the employee will be entitled to recover the 
actual loss of wages or salary from his employer^^ without any deduction 
of income tax.^^ These damages are then taxable in the hands of the 
employee. 
2. Recovery of Wages due under the Award 
In Australia, an award employee who has been wrongfully 
dismissed will rarely seek a common law remedy of damages for breach 
of contract. He is more likely to urge his union or the industrial 
authorities to prosecute his employer for breach of the award governing 
his employment. The industrial tribunal in all Australian jurisdictions 
may impose a penalty^^ for such a breach and require the employer to 
54 
pay the employee any arrears of wages to which he is entitled. 
Normally the employee is also able to recover amounts due in lieu of 
annual leave and long service leave. But generally industrial tribunals 
have no jurisdiction to award damages for wrongful dismissal; this is 
reserved for the common law courts. On the other hand, if an employee 
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claims wages in lieu of notice under an award he is under no 
obligation to mitigate his damages,^^ 
3. Quantum Meruit 
In lieu of an action for damages, an employee who has been 
wrongfully dismissed may choose to sue his employer on a quantum 
meruit. This option is only available when the contract of service has 
been rescinded or determined.Starke J. expressed this principle 
57 
neatly in Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v. Watson. His Honour 
stated that the dismissed employee 'may elect to treat the agreement as 
rescinded and sue immediately on a quantum meruit for services actually 
rendered or he may sue immediately on the agreement for breach thereof 
in wrongly dismissing him from his employment, "But he cannot do 
both"*,^^ 
A claim for a quantum meruit is founded upon the defendant's 59 
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of the plaintiff's work. This 
presents no real obstacle in wrongful dismissal cases, 
A quantum meruit is calculated on the basis of the value of 
the work done and services rendered by the employee up to the time of 
the dismissal, Thus, an employee will rarely resort to an action 
for a quantum meruit^^ because he cannot thereby recover wages or 
salary for the period from the dismissal until the end of the proper 
period of notice; nor can he recover compensation for the wrongful 
dismissal. 
This last point is largely academic because when an employee 
sues for wrongful dismissal an allowance may be included in the damages 
which might, if the employee had so elected, have been recovered upon 64 a quantum meruit. 
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4. Declaration 
The traditional view that wrongful dismissal terminates the 
employment relationship irrespective of the employee's acceptance or 
rejection of this breach of contract^^ militates against the grant of 
declaratory relief. If the employer wrongfully discharges his employee, 
service is terminated, albeit in breach of contract.^^ By his action 
the employer clearly indicates that he will no longer assign work to 
the employee. This prevents the employee performing his normal 
61 
obligations under the contract of service. In these circumstances 
courts will not ordinarily declare that the employment relationship 
survives. 
The grant of declarations as a remedy for wrongful dismissal 
68 is usually restricted to employees who enjoy a statutory status. 
69 
McClelland v. Northern Ireland General Health Services Board may be 
a notable exception. McClelland's employment did not carry a 
statutory status. Why, then, was the declaratory relief granted? Her 
employment was subject to the approval of the Northern Ireland 70 Minister of Health and Local Government. This might suggest that 
71 
McClelland held a public post and enjoyed a permanent status. But 
none of the majority referred to this fact in their judgments. Their 
Lordships thought that the issue turned on a construction of the 
72 contract. 
73 74 Lord Goddard and Lord Evershed pointed out that the 
appellant's post resembled that of a civil servant whose tenure was, 
in practice, quite secure. In this sense the appellant's employment 
had a statutory flavour. 
Whatever may be the correct description of her position,one 
thing seems clear: the appellant's post did not involve an ordinary 
master-servant relationship. Moreover, the trend of subsequent 
decisions^^ implies that McClelland's Case"^^ may be regarded as an 
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exception rather than the rule. 
77 On the other hand, in Hill v. C.A. Parsons & Co. Ltd, the 
English Court of Appeal suggested that a declaration may be available 
to an ordinary employee in ill-defined 'special circumstances*. The 
78 majority relied upon Francis v. Kuala Lumpur Councillors as authority 
for this proposition. However the view of the Court of Appeal on the 
availability of declaratory relief is not consonant with established 
authorities and should be treated with caution. 
To sum up, an ordinary employee has only a remote prospect of 
79 obtaining a declaration challenging his dismissal. 
5. Injunction 
The courts have also steadfastly refused to grant injunctions 
vAich would, in effect, amount to an order of specific performance of the 
80 contract of service. There are several reasons for this approach. 
81 In De Francesco v, Barnum, Fry L.J. asserted that to grant 
specific performance would 'turn contracts of service into contracts of 
82 
slavery Although this statement implies that the employee's 
interests are being safeguarded, it merely entrenches management's 
right to hire and fire its employees. In general, no matter how eager 
a dismissed employee is to continue in his employment, neither common 
law nor equity will compel the employer to reinstate him. 
In addition, the employment relationship is regarded as an 
essentially personal arrangement dependent upon mutual confidence; 8 3 once lost, this confidence cannot be restored by a court order. Yet 
84 85 injunctions are used to enforce the creation or continuance of 
8 6 
other personal relationships. And courts have been prepared to 
enforce a negative covenant in a contract of service even though the 
court's order would effectively compel the employee to perform his 8 7 contractual obligations. 
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Courts are also reluctant to grant specific performance of 
a contract if such an order would require the continued superintendence 
88 
of the court. Too much can be made of this difficulty. Courts could 
compel compliance with their order through contempt proceedings. 
Alternatively they could appoint an officer of the court to ensure 89 
that their order is observed. 
Again, courts are chary of interfering with the parties* 
freedom of contract. One may doubt whether enployees enjoyed equal 
bargaining power with their enployers in the nineteenth century. 
Certainly in modern employment, this presumed equality of bargaining 
power is becoming increasingly attenuated. 
Further, specific performance is denied because damages are 90 
regarded as an adequate remedy. In many cases, this argument is now 
untenable. Damages are not sufficient compensation for the loss of a 
job and all its valuable incidental benefits. 
There is, however, some hint of a more relaxed attitude to 
injunctive relief in wrongful dismissal cases. In Hill v. C.A. Parsons 
91 
& Co. Ltd the appellant sought interlocutory relief to restrain the 
respondent company dismissing him. Hill was an engineer who had been 
employed by the company for thirty-five years. He was only two years 
off retirement. A union exerted pressure upon the company to ensure 
that all professional and technical company employees joined the union. 
The company purported to vary Hill's contract so as to require him to 
join the union. When the appellant refused, the company purported to 
terminate his contract by one month's notice. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal treated the company's 
action as a wrongful repudiation of the contract of employment. The 
remarkable feature of the case for present purposes was that both Lord 
Denning M.R, and Sachs L.J. granted an interim injunction even though they were, in effect, ordering specific performance of the contract of 
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service. 
Lord Denning M.R, found support for his conclusion in form 
92 
of the order made by Lord St Leonards in Lumley v. Wagner. In 
fact,the order in that case did not operate in the employee*s favour; 
it merely enforced a negative covenant which required the defendant 
not to sing for any other theatre or for any other concert manager 
or proprietor other than the plaintiff. And traditionally courts have 
been more prepared to enforce negative covenants on behalf of employers 93 
than to oblige employers to re-employ or reinstate dismissed employees, 
Sachs L.J. pointed out that the main grounds on which specific 
performance of a contract of service had been refused in the past did 94 
not exist in the present case. Above all, the mutual confidence which 
existed between the parties had not been impaired by the purported 
dismissal. 
The majority thought that damages were an inadequate remedy 
for the plaintiff since he would not be compensated for lost pension 
benefits or the difficulty he would have in securing alternative 
employment. Further, they refused to be restricted by what Lord 95 
Denning M.R. called 'the trip-wires of previous cases'. In their 
view, there was a need to modify the law to suit the realities of 
modern enployment.^^ 
Denning M,R. and Sachs L.J. were anxious to preserve the 
appellant's position until he could invoke the protection of the 97 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 which was not yet operative. With 
respect, this would seem to be an illegitimate judicial exercise. In 
effect, they anticipated the Act and attempted to confer upon the 
appellant rights which had not yet been created by the legislature. 
Moreover, they over-estimated the protection which that Act would 
_ 98 provide. 
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In his dissenting judgment, Stamp L.J, took an orthodox 
line. His Lordship conceded that damages may not have been an 
adequate remedy but he was not persuaded that an injunction should 
issue. 
Though the reasoning of the majority is suspect, the decision 
99 
on the particular facts appears just. Whether Hill's Case is the 
vanguard of a new judicial trend towards recognition of an employee's 
•property'^ in his job or merely an exceptional case restricted to its 
facts, remains to be seen. One writer suggests that the decision »may 
portend a changing attitude by the courts in considering equitable 2 
remedies available to employees and could be a major development*. 
But the fact that Hill's Case concerned an application for inter-
locutory relief prompts a more conservative assessment. As Stamp L.J. 
pointed out in his dissenting judgment, the proper role of an inter-
locutory injunction is to preserve the status quo until the matter 
4 is heard. 
Further, both members of the majority conceded that the case 
involved 'special circumstances',^ These 'special circumstances* may 
not exist in an ordinary wrongful dismissal. It may well be that 
Hill's Case^ will be confined to its particular facts. However if it 
does herald a new trend then the principles established by Australian 
industrial arbitration tribunals in reinstatement cases may provide 
useful guidelines for future development of injunctive relief in 
Australia, 
6. Reinstatement 
Ci) Federal Jurisdiction 
The employee who seeks a reinstatement order from the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has a hard rcw to 
hoe and little chance of success. The Commission's jurisdiction depends 
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upon the existence of an industrial dispute, a dispute 'as to 
industrial matters which extends beyond the limits of any one 
7 
State The term 'industrial matters' is defined as 'all matters 
g 
pertaining to the relations of employers and employees ...'. 
Further, it includes 'the right to dismiss or to refuse to employ, 
or the duty to reinstate in employment, a particular person or class g 
of persons ...', Does a claim for reinstatement of a dismissed 
employee fall within this description? 
(a) The Industrial Matter Hurdle 
In Australian Iron and Steel Ltd v. Dobb,^*^ the High Court 
considered a claim for reinstatement under the Coal Industry Act, 
1946-1951 (N.S.W.). The definition of 'industrial matters' in that 
Act opened with the words 'matters relating to the relations of 
employers and employees'. Thus, the description was almost identical 
to the introductory words of the definition of 'industrial matters' in 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1973 CCth), Dixon C.J., 
McTiernan, Webb and Fullagar JJ., Taylor J. dissenting, decided that 
these general opening words were sufficient to cover a dispute over 
the reinstatement of a dismissed employee. 
The Chief Justice, with whom McTiernan and Webb JJ. concurred, 
also decided that a reinstatement claim fell within paragraph (k) of 
the statutory definition. In his view, the 'duty to reinstate' was 
not confined to an 'antecedent legal duty';^^ this would be an 'absurd 
1 ? 
interpretation'. Rather the expression refers to*a question whether 
it is not obligatory or incumbent industrially upon the party to reinstate a particular person or class of persons in employme 4-t 13 nt'. 
14 
Thus, Dobb's Case suggested that the Commission may have 
jurisdiction to award an arbitral form of reinstatement. This 
suggestion was partially eclipsed by Re Association of Professional 
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Engineers; Ex parte City of Perth.^^ 
Re Association of Professional Engineers;^^ the facts 
Among the claims in letters of demand which the Association 
served upon local authorities in two states was the following clause: 
(a) That officers, in the event that their employment is 
terminated or who are dismissed, shall have the right to appeal 
against such purported termination or dismissal to the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission provided 
any such appeal is made within fourteen days of the purported 
termination or dismissal; 
(b) The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
shall determine whether or not the purported termination or 
dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and may make such 
settlement as it deems just in the circumstances. 
When a dispute over non-compliance with the letters of demand 
17 came before the Commission, Commissioner Portus commented that an 
award in the terms of the demand might involve an improper exercise of 
18 
judicial power. Nevertheless, the Commissioner recorded a finding 
that an industrial dispute existed as to 'the matter claimed in the 
letters of demand*. He also suggested that an award in somewhat 
different terms might not involve an exercise of judicial power, and 
he adjourned the hearing to allow the parties to consider an appropriate 
form for the award. When the hearing resumed, the Association tendered 
a draft award and the Commissioner expressed the view that an award 
could be made which would state (a) that except as provided in section 
5 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1972 (Cth) and by 
variations to the award a dismissed officer or one whose employment 
had been terminated should have no right to reinstatement or to monetary 
compensation except in accordance with his employment contract, and 
(b) that an officer, within fourteen days of termination of employment 
or dismissal, might apply for variation of the award to provide that 
the particular employer might be ordered to reinstate the officer or 19 might be ordered to pay monetary compensation. 
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The local authorities applied to the High Court for a writ 
of prohibition, 
Barwick C.J., Menzies and Stephen JJ. decided that the 
Association's claim could not be classified as an 'industrial matter*. 
It did not fall within the opening words of the statutory definition 
for it did not pertain to an existing employer-employee relationship. 
Rather, it involved the relations of a former employer and an ex-
employee . 
20 
This reasoning is inconsistent with Dobb's Case. In fact, 
21 Dobb's Case was not mentioned in the majority's judgments in Re 
22 Association of Professional Engineers. Further, the majority's 
reasoning relies heavily upon R. v. Hamilton Knight; Ex parte 
23 Commonwealth Steamship Owners* Association, which itself was an 
24 
unsatisfactory decision. Moreover, it may be argued that the 
principal issue between the Association and the local authorities was 
job security. Surely this issue directly relates to a current employer-
employee relationship. 
The majority also found that the rejection of the Association's 
demand did not create a dispute as to the authorities' 'right to 
dismiss'.^^ In the majority's view, the demand did not challenge this 
right. Rather, it sought to regulate the consequences of certain 
dismissals. Indeed, Stephen J., with whom Barwick C.J. and Menzies J. 
concurred, went so far as to suggest that dismissal or other termination 
by the employer was made *a condition precedent to the operation of the 
proposed right of appeal to the Commission*. But is this so? The 
Association's demand referred to the 'purported termination or dismissal'. 
Is it valid then, to assert that the Association did not dispute the 
authorities"right to dismiss'? 
Stephen J. conceded that the demand involved the employer's 
'duty to reinstate' in employment since reinstatement was a possible 
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outcome of an appeal to the Commission in pursuance of the proposed 
award. Nevertheless, he led the majority who characterised the dispute 
as one relating to the powers of the Commission, Thus, although the 
Association's claim fell squarely within paragraph (k) of the 
definition of'industrial matter^, the majority deftly avoided the 
conclusion that the dispute was as to an industrial matter by what 
appears to be a subtle sophism. Once again, it is important to note 
27 
that Dobb's Case was not even mentioned in the judgments. 
To attract federal jurisdiction it is not enough that a 
dispute relates to an industrial matter; it must also extend beyond 
the limits of any one state, 
(b) *Interstateness' Requirement 
Failure to satisfy this requirement proved fatal in R. v. 
28 
Gough; Ex parte Cairns Meat Export Co. Pty Ltd. There the relevant 
award preserved the company*s right of summary dismissal on grounds of 
inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct. The company purported to 
exercise this right by dismissing four employees from the *boning room* 
because it was not satisfied with their rate of work. The company then 
notified the Registrar of a threatened industrial dispute over the 
dismissals. The question of the company's right or power to discharge 
the workers eventually came before Commissioner Gough, The Commissioner 
found on the evidence that the dismissals were not justified. He 
ordered re-engagement of the workers with arrears of wages and without 
break in the continuity of their service. The company then applied to 
the High Court for a writ of prohibition. 
Dixon C.J. held that the dismissals did not create a new 
industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one state. McTiernan 
and Taylor JJ. concurred. 
164 
Thus, the orders could only survive if they were award 
variations within the ambit of the original interstate dispute on 
which the basic award was founded. The Chief Justice doubted whether 
a power of variation of the award had been exercised. He nevertheless 
concluded: 
But if there were any attempt to vary the award, I cannot see 
that it would have been within the original dispute. It would 
have required great foresight to make a dispute about these 
events, events which occurred three years later or at least 
two and one half year later, 
It appears then, that the dismissal of an individual employee 
or a small group of employees will rarely involve an interstate 
industrial dispute. Re Association of Professional Engineers^^ confirms 
this assessment. There the majority^^ found that the Association's 
demand was designed to provide machinery for the settlement of 
essentially local disputes between an ex-employee and his former 
32 employer. Such a demand was not arbitrable. 
(c) 'Judicial Power* Hurdle 
The final ground on which an application for reinstatement 
may flounder in federal jurisdiction appears in section 71 of the 
Constitution, If the determination of the application would involve 
an improper exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth it is 
not within the jurisdiction of the federal arbitral tribunal. Further, 
it is established that this judicial power may not be conferred upon 
33 
a tribunal whose primary function is arbitral. But would the 
Commission's decision upon a reinstatement application necessarily 
involve an exercise of judicial power? 
In R. V. Gough; Ex parte Meat and Allied Trades Federation of 
Australia^"^ a clause proposed for an award provided, in effect, that an 
employer should not harshly or unreasonably give notice of termination 
to a weekly employee or refuse to re-engage a regular daily employee 
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or refuse to re-employ any person employed by him in the preceding 
twelve months or dismiss an employee without notice. The second 
paragraph of the proposed clause stated: 'If any dispute arises 
under this Clause the Commission may on the Application of the Union 
order the reinstatement in employment or re-engagement or re-employment 
of any such employee*. This last phrase, *any such employee', was 
taken to mean any employee ®whose rights created by the first 
35 
paragraph of the clause have been violated'. 
The High Court unanimously held that the second paragraph 
of the clause could not validly be inserted in a federal award, 
Barwick C.J., Windeyer and Walsh JJ. found that the clause purported 
to confer judicial power upon the Commission. It involved the 
determination of legal rights and provided a remedy for their infringe-
ment, In the opinion of the Chief Justice, the clause called for 'the 
ascertainment and enforcement of existing rights, classically at the 3 6 
very heart of the exercise of judicial power*. Owen and Menzies JJ. 
felt it was sufficient to decide that the proposed clause did not 
involve an exercise of arbitral power: this, in itself, spelt 
invalidity. 
The message was clear: the power to decide upon legal rights 
and their enforcement by reference to any objective criteria or 
standards is a judicial function. The union in Re Association of 
Professional Engineers overlooked this message. There the claims 
in the Association's letters of demand attempted to confer two judicial 
functions upon the Commission. The first was the determination of the 
issue whether an appellant was an officer whose services had been 
terminated or who had been dismissed. The second was the decision 
whether the appellant's termination or dismissal was 'harsh, unjust 
or unreasonable*. Clearly both these functions would require the 
Commission to exercise judicial power. Thus, on the authority of 
166 
38 R. V. Gough; Ex parte Meat and Allied Trade Federation of Australia 
this clause could not validly be inserted in the award. 
Does this mean that no reinstatement application can evade 
the 'judicial power* obstacle? If instead of providing objective 
standards by which a dismissed employee's rights could be determined, 
the award gave the Commission an arbitrary, unfettered discretion to 
entertain a reinstatement claim, then perhaps this would not offend the 
•judicial power* injunction, Gibbs J, concedes this in Re Association 
39 of Professional Engineers. But the question then arises: can the 
award give the Commission power to back up the exercise of its unbridled 
40 
discretion by a reinstatement order? Gibbs J. believed that it could. 
Yet this would come dangerously close to enforcing an award, a matter 
reserved for the Australian Industrial Court. 
(d) Conclusion 
While a dispute over a wrongful dismissal may concern the 
•right to dismiss^, it may not involve the *duty to reinstate* for 
there is no legal duty to reinstate a wrongfully dismissed employee. But a 
duty to reinstate may possibly be created 'in the future*. Yet, even 
if this argument is accepted, a claim for reinstatement is not, on the 
current law, an 'industrial matter*: it does not pertain to an existing 
employer-employee relationship. 
In addition, a dispute over reinstatement of an employee 
wrongfully dismissed would rarely satisfy the 'interstateness* 
requirement. Even if it did, the Commission would be precluded from 
ordering the relief sought since this would involve a judicial function. 
Similarly, the Commission could not order reinstatement of 
an employee whose dismissal, although lawful, was harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable. Once again the dispute would not involve a current 
employer-employee relationship. Nor would it normally have the 
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necessary interstate character. And to decide the threshold question 
whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable would involve a 
judicial function. Further, to order reinstatement in such cases 
might amount to enforcement of the award, another judicial exercise, 
(e) Reinstatement in Practice 
Notwithstanding these jurisdictional fetters, the Commission 
entertains applications for reinstatement of employees wrongfully 
dismissed and employees whose dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, 
41 It does not, and cannot, order reinstatement but it does often 
42 recommend or direct reinstatement in these cases. This reinstatement 
•jurisdiction* appears to be based upon the parties* consent to be 
43 
bound by the Commission's decision. Since the direction of 
reinstatement is not enforceable one may doubt its utility. On the 
other hand, the practical realities of the industrial arbitration 
system ensure that the Commission*s recommendations will not be taken 
lightly. It will be sufficient to give a brief sketch of the 
Commission's practice. 
(f) Wrongful Dismissal Cases 
The Commission has evolved several principles in exercising 
its de facto jurisdiction to direct reinstatement in wrongful dismissal 
cases. It scrutinises the circumstances surrounding the dismissal 
carefully. If it appears that the discharge was justified,the 
44 
Commission will rarely interfere with the employer's decision. 
Further, reinstatement will not normally be recommended where the 
employee resigned from his position. Thus an employee who is forced 
to resign because of his employer's oppressive conduct towards him 
may be denied protection^ In addition, the remedy of reinstatement 
is easily lost by d e l a y . E v e n if reinstatement is directed, the 
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Commission may stipulate that the arrangement is to lapse if it 
47 appears that there is insufficient work available for the employee, 
(g) Lawful Dismissal Cases 
Subject to the ^victimisation provisions* of the industrial 
48 arbitration and wages boards statutes, an employee dismissed with 
the requisite period of notice may not complain that his dismissal 
49 
was wrongful. The remedy of reinstatement is thus vitally important 
to an employee who has been lawfully, though harshly, unjustly or 
unreasonably, dismissed. 
Where it appears that a summary dismissal, although technically 
justified,may have harsh, unjust or unreasonable consequences for the 
employee, the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission may 
recommend reinstatement.^*^ 
On the other hand, the Commission has no power to order re-
instatement of an employee dismissed in accordance with an award,^^ 
Thus, an employee discharged with the one week's notice prescribed in 
the award is not entitled to reinstatement if the dismissal is harsh, r ^ 
unjust or unreasonable. In Wilson and Gorman Pty Ltd v. Australian 
Timber Workers* Union,^^ J.M. Galvin, Chief Conciliation Commissioner, 
upheld management's right to dismiss an employee with the appropriate 
notice, but he urged management to give the employee another chance. 
Although management decided to re-employ the worker in that case the 
fact remains that the Commissioner did not purport to order 
reinstatement. 
After hearing evidence of the circumstances surrounding the 
dismissal, the Commission may conclude that reinstatement is not 54 warranted. Thus, in Association of Architects v. Olympic Cables Ltd, 
the Commission refused to recommend reinstatement of an employee 
dismissed with wages in lieu of notice because of his membership of 
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the Communist Party, It decided that the employer could not be 
obliged to employ a person whom the employer found unacceptable for 
any reason. This decision has far-reaching implications. By parity 
of reasoning, the Commission might not be willing to recommend 
reinstatement of an employee dismissed on the ground that he had 
red hair or a beard. 
The power to direct reinstatement is discretionary and the 
applicant must establish that the Commission's intervention is 
justified.^^ It is not enough that the dismissed employee will 
suffer financial detriment or be disturbed in the normal pattern of 
his life;^^ special circumstances are normally required to establish 
57 that the dismissal is harsh and unreasonable. Further, the 
Commission will exercise its power to direct reinstatement in cases 
5 8 of lawful dismissal with the greatest caution. It occasionally seeks 
guidance in the principles established by New South Wales tribunals 
59 
exercising their reinstatement jurisdiction. 
(ii) New South Wales 
(a) Wrongful Dismissal Cases 
None of the jurisdictional limitations which circumscribe 
reinstatement in the federal sphere apply in New South Wales. There 
Conciliation Committees and the Industrial Commission are empowered 
to determine 'industrial matters*. The statutory definition of this 
term in the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended CN,S.W.) 
differs significantly from its federal counterpart. It includes 
*the right to dismiss or refuse to employ or reinstate in employment 
any particular person or class of persons therein 
Armed with this jurisdiction, the industrial tribunals order 
r - - •, A 
reinstatement if the employer abuses his right of dismissal. An 
application for reinstatement may only be made by an industrial union 
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of which the dismissed employee is legally entitled to be, and is in 
fact, a member,^^ 
A reinstatement order or award may not take effect from a 
date earlier than the day on which the application was lodged with 
the Registrar,^^ This principle may deprive an employee of wages to 
which he should be entitled. This will certainly be true where the 
employee's union engages in protracted negotiations with the employer 
over the dismissal before resorting to an industrial tribunal for 
reinstatement. 
Reinstatement will not normally be ordered where it appears 
that the summary dismissal was justified. Thus, an employee who is 
dismissed for speaking to management's representatives in a threatening 
6 7 or abusive manner or for an unco-operative attitude in his work will 
be refused reinstatement.^^ An unreasonable refusal^^ or neglect of 
70 71 duty will also disentitle an employee. In one case, an employee 
was dismissed for his refusal to perform a certain task even though he 
did not know the safe way of doing the job. The tribunal rejected his 
claim for reinstatement: it was enough that he would have seen the 
72 
job done and known that it could be done safely. Mere unfitness or 
73 inefficiency may disqualify an employee from obtaining an order. 
Further, an employee dismissed for dishonesty has little chance of 
74 obtaining a reinstatement order. 
It appears then, that reinstatement has been refused in some 
cases where the employee's misconduct was somewhat trivial. Moreover, 
75 reinstatement is a discretionary remedy. It may not be available 
where it appears that the employer does not have enough work for the 
7 6 employee. Yet compensation will not, it seems, be available in lieu 
77 
of reinstatement in these cases. 
Subject to these minor criticisms, industrial tribunals in 
New South Wales have, through their reinstatement jurisdiction, 
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substantially curtailed abuse of management's right of summary 
dismissal. 
Cb) Lawful Dismissal Cases 
The term *right« in paragraph (c) of the statutory definition 
78 
of 'industrial matters' has been interpreted as *not referring 
solely to a legal right, but as referring to the propriety, as a 
matter of fairness and justice, of doing in particular circumstances 79 
that which admittedly an employer has a legal right to do*. 
Thus, the New South Wales Industrial Commission and other 
tribunals empowered to determine industrial matters have jurisdiction 
to order reinstatement where a dismissal, although lawful, was harsh, 80 unjust or unreasonable. This jurisdiction is now firmly established. 
81 In Western Suburbs District AiTibulance v. Tipping, McKeon 
J. collected the main principles which may be extracted from the early 
82 
decisions upon the reinstatement jurisdiction. It is sufficient for 
present purposes to examine some of these guidelines. 
Firstly, the Commission has repeatedly affirmed management's 83 right over the selection and retention of its employees. Only where 
84 
the employer abuses his right of dismissal by acting harshly, 
unfairly, unjustly^'^ or oppressively^^ will the Commission interfere 
with management's decision. Further, an order for reinstatement will 
only be made in exceptional circumstances where a strong case for 87 intervention is established. And it is incumbent upon the applicant 
to call sufficient evidence to justify the Commission overruling the 
88 employer's right of dismissal. The Commission will inquire into 
the circumstances of the dismissal and each case must turn on its 
89 own particular facts. Finally, there is some doubt whether the 
Commission should take into account the likely practical outcome of a 
90 reinstatement order in exercising its discretion. The authorities 
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indicate how these basic principles have been applied in practice. 
Where Dismissal was Excessive Punishment 
The Commission has shown an alacrity to intervene where the 
91 dismissal was a severe penalty for the employee*s conduct. Thus, 
where the employee*s conduct amounted to a trivial breach of a company 
92 rule, the employee was reinstated. Again, an employee dismissed for 
his refusal to obey a lawful instruction was granted reinstatement 
because his refusal was attributable to a conscientious religious 
93 belief. Similarly, disobedience which the employee genuinely and 
reasonably believed was justified in the circumstances will not preclude 
94 the employee obtaining a reinstatement order. In addition, if it is 
unreasonable to hold the employee responsible for damage to company 
95 property, the Commission will order reinstatement. 
Manner of Dismissal 
The manner of dismissal may also persuade the Commission to 
96 order reinstatement. Accordingly where a company gives no reason for 
the dismissal of a long serving employee, the Commission will not 
97 hesitate to direct reinstatement. Again, the fact that the dismissed 
employee was given no caution or warning prior to his discharge may be 
98 good grounds for reinstatement. 
Discretionary Remedy 
As reinstatement is a discretionary remedy, the employee may 
disqualify himself by his past conduct. An unsatisfactory work 
99 
performance may tilt the balance against an employee. Where an 
employee in a responsible position maintained a pattern of lying and 
deceit for his ov/n purposes, he was denied reinstatement.^ In one 
case, the Commission accepted the evidence of management representatives 
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that they did not have a high opinion of the employee's work as 
2 sufficient justification for dismissal of the employee. 
The Commission's exercise of discretion has, in some cases, 
been quite favourable to the employer. Thus, if the employer has no 
work available for the employee, reinstatement may be refused even 
though the employee has made out a case for the Commission's inter-
3 vention. Further the fact that the dismissal may cause an employee 
4 5 
hardship is not sufficient to justify reinstatement. In one case, 
five employees with 'long or considerable' service were dismissed from 
their positions with a municipal council because of their association 
with a different political organization from that to which the members 
of the employer body belonged. On the authorities, the Commission 
declined to interfere with the dismissals. 
The New South Wales decisions on this exercise of 'arbitral* 
jurisdiction to order reinstatement are particularly important because 
they influence industrial tribunals in other jurisdictions.^ 
(iii) Queensland 
(a) Wrongful Dismissal Cases 
In Queensland, jurisdiction to determine 'industrial matters' 
is vested in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.^ 
g 
The definition of 'industrial matters' in the relevant Act includes 
a sub-paragraph which corresponds with section 5, paragraph (c) of 
9 
the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940, as amended (N.S.W.). It would 
appear then, that the Queensland Commission has power to order 
reinstatement in cases of wrongful dismissal. 
Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Qld v. M.R. Hornibrook 
(Pty) Ltd^*^ is an example of the exercise of this jurisdiction. The 
company asserted that the employee concerned was sacked because he 
abused a foreman and refused to work on after normal finishing time on 
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a Saturday. Commissioner Pont who heard the matter found that the 
foreman had acted unreasonably and ordered the reinstatement of the 
dismissed worker with back-pay from the date of the dismissal. 
(b) Lawful Dismissal Cases 
Paragraph (c) of the statutory definition of 'industrial 
matters* in the Queensland statute^^ is distinctive. It reads as 
follows: 
any question whether any particular person or persons or class 
of persons ought (having regard to public interests, and 
notwithstanding the common law rights of employers or employees) 
to be continued or reinstated in the employment of any particular 
employer ; ... 12 
In R, V. The Industrial Court and the Honourable Mostyn 
Hanger, President of the Industrial Court,and Mount Isa Mines Ltd,^^ 
the Queensland Supreme Court stressed that the power to order reinstate-
ment under this paragraph must only be exercised after 'considering and 
14 
giving weight to all relevant circumstances*. Mere discrimination 
against the applicants is not enough to warrant interference with the 
employer's right to dismiss without stating a reason,^^ Nor will 
actual or anticipated industrial unrest in the circumstances of a case 
be, in itself, a sufficient basis for directing reinstatement,^^ 17 
The criterion of 'public interest' is nebulous. Until 
authorities establish its ingredients the protection afforded by the 
paragraph appears inadequate. Jurisdiction to order reinstatement in 
these cases turns on matters extraneous to the employment and upon 
factors over which the particular employee may have no control. Yet 
the essential issue in these cases should be whether the employer has 
abused his right of dismissal in such a way as to warrant intervention 
by the Commission. 
In spite of these limitations, it appears that the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction to order 
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reinstatement where the employer has acted unfairly, harshly or 
1 8 
unjustly in exercising his right of dismissal. It is not yet 
clear whether this jurisdiction is founded upon paragraph (c) or 
paragraph (d) or, in fact, both these paragraphs of the statutory 19 
definition of 'industrial matters*. But it seems certain that 
the principles evolved by the New South Wales Industrial Commission 
exercising its 'arbitral* jurisdiction to order reinstatement in 20 lawful dismissal cases will be applied by the Queensland tribunal. 
(iv) South Australia 
(a) Jurisdictional Basis 
Section 15 (l)(e) of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, 1972 (S.A.) confers upon the Industrial Court of 
South Australia jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to 
21 
whether a dismissal was *harsh, unjust or unreasonable*. Paragraph 
(e) echoes much of the language of the former section 26 (2) of the 
Industrial Code, 1967-1972 (S.A,), but there is one essential 
difference: the new provision covers dismissals which are harsh, 
unjust or unreasonable; the old sub-section referred to dismissals 
which were harsh, unjust and unreasonable. Since the present 
prescription is expressed disjunctively it is now only necessary to 22 
prove that one of the adjectives applies to the dismissal. This 
difference is substantive and substantial. 
Referring to the tests applied under the pre-existing 
legislation, Olsson J,, Deputy President of the Industrial Court, 
stated: 
I am by no means convinced that they necessarily fully cover 
the whole field contemplated by the present legislation. In 
particular questions of unreasonableness appear to me to involve 
concepts which are rather different from the more extreme 
connotations of harshness and injustice. 
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The Industrial Court is empowered to direct the employer 
to re-employ the dismissed employee in his former position on terms 
that are not less favourable than those enjoyed by the employee prior 
24 
to his dismissal. An employer may also be ordered to pay to the 
employee an amount equivalent to the wages he would have earned had 
he been employed in his position between the dismissal and the date 25 
of re-employment. A successful applicant will not, however, be 
awarded costs.^^ 
Applications for re-employment must be made within twenty-27 
one days from the date of the dismissal. While a prompt re-employment 
is desirable in most cases, this limitation period does seem to be 
unnecessarily short. If the employee's union becomes involved in 
lengthy negotiations over the voluntary reinstatement of the employee, 
this interval could easily be exceeded. 
The sub-section does not make it clear who shall be allowed 
to make an application for re-employment but normally the applicant 
will be the dismissed employee. 
(b) Wrongful Dismissal Cases 
28 
Geracitano v. Grote Street Service Station involved an 
application for re-employment under the former section 26 (2). The 
applicant was summarily dismissed when he refused to obey his employer's 
direction to take his annual leave during a period of slackness, such 
direction being contrary to the relevant award. The Industrial 
Commission had no hesitation in ordering the re-employment of the 
applicant. It rejected the respondent's submission that the personal 
ill-feeling generated by the dismissal would make the work situation 
intolerable in the small scale business. Clearly a similar decision 
could be reached under the present legislation. 
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(c) Lawful Dismissal Cases 
An early decision suggested that section 26 (2) did not 
extend to the situation where the employer terminated his employee's 
contract of service by giving the appropriate period of notice or 
29 
wages in lieu thereof. This suggestion was refuted by subsequent 
30 decisions, and it seems clear that section 15 (l)(e) of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1972 (S.A.) applies to dismissals 
31 with the proper notice. 
Manner of the Dismissal 
The manner in which management handles a dismissal may 
justify a re-employment order. Thus, in Minchin and Gorman v. St 
32 
Judes Child Care Centre, the fact that no warning preceded, and no 
reason accompanied, the dismissals clearly influenced the Industrial 
Court to grant the relief sought under the present section 15 
Consequences for Dismissed Employee 
Under the former legislation the consequences of the 
dismissal upon the individual employee were not regarded as significant 
factors. Blacker v. Ashford Community Hospital Incorporated^"^ 
indicates that the impact of the dismissal upon the applicant may be 
35 decisive under the new Act. 
Harsh Decisions 
The Industrial Court's exercise of the new jurisdiction is 
not without blemish. In one case,^^ an employee was dismissed for an 
alleged failure to follow instructions formulated by the company's 
house manager requiring that all items found in the rubbish were to be 
handed over to the supervisor. Bleby J. absolved the applicant from 
any intention other than to return both the items in question to the 
178 
employer's custody, although through a means other than the correct 
channel. Yet His Honour ruled that the dismissal was not harsh, unjust 
or unreasonable and refused to order re-employment. 
37 
Further, in Merrett and Davis v. Ralph McKay Ltd, the 
Industrial Court suggested that a dismissal for refusal to join a trade 
union might not be harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In that case, the 
applicants were in fact dismissed with notice when their refusal to 
join a trade union seemed certain to cause strike action by the other 
employees of the company. Bleby J. found that all the circumstances 
surrounding the dismissal had to be considered. Among these circum-
stances, of course, was the position of the employer. On this basis, 
the dismissals were not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. While this 
decision may have been politic because of the industrial relations 
problem faced by the company, it does ignore the effect of the dismissal 
upon the individual employees concerned. 
In general, however, section 15 (l)(e) ensures that the 
employer's right to hire and fire will be exercised responsibly or, 
at least, that unreasonable dismissals will not be sustained. But it 
does not completely override the employer's right of dismissal. To 38 quote Olsson J. in Kilworth v. Zweck; 
there must be a fair and reasonable explanation for the dismissal 
which could extend, of course, to aspects such as a down-turn in 
the employer's business, a bona fide restructuring of the 
business or of staff, or some other aspect of the employer's 
operations which, when viewed in its true perspective, could be 
considered by fair-minded persons as being a totally legitimate 
reason for action actually taken. 
(v) Western Australia 
(a) Jurisdictional Basis 
Under section 61 (2)(d) of the Industrial Arbitration Act, 
1912-1971 (W.A.), the Industrial Commission of Western Australia was 
denied the power to order an employer to re-employ any worker unless, 
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in the opinion of the Commission, the employer was participating in 
a lock-out or the employer had victimised the worker because of his 
industrial activities. The implication was that section 61 (2)(d) 
specified the only grounds on which reinstatement could be ordered 
by the Commission. Indeed, in Building Trades Association of Unions 
of Western Australia, Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union, 
40 
Western Australian Branch v. N.J. Hurll & Co. (Vic.) Pty Ltd the 
Commission decided that it had no jurisdiction to award reinstatement 
in cases other than those covered by the sub-section, 
A recent amendment^^ repealed section 61 (2)(d), But it is, 
at present, not entirely clear whether this amendment removes a 
restriction upon the Commission's jurisdiction to order reinstatement 
or simply abrogates the Commission's former power to direct reinstate-
ment in victimisation cases. 
(b) Wrongful Dismissal Cases 
Whatever may be the theoretical foundation of the jurisdiction 
in these cases, reinstatement applications are frequently heard and 
determined by industrial tribunals in Western Australia. 
Compulsory conferences often result in a recommendation that 
the dismissed employee be reinstated but these recommendations are 
apparently not binding upon the employer: in some cases the parties 
42 
agree to accept any recommendation which the Commissioner may suggest; 
in others the employer has simply refused to abide by the Commissioner's 
recommendation . Even if it appears in the course of the conference 
that the employer has abused his right of summary dismissal, a 44 ^ 
direction for reinstatement will not automatically ensue, in some 
instances, the Commissioner has merely suggested that the employment 
45 
be terminated in accordance with the award provision. 
Employees who have been wrongfully dismissed have fared 
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little better when the parties agree at a compulsory conference to 
have the matter determined by the presiding Commissioner. In 
Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Union of Workers of Western 
46 Australia v. Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd, Commissioner Kelly found that 
the employee's summary dismissal was unjustified yet he directed merely 
that the employee be paid one week's pay in lieu of notice. In another 
47 case where a worker was wrongfully dismissed, the Commissioner 
declined to order reinstatement. On the other hand,the Commissioner 
48 determining the dispute will occasionally award reinstatement. 
(c) Lawful Dismissal Cases 
Conciliation Commissioners at compulsory conferences commonly 
recommend reinstatement of employees lawfully dismissed if the 
49 
dismissals were harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The efficacy of 
these recommendations depends largely upon the agreement of the 
employers to comply with the Commissioner's proposal.Moreover, the 
Commissioners appear reluctant to recommend reinstatement when the 
employer has acted in observance of award provisions,^^ 
Where the parties formally agree to have the dispute 
determined by the presiding Commissioner, he will examine the circum-
stances surrounding the dismissal to ascertain whether the employer 
has been unfair. But the fact that the dismissal may be harsh or 
that the employer should have taken other factors into account before 52 
discharging the employee is immaterial. 
Trades and Labour Council Disputes Committee v. Midland 
Junction Abattoir Board'^^ provides an illustration of the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction to determine a reinstatement claim. There, the employer 
dismissed certain employees striking in protest over the discharge of 
another worker. The employer was directed to re-employ the striking 
employees without loss of accrued or accruing entitlements. 
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54 In a recent decision, Commissioner Kelly summarised the 
reinstatement jurisdiction in the following statement: 
To justify making an order for reinstatement it is necessary for 
me to find that the Company had no right to terminate [the 
worker's] contract of employment, or, if it had that right, that 
it exercised it in a harsh, unreasonable or unjust way.^^ 
So formulated, the Western Australian jurisdiction corresponds closely 
with its South Australian and New South Wales counterparts. 
(vi) Tasmania 
In Tasmania, section 23 (2)(d) of the Wages Boards Act 1920 
(Tas.) precludes a board determining any matter relating to the 
•dismissal, or reinstatement of any particular employee or particular 
class of employees'. But a compulsory conference convened by the 
Minister may hear such a claim,^^ and the person presiding may order 
reinstatement of the employee dismissed. If the employer disregards 
57 
this order he is liable to a penalty. It would seem that reinstate-
ment would be available both in cases of wrongful and lawful, but 
harsh, dismissal. 
(vii) Victoria 
The powers of wages boards in Victoria are defined by section 
30 (1) of the Labour and Industry Act 1958 (Vic.). There is no 
express provision empowering Victorian wages boards to direct reinstate-
ment. The term 'non-employment* in section 30 is vastly different from 
words such as 'reinstatement' and 're-employment' on which jurisdiction 
is based in some of the other states. 
Further, the general words in section 30 (l) might be construed 
in the light of the basic principles of statutory interpretation. One 
such principle is that, since every citizen is at liberty prima facie 
to carry on his business in his own way within the law, it will not be 
held that the legislature has intended by any statute to restrict that 
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liberty unless it has expressed that intention by plain words or by 
58 
necessary implication. Moreover, when general words are inserted 
in a statute they will ordinarily be given no wider meaning than is 
necessary to carry into effect the Act's object and purpose.^^ On 
the other hand, it has been held that the general words in the 
opening paragraph of the definition of 'industrial matters* in other 
jurisdictions authorise industrial tribunals to award reinstatement.^*^ 
In Austral Bronze Co. Pty Ltd v. Non-Ferrous (Metal Strip) 
Wages Board,^^ Banbury C.J. examined the purpose of the Tasmanian 
wages boards system at length. His Honour concluded that a wages 
board was constituted as a subordinate legislative body for the 
purpose of making determinations 'of general application prescribing 
terms and conditions of employment in respect of the trade for which 62 it is established A wages board could not, therefore, direct 
the reinstatement of an employee as this would involve the exercise 
6 3 
of judicial or arbitral functions. Moreover, since an application 
for reinstatement does not relate to the 'direct current mutual 
relations of employers and employees', it could not be entertained 
by a wages board. 
The wages boards system which operates in Tasmania is broadly 
similar to that which exists in Victoria and, it is submitted, the 
reasoning in the Austral Bronze Case^^ is equally relevant in the 
Victorian context. Thus it appears wages boards in Victoria may not 
order reinstatement. 
The Victorian Industrial Appeals Court heard an application 
for reinstatement in Collard v. L.F. Pratt Motor Cycles Pty Ltd.^^ 
Although it found that the employee had been wrongfully dismissed, it 
did not order reinstatement; it merely held that the employee was 
entitled to one week's notice or wages in lieu thereof. The unofficial 
report of this case does not disclose whether the application was 
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rejected on jurisdictional grounds but it implies that even if the 
jurisdiction exists the Industrial Appeals Court is reluctant to 
exercise it. 
To this point remedies for wrongful dismissal and lawful 
dismissals which are unjust, harsh or unreasonable have been examined. 
It remains to consider the remedies provided for an employee dismissed 
in breach of the 'victimisation provisions*. 
(viii) Unlawful Dismissals 
In the federal sphere, the Australian Industrial Court is 
empowered to direct the reinstatement of an employee victimised for 
his legitimate trade union or industrial activity.^^ This provision 
is undoubtedly valid since it is incidental to the Federal Parliament's 
6 8 
power to make laws under section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution. It 
appears then, that the complainant need not establish an interstate 
industrial dispute in order to invoke section 5 of the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1904-1973 (Cth). Moreover, since the jurisdiction 
is vested in the Australian Industrial Court, section 71 of the 
Constitution is satisfied. 
The power to order reinstatement of employees dismissed or 69 demoted in contravention of section 5 is discretionary, and will 
70 only be exercised in special circumstances. A delay in instituting 
proceedings under section 5 may prejudice the employee's chance of 
71 
regaining his position. Further, the fact that the employee 
discharged has obtained other employment which is not 'materially less 
beneficial' than employment with the defendant employer may persuade 72 the Australian Industrial Court to refuse reinstatement. 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1961-1974 
73 
(Qld) contains a provision substantially similar to section 5 of the 
federal Act.^'' In Queensland, the jurisdiction to order reinstatement 
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in victimisation cases is conferred upon the Industrial Court 
or an industrial magistrate.^^ Similarly in New South Wales the 
Industrial Commission or an industrial magistrate may direct reinstate-
ment of employees dismissed in breach of section 95 of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended (N.S.W.).^^ 
Section 61 (2)(d) of the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1912-
1971 (W.A.) gave the Industrial Commission of Western Australia power 
to require an employer to re-employ a worker dismissed in contravention 
77 
of section 135 of that Act. But section 61 (2)(d) has now been 
78 repealed. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Commission has 
jurisdiction to order the reinstatement or re-employment of an employee 
79 victimised for legitimate industrial activities. Similarly, in the 
wages board states, there does not appear to be jurisdiction to order 
80 reinstatement in these cases. 
South Australia is the only jurisdiction in which damages may 
81 be awarded to an aggrieved party. Such damages may amount to more 
8?* 
than simply a reimbursement of lost wages, " Moreover, it is expressly 
provided that the monetary remedies afforded to an employee dismissed 
for taking part in industrial proceedings in or before a Conciliation 
Committee shall not restrict or limit his right to seek an order 83 
directing his re-employment. Presumably an employee dismissed on 
these grounds can seek an order for re-employment in pursuance of 
section 15 (l)(e) of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 
1972 (S.A.). 84 
On the other hand, the South Australian provision which 
prohibits an employer dismissing or demoting an employee because of 
industrial activity or because the employee is entitled to the benefit 
of an award or industrial agreement does not mention a remedy of re-
employment. Yet, once again, the complainant would qualify for an 85 order under section 15 (l)(e). 
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(ix) Overall Conclusion 
At common law the remedies for wrongful dismissal are 
grossly inadequate. Damages do not reflect the true nature of the 
employee's loss: they do not include compensation for the indignity 
of the dismissal, the injury to reputation or feelings or the 
difficulty of obtaining other employment; nor do they compensate for 
the loss of valuable 'rights* incidental to the job. If the dismissed 
employee performs his obligation to mitigate the meagre damages to 
which he is entitled, he may forfeit his chance of reinstatement 
by an arbitral order or award. 
A quantum meruit claim is a limited remedy because the 
plaintiff loses his right to wages for the proper period of notice. 
Declarations or injunctions could be useful remedies since they would, 
in effect, enable the employee to continue in the employment. 
Unfortunately these forms of relief are not available to the ordinary 
employee despite some recent suggestions to the contrary. 
The common law provides no remedy for an employee whose 
dismissal is lawful although harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Provided 
the employee is given the appropriate notice or wages in lieu thereof, 
he has no grounds for complaint at common law even if the dismissal 
was capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory. 
Realistically the only viable remedy for the employee 
wrongfully or unjustly dismissed is reinstatement or adequate 
compensation at the option of the employee. In no Australian 
jurisdiction is this option available to the aggrieved party. Industrial 
tribunals in New South Wales, South Australia and, apparently, Queensland 
have jurisdiction to order reinstatement in these cases. The remedy 
is discretionary and some decisions where reinstatement is refused 
suggest that the tribunals have not thrown off the shackles of 
managerial prerogative. 
186 
Industrial tribunals in the federal sphere and probably-
Western Australia, as well as the wages boards in Victoria and 
Tasmania, have no jurisdiction to order reinstatement. In effect 
then, the majority of workers in award employment in the private 
sector are not entitled to reinstatement in the event of a harsh or 
wrongful dismissal. And even in those jurisdictions where reinstate-
ment is available it is not generally an individual remedy: except 
in South Australia the proper applicant is the employee's union. 
This leaves non-unionists without ready access to the remedy. 
For the employee unlawfully dismissed in breach of the 
victimisation provisions of the sundry industrial arbitration statutes 
the position is somewhat brighter. He may be entitled to reinstate-
ment in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and the federal 
sphere. On the other hand, there appears to be no such jurisdiction 
in Western Australia, Tasmania or Victoria. Moreover, if the 
victimised worker does not wish to be reinstated he may not be awarded 
compensation for the dismissal as an alternative remedy. 
SECTION 2: EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
CHAPTER 8 REDUT^DANCY 
1. Introduction 
Redundancy and retrenchment may further erode employees* 
job security. The expression 'redundancy* is normally used to describe 
the situation where an employee's skills become surplus to his employer's 
manpower requirements. Often the term is reserved for permanent 
manpower changes caused by the introduction of mechanisation or 
technological innovations. 'Retrenchment*, on the other hand, may 
refer to a temporary cut-back in staff caused by a recession or market 
fluctuation. Whatever their semantic differences, redundancy and 
retrenchment have one common factor: they strike at the heart of job 
security. For this reason, the terms will be used interchangeably 
in this paper to cover dismissal and displacement of employees through 
no fault of their own. 
Such a general description masks the often-painful fact that 
redundancy causes personal hardship. To take a recent example. On 
Friday 21 June 1974 Leyland Australia dismissed over 1,000 employees at 
its Waterloo plant in Sydney because of the 'credit squeeze* and 
shortage of components. It was reported that Leyland gave the dismissed 
workers a week's pay in lieu of notice and pro rata four weeks* annual 
leave,^ 
The retrenchments provoked an angry reaction from vehicle 
industry union officials who criticised the Government*s economic 
policies which, they claimed, contributed to the retrenchments. Faced 
with the prospect of further retrenchments, the New South Wales Secretary 
of the Vehicle Builders'Employees* Federation, Mr J. Thompson, asserted? 
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•Some of our members employed at Leyland have 18 years* service 
behind them. We won*t allow the company's employees to be turned 
2 out of the gates like mangy dogs*. 
Initially the Federal Government washed its hands of 
responsibility for the affair. Less than a fortnight after the 
sackings, the Prime Minister told a press conference in Canberra: 
«It*s not the government's fault if Leyland finds it more difficult 
3 
to sell its products than other companies find to sell theirs*. 
The retrenchments had a traumatic impact upon the individual 
workers dismissed. Some idea of their bewilderment and dejection can 
be gained from the following comments:-
I joined the staff only a month ago as a press operator 
after seeing the company's big advertising campaign for new 
staff. I have no idea what I will do for another job, but I 
need one soon. (Mr Con Gianoutsos, father of four, from Redfern.) 
I thought my nine months* service might be enough to keep 
my place, but it wasn't. (Mrs Lena Tawhi of Bondi.) 
The company has treated all its production workers shabbily. 
To notify a staff that 20 per cent of them have been sacked and 
then wait another two days to name the unlucky ones is unfair, 
(Mr Mike Harrison, 21,of Villawood. 
Later in the year Leyland*s position deteriorated but with 
government assistance it evolved a plan for rationalising its operations. 
Unfortunately the plan involved further retrenchments. Moreover, the 
employees who survived the initial wave of dismissals in June were 
workers with relatively long service but little prospect of industrial 
retraining. As Mr Laurie McDonald, one of Leyland's production planners, 
put it: *A11 we know is motor work. We're not suited for anything 
else. Give us something else and we'll curl up and die*,^ 
Redundancy is a 'man-made phenomenon'^ with disturbing 
consequences for those who bear its burden. It is becoming a fact of 
economic life. What then has the law done to cushion its impact? 
In general, the law provides no remedy for employees dismissed or 
7 displaced through redundancy although industrial tribunals have forged 
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some solutions in particular cases. 
2. Jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals 
(i) The Statutes 
The industrial arbitration and wages board statutes in 
Australia either define the *industrial matters* over which the 
tribunals have jurisdiction or contain sections delimiting the powers 
g 
and functions of the tribunals. In most cases this jurisdiction 
appears to be founded upon a continuing relationship of employer and 
9 
employee. As mentioned earlier, a dismissal automatically terminates 
the employment relationship.^*^ On this reasoning an industrial 
tribunal may not have power to determine a redundancy dispute.^^ 
In South Australia, the statutory definition of 'industrial 
dispute* expressly provides: 
An industrial dispute shall be deemed not to have ceased where, 
in consequence of such dispute, the relationship of employer 
and employee has ceased as between the parties thereto or any 
of them. 
At first sight this definition appears to suggest that a dispute over 
retrenchment may be an industrial dispute even though the dispute arises 
after the employment relationship has terminated. But on closer 
scrutiny it seems that this part of the definition only applies where 
the employment relationship is terminated in consequence of an 
industrial dispute, for example by dismissals in response to a strike. 
Certain paragraphs of the definition of 'industrial matter* 
in the Queensland Act^^ clearly envisage regulation of the post-
employment situation. Paragraph (c) was examined in the previous 
chapter. Fisher^'^ argues that this clause may be sufficiently broad 
to cover 'most elements of a redundancy situation*.^^ Certainly 
retrenchment caused by the progressive introduction of automation 
and mechanisation into industry is a matter involving the public 
interest.^^ In addition, the paragraph suggests that continuity of 
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employment and reinstatement may be regulated. But it is doubtful 
if this regulation applies to a redundancy situation. The only case^^ 
in which the paragraph has been invoked in recent times involved a 
dispute over reinstatement, not redundancy. Further, in the absence 
of discrimination, industrial tribunals in other jurisdictions have 
refused to order reinstatement where employees are dismissed by reason 
18 
of redundancy. Admittedly, the paragraph in the Queensland Act is 
somewhat different from its counterparts in other jurisdictions but 
the policy of these tribunals in refusing reinstatement of retrenched 
workers would, it is submitted, be equally relevant in the Queensland 
context. 
The statutory definition of 'industrial matter* in the 
19 
Queensland Act also includes any question 'whether monetary allowances 
shall be made by enployers to employees in respect of standing back or 
waiting time imposed by the conditions of the employer's enterprise or , 20 
because of intermittency of industrial operations or other causes...*. 
Thus, it appears that the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission is empowered to regulate certain terms of a temporary 
abeyance of employment. The implication is that, although employment 
is temporarily discontinued, the employment relationship survives. 
This situation is, however, fundamentally different from a redundancy where the employment is terminated. 
To sum up, in most jurisdictions there is no express 
provision indicating that the industrial tribunals have jurisdiction 
to determine disputes over retrenchment. On the other hand, the 
phrasing of the statutory definition of 'industrial matter' in the 
21 
Queensland Act implies that the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission may have this jurisdiction. 
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(ii) Judicial Interpretation of °Industrial Matters* 
The High Court has frequently grappled with the term 
•industrial matters®. Although the definition of this phrase in the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1973 (Cth) differs from its 
counterparts in most of the states, the High Court's decisions in 
this field seem to have had a subtle, but nevertheless significant, 
effect upon the approach of state industrial tribunals in redundancy 
disputes. 
The propositions which emerge from the High Court's analysis 
are simply stated but difficult to apply. Firstly, an industrial 
matter is an issue which directly relates to, and is within, the 
22 
scope of a current employment relationship. Secondly, matters which 
fall outside the contract of service may yet be within the scope of 
the term provided a sufficient nexus with the employment relationship 23 can be established. Thirdly, whether or not a redundancy dispute 
relates to an industrial matter may depend more upon the way the claim 
24 is phrased than the underlying issue. Finally, management's decision 
25 
to retrench is not, of itself, an industrial matter. 
Behind these principles lies an often-unarticulated policy 
of respect for managerial rights. This is yet another obstacle to 
reform of the law of redundancy at both state and federal level. 
(iii) Respect for Managerial Rights 
Industrial tribunals will rarely disturb management's rights 
to select^^ or dismiss^^ employees, to distribute them throughout the 
29 workplace, to allocate work, to determine what machines shall be 
used^*^ and how they shall be operated. ^ ^ 
However, the tribunals may interfere with a managerial 
32 
decision which causes employees unreasonable hardship. The introduction 
of a new system of working will involve such hardship if the manning 
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provided for by the company is insufficient to carry out the work 
required or if the working conditions are such that they warrant 
33 
specific relief time or special rates of pay. Normally intervention 
will be warranted when management's exercise of its rights imposes 
an unreasonable burden on its employees or has harsh or unreasonable 34 
consequences for the employees. The tribunal has the difficult task 
of reconciling management's claim to operate its business in an 
efficient manner with the interests of employees directly affected 
by management's decisions. 
Notwithstanding their ill-defined jurisdiction in redundancy 
situations and their policy of non-interference with management's 
rights, Australian industrial tribunals have considered the problem 
of retrenchment intermittently. 
3. The Tribunals' Response 
(i) Redundancy caused by a cessation or curtailment of the 
employer's operations 
Three recent cases which came before the Flight Crew Officers' 
Industrial Tribunal^^ give some insight into the scope of its juris-
diction to deal with this form of redundancy. 
3 6 
The first case involved a claim for severence pay for 
fourteen members of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots retrenched 
when the major part of Ansett-ANA helicopter fleet in which they were 
engaged was sold to another company. 
Professor J.E. Isaac, Chairman of the Flight Crew Officers' 
Industrial Tribunal, criticised the employer for its failure to consult 
with the Federation when the terms of sale were being negotiated. He 
also admonished the Federation for its negative attitude to securing 
employment for the retrenched pilots. 
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The Chairman suggested two guidelines for an ad hoc 
consideration of a severance pay claim: 
(1) the degree of hardship the retrenched persons are likely to suffer 
through loss of accumulated benefits of service, including lost 
opportunities of other and more secure employment, and costs of 
movement; 
(2) the extent to which the employer could reasonably have been able 
37 
to prevent or mitigate such hardship. 
Although Professor Isaac thought that the amount of money 
compensation warranted would vary from person to person, the Federation's 
claim sought severence pay scaled according to seniority. Despite the 38 
form of the union's demand, he took a number of factors into account 
in devising an appropriate scale. Compensation ranged from one month's 
pay for pilots with less than one year's service to five months' pay 
for pilots with four or more years* service. 
In addition, the Chairman directed that the retrenched pilots 
be given a right of re-employment by the airline in order of seniority 
if there were suitable positions open to the pilots in the future. 40 
In the second case the Australian Federation of Air Pilots 
applied for an order varying the Jetair Australia Limited Air Pilots' 
Agreement 1970 by the addition of a new severance pay clause. The 
application was filed in response to Jetair's decision to retrench 
fifteen pilots and twelve first officers some five days earlier. It 
appeared that the company was compelled to cease operations because 
'the Government's Two Airline Policy prevented it from importing the 41 
jet equipment it needed to operate properly®. 
The Flight Crew Officers' Industrial Tribunal (K.D. Marks) 
decided that the purpose of severance pay was to compensate 'an 
employee who, having been in employment with an employer for a 
considerable period and having expected that employment to continue as 
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a career, finds his services no longer required by the employer because 
42 
of a surplus of his classification within company requirements'. 
Further, the tribunal considered that an employee's entitle-
ment to terminal compensation depended upon three conditions. First, 
the employee must have an expectation of a career with his employer 
and must have served his employer in excess of two years. Second, the 
retrenchment must be caused by factors within the employer's control 
such as an alteration in the company*s procedure, changes in function 
or technological development requiring a reduced payroll. Finally, 
the employer must continue to operate as a going concern. Since, in 
the present case, the second and third conditions were not satisfied, 
the tribunal refused to grant the variation. 
An important factor in this decision was the finding that 
the pilots who joined Jetair knew of the Government's Two Airline 
Policy and understood its implications for the company. They took a 
'calculated risk that the company would either obtain the third licence 43 
or be able to successfully operate as an exempt operator*. Thus 
they could not complain when their hopes were not realised. 
Perhaps more than anything else, the Jetair decision high-
lights the defects in a piecemeal development of redundancy law. The 44 
tribunal referred to three cases in which severance pay was 
considered, and concluded that, unless a claim for terminal compensation 
fell within the compass of these cases, it should not be allowed. It 
did this even though none of the cases cited purported to lay down any 45 
precedent. Indeed, one of the cases expressly disclaimed any such 
intention. All the earlier cases appeared to approach the claims for 
severance pay on their merits. With respect, the tribunal should have 
followed this example instead of approaching the issue with a pre-
conceived and circumscribed view of its own jurisdiction. 
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In October l97l the Flight Crew Officers* Industrial 
Tribunal was again the forum for a redundancy dispute. On this 
46 
occasion the Australian Federation of Air Pilots challenged a 
decision by Qantas Airways Ltd to retrench 138 second officers and 
cadets. Although these pilots were dismissed with the period of 
notice prescribed by the award, the Federation contended that the 
dismissals were unjustified since they were ®compounded in error and 
mismanagement*. 
The tribunal declined to interfere with management's 
decision since the notification of dispute did not raise an industrial 
matter. It drew a distinction between an employer's act which itself 
relates to an industrial matter and the causes and effects of an 
employer's act which relates to an industrial matter; only the former 47 
allowed the tribunal to assume jurisdiction. Further, the award 
merely obliged Qantas to give a certain period of notice of possible 
termination on account of redundancy; there was no obligation to 48 justify dismissals on that ground. 
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The Federation applied to the High Court for a writ of 
mandamus to the officer constituting the tribunal to determine the 
industrial question submitted to it. The High Court unanimously 
upheld the decision of the tribunal endorsing its reasoning on the 
industrial matter" issue. It mattered not that many of the retrenched 
pilots had dropped 50% in salary to join Qantas on the faith 
of its assurance of secure and permanent careers. Nor was it material 
that the discharged pilots had, in some cases, been employed for only 
a month before the retrenchment notices issued. Here, then, the steps 
the employer could have taken to minimise the hardship was not a 
weighty factoro The decision to retrench involved a question of 
managerial policy. As such it was not a proper subject matter for an 
50 award or order. 
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The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
has also considered the plight of employees displaced by a close-down 
of operations. Wlien the Stockton-Newcastle Ferry Service was replaced 
by a bridge, ferry masters and engineers employed in the service were 
retrenched. The Merchant Service Guild of Australia applied to the 
Commission for an award of redundancy payments. But Mr Justice Franki, 
who first heard the matter, rejected the Guild's claim. On appeal,^^ 
the Full Bench of the Commission decided that payments by way of 
52 
•solatium or consolation* should be made to some of the retrenched 
workers. 
The Commission instructed the parties to confer upon the 
assessment and calculation of the severance payments since this was 
a matter 'uniquely within the qualification of the parties 
But it indicated that it would not be prepared to include in any award 
variation a payment of more than ten weeks* base rate of pay for any 
individual employee. 
The Commission also expressed the view that the terminal 
compensation should be less for men who were in their thirties and 
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in their late fifties and early sixties. Presumably it thought 
that senior employees had only a relatively short period of employment 
left in their working life and the compensation should reflect this 
fact. This reasoning may be anomalous since employees in their late 
fifties and early sixties would find it much more difficult to obtain 
alternative employment than employees many years their junior. If 
anything, their stake in their employment is greater than the other 
employees retrenched. 
The ferry masters and engineers on the Stockton-Newcastle 
ferry had known for around five years that their employment would be 
terminated when the bridge was completed. They were also aware for 
over two years that the alternative employment offered by 1 he employer 
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might involve a drop in wages. Why then, were they entitled to 
severance pay? The answer lay in the fact that the retrenched workers 
were engaged in an essential public service which had to be maintained 
until alternative arrangements could be finalised for the convenience 
of the public. 
The Lysaght Case^^ also involved redundancy caused by a 
cessation of operations. On 21 April 1972 Lysaght Brownbuilt Industries 
announced its decision to close down some sections of its Newcastle 
plant whose operations had not been economically viable for some time. 
It stated that the closure would be effected by the end of December 
1972. Some 600 workers were affected by the decision. 
At a conference with the relevant unions shortly after the 
announcement the company made an offer which was modified in subsequent 
discussions. The final offer was a generous 'package deal* which 
incorporated early retirement on superannuation benefits for employees 
over sixty. It promised workers in the 50-59 years of age bracket 
gratuitous severance pay increasing on a scale with age and length 
of service. Further, the company guaranteed each worker a gratuitous 
payment of $55 per year of past service. In effect, this ensured that 
all workers would receive the same benefits as members of the Wages 
Employees' Retirement Fund,although in the latter case the gratuities 
would be financed by the fund. The company also offered a lump sum 
gratuity of $250 to all regular workers who remained to the date 
specified for their retrenchment or retirement. 
The unions disputed only one feature of the company's offer: 
the scale of severance pay based on age and length of service. They 
proposed a more generous formula. 
The matter was referred to the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission where Mr Commissioner Clarkson adjourned the 
hearing to allow the parties to explore the possibilities of retraining 
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and relocation of the retrenched workers. He stressed the gravity 
of the situation: »When all is said and done, what we are talking 
about here is people, not just pawns on an industrial chess board*.^^ 
In particular, he expressed concern for the welfare of the workers 
in the critical 45-60 age bracket noting that there were some two hundred 
employees facing retrenchment who were over forty-five years of age 
with twenty-six or more years' service. 
When the hearing resumed, he maintained this attitude. He 
decided that the company's offer should be modified to provide a 
gratuitous payment of $10 per year of continuous service for employees 
in the 45-51 age group. With this exception, he thought the offer was 
a *fair and reasonable proposition*.^^ The Commissioner fortified his 
conclusion by pointing to the Stockton Ferry case where the Full Bench 
of the Commission decided that men in their ibrtLes and fifties should be 
given more consideration in retrenchment than those in the younger or 
older age groups. 
Mr Commissioner Clarkson also directed that any retrenched 
workers who accepted alternative employment within 'the B.H.P. group* 
should have a period of three months within which to decide whether 
this new employment was suitable. If within this period they 
decided on reasonable grounds that it was unsuitable they would 
qualify for the severance pay offered by the company. 
The Commissioner stressed that he was 'constrained to act 
within the framework created by the parties and, in particular, by 
58 the company*s offer*. For this reason the award, in his opinion, 
'should not be viewed as a precedent in any future cases regarding 
59 
redundancy payments'. 
The Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia appealed 
from this dec ision to the Full Bench of the Commission. The union's 
basic complaint was that the award did not give adequate compensation 
lag 
to employees in the lower age groups, many of whom had lengthy 
periods of service with the company. It also argued that the award 
should not have taken the Wages Employees* Retirement Scheme into 
account since this was a contributory fund. 
The Full Bench of the Commission listed a miscellany of 
factors which are relevant in computing severance pay whea an employer 
closes down or partially closes down his establishment.^^ It stressed 
that calculation of severance pay is a complex exercise involving many 
6 2 
contentious and weighty issues. The Full Bench focused upon some of 
these issues to emphasise *the tentative and circumscribed natire*^^ of 
its decision if it were sought to be used as a precedent. 
Like Mr Commissioner Clarkson, the Full Bench stated that 
they felt obliged to act within the framework of the company's offer. 
Thus, they decided that their award could be integrated with the 
contributory retirement scheme. Nevertheless, the Commission accepted 
the union's submission that employees in the lower age groups were not 
adequately compensated. It also decided that the amounts payable 
under the scale of severance payments awarded should be ircreased. 
The Full Bench pointed out that Newcastle was,to some extent, isolated 
from other industrial areas, and that it was difficult to obtain jobs 
of a comparable standard in the local region. This finding was, no 
doubt, influenced by "the fict that seventy workers were still unemployed at 
the time of the appeal proceedings. 
In effect, the Commission awarded compensation of approximately 
one week's pay for each year of service for all employees with five or 
more years' service with the company. In addition, members of the 
retirement plan were allowed to retain their benefits under that 
scheme. The Commission did not modify the other features of the 
company's offer. When the dust settled one could not say that the 
employees were handsomely compensated for the loss of their jobs. 
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Employees retrenched when their employer finishes a limited 
project are, however, much worse off. Take one example. In 1971, 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission rejected an application 
for terminal compensation by building workers disclmrged when contracts 
64 
on the Yallourn W. Power Station were completed. The Commission 
pointed out that employment in the construction industry was 
essentially itinerant and that this fact was recognised by the 'Loaded* 
hourly rates of pay,^^ 
(ii) Redundancy due to Technological Change 
Employees retrenched or displaced as a result of technological 
change have a more legitimate claim for compensation and assistance from 
their employer, Australian industrial tribunals have come to recognise 
this claim despite the tentative approach reflected in an early 
decision. Re Clerks (Oil Companies) Award 1966.^^ 
There the H.C. Sleigh group of companies became involved in 
a dispute with the Federated Clerks Union over the displacement of 
employees. In essence, the union claimed permanent employment on 
certain conditions for their members. 
The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission was 
not prepared to require the Sleigh group to retain its employees at 
their present place of employment until retiring age; such an 
6 7 
imposition would be too restrictive on the employers. The Commission 
merely suggested that the parties confer with a view to agreeing upon 
adequate compensation for the retrenched employees. It stressed that 
many real human problems may be involved in cases cf this nature and 
that it is important for employees to be consulted both personally and 
through their union when technological changes are being planned. 
Further, it warned that it might intervene in the interests of 
industrial justice,if in the future, it appeared that employees' welfare 
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had not been properly safeguarded in company pianni ig. But, for the 
present, the fact that the company had failed to give the employees 
and their union an adequate advance warning of the mpending redundancy 
was not sufficient to warrant an award of severance pay. 
This timorous approach is understandable: the union's claim 
raised a novel issue with which the Commission was not familiar. On 
the other hand, the Commission missed a golden opportunity to define 
an employer's responsibilities in this situation. 
In Qantas Airways Ltd v. Australasian Airline Navigators* 
6 8 
Association the Flight Crew Officers* Industrial Tribunal made a 
bolder attempt to deal with the problems which might arise as a result 
of technological innovations. The parties assumed ^hat technological 
displacement might take place in the future, and they negotiated 
methods of dealing with this issue. After a series of conferences 
and hearings only one item remained in dispute: the re-adjustment 
allowance to be paid to navigators who might be displaced by technolog-
ical changes other than the Doppler system. By agreement, the parties 
referred this matter to the tribunal for arbitratioi . 
Although the main issue before the tribunal was assessment 
of severance pay, the Chairman, Professor J.E. Isaac, commented in 
passing that the company had fully discharged the employer's 
obligations prescribed in the National Labour Advisory Council's 69 
guidelines 'Adjusting to Technological Change*. In particular the 
airline had given the navigators a considerable amoimt of notice of 
the anticipated changes. 
Professor Isaac regretted that there was no objective 70 criterion for fixing the re-adjustment allowance for the navigators. 
But he repeatedly stressed that the airline had no obligation to 
71 
guarantee its navigators' employment until retirement. This 
contention was implicit in the Association's claim. He also rejected 
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the argument that the re-adjustment allowance should contain a 
punitive element in cases where the company could have avoided the 
72 displacement of navigators. 
In fixing severance pay in advance, Professor Isaac did not 
think it was fair to consider the prospects for training and transfer 
to jobs with equivalent status and income. Thus he declined to 
•reward* the airline for its offer of retraining and alternative 
73 
employment by reducing the amount of the re-adjustment allowance. 
In calculating the terminal compensation, Professor Isaac 
adopted a 'dual hardship-compensation principle^. He dccided that 
severance pay should compensate the employee for the hardship likely 
to be suffered. This hardship element involved unemployment, 
relocation, the likelihood of lower income in the future, and finally, 
the loss of superannuation and other fringe benefits. In addition, 
severance pay should be awarded to the navigators for their loss of 
•job-property*, their investment in their job as a career. This was 
the compensation element. These various factors were difficult to 
quantify. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that Professor Isaac 
emphasised the navigators* anticipated drop in income. In fact, this 
appeared to be the paramount factor.^^ 
The Chairman recommended a re-adjustment allowance of one 
month*s pay for each year of service for navigators who leave the 
airline*s employment as a result of displacement. There was to be ro vpper 
limit on years of service which could be credited. On the other hand, 
only navigators who had served the company in that capacity for five 
years would qualify for the compensation. To this basic scale, an age 
loading of one half of a month*s pay for each year over forty was 
added. This reflected the Chairman*s awareness of the diminished 
re-employment and retraining prospects for the more senior navigators. 
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Professor Isaac thought that his recommendations were a 
compromise between 'equity and administrative feasibility*. They 
aimed at a general standard of equity for a group of persons since 
an individual treatment for each displaced navigator was pregnant 
with practical difficulties. One theme pervades bis judgment: the 
matter could be better determined by the parties through compromise 
78 
and agreement. 
This reluctance to impose a solution upon the parties can 
also be seen in Senior Commissioner Taylor's decision upon the Vehicle 79 
Industry 1972 Award. The Vehicle Builders* Employees'Federation 
claimed severance pay on the basis of four weeks* normal pay for each 
year of service. The employers, in this case the mcijor vehicle 
manufacturers in Australia, responded with an offer of an increased 
period of notice for employees who are discharged because of redundancy. 
Employees under fifty years of age with twelve months* continuous employment 
would be entitled to an additional day's notice for each year of 
service up to twenty years* service, and two additional days* notice for 
each year in excess of twenty. On the other hand, employees fifty years of 
age or older would be given two additional days' notice for each year 
of service. 
The term •redundancy* in the company's offer was given a 
limited meaning. While it covered a surplus of employees created by 
'technological and/or method changes*, it did not include retrenchment 
caused by market fluctuations or economic recessions. 
In terms of the offer, an employee who was under notice 
because of redundancy could terminate his services at any time with 
the appropriate notice and still receive a monetary payment equal to 
50% of the award wages he would have received for ordinary hours in 
the period between his counter-notice and the expiry of his employer's 
notice. The employee would forfeit this entitlement if he failed to 
204 
give at least one week's counter-notice. 
If, on the other hand, an employer decided to terminate 
the services of an employee already under notice because of 
redundancy he would have to pay the employee wages in lieu of the 
extended period of notice in the company's offer. But an employer 
would only be liable to pay these wages if this early termination 
was 'through no fault of the employee*. This qualification is clearly 
open to abuse by an unscrupulous employer. 'Fault of the employee' 
does not necessarily mean misconduct or other behaviour warranting 
80 
summary dismissal. For example, an employee who was too slow in 
performing tasks assigned by his employer might be at 'fault'. 
The Union, however, concentrated their attack upon the 
definition of 'redundancy* arguing that employees retrenched for any 
reason should be entitled to the scaled benefit. The reason for this 
stand is clear: market fluctuations and fall-offs in orders 
frequently cause large scale retrenchments in the vehicle building 
industry. An award clause covering redundancy should extend to this 
situation. 
The Commonwealth Arbitration Commission overruled the union's 
objection. It was enough that the company's offer contained substantial 
benefits for vehicle building workers. Senior Commissioner Taylor 81 stated that, at this stage, he was not prepared to go further. 
Accordingly, the terms of the company's offer were incorporated in the 
82 award without alteration. 
New South Wales and South Australian Provisions on Redundancy 
In New South Wales and South Australia, industrial tribunals 
are more prepared to deal with the problems of redundancy arising 
from the introduction of technological changes or mechanisation. In 
both states, certain tribunals are empowered to insert in awards 
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provisions dealing with this issue. Space permits only a brief 
analysis of the New South Wales jurisdiction. 
Sectioia 88G of the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940, as 
amended (N.S.W.) obliges the Commission, a Committee, or an Apprentice-
ship Council on application to incorporate in an award or industrial 
agreement clauses relating to the obligations, duties and responsibili-84 ties of an employer upon the introduction or proposed introduction 
85 
of mechanisation or technological changes in his industry. 
The tribunal must also insert provisions relating to the 
employees to whom notices of termination are to be given in these 8 6 circumstances, and clauses governing the form, effect and consequences 
of such notices. These notices of discharge must be not less than 
87 three months. The tribunal is required to fix a finite period: it 
may not provide, for example, that the period of notice shall be not 
88 
less than a specified term. 
The tribunal may also prescribe a qualification period after 
which an employee will be entitled to the benefit of an award or 89 
agreement made in pursuance of the section. 
In addition, it must specify the notifications to be given 
to the Registrar, the Director of the Vocational Guidance Bureau and 
the Director of Technical Education, and include this direction in the 90 award or agreement. 
Unlike the South Australian provision, the New South Wales 
91 
section is mandatory; it obliges the tribunal to do certain things. 
Further, if an application is made under the section the tribunal cannot 
postpone action until the mechanisation or technological changes are 92 actually introduced into the industry. 
Section 88G and its South Australian counterpart represent 
93 
the only serious legislative attempt to regulate the problems created 
by redundancy. Yet these provisions do not apply to retrenchment 
206 
caused by economic recession, market fluctuations, mergers, take-
overs, or the curtailment or cessation of operations. 
(iii) Redundancy due to Insufficient Work 
Where a redundancy occurs as a result of insufficient work 
for the particular employee retrenched, the approach of the industrial 
tribunals has, with one exception, been equally disappointing. An 
application to vary the determinations governing the working conditions 
of professional staff engaged in the Snowy Mountain Hydro-Electric 
Authority was brought before Deputy Public Service Arbitrator Wilson 
when it appeared that some of the staff would be retrenched due to 
94 
insufficient work. The Deputy Public Service Arbitrator decided 
that the retrenched employees should be given monetary compensation to 
cushion the hardship caused by the loss of accumulated benefits and 
costs of relocation. His variation gave a retrenched or displaced 
employee the option of taking a lump sum calculated on the basis of 
length of service, accepting an alternative position with a lower 
salary and a lump sum representing three times the difference between 
the annual salaries of the two positions up to a certain maximum, or 
submitting his case to an independent arbitrator where he thought it 
was not reasonable for him to accept an alternative position with a 
lower salary. The cardinal feature of the variation was its 
flexibili ty. 
By comparison, employees retrenched by private enterprises 
due to insufficient work have fared poorly. Industrial tribunals in 
the Commonwealth sphere^^ and in N.S.W.'^^ have refused to order re-
instatement where employees were dismissed because of a lack of 
suitable available work. It might be thought that the failure to award 
terminal compensation to these employees could be attributed to the 
strategy of the unions in pressing solely for reinstatement. However, 
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in Boilermakers' and Blacksmiths* Society of Aust. v. Frigite 
97 
Industries S.A. Ltd the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission refused 
to order reinstatement or award any other compensation. 
(a) Stand-down Provisions 
The problem of insufficient work for employees has also 
98 arisen under the stand-down provisions in awards. Where the award 
contains such a clause the employer is permitted to advise employees 
in advance that their services will not be required on the following 
99 
day or days. 
The basic principle inherent in a stand-down clause, that 
of sharing available work, was described by one tribunal as a 'very 
humane custom*.^ It is intended that an employer will invoke his 
right to stand-down employees during slack periods rather than resort 2 3 
to the •frightening alternative* of dismissal. Thus, where unemploy-
ment is caused by insufficient work, a stand-down clause replaces the 
employer's right of dismissal with notice or wages in lieu thereof 4 
with a duty to distribute the available work equitably. But an 
employer's right to dismiss for reasons unconnected with the slack 
times remains intact,^ 
Initially at least it is up to the employer to decide 
whether employees can be *usefully employed* within the meaning of a 
stand-down provision. This phrase has been interpreted to mean *usefully 
employed to the benefit, advantage or profit of the employer'.^ Thus, 
the availability of 'fill-in* work outside the employee's normal 7 
classification is largely immaterial. If, after examining his overall 
situation, an employer concludes that employees cannot be usefully 
employed, he is entitled to stand down the employees and deduct wages 
O 
for the period of lay-off, A tribunal will be reluctant to interfere 
with management*s decision if it appears that the employer is unable 
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9 to carry out his normal operations. 
To comply with the typical award provision, the employer's 
action in deducting wages of employees stood down must not be taken 
prematurely.^^ Further, an employer is usually oi ly entitled to invoke 
the stand-down clause when his normal operations ;re unavoidably stopped 
for reasons beyond his control,^^ 
The employer carries the onus of establishing that the cause 
of the work stoppage is beyond his control^^ but i is not necessary to 
submit this proof in advance.^^ The following rea ons are common and 
legitimate grounds for a stand-down: suspension of a temporary power 
14 • 15 service during reconstruction of premises; slio- tage of materials; 
• 16 and rain. 
On the other hand, industrial tribunals have shown a willing-
ness to intervene where the employer abuses his rights under the 
stand-down clause. Attempts to use the clause indiscriminately for 
purposes outside its ambit is strongly resisted by the tribunals.^^ 
18 
Until recently, the principle of «collecfive responsibility* 
was accepted as sufficient ground for deducting the wages of employees 
stood down in purported compliance with an award provision. This view 19 has now been soundly rejected. 
A stand-down notice given for an indefinite period will not 
20 
normally be a breach of the award. In such a case the employee is 
faced with the choice of ending his employment and seeking another 
position or waiting for the resumption of work. If he adopts the 
latter course he will be out of work during the lay-off. Yet, if he 
secures another position he may be unable to resume work with his 
former employer when the stand-down is over. This places the employee 
in a quandary. 
The interpretation of stand-down provisions in awards is 
just one of the many ways in which Australian industrial tribunals have 
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dealt peripherally with a potential redundancy situation. A brief 
survey of these indirect methods is warranted. 
(iv) Peripheral Methods of Handling Redundancy 
(a) Seniority 
21 
Seniority clauses are often inserted in awards or industrial 
22 
agreements governing the employment. The effect of this type of 
provision is that seniority should be considered by an employer in 
deciding which employees are to be retrenched. But seniority will not 
be the paramount consideration; it merely ranks with a number of other 23 
factors which management is entitled to consider. 
The consequences of not observing the seniority clause are 
not entirely clear. In some cases the tribunal will direct the parties 
to confer with a view to reinstating the employee retrenched in disregard 24 
of the seniority clause. This approach, of course, raises the problem 
that another employee will be displaced or dismissed when the retrenched 
employee is re-employed. In other cases the tribunal will uphold 
management's decision to displace the employee even though the seniority 25 clause has not been observed. 
The problem of reconciling managerial prerogative with the 
seniority principle is illustrated by Australasian Coal and Shale 
26 
Employees* Federation v. J.A. Brown and Abermain Seaham Collieries Ltd. 
There Mr Justice Drake-Brockman*s order for variation of the award 
recognised management's complete and unfettered right in the free 
selection of those employees who would man new mechanical units 
while providing that any present employees (if competent) should be 
selected in order of their seniority. In effect, the variation provided 
that redundant employees should, where possible, be absorbed into the 
employer's new operations in order of seniority. This was, to some 
extent, an interference with management's right to distribute the 
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labour force through its plant as it saw f i t . 
Employees who have already been retrenched will usually be 
unable to invoke a seniority clause in an interim award obtained by 
their union as a result of the retrenchment since such an award 
27 
will not normally operate retrospectively. Thus, if seniority is 
to rank as a guiding principle in retrenchments the employees* union 
should press for the inclusion of an appropriate clause in the award 
before a redundancy crisis arises. 
Seniority is one system of preferential treatment in 
redundancy. Industrial tribunals have also granted preference to 
union members in retrenchments.^^ 
(b) Other Measures 
Another strategy which some tribunals have used is to postpone 
the hardship involved in a redundancy. This can be done in a number of 
ways. For example, the tribunal may restrict the employer's right to 
engage new labour where it appears that employees face imminent 
29 
retrenchment. In a recent Western Australian case, Mr Commissioner 
D„E. Cort at a Compulsory Conference succeeded in obtaining an under-
taking from certain employers that no permanent foremen would be made 
redundant until the parties determined the terms and conditions of 
retrenchment.^^ 
In Queensland, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission is given power to prohibit the working of overtime in any 
calling covered by a state award if it appears that a distribution of 
the available work will relieve unemployment or will serve *any other 
31 
purpose which appears to the Commission to be good and sufficient ...*. 
Such a provision undoubtedly encompasses a redundancy situation. 
To sum up, a wide range of strategies has been developed by 
various industrial authorities in their tangential treatment of 
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redundancy situations. 
(v) Conclusion 
Doubts surrounding the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals 
to deal with the post-employment relationship have, in some cases, 
stifled their response to the very real problem of redundancy. It 
seems to be beyond the competence of some industrial tribunals to 
direct training, retraining, re-location or re-employment of redundant 
workers. Only in New South Wales and South Australia has the 
legislature attempted to dispel these doubts about jurisdiction and 
even there the relevant legislation has a limited scope. 
Judicial interpretation of the term ^industrial matters* has 
become a semantic exercise far removed from the realities of industrial 
relations. In redundancy cases before federal industrial tribunals, 
the parties assume that the authority has jurisdiction or, at least, 
agree to abide by the tribunal's recommendation. Many of these 
recommendations would not survive a jurisdictional challenge. And the 
tribunals themselves are conscious of the threat of such a challenge 
for they often confine their awards to slight modifications of the 
employer's offer. 
Respect for managerial prerogatives further restricts the 
role tribunals could play as a buffer against the impact of retrench-
ment, Management is urged to consult with employees and their unions 
when planning technological changes or mechanisation but there is no 
obligation to do so. Further, management's evidence that a redundancy 
exists will normally be accepted without question. Only in rare cases 
have industrial tribunals decided to intervene to postpone or alleviate 
the hardship caused by redundancy. Management has no obligation to 
assist the retrenched workers obtain other employment. In most cases, 
it is not even required to advise the unemployment bureau of the 
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retrenchments, 
No consistent pattern emerges from the decisions upon 
severance pay, and there are no general objective criteria which 
determine an employee's entitlement to this compensation. Age and 
length of service are important factors but even senior employees 
with long service will not be entitled to severan ;e pay if they are 
employed in a speculative venture. 
In general, there are no established criteria for selection 
of employees to be retrenched. Seniority is the only concession to 
employees* interests and this is not always an equitable basis for 
selection. 
Industrial tribunals consider the problem of redundancy in 
an ad hoc manner when a dispute arises or when unions fear that 
retrenchments are imminent. In these cases, monetary compensation 
often seems to be regarded as a panacea for the retrenched workers. 
One can understand the unions* attitude: to their members, severance 
pay is a tangible, and readily identifiable, benefit won by the union. 
But the tribunals cannot be excused. They have made very little effort 
to lay down general guidelines for dealing with redundancy or to define 
management*s responsibilities in a retrenchment situation. In this 
respect, the law has failed to provide a comprehensive, or even 
adequate, solulion to the hardship caused by redundancy. It has skated 
around the problem without coming to grips with tlie fundamental issues 
involved. 
SECTION 3; EMPLOYEES* INTERESTS IN PARTICIPATION, ADVANCEMENT 
AND »REASQNABLEf SUPERVISION 
CHAPTER 9 TliE LAW RELATING TO PARTICIPATION, PROMOTION 
AND SUPERVISION 
1. Participation 
Although members of a company*are not, in the eye of the law, 
part owners of the undertaking',^ they have the right to participate in 
company affairs particularly in matters which affect their investment. 
Membership is conferred through the medium of shareholding and by that 
2 
means alone. It is not granted to a person simply because he is 
employed by the company. Indeed, no matter how physically, mentally 
and emotionally involved an employee becomes in the company, he is not 
given the status of membership unless he acquires shares in the company.^ 
The consequences which flow from this fact are manifold. 
(i) No Role in Policy Formulation 
Firstly, employees have no right to play a role in the 
4 
formulation of company policy: they are not entitled to call or 
requisition^ company meetings, nor attend and vote^ at these meetings; 
7 
consequently they have no right to address a general meeting or to 
O 
demand a poll. Further, management need not even consult them about 
take-over bids,^ plant shut-downs or rationalisation of s t a f f , Y e t 
all these factors may vitally affect their'investment* in the company. 
(ii) No Right to Information 
In general, enployees have ro rights to information about the 
company, its financial position or its management: they are not entitled 
to a copy of the memorandum and articles of association,^^ the a inual 
balance sheet and profit and loss account, or the directors* statutory 
IP report; further, they may not requisition company circulars and 
^ 
notices. 
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(iii) No Legal Control over Management 
Finally they have no formal control over the management of 
14 
the company: they cannot elect or remove directors; they are unable 
to apply for a winding up^^ or to seek an alternative remedy under 
section 186 U.C.A. if the company is being managed in an oppressive 
manner detrimental to their interests;^^ in addition, they cannot 17 
initiate an inspector's inquiry into the company*s affairs; nor can 
they commence proceedings for breach of directors* duties or controlling 
shareholders* duties. 
Civ) No Role in the Administration of the Policy 
While company law denies employees a role in the formulation 
of company policy, labour law generally precludes them from particip-
ating in the administration of this policy, 
(a) Respect for Managerial Prerogatives 
To some extent most awards restrict management's freedom to 
carry on its business as it thinks fit but Australian industrial 
tribunals are generally reluctant to intrude further upon management's 
preserve.^^ Traditionally, they have declined to intervene unless it 
can be shown that management's action has caused employees some 
19 injustice, oppression or undue hardship. Management*s right to control 
an eiT^Dloyee*s work appears to be the fundamental ingredient of the 
20 employer-employee relationship. Industrial tribunals will not usually 
disturb this right. Certainly they would reject any demand that control 
21 of the employer*s business be handed over to its employees. 
Moreover, employees or their unions are not generally entitled 
to exercise an indirect control over the operation of the enterprise bv 
vetoing or challenging management's decisions. To quote Barwick C.J.: 
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'management or managerial policy as such is not ... a proper subject 
22 
matter for an award or order*. 
2. Advancement 
Promotion disputes also seem to fall outside the jurisdiction of most industrial tribunals in Australia. In R. v. Railways Appeals 
23 
Board and Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W,); Ex parte Davis, 
McTiernan and Taylor JJ. doubted whether the promotion of an employee 
was an 'industrial matter* within section 4 of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1912-1955 (Cth). In Mr Justice McTiernan's view: 
'If the Parliament intended promotion to be an "industrial matter" 
the omission to mention it expressly is strange, having regard to its 
importance',^^ 
Fullagar J., who dissented, thought that a Conciliation 
Commissioner had jurisdiction to include in an award a provision 25 
relating to promotions and appeals against promotions. 
More recently, two state industrial tribunals reached opposite 
views on the jurisdictional issue even though the type of employment 
in each case was identical. 2 6 
In the first case, Fire Brigade Officers* Award, the 
Industrial Commission of South Australia held that a Commissioner could 
prescribe mandatory provisions as to the manner in which an employer 
ought to classify or promote employees. This issue was clearly an 
industrial matter since it directly pertained to the employer-employee o 7 
relationship and because it could be treated as a term of or ancillary 
to the contract of service. The Commission conceded that a matter of 
managerial prerogative was also involved but this did not exclude 
jurisdiction. Since the employer's promotion practices had been unfair 
in the past, the Commission decided that it was justified in encroaching 
upon normal management rights in the interests of industrial justice. 
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Just over a year later, the Industrial Appeals Court of 
29 
Victoria considered a similar claim. It held that the fixing and 
designation of ranks and promotion of employees to these ranks was 
not an industrial matter. Nor was it within the powers of a wages 
board. Rather, the question of promotion was a managerial matter 
and, therefore, beyond jurisdiction. 
(i) Selection Criteria 
A company is entitled to create a new classification and 
introduce a lin:^  of progression governing promotions provided these 
30 measures do not operate unfairly upon employees. Industrial tribunals 
have occasionally granted concessions to employees* interests by 
31 32 inserting seniority provisions and rosters for promotion in some 
awards,^^ 
The seniority clause will normally be qualified by the phrase 
•all other things being equal* so that management's right to promote 
its employees according to their ability and the exigencies of the 
34 business are relatively unimpaired. In addition, employers will not 
be bound to observe seniority in promotions unless tliis principle is 
embodied in the award or enshrined in an established custom or 
35 practice. 
(ii) Promotion Appeals 
Although industrial tribunals have been chary of prescribing 
criteria of selection of persons for promotion, they do, on occasions, 
entertain appeals against promotions. 
In New South Wales and Queensland, it would appear that 
industrial tribunals have power to determine this type of claim. In 
those jurisdictions the definition of 'industrial matters* includes the 
. 36 words *the right to ... refuse to ... reinstate in employment 
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These words are perhaps inappropriate to describe a claim of an 
employee to be promoted over the employer's appointee, but they 
37 
nevertheless confer jurisdiction to determine such a dispute. 
Management's appointment will only be reviewed if the 
company acted so unfairly or unreasonably as to warrant the tribunal's 
38 39 intervention. In a recent case, the Industrial Commission of New 
South Wales reviewed a managerial decision to promote a particular 
employee over a workmate whose seniority, practical experience and 
union membership gave him a legitimate claim to the appointment. In 
the interests of good industrial relations and justice, Cahill J. 
recommended that the employer reconsider its decision. 
The Industrial Commission of New South Wales may also 
intervene when certain employees suffer an unexpected delay in their 
40 
opportunities for promotion. In Argent's Case, the Commission 
ordered an employer to cancel the appointment of an employee to the 
position of chief train controller. The employee had been demoted to 
this rank on disciplinary grounds. He had reached his former position 
through a line of progression other than that followed by train 
controllers. In effect, the Commission prevented an 'outsider* 
disrupting the order of promotions within a particular division. 
In the absence of an express provision granting jurisdiction 
to determine disputes over the right to reinstate, it would seem that 
industrial tribunals in the other states and in the federal sphere 
have no power to overrule management's decisions upon particular 
41 promotions. 
3. 'Reasonable and Decent*Supervision 
(i) Appointment of Supervisors 
Industrial tribunals have repeatedly affirmed management's 
42 
right to select employees for a particular task. Employees may not 
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campaign for the appointment of a particular supervisor or for the 
rejection of certain candidates for a supervisory position. If they 
43 do so they are guilty of misconduct justifying dismissal. 
(ii) Removal of Supervisors 
On the other hand, employees may agitate for the removal of 
a supervisor. Such a protest provides no justification for the summary 
44 dismissal of those who complain. But tribunals are unlikely to accede 
to the workers* demands as they will not normally interfere with the 
appointment of a supervisor even if they doubt the wisdom of management's 
45 choice. 
Similarly, the amount of supervision and the competence of 
46 
supervisors are essentially matters for management. However, if manage-
ment's supervisory practices offend the principles of industrial justice, 47 the tribunals will intervene. 
4. Conclusion 
48 49 Although strong and strategic unions have made occasional 
forays into managerial rights, the industrial tribunals* policy of non-
interference in these issues has left certain areas of managerial 
prerogative almost unscathed. This policy presents a major obstacle 
to the development of comprehensive principles for the settlement of 
plant-level disputes. Respect for managerial rights is not, however, 
the only factor which militates against an adequate solution of problems 
arising at the work place. 
SECTION 3; EMPLOYEES* INTERESTS IN PARTICIPATION, ADVANCEMENT 
AND TREASONABLE^ SUPERVISION 
CHAPTER 10 LEGAL MACHINERY FOR SETTLEMENT 
OF PLANT-LEVEL DISPUTES 
1. The Problem of Jurisdiction 
In the federal sphere the *interstateness* requirement 
deprives arbitral tribunals of jurisdiction over local, intra-state 
disputes.^ Notwithstanding this impediment, federal tribunals 
frequently hear and determine plant-level disputes. Where the 
parties waive the jurisdictional objection it may be possible to 
persuade a Conciliation Commissioner to settle the matter in dispute. 
The success of this practice depends almost entirely upon the 
disposition of the Commissioner who hears the claim and an agreement 
between the parties to abide by the Commissioner's direction, A 
Commissioner cannot be compelled to determine the dispute. Conversely 
the parties cannot be obliged to follow his recommendation. 
Where employees involved in the plant-level dispute work 
under a federal award, and the federal tribunal refuses to entertain 
the claim, it appears that the matter may go unresolved. If a state 
tribunal stepped in,its ruling would be open to challenge on the ground 
2 
that it was usurping federal jurisdiction. 
State tribunals are not restricted by the *interstateness* 
requirement and can therefore determine local disputes involving 
employees who are covered by state awards and employees who are not 
covered by any awards. But, apart from the jurisdictional problem 
there is some doubt whether Australia's industrial relations systems 
have established suitable machinery for the resolution of local 
4 grievances., 
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2. Machinery for Settlement of Plant-Level Disputes 
(i) Boards of Reference 
Section 50 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1973 
(Cth) empowers the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
to insert a provision for a board of reference in an award or, on the 
application of an organization or person bound by an award, appoint a 
toard of reference for the purposes of the award. Most federal awards 
contain a board of reference clause, ^^ 
The Industrial Commissions in Western Australia^ and South 
7 Australia may also provide for boards of reference in their awards. 
These bodies exist in Queensland and New South Wales jurisdictions; 
g 
in Victoria each wages board may appoint a board of reference but it 
9 
seems that these boards are not used extensively in that state. 
The Wages Boards Act 1920 (Tas.) makes no special provision 
for boards of reference although a wages board may require anything 
to be done under its determination to be done subject to the satis-
faction of the Chief Inspector or the chairman of the wages board.^^ 
(ii) Functions 
Boards of reference may serve a variety of purposes many of 
which are not germane to the present study.^^ Normally a board of 
reference is charged with the function of resolving disputes arising 
under awards and settling disputes over matters specifically assigned 
to the board by the award. Of particular interest in the present 
discussion is the use of these boards to review managements' personnel 
decisions involving the discharge, stand-down and reclassification of 
employees. 
Unfortunately, boards of reference may oi^ ly deal with these 
issues in a peripheral manner. For example, in the case of an employee 
who has been summarily dismissed, the board will merely decide whether 
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the employee is entitled to pay in lieu of notice and whether the 
employer's action was justified under the award. Again, boards of 
reference may be asked if management's action in standing down 
employees is permissible in terms of the award. The board's function 
here is primarily fact-finding. Moreover, reclassification of employees 
comes before the boards as a demarcation dispute or a dispute over extra 
pay but not as a dispute about promotion or demotion. 
12 
The composition and informal procedure of boards of 
reference make them useful appendages in the Australian industrial 
relations machinery. Their prompt decisions can do much to arrest 1 3 discontent at the local level. Further, they adapt awards to 
the conditions prevailing in a particular enterprise; this degree of 
flexibility is essential in our legalistic system of industrial 
14 
relations. The potential of boards of reference has nol however, 
been fully realised because the boards operate under grave juris-
dictional limitations. 
(iii) Limitations 
The functions of a board of reference are usually limited 
to matters arising under or specified in the award^^ creating the 
board. Unless a plant-level dispute is related to the award governing 
employment in the industry, the board of reference has no jurisdiction 
to hear the matter. Disputes arising from the personnel decisions of 
management in the day-to-day administration of the work place will 
often have little to do with the relevant award. Indeed, the arbitral 
authority which made the award in the first instance would have been 
careful not to encroach upon management's right to run its business 
as it sees fit. 
Furthermore, in the federal sphere, a board is enjoined from 
interpreting awards or enforcing its own decisions since these are 
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essentially judicial functions, and a board of reference may not be 
16 
invested with the judicial power of the Commonwealth. In those 
states which have boards of reference, questions of interpretation 
and enforcement of awards are assigned to the judicial authorities 
established under the industrial arbitration legislation in that 
state. 
In the result, boards of reference in both federal and state 
spheres are concerned primarily v/ith disputes of fact arising out of 18 
the application of the award or determination; they cannot interpret, 
they cannot arbitrate, they cannot give their decisions retrospective 
effect. The parties in an industrial relationship are well aware of 19 
these limitations, and can use them to their own advantage. 
It is inevitable that the decisions of boards of reference 
upon disputes of fact occasionally come very close to award interpret-
ations. While in theory this is not permissible, in practice it may 
go unchallenged because of the concurrence of the parties and the 
disposition of the chairman.^^ Thus there appears to be a vast gulf 
between what boards of reference are authorised to do and what they, 
in fact, do to settle a dispute. 
3, Other Machinery for Settlement of Plant-Level Disputes 
(i) Arbitral Jurisdictions 
Australians industrial relations systems provide a variety 
of authorities to which parties can have recourse for the settlement 
of disputes arising at the work place. The disputants may resort to 
the principal arbitral tribunal in the jurisdiction which may dispose 
21 of the matter by an award variation. More frequently the major 
tribunal will simply determine the dispute on its merits and issue its 
22 decision. 
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In some jurisdictions, industrial magistrates have power 
23 to settle local disputes while in other jurisdictions conciliation 
24 committees have this power. Moreover, in all jurisdictions, a local 
grievance may be ventilated at a compulsory conference summoned by a 
25 
Conciliation Commissioner. Where the dispute involves the interpret-
ation or enforcement of an award, the parties may invoke the 2 6 jurisdiction of an industrial court. 
(ii) Wages Board States: Victoria and Tasmania 
Wages boards were originally devised to curb the abuses 
27 
arising from 'sweating* in manufacturing industries. In later years 
wages boards* determinations came to regulate wages and working 
conditions principally in the unorganised sector of the work force 28 
who are engaged in small scale undertakings. Hie consenses of 
opinion seems to be that the wages board system, at least in Tasmania, 
provides adequate industrial regulation for those employees beyond 29 
federal jurisdiction . 
A determination generally operates as a common rule for the 
industry. Accordingly local grievances arising in individual 
enterprises are not within the purview of the system. 
In Tasmania,the Minister is empowered to call a compulsory 30 
conference which may dispose of a local dispute, but this procedure 
is not available in Victoria, Thus, the fear that the w^es board 
system would take the management of the business out of the hands of 
employers and place it in the hands of the chairmen of the wages 
boards^^ has not been vindicated. 
4. Conclusion 
The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission is 
unable to establish machinery for the settlement of local disputes in 
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32 the round. It can only create boards of reference charged with 
the supervision of routine matters arising out of awards properly 
33 
made. In theory, the jurisdiction of boards of reference in both 
federal and state spheres is heavily circumscribed; in practice, these 
boards enjoy some degree of success as a means of settling local 
grievances, A former President of the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission paid the following tribute to the work of 
the boards in the federal arena: 
The success of these boards has been remarkable, and has been 
reflected in the fact that there are only two or three appeals 
each year from about a thousand decisions. Boards of reference 
have become one of the safety valves in our system for the 
conciliating of disputes in which both parties do participate 
with signal success. 
On the other hand, Hutson reports that only 208 boards of 
reference were used in 1966 for the whole area of the Commission's 
35 
jurisdiction. He points out that only seventeen boards were used by 
parties to the Metal Trades Award in that year.^^ Professor De Vyver's 
study of Australian boards of reference some years earlier provides 
further evidence of the limited use made of boards in the federal sphere. 
In the period 1950-1955,parties to the Metal Trades Award resorted to 37 
boards of reference an average of twenty-nine times per year. Moreover, 
little use is made of the boards in some states while in others they 
simply do not exist. 
Decisions of boards of reference may frequently be impeached 
on jurisdictional grounds if one of the disputants decides it will not 
co-operate. Further, the utility of these bodies as a means of resolving 
plant-level disputes depends to no small degree upon the view the 
chairman takes on the jurisdictional points. 
Alternative methods of disposing of plant-level grievances 
are available in most jurisdictions but there is no machinery specific-
ally tailored for the settlement of these local disputes. In addition, 
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the techniques of industrial regulation normally practised by 
Australian industrial tribunals are not well-suited to the settlement 
38 
of disputes at individual enterprises. A tribunal which is 
customarily concerned with the prescription of wages and general 
working conditions for an industry or even for the disputants can be 
excused for clinging to a guideline of non-interference with managerial 
prerogatives when faced with a local dispute over a routine matter. 
This policy must be recognised as a major fetter upon the tribunals* 
ability to cope with intra-pLant grievances. 
PART III 
ARGUMENT FOR REFORM 
CHAPTER 11 HISTORY AND THEORY BEHIND THE LAW 
1. Historical Background 
Before the Industrial Revolution the British economy was 
predominantly agrarian. The bulk of the work force was engaged in 
agriculture, the balance as craftsmen, tradesmen, servants or soldiers. 
Workers on the land enjoyed a measure of security because long periods 
of notice were commonly required to terminate their employment.^ And 
in these local communities, masters were paternalistic towards their 
servants. 
A craftsman in the country or in a small town was also better 
off than his counterparts in the cities. As Gaskell put it: *He lived a 
peaceful life amongst his own people, and was a respectable member of 
society He worked at home or in a small workshop and he was 
often able to supplement his wages with a small farming income. 
Weavers in the cities were not so fortunate. Their only 
income was wages, and they were economically dependent upon their 
employer. Yet here, too, the master-servant relationship was essentially 
personal. Mantoux reports: *About 1720 an "eminent manufacturer" of 
Manchester would go down to his workshop at six o*clock in the 
morning, breakfast with his apprentices on oatmeat porridge and then 
set to work with them*,^ And Toynbee observed that the manufacturer 
4 
*was literally the man who worked with his own hands in his own cottage'. 
Thus, in the eighteenth century, the master was usually both owner and 
manager of his workshop. 
As the Industrial Revolution gained momentum, partnerships 
appeared to be increasingly inadequate as a means of attracting and 
marshalling capital. They suffered from two major defects: unlimited 
liability and discontinuity. Each partner was liable to the extent of 
*his last shilling and last acre*. And the firm was, in theory, 
dissolved by the death of one partner. Entrepreneurs sought a more 
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viable commercial unit and their search led to the joint stock 
company. 
During the early decades of the nineteenth century these 
companies proliferated. Although they changed the structure of the 
capitalist economy they had little immediate effect upon the master 
and servant relationship; the companies were merely projections of 
their owners* personalities. In 1844 there vere oily twenty-four woollen 
manufacturing companies in existence. And the mills throughout the 
West Riding area were •principally owned and occupied by clothiers in 
shares®.^ 
Company crashes characterised the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In December 1825 following the failure of 
several banks, *panic set in and the value of shares fell 60-80% or 
vanished*.^ According to a reliable estimate made in 1827, only 
127 of the 624 companies formed in 1824-1825 survived the crisis.^ 
Again, in 1834, many investors suffered in ill-fated speculative 
ventures. Against this background, it is little wonder that nineteenth 
century companies Acts were designed to protect the investing public. 
In this period, as now, company law treated shareholders' 
g 
interests as pre-eminent. The Act of 1844 gave statutory recognition 
to joint stock enterprises and demanded adequate iriformation about the 
company for investors. Subsequent company legislation has confirmed 
the legislature*s faith in the disclosure policy. 
The Census of l85l revealed that the scale of industrial 
organization was still quite small by modern standards. This was the 
first census in which masters were asked to state the number of their 
servants. Approximately 130,000 replies were received. One-third 
advised that they had no hired workers. Of the remainder, 76,000 
masters reported having fewer than 10 hired servants, 9,000 had 9 between 10 and 49, and 1,000 between 50 and 90 workers. Thus, less 
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than one per cent of the masters had a work force in excess of 50. 
Part of the reason for this small scale activity lay in the fact 
that unlimited liability discouraged investment. 
But there was mounting pressure to grant joint stock 
companies the privilege of limited liability. Ironically some 
advocates claimed that this privilege would permit a marriage of the 
employees* skill and capital and would prove *an instrument of 
immense latent capacity for elevating the whole labouring class*.^^ 
Indeed, some argued that it was the workers **clear and undoubted 
right to have use of this instrument Further The Economist 
suggested that limited liability could resolve the problem of friction 
between capital and labour by enabling workmen to be partners in the 
12 
success of the undertaking. 
Finally, in 1856, the prejudice in favour of individual 
enterprises was overcome, and limited liability was granted to any 
group of seven persons upon registration of a memorandum and articles 
of association in compliance with a procedure laid down in the Act of 
1844,^^ With the advent of limited liability, companies multiplied 
and invaded most sectors of the economy. On 19 May 1865 The Times 
complained that the whole country was becoming *one vast mass of 14 
impersonalities*. While this was perhaps an exaggeration, it was 
true that the Act of 1856 set the stage for a fundamental change in 
the master and servant relationship. 
Limited liability companies attracted capital investment. 
The family firms and partnerships were rapidly giving way to companies 
in which ownership and control were divorced. A distinct class of 
shareholders grew up. Trevelyan describes this group as *an element 
in the national life representing irresponsible wealth detached from 
the land and the duties of the landowner; and almost equally detached 
from the responsible management of business*.^^ Even then the 
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shareholder played a passive role in company affairs. To quote 
Trevelyan: *The "shareholder" as such had no knowledge of the 
lives, thoughts or needs of the workmen employed by the Company in 
which he held shares, and his influence on the relations of capital 
and labour was not good*.^^ 
Salaried managers stepped into the vacuum left by the 
departure of the shareholders from active management. Gone was the 
personal relationship between the owner-manager and his servants. 
The vast amount of capital invested in limited liability 
companies hastened the expansion of the factory system. The Industrial 
Revolution was now in full swing. Workers were recruited into the 
system and subjected to a new form of discipline. No longer was the _ 
tempo of production set by the seasons or the weather. Now the master 
determined the pace. As Wadsworth and Mann put it: 'Whatever else the 
domestic system was, however intermittent and sweated its labour, it 
did allow a man a degree of personal liberty to indulge himself, a 
17 
command over his time which he was not to enjoy again*. 
When artisans and craftsmen entered the factory they 
surrendered control over their instruments of production; they no 
longer owned their own tools. Moreover, the factory system fragmented 
and standardised their work making it difficult for them to take pride 
in their workmanship. For these workers, factory employment entailed 
a loss of status. 
Industrial discipline was hard. Production demanded 
regularity and accuracy. Masters enforced strict standards of 
punctuality and punished negligence severely, especially if expensive 
machinery was damaged. Usher observes: ®The capitalist employer 
became a supervisor of every detail of the work: without any change 
in the general character of the wage contract, the employer acquired 18 new powers which were of great social significance*. 
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The main penalty was, of course, dismissal or threat of 
dismissal and this was a most effective sanction during the 
irregular periods of employment in the nineteenth century. For minor 
infractions, masters levied fines. These were not merely small change. 
•Their general level was high and was meant to hurt,*^^ Surprising as 
it may seem, corporeal punishment was also used for some offences. 
In this period then, employers and managers were pre-
occupied with the exigencies of business. Little attention was given 
to any new responsibilities which might arise out of the changes in the 
pace of output and industrial organization in the factory, mine or 
workshop. Only a handful of the more successful employers continued 
the tradition of paternalism towards their employees. To the majority 
of managers, employees were merely an adjunct to capital. Like raw 
materials, labour was a commodity to be bought and used and discarded 
if unsuitable. The worker*s status and security were matters *of 
20 
economic circumstances rather than social obligation*. 
Laissez-faire was the prevailing economic and political 
philosophy throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, some of the worst 
abuses of the factory system were said to be justified on the basis 
of freedom of contract: workers were free to leave their master and 
sell their labour elsewhere if they resented the way they were treated. 
But this ignored the fact that unemployment was high because of a 
rapidly increasing population. Competition for jobs was fierce and 
freedom of contract, a facade. Even Adam Smith noticed the inequality 
of bargaining power: 
A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though 
they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a 
year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. 
Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a 
month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long 
run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master 
is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.^^ 
There could be no real freedom of contract while the servant was totally 
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dependent upon his master for his subsistence. 
The laissez-faire philosophy forestalled legislative reforms. 
State intervention, it was argued, might hamper growth and reduce 
profits. But the State slowly awakened to its role of industrial 
22 
watchdog. it secured basic improvements in working conditions and 
recognised trade unions. Later it guaranteed the individual's freedom 
of association and right to strike. Yet for the greater part of the 
nineteenth century, trade unions were legally impotent. Their powers 
of negotiation were ill-defined, and direct action was illegal. The 
workers stood alone and they had not yet learned the rules of the 
game. This is a fact of fundamental importance. 
Much of our company law and master and servant law has its 
roots in nineteenth century England. The foregoing account shows 
that there were several important themes in that period but only three 
are material here: paramountcy of shareholders*interests, freedom of 
contract, and property rights. Let us examine the relevance of these 
notions to the modern corporation, 
2. The Underlying Theory; 3 Themes 
(i) Paramountcy of Shareholders^ Interests 
When companies were groups of investors who pooled their risk 
capital to organise and operate a business enterprise it may have been 
legitimate for the law to focus upon protection of shareholders* 
interests. Since shareholders risked their capital and savings, the 
law treated them in nruch the same way as it treated the owner of land; 
they alone were entitled to the profits of their investment just as 
the landowner was entitled to the product of his toil. For this 
reason shareholders were granted,and continue to enjoy, a pre-eminent 
position in company law. In law, a company is an association of 
persons in an autonomous legal entity with a distinct personality 
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which enables it to carry on business, own property and contract 
debts. As Galbraith points out, this image is highly normative: 
it describes what the corporation should be, not what it is in 
1 -4- 23 reality. 
The modern investor does not contribute his savings to an 
24 
enterprise in the same way as his nineteenth century predecessor did: 
he does not invest money to enable the company to purchase plant or 
expand its operations; he does not normally take the 'risk* of a new 
economic venture; he simply purchases a liquid, intangible asset only 
remotely connected with the company property on which production 
depends; generally the transaction by which the modern investor 
purchases shares is far removed from the original investment of the 
founders or proprietors of the enterprise. 
Nor is the modern shareholder's risk equal to that of his 
nineteenth century ancestor. Before the advent of limited liability 
an investor was liable to the extent of 'his last shilling and last 
acre*. In the modern company the shareholder's risk is limited to 
the extent of his investment (and, of course, any unpaid calls on 
his shares). And the modern shareholder can spread his risk over 
several stable companies thereby protecting himself against crippling 
losses. Generally speaking, the most today's shareholders risk is a 
loss of income; there is only a remote possibility of a loss of 
, 25 capital. 
Further, the modern investor bears little resemblance to 
the owner-manager or entrepreneur of the Industrial Revolution. He 
does not normally contribute managerial expertise to the enterprise 
and he has delegated control over the instruments of production to 
others. In most cases he has become a mere purchaser of dividend 
income. Yet, in recognition of this passive, relatively safe 
investment, the law requires that the company be managed solely in 
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the interests of the shareholders. Tawney makes the point well. 
In modern industrial communities the general effect of recent 
economic development has been to swell proprietary rights which 
entitle the owner to payment without work and to diminish those 
which can properly be described as functional.26 
Moreover, the modern shareholder's role in corporate finance 
is diminishing. The Vernon Committee reported that the major source 
of capital expenditure by all companies in the economy was company 
saving. The proportion for all companies throughout the period 1954-
1961 was over 70%, the balance being derived from share and debenture 
27 issues, financial intermediaries and banks in that order. Further, 
the major buyers of ordinary and preference shares in Australia are 
28 
the institutional investors, not individual shareholders. 
Certain features characterise the development of companies 
in the present century: the fragmentation of family capitalism, the 
separation of ownership and control, dispersed shareholding in large 
corporations and the emergence of management as a self-perpetuating 29 
organ of corporate government. These are not in dispute. There is, 
however, a controversy about the implications of these factors. 30 
On one hand, the 'managerial revolution' school contends 
that management now has considerable freedom to neglect shareholders' 
interests since investors are no longer a potent force in the company: 
they argue that ownership without control is impotent and insignificant. 
On this view, managers have sufficient latitude in the large 
corporation to follow autonomous goals^^ which may not necessarily 
coincid with shareholders' interests. 
On the other hand, some argue that the emerging class of 
managers will merely act as executors or caretakers of the company 32 
property on behalf of the passive shareholders. On this view, 
managers tend to identify with and defend the interests of private 
property, and they will act in the interests of the shareholders. 
235 
33 34 
Separate studies by Rolfe and Encel suggest that there 
is a si iiificant degree of social homogeneity among Australian 
executives and directors. These managers may, therefore, align 
themselves with, and aspire to,the propertied class. But it does not 
follow that they will manage their companies in the interests of 
investors. And even those commentators who assert that managers are 
caretakers of corporate property must concede that directors are 
expected to be stewards only for the largest, most influential, 
shareholders, not the members as a whole. 
Thus, on either interpretation of the evidence, the 
traditional theory of the paramountcy of shareholders* interests is 
not in tune with the realities of the modern corporation.^^ This does 
not mean that managers should now be the sole beneficiaries. Nor does 
it mean that the influential shareholders should enjoy this status. 
Rather, it clears the way for consideration of the relative merits of 3 6 
the claims of other groups within the enterprise. And employees 
have a legitimate claim to recognition. 
Company law is unrealistic in its failure to recognise that 
industry involves a combined effort in which employees participate 
with management and shareholders. Indeed, the association which the 
law does recognise - shareholders, creditors and directors - is 37 
incapable of production or distribution of goods or services. 
In the modern company, the shareholder's risk pales by 
comparison with that of the employee. The employee's security and 
livelihood are, in many cases, tied to the fortunes of the company. 
He invests his labour and he cannot normally spread this investment 
over several companies. If his employer goes into liquidation or is 
forced to retrench him, his long term investment is forfeited. He 
may seek another job but there, his work, his pay and his working 
conditions may not be as good as in his former position. For the 
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employee in a company town, displacement may involve a long period of 
unemployment or a domestic upheaval. 
Further, company employees spend the major part of their 
daily lives travelling to and from work and in the service of the 
company. The typical shareholder, on the other hand, is not totally 
dependent upon dividend income and pays only cursory attention to 
share price lists in the daily newspaper. 
An employee contributes his whole personality to his work 
and he is absorbed in social, psychological and economic relationships 
in his work place. In return, the law requires management to respond 
with largely material benefits. When the industrial worker gave up 
his tools he suffered a diminution of status; he also lost his 
independence. Unlike the craftsman or artisan before the Industrial 
Revolution, the modern industrial worker is not usually a •producer*. 
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The organization, not the worker, produces goods and services. 
In addition, the individual employee's responsibility over his work 
has declined. He has lost the recognition which his eighteenth 
century forebears enjoyed as an incidental feature of their work. 
The law has done little to compensate him for this loss. 
In the early decades of the industrial Revolution, the 
entrepreneur was the owner-manager of his business. He directly 
participated in the undertaking by investing not only his capital 
but also his labour. 
Today, with control of the large companies concentrated in 
a few h a n d s , t h e typical shareholder plays only a passive role in 
company affairs. Widely dispersed shareholding prevents him from 
bullying or even influencing management. He has become an almost 
functionless figure. He is often geographically separated from fellow 
members, and is commonly incapable of organising any effective 
opposition or challenge to management's proposals. In theory, general 
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meetings give shareholders a voice in company affairs but in a large 
company these ceremonies are little more than specious rituals. The 
theory disguises the fact of the shareholders* impotence. True, the 
shareholder may have a vote but the vote is w o r t h l e s s . T h e franchise 
gives sharehoJders only a chimera of power. 
Perhaps the shareholder has no desire to govern his company. 
The typical shareholder is inexperienced in business affairs and too 
pre-occupied with his own full-time job to interfere with management. 
Further, he may spread his investment over several companies thereby fore-
feiting his chance of exercising some influence in one enterprise. The 
fact that the average shareholder buys and sells his shareholding often 
suggests that he has little genuine or enduring interest in the 
fortunes of a particular firm.^^ 
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Shareholders* poor attendance at general meetings and their 
failure to appoint proxies to vote in their place are further evidence 
of their apathy. In most instances, shareholders in the large 43 
corporation are merely *rubber stamps* for management's policies. 
In general, only a drastic decline in dividends or a threat to their 
capital investment will provoke an outcry from shareholders. In 
Schumpter*s view, *Dematerialized, defunctionalised and absentee 
ownership does not impress and call forth moral allegiance. Eventually 44 
there will be nobody left who really cares to stand up for 
company property. 
There are two reasons why the traditional theory underlying 
much of our company law is inadequate. The first is that it fails to 
recognise that shareholders are no longer the motive force in the 
large corporation. And the second is that it denies employees* 
legitimate claims to participate in company decisions. 
The large company is one of the most pervasive influences in 
an employee*s life. It determines where he will work, what work he 
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will do, who will be his supervisor, his advancement and discipline, 
his wages, and the time of his holidays. In short, the corporate 
employer has almost unfettered control over his sustenance and 
livelihood. In remote company towns, management assumes the role of 
45 
a 'quasi-governmental agency*: it provides not only employment but 
also accommodation, schools, health and recreational facilities. 
The law grants employees the franchise in the often-remote 
political arena, yet denies them a voice in the organization which 
intimately affects their lives and those of their dependants. The 
ordinary employee plays no part in policy formulation or definition 
of company objectives. And he is not entitled to be consulted on 
matters which directly affect his security, prospects for advancement 
or working conditions. 
But would it help to extend the corporate franchise to 
46 employees? Perhaps employees would fail to exercise their votes 
47 
intelligently just as shareholders have done in the past. On the 
other hand, the average employee's*stake• in the company is more 
significant than the typical shareholder's investment. Moreover, 
employees are, on the whole, better-organised than shareholders. They 
can assemble at their work place, whereas communication is a problem 
for a widely dispersed body of shareholders. Again, employees are 
familiar with such concepts as group solidarity. Their bond of unity 
is stronger than a desire for maximum dividends. 
(ii) Freedom of Contract 
48 
Soon after the Statutes of Labourers fell into disuse, the 
law came to regard the employment relationship as one founded on 
contract"^*^ - a bargain concluded between equals. Cracks appeared in 
this facade early in the nineteenth century^*^ but they were largely 
overlooked. Yet in 1911, Higgins J. asserted: 'The power of the 
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employer to withhold bread is SL much more effective weapon than the 
power of the employee to refuse his labour».^^ And in the next year 
His Honour repeated this sentiment; *The power of giving or refusing 
employment is a tremendous factor in the bargain, an unfair weight 
thrown into the scale, like the sword of Brennus*.^^ Unions were 
weak in this period and employees suffered from this lack of collective 
power. But even when the unions gained strength and consolidated their 
position they did not entirely redress the imbalance inherent in the 
contract of employment. 
To a great extent, the presumed equalitv of bargaining power 
is still a myth. It is often 'set at nought by economic facts*.^^ 
Principal among these is the fact that we have become a nation of 
54 
employees almost totally dependent upon wages for income. To quote 
Tannenbaum: 'For our generation, the substance of life is in another 
man's hands'. Kahn-Freund also expresses the point with character-
istic clarity: 
the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or 
worker is typically a relation between a bearer of power and 
one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an 
act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of sub-
ordination, however much the submission and the subordination 
may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal 
mind known as the "contract of employment".-^ 
During the nineteenth century both parties to the contract 
57 
of service wanted short periods of notice of termination. Under 
this arrangement, employees could take full advantage of the irregular 
labour market. But short periods of notice are no longer to the 
employee's benefit. The increasing specialisation demanded by modern 
technology in particular and industrial society iri general means that 
the modern employee has fewer avenues of employment open to himo He 
may not be able to drop one job and pick up another. 
Further, the inadequacy of the notice required at common law 
is without doubt one of the main reasons why employees rirely resort 
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to their common law remedy of damages for wrongful dismissal. 
Tlie traditional notion of freedom of contract has probably 
survived as the hub of the employment relationship simply because the 
CO 
relationship was fitted into a legal framework. Behind this facade 
it has been adapted and distorted' but the framework itself has 
protected it from a complete revamping. Thus, the employer*s right 
to dismiss an employee arbitrarily or capriciously, without reason or 
cause, can still be defended, in theory, by reference to the 
contractual principle of mutuality: since the employee may resign 
on a whim he may not complain of a capricious dismissal. This principle 
also allows an employer to dismiss an employee without stating a 
reason. As one executive put It: 'Why should we give him a reason?; 
we don't ask him for one when he applies for a job'.^*^ Failure to 
state the grounds for dismissal is by no means uncommon. Indeed, in 
the writer's survey over one-fifth of the respondents reported 
dismissals in this category in the three years preceding the survey.^^ 
Nearly one-third of the respondents, many of them large 
companies, had dismissed employees in the relevant period on grounds 
of incompatibility with other employees.^^ When economic units were 
small there was perhaps some justification for allowing a master to 
discharge his servants if they could not get on with their work mates. 
In the large, modern company incompatibility should not automatically 
be treated as sufficient cause for discharge. Yet this is the law -
contract law. 
Ironically, courts justify freedom of contract in the 
6 3 
employment relationship as a protection for the employee. This 
obscures the fact that the courts are really upholding management's 
disciplinary power. 
The survival of some of the anachronistic contractual 
principles might be explained on the ground that the courts have not 
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been given the opportunity to reappraise these old rules in the light 
64 
of modern conditions. It is true that the common law on dismissals 
is dying of starvation,^^ but that is not the whole picture. For 
example, in Cyril Leonard & Co. v. Simo Securities Trust Ltd,^^ the 
Court of Appeal missed a golden opportunity to jettison the patently A 7 
unjust rule in Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Company v. Ansell. 
While the law has placed the employment relationship in the 
pigeon-hole of contract, it has been curiously selective in deciding 
what contractual principles it will apply. Thus the courts have 
consistently refused to order specific performance of the contract of 
service.^^ This rule, no doubt, recognises the personal nature of 
the employment relationship. Yet when the law comes to compute 
damages for wrongful dismissal it ignores the personal elements in the 
contract: it grants no damages for the stigma of dismissal, mental 
anxiety or hurt feelings caused by the discharge, the manner of the 69 
dismissal or any imputation of dishonesty conveyed thereby. This is 
only part of the law*s general failure to award damages which reflect 
the true nature of the employee's loss. 
Australian employees* job security depends as much upon 
trade union pressure and the vagaries of the labour market as it does 
upon the law. It is true, as Kahn-Freund observes, that employees* 
power is collective power.^^ More will be said of this later.^^ The 
second factor, the state of the labour market, can hardly be sufficient 
protection for employees. The labour market is fickle. 'Whether there 
is one more vacancy than there are applicants or one more applicant than 
there are vacancies decides which of two worlds the wage-earner shall 72 
live in, and makes all the difference between two industrial systems.* 
What the law needs is a new conceptual framework for the 
employment relationship - one that fits the reality of modern industrial 
society. Contract law is simply inadequate as a body of rules governing 
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the duration and termination of the contract of service. Perhaps it 
is now time to recognise that security of tenure is a form of 
property, that a job is now a valuable right. If the law granted 
employees proprietary rights in their employment it could logically 
protect employees from harsh or arbitrary dismissal. It could also 
demand compensation for the worker's loss of investment in his job, 
or, alternatively, it could order reinstatement. None of these 
objectives can be achieved within the existing contractual framework. 
The notion of freedom of contract also restricts the law*s 
ability to recognise employees* interests in their inventions. 
The basic principles governing this issue were developed 
73 during the late nineteenth century. Britain's Industrial Revolution 
was still a little unsteady on its feet, and it would seem that the 
law's sympathy lay with the employer-entrepreneur rather than the 
74 employee, Wliile the courts have not been unmindful of employees* 
interests in their inventions,^^ it does appear that the law was, and 
16 
is, slanted fairly steeply in favour of the employer. 
Not only is the employer favoured by the law, in many cases 
he virtually makes 'the law*. The contract of service of an employed 
inventor or researcher is drawn up by the employer with few concessions 
to the interests of the employee. Indeed it is this freedom of contract 
principle which enables the anplowr to obtain rights to the beneficial 
ownership of inventions which, at common law, would belong to the 
77 ? 
employee-inventor. 
Today, an inventor is normally an employee, not an entre-
preneur. In general, contemporary inventors are dependent upon their 
employers for sponsorship and continued employment. The costs of 
research and invention preclude much small scale activity. In the 78 private sector, the larger companies dominate research and development, 
government grants favour companies with substantial research 
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programmes, and it is the larger companies which are in a position to 
79 
take full advantage of these subsidies. Under these circumstances, 
equality of bargaining power between an inventor and his corporate 
employer is becoming increasingly attenuated. 
The law on employee inventions has developed in a disjointed 
manner and few coherent principles are established. Much depends upon 
the particular terms of the employment and the circumstances in which 
the invention was made, A study of the cases reveals a lawyers* 
paradise of distinguishable features. With this in mind, litigation 
to establish an employee's rights takes on an element of speculation. 
Apart from the costs of litigation and the limited prospects of 
success, an employee may be deterred from challenging his employer's 80 claim to the invention through fear of dismissal or victimisation. 
The law gives the employed inventor little direct stimulus 
to exercise his creative talents. True, he may be formally recognised 
81 
in the patent, but he is entitled to no extra compensation for his 
efforts unless he can persuade a court to grant him beneficial 
ownership of the patent. Courts have declined to apportion the 
beneficial ownership of a patent as between an employer and an employee 
because of the difficulties inherent in such an exercise. But mere 
difficulty of calculation should not deter the court from deciding 82 
upon an equitable division of the rights attached to a patent. 
Whatever compensation the employed inventor receives is granted ex 
gratia and not as of right. 
Promotion is another way of rewarding an employee for his 
inventive faculty. But promotion is not always possible or even 
desirable. There may be no vacancies in the employer's hierarchy to 
which the successful inventor can be promoted. On the other hand, a 
promotion may involve an inventor in administrative or supervisory 
duties beyond his capability: a good scientist is not always a good 
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administrator. Further, the employee may not feel that his promotion 
is directly related to his creative efforts, and it is the employee's 
subjective assessment which determines his level of incentive and job 
satisfaction. 
The present means of recognising employees' creative genius 
are inadequate but are there any other compelling reasons for reform? 
The Australian Government has eroded the tariff protection 
enjoyed by Australian industry, and management may be forced to expand 
local technological research and experiment to compete with imported 
products. Unfortunately, Australian industry seems to be lagging behind 
85 
its overseas counterparts in technological development. It may well 
be impossible or impracticable to attempt to close this technological 
gap or even diminish it significantly. But that is not the sole 
purpose of encouraging local research and developm^mt. 
Local researchers and inventors who are given some incentive 
to use their ingenuity will be better able to assess the merits of 
imported technology and to make appropriate modifications for the 8 6 
domestic market. Employers will also benefit directly from 
inventions which reduce the costs of labour and materials or increase 
production. 
In the long term, the community gains from economic progress. 
The patent system itself recognises the public's interest in progress. 
This interest will be fostered if employees are encouraged to inquire, 
to create and to invent. Local research and development may also have 
a salutary effect upon the nation's balance of payments deficit although 87 it is difficult to quantify the likely impact. 
The problem of stimulating an employee's approach to his work 
is primarily the responsibility of management. But the law can play a 
role in this area. 
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Ciii) Respect for Private Property Rights and Their Modern 
Analogue, Managerial Prerogatives' 
As mentioned earlier, laissez-faire dominated the economic 
and political philosophy of nineteenth century England. Under this 
policy private property rights were almost inviolate. The owner-
manager was given virtually unbridled freedom to run his business as 
he saw fit. Indeed, laissez-faire was seen as the guarantee of growth 
and the efficient use of resources, labour and capital. When corporate 
property divided into two components, passive ownership and active 
control, the law overlooked this fundamental change in the nature of the 
property. To transpose a theory devised for the close corporations of 
the Industrial Revolution to the large modern company involves *a vast 
88 
optical illusion*, or at least a distortion of the original theory. 
Yet the transition caused barely a ripple in the law. 
In 1910 the President of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission was still able to defend every employer's right to *carry 
on his own business on his own system* so*that he may make the greatest 89 
profit within his reach*. This masks the fact that, in many 
companies, those who now carry on the business are not the owners. 
The traditional theory might yet be well-founded if manage-
ment were directly accountable to *the owners* for its everyday 
decisions. The fact is that management is not responsible in this 
way. The ordinary shareholder in a large modern company is an 90 
impotent, functionless figure. Thus the law accepts two abstractions 
in order to accommodate the modern company within the traditional 
theory: firstly, it overlooks the fact that the owners no longer 
manage the business; secondly, it disregards the fact that management 
is not always the servant of the shareholders. 
Not only has the nature of company property changed beyond 
recognition, but the implications of property rights in this new era 
are dramatically different. In the nineteenth century, the typical 
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91 company was small in relation to its market. The scale of the 
enterpri se ensured that it would act responsibly, or so it was 
thought. In any event, management's decisions had a limited impact. 
92 Today, when employment is concentrated in large companies, 
executive decisions are often social and political i s s u e s . T h e y are 
no longer purely economic matters; now they can intimately affect the 
94 lives of thousands of employees and the community at large. 
Management's mandate has not changed. What has changed are the 
95 
implications of the mandate. It is no longer legitimate to conceal 
this fundamental development behind a smokescreen of private property 
rights. Respect for private property rights was justifiable when the 
property was 'private*. But company property has outgrown this 
description. When a large vehicle manufacturing company can defend a 
decision to retrench 5,000 workers without severance pay by an appeal 
to private property rights and managerial freedom to run its business, 
it is time to modify the traditional theory. 
The slogan 'managerial rights' is not merely part of the 
folklore of labour relations. It does hinder the law's attempts to 
foster or protect certain important interests of employees. Thus, the 
law's failure to develop a code of job security rights, to make re-
instatement and/or adequate compensation freely available in dismissal 
cases, to require advance notice and consultation regarding impending 
redundancy, and, finally, to review managerial decisions upon promotions 
or supervisory appointments can all be explained, at least in part, by 
the reluctance of industrial tribunals to encroach upon management's 
domain. 
Managerial prerogatives also hamper the development of more 
equitable and more secure superannuation and long service leave benefits. 
Long service leave is, of course, governed by statute or, in some 
instances, by award, whereas superannuation is regulated indirectly 
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through taxation and revenue legislation. Further, long service leave 
is an 'industrial matter*; superannuation is not. Yet these two 
benefits have much in common. For one thing, they both accrue over 
a long period in recognition of the employee's services. 
In the present analysis the key issue is whether the law 
should ensure that employees actually receive the benefits they are 
promised and guarantee that they are not deprived of these benefits 
through no fault of their own. In essence, the issue is one of 
managerial freedom. For example, the question whether an employee 
should receive a Vested*superannuation benefit when he resigns or is 
dismissed involves management's right to run its business, and, in 
particular, its superannuation scheme. Again, managerial rights are 
involved when one considers whether a certain period of service to an 
industry or with a national company and its associates in several 
states should qualify an employee for long service leave. 
A fresh approach to managerial rights would greatly expand 
the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals. They would be able to 
act upon all the issues discussed above. Managerial prerogative is, 
after all, an evolutionary concept. As time goes by, it will be eroded 
more and more. This process of accretion will be nudged along if it 
is recognised once and for all that, in some areas, managerial rights 
. . . . . 96 are the main fetters upon the tribunals* jurisdiction. 
Although much of the theory which determines management*s 
responsibilities to its employees is obsolete, perhaps there is little 
cause for concern: the theory may be so inappropriate in modern 
conditions that it is disregarded. Unfortunately there are several 
indications that this is not so. In particular, the parties have not 
yet found a panacea for plant-level unrest. 
CHAPTER 12 DIMENSIONS OF PROBLEMS ARISING AT THE WORK PLACE 
1. Introduction 
Local grievances cover a broad spectrum. At one end of the 
scale is the 1973 Ford strike at the Broadmeadows plant. In the early 
negotiations the dispute was ostensibly about a claim for wages, 
45% in excess of the award. Later a union leader asserted that 
the cause of the dispute was essentially hostility to the speed of the 
line and 'assembly line blues'.^ The sequence of events preceding and 
2 
during the strike will be examined elsewhere. At this point it is 
sufficient to note that the protracted strike cost the company the 
fruits of nine weeks* production amounting to $60 million; workers 
employed by the company lost approximately $3 million in wages.^ In 
addition, the violence which erupted on 13 June 1973 at the Broadmeadows 
I 4 
plant caused an estimated $10,000 damage to factory installations. 
At the other end of the scale are the minor disputes which 
arise over relatively routine matters such as promotion, transfer, 
discharge and stand-down of employees, supervision, and management's 
decisions on the nature, allocation and organization of the work. It 
is important to emphasise that any of these disputes can explode with 
large scale repercussions if they are not defused at an early stage. 
Disputes over domestic issues are not confined to factories or to 
assembly line, blue collar employees. They may arise in the white 
collar sector, in offices, banks, emporiums, and airports. 
2, Level of Dissatisfaction 
While there is not sufficient evidence to generalise about 
the level of job satisfaction of Australian employees, surveys by 
both government and independent researchers reveal that, in some 
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establishments, job satisfaction is only moderate,^ while in others 
it is curiously low.^ 
3. Reactions against Plant-Level Problems 
Ci) Passive Responses of Individual Employees 
Ca) Absenteeism 
Employees may express a passive protest against their 
position in the plant or work place by absence from work, resignation 
or simply a negative approach to their job. 
It is estimated that absenteeism costs Australian industry nearly 
y 
$1,000 million ayear in lost production. In Victoria alone, an 
g 
estimated 52,000 workers are absent from their jobs each day. If 
Victoria can be taken as representative of the trend in the whole of 
Australians civilian work force, it appears that well over 68 million 9 
working days are lost each year through absenteeism. When it is 
considered that a record 6.3 million working days were lost through 
industrial disputes in 1974,^^ and an estimated 3.5 million working 
days through industrial accidents,^^ the amount of working time lost 
by absenteeism is a staggering figure. 
Absenteeism can be attributed to a variety of factors, and, 
in many cases, it results from genuine illness or injury. But Mr Peter 
Diehm, director of the Foundation for the Research and Treatment of 
Alcoholics and Drug Dependants, believes that some absences (about 12 
20% on Mondays and Fridays) can be directly related to alcoholism. 
Unfortunately, in the past, there has been little significant research 
into the underlying causes of absenteeism although the Department of 
Labour is at present undertaking an extensive survey of the problem. 
What little research has been done in Australia suggests that employees 
with bad attendance records are more dissatisfied with their foremen and 
the work task itself than are their fellow employees.^^ There also 
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appears to be a correlation between an employee's general level of 
14 job satisfaction and his attendance record. 
(b) Resignation 
If an employee terminates his employment on his own initiative 
this may in some cases be taken as a rejection of his situation in the 
work place. Many subjective factors may influence an employee to 
decide to leave his job^^ but it appears that labour turnover can be 
partly attributed to such factors as low job satisfaction and dis-
.1 6 
satisfaction with supervision and management. ' While a higher labour 
turnover rate is common among employees who had a short length of 
service on their previous job and among single employees or employees 17 who are married with no children, much will depend upon conditions 
in the individual enterprise and the personal characteristics and 
18 
aspirations of the employees. 
Labour turnover statistics show that the separation rate 
for male manual workers who left their jobs in a survey period in 
March 1972^*^ was 4.2%, while the separation rate for female manual 20 
workers who chose to leave their employment was 6.6%. On an annual 
basis the separation rate for male manual workers in all industries 
during 1972 would be in the vicinity of 50%; the separation rate for 
all female manual workers in industry would be approximately 80%. 
The official labour turnover survey does not indicate what 
percentage of the separation rate can be ascribed to individuals who 
leave their employment several times in the year. The figures are a 
guide to the number of separations in industry, not the number of 
employees who resigned. Thus, they are rather unreliable as a guage 
of employees* dissatisfaction with their jobs. 
251 
(c) Job Performance 
Dissatisfaction and frustration at the work place may have 
an adverse effect upon an employee*s performance of his job. The 
following comment of a young assembly worker employed at General 
Motors* new automobile plant in Lordstown, Ohio shows how frustration 
breeds hostility: 
you can*t light up a cigarette or anything like that. 
It's in - they price you for it. And I think this is what 
brought about some sabotage - the men's only form of retal-
iation is that. Men today, I feel, least I feel, want to feel 
like individuals, they don't want to be a machine where you 
just take a screw and you oil it and you're okay, you know. 
They want to be respected.^^ 
The violence which occurred during the Ford strike at the Broadmeadows 
plant suggests that vehicle building companies operating assembly lines 
in Australia are not immune from this reaction. And the problem is not 
22 confined to the assembly line, 
(ii) Industrial Disputes Arising at the Work Place 
By far the greatest number of industrial disputes in Australia 
23 
last for not more than one day. An early estimate suggested that the 
participation rate of Australia's non-agricultural employees in strikes 
of one day or less was nearly sixteen times that of their counterparts 24 
in the United States, This phenomenon has puzzled American 
researchers. One observer attributes the short strikes in Australia 
to 'the unattended grievances of the rank and file, and the spontaneous 
outbursts that are the workers' reactions against tensions and 2 6 frustrations on the job*. 
On the other hand, some Australian commentators claim that 
short strikes are simply used as strategems in negotiations over 
i n t e r e s t s . A n d there is some merit in this claim. While a strike 
28 
is not essential to establish that a dispute exists, it will attract 
the attention of an industrial tribunal, and ensure that the union's 
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case is dealt with promptly. 
The number of industrial disputes of duration up to one day 
29 
in 1972 numbered 1,052. In the same year, disputes caused by 
claims over wages and hours of work totalled only 897.^^ That leaves 
at least 155 short strikes unaccounted for. Some of the items in the 
category ^physical working conditions' could be termed ^interests', 3] There were 275 such industrial disputes in 1972.^ Perhaps these 
explain the 155 short strikes which could not have been claims over 
wages and hours. On the other hand, the category 'physical working 
32 
conditions' is dominated by such items as safety and ventilation. 
There is some evidence to suggest that strikes over these issues 
tend to be lengthy.^^ If this is so, it may be possible to discount 
disputes over physical working conditions as substantial contributors 
to the number of short strikes in Australia. 
It appears then, that the short strikes cannot be entirely 
explained as part of a negotiation process over interests. 
When one passes to the statistics dealing with the method of 
settling industrial disputes in Australia, it appears that nearly 60% 
of industrial disputes in 1972 were settled by the strikers' returning 34 
to work with no negotiation between the parties. Disputes settled 
in this matter involved just over 80% of all the workers involved in 
strikes, but accounted for only about 54% of the total working days 
lost through strikes in that year.^^ A reasonable inference from these 
figures is that disputes in this category were of very short duration. 
Workers are unlikely to abandon claims over interests without 
negotiation or resort to arbitration since there exists an effective 
means of settling the dispute. By contrast, workers may be forced to 
forego claims involving managerial policy either because management 
will not compromise or because the workers believe that an industrial 
tribunal would uphold management's decision if the matter were 
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arbitrated. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that many of the disputes 
settled by resumption of work without negotiation are in fact militant 
gestures in protest against managerial policy. Certainly short strikes 
are often used to back up claims over ^interests* but that is not the 
whole picture. 
Disputes over managerial policy and physical working 
conditions taken together have consistently caused more disputes than 
wages claims although the number of workers involved and the number of 
working days lost in disputes over wages is considerably greater.^^ 
Oxnam points out that physical working conditions fall mainly 
within the jurisdiction of the states* Departments of Labour and 
factory inspectorates while managerial policy is regarded as the 
37 
concern of internal management. If the industrial tribunals adopted 
a more sympathetic attitude to workers* protests against managerial 
policy they would make much greater progress in their attempts to 
handle plant-level disputes. 
4. Underlying Causes of Plant-Level Disputes 
The official statistics of the causes of industrial disputes 
shows only the 'direct causes of stoppages of work* and even then only 
the 'stated* cause of the dispute is recorded.^^ The stipulated reason 
for an industrial dispute may not be the actual cause of the dispute; 
industrial stoppages may be the external symptoms of a most disturbing 
internal disorder.^^ While it is impossible to generalise about factors 
contributing to friction at shop level in different establishments, it 
is important to attempt some analysis of the causes of problems arising 
in plant-level relationships. Only then will it be possible to suggest 
what the parties can do to minimise this friction. Plant-level 
relationships do not operate in a vacuum immune from the influences of 
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external factors such as the level of full ernployment in the conununity 
and the general industrial climate which prevails between employer 
40 
and employee representatives on a national or industry level. 
However, most factors which influence a plant-level relationship exist 
within the plant or company, 
(i) Lack of Communication 
A lack of effective communication can escalate conflict at 
shop level. It is vitally important to advise employees of company 
rules. Yet, of the seventeen companies surveyed by Paquin, only four 
issued the employees with written rules; the remainder advised employees 
41 
of the company rules in an informal manner. 
The employee should also be made aware of the standard of 
performance expected of him. This can be done initially through 
induction and training procedures and periodically by a supervisor. 
Unfortunately, it appears that formal induction and training programmes 
are not common in Australian c o m p a n i e s . N o r is the need for training 43 of potential supervisors widely recognised. 
With wages and general working conditions being determined by 
industrial tribunals concentrated in Australians capital cities, it is 
understandable that attention has been diverted from the work place. 
High-level representation of both sides of industry in negotiations 
and before the tribunals accentuates this tendency. In large companies 
the decisions of directors at board meetings far removed from the work 
place may be sound in terms of marketing or investment policy, but this 
will not guarantee the smooth functioning of an organization; the 
human implications of these decisions at plant level must also be taken 
into account. To achieve a balance, management must be able to assess 
the impact of their decisions on the work place in advance, and explain 
the reasons for their policies to the employees directly affected. An 
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effective chain of communication is essential for a healthy plant-
level relationship. 
Australian management has adopted a variety of means of 
informing employees of company policy and decisions and obtaining 
45 
•feedback* from employees. Early in 1963 a survey of fortyone \ictorian 
undertakings was conducted to collect information about the preparation 
and distribution of house m a g a z i n e s . T h e survey was intended to be 
a »follow-up« to an earlier survey carried out in 1954.'^^ While the 
average space allotted in the magazines to management matters fell 
from 13,6% in 1954 to 12.5% in 1963, several editors reported that 48 this type of news item was popular among employees. 
Information on personnel practices and policies as well as 
rules and conditions of employment features prominently in employee 
49 
handbooks. These booklets suffer from the need to condense inform-
ation with the result that much of the material presented is difficult 
to read.^*^ And very little allowance is made for migrant workers 
with language difficulties.^^ Notice boards and periodic newsheets 
are other means of written communication used by Australian firms with 
some success. 
Joint consultation through management-employee committees is sone-52 
times used to :fe.cilitate a two-way flow of information in some enterprises. 
These committees fall into two main categories: special purpose and 
general.^^ The former is designed to consider only one matter such as 
safety or welfare. General committees have a much broader scope 
covering such items as production methods, physical working conditions, 
employees* health and safety, amenities, employees* grievances, 
attendance and time-keeping, welfare schemes and recreational 
facilities. 
An early survey^^ of management-employee committees in fifty-one 
firms found that general committees existed in tv\enty-eiglit firms, while the 
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remainder had established special-purpose committees. The aims of 
the general committees were to allow joint consideration of problems 
by management and employees and better communication between these 
parties. There was no evidence to suggest that these objectives had 
been achieved. 
Gordon^^ examined the extent of joint consultation in 
industries engaged in the manufacture of steel and steel products, 
chemicals, textiles, electrical goods, milk products, building 
materials and shipping in the Newcastle area. The twenty companies 
surveyed were divided into two groups: the steel and steel products 
industries and the non-steel industries. The former group consisted 
of twelve companies of which seven had a work force of 500 
or under. With one exception, the larger companies in the steel 
industries group restricted management-employee consultation to safety 
issues. Of the smaller steel companies only two indicated the existence 
of joint consultation committees and again these were confined to 
safety matters. 
Four major concerns and four smaller companies comprised the 
non-steel group. Two of the larger companies in this group had joint 
consultation in the form of management-employee committees while the 
other two companies reported joint union-management consultation. One 
company advised that it had established joint consultation committees 
on safety, canteen and bonus matters as well as a settlement of 
disputes committee. The latter consisted of management and union 
representatives. None of the smaller non-steel companies reported 
joint consultation procedures although in these companies senior 
management was readily accessible for consultation on an informal 
basis. Gordon's survey is useful in that it indicates the diverse 
approach to joint consultation in different industries, and even in 
different companies within the same industry. 
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A later survey^^ carried out on a much larger sample over a 
broader geographical area confirmed some of Gordon's findings. Of the 
308 undertakings surveyed, only s3>^ enly-nixTe had established some form of joint 
consultation. In nearly half of the firms with formal joint 
consultation committees, the committees considered safety matters 
only. The composition and scope of the committees surveyed differed 
markedly. 
The inescapable conclusion is that joint consultation is not 
widely practised in Australian industry, and, where it is^used it is 
57 carried out on an informal basis. Management-employee committees 
may assist in moulding the parties in an organization into a smooth-
58 • functioning unit, but there is little evidence to suggest that these 
committees are essential links in the chain of communication between 
management and workers. 
Australian companies also deal with grievances in an informal 
59 
manner. Apart from Gordon®s survey, there is little information at 
present available on this topic, Gordon found that the larger companies 
in both the steel industries group and the non-steel industries group 
adopted a policy of trying to settle grievances at the lowest level 
possible. Failing settlement by the foreman, the party could take his 
grievance through a hierarchy of authority involving the production 
superintendent and later the industrial officer until settlement was 
achieved. The groups differed in their approach to intervention by 
the employee's job delegate or union official. The steel group tended 
to discourage the early entry of the union into negotiations over the 
grievance. Companies in the non-steel group allowed the workers* job 
delegate to intervene if the grievance was not satisfied at foreman 
level. 
The smaller companies in each group shared the policy of 
disposing of grievances at the lowest level possible but they appeared 
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to be more prepared to enter into informal discussion between manage-
ment and the employees concerned; grievance processing in the smaller 
firms generally followed a much more flexible line. 
In contrast with their American counterparts, Australian 
grievance procedures appear to be largely informal. In spite of this 
lack of uniformity, our grievance procedures dispose of the bulk of 
grievances arising at the work place^'^ and represent an effective means 
of communication between an employer and its employees. 
A healthy system of communication permits employees to make 
suggestions and contribute ideas about their work. Apart from 
fostering an employee*s interest in his job, this 'feed-back* •)! 
information enables management to assess how its policies are being 
received by employees, A comprehensive survey^^ of employee benefits 
and services in mid-l97l of 1,221 establishments throughout Australia 
indicated that only 22% of the undertakings had a staff suggestion 
scheme. Twenty-two establishments were considering the introduction 
of a scheme.^^ The failure rate among the suggestion schemes was 
quite high, twenty-five firms reporting that they had terminated 
64 
their schemes. It would appear that there is ample scope for the 
extension of suggestion schemes in Australian companies. 
(a) Union Organization at Plant Level 
Australians industrial relations system tends to bolster up 
small, weak unions^^ with the result that the interests of unionists 
working in some plants are not adequately represented.^^ Australian 
unions have been criticised for their neglect of the problems of 
members on the job: Kuhn's analysis^^ of the federal and state rules 
of thirty-two large Australian unions accounting for two-thirds of the 
total Australian union membership revealed that only four unions 
69 provided for any kind of shop organization in their rules. The 
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overwhelming majority of the unions had *no recognised, formal union 
activities at the place of employment except at the specific direction 
of the top off icers*. Further, a survey conducted by the Department 
of Labour and National Service confirmed that shop organization was 
in a very rudimentary stage and that plant-level machinery for 
71 
treatment of workers* local problems was rare. 
The criticism of Australian unions has not gone unchallenged. 
Hutson argues that union officials who were not attentive to the routine 
72 
problems of their constituents would be jeopardising their own tenure. 
This argument may have ended the controversy if the Ford strike at 
Broadmeadows had not erupted on 13 June 1973, 
(b) Ford Strike 
Ford employees resolved to strike on 18 May 1973 in support of a 
claim for wages 45% in excess of the award rate. Tne company offered 
an increase of only 5% in its negotiations with Mr L , Carmichael, 
Assistant Federal Secretary of the Amalgamated Metal Workers* Union, 
and Mr L. Townsend, Assistant Federal Secretary of the Vehicle 
Builders Employees* Federation. When the union leaders put the terms 
of settlement proposed by the company to the workers, the majority 
decided to resume work the following Wednesday, 13 June. Violence 
broke out at the plant on that date when approximately 1,000 workers 
rioted in protest against the return to work. The company reacted by 
standing down the employees who were prepared to return to work until 
73 
it could be sure they would be able to work in safety. 
After prolonged negotiations under the auspices of Mr Justice 
Moore of the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission, the company agreed to 
increase the number of relief operators on the production line, to 
provide increased spacing between units on the assembly line and to 
grant an afternoon tea break. The claim for an increase in wages was 
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74 ultimately resolved by arbitration in favour of a 7% rise. Ford 
workers paid dearly for these benefits as an estimated $3 million 
, ^ . 75 was lost in wages. 
The underlying cause of the Ford dispute became blurred by the 
assertions and counter-assertions of the parties involved. On the 
management side, Mr E. Witts, director of Ford*s industrial relations 
suggested that the strike was caused by the disappointment of migrant 
workers when the company rejected the union's ambitious claim for a 
76 45% over award margin in wages. A union leader lay the blame on 
77 
•the inhuman character of mass production* and the speed of the 
production line. Whatever may be the real reason or reasons for the 
strike, the violence unleashed during the Ford riot was not directed 
solely against company property. Mr Townsend had to be guided to 
safety by a shop steward, and Mr Carmichael had his coat torn by an 
angry worker.^^ Militant strikers claimed that their union officials 
had *sold them out*. It seems clear that the officials completely 
misinterpreted the feelings of the rank and file. Addressing a mass 
meeting of the strikers two days after the riot, Mr Carmichael • 79 
confessed: »I have made a mistake and you have taught me a lesson^. 
The error of union officials in failing to grasp the mood of their 
members is understandable in view of the problem of communicating with 
migrant workers who, in all, spoke forty different languages. But 
unions must overcome the language barrier if they are to communicate 
with their members effectively. 
(c) Other problems facing unions 
Language difficulty is just one of the problems facing unions 
in their representative role. Diversification^° and decentralisation 
of industry have bedevilled effective union organization at the work 
place.^^ The multiplicity of unions which exist in Australia results 
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in duplication of effort, inadequate staffing and leadership, and 
QO 
wastage of financial resources. 
(d) What can Unions do to narrow the cormnunication gap? 
Only rarely will the local branch of a union correspond 
84 
with the enterprise. Since official union organization within the 
plant is, in many cases, not feasible, unions have had to rely on 
other means of communicating with their members. Many state and 
federal awards contain a 'rights of entry* clause which permits an authorised union official to visit the employer's undertaking during 
85 
working hours for certain purposes. The usual right of entry clause 
will allow the union officer to inspect and, if necessary, copy 
time and wage records kept by the employer. The union officer will 8 6 also be permitted to discuss legitimate union business with members 
87 
during lunch hour or non-working time, and ascertain whether the 
members have any grievances about their wages and working conditions. 
It appears that a right of entry clause does not authorise a union 
official to call a meeting of members for the purpose of taking a vote 88 on an issue or participate in such a meeting in any way. In 
practice, union officials are usually given a degree of latitude in 
89 exercising their rights of entry but officials who encourage or 
90 
instruct union members to strike may have their authority revoked. 
The visits of union officials are, of necessity, intermittent. 
However, unions can exert a continuing influence upon the enterprise 
through their shop stewards. 
In theory the shop steward should be able to fill the 
communication gap between the union branch and members at the work 
place but the official policy of a number of unions is adverse to the 
shop steward movement.^^ Nevertheless shop stewards are common in the 
92 larger unions. They are normally given relatively menial tasks such 
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as the collection of union dues, enrolment of new members, and 
distribution of union material to members. They are in a good 
position to detect breaches of the award, and are encouraged to report 
all such breaches or suspected breaches to union officials. In most 
cases, shop stewards are authorised to investigate the complaints of 
union members in the plant and discuss these grievances with manage-
ment representatives. If the matter cannot be resolved in this way, 
the shop steward is expected to contact union officials; he is not 
usually authorised to initiate any remedial action such as calling 
93 a stop-work meeting. In general, it may be said that the shop steward 
is to promote the interests of his union among his work mates and to 
94 
keep the union informed of the interests of its members. 
In some of the larger undertakings shop committees consisting 
of shop stewards of different unions from a particular plant or 
department have grown up. These committees provide an opportunity 
for shop stewards to co-ordinate their handling of local problems. 
Unions are acutely aware that shop committees could usurp traditional 
union prerogatives such as the right to negotiate over wages and 
general working conditions. Indeed, shop committees have been viewed 
by unions and management alike as a potentially disruptive force in 
industrial relations.^^ For these reasons the trade union movement 
has had reservations about the growth of shop committees and has 96 sought to restrict their role. 
If unions cannot satisfy the need for official shop floor 
representation, rank and file employees may look to shop stewards or 
shop committees for representation and protection of their 
interests.^^ Should this happen it might be necessary to afford the 
shop steward more legal protection against dismissal or victimisation 
and grant him preferential treatment in retrenchment or redundancy 
situations.^^ Union amalgamations will facilitate research, improve 
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staffing and leadership and avoid duplication at branch, state and 
federal level but they will not entirely obviate the need for 'grass 
roots' representation at the work place. 
(ii) Inadequate Knowledge of Rights and Obligations 
One result of the gap in cominunication which exists at plant 
level is that parties left to their own resources tend to overstep 
their authority and act on assumptions which, at times, have no basis 
in law or fact. In Walker's survey, 16.4% of the personnel officers 
interviewed thought that 'ignorance* was one of the main causes of 
industr ial strife in Australia} 18% of the executives surveyed listed 
this factor, while only 4.8% of union leaders felt that it was 
99 
significant. 
The small size of the overwhelming majority of Australian 
undertakings^ fosters the growth of informal plant-level relationships. 
Management at the local level may have difficulty keeping up with 2 
changes in their award and statutory obligations. Unions, too, 
encounter this sort of problem. And despite frequent warnings from 3 
industrial tribunals shop stewards frequently exceed their limited 
authority. 
(iii) Managerial Prerogatives 
(a) Promotion 
Managerial decisions can contribute to tension and frustration 
at plant level. In some industries a worker's earning prospects depend 
4 
on his promotion opportunities. Even without this link between 
promotion and earnings, promotion is one means of recognising the 
achievements of a worker and giving him responsibility. The importance 
of these factors to employees should not be underestimated.^ By 
classifying promotion as a managerial matter rather than an industrial 
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matter, Australian industrial tribunals have failed to come to grips 
with an issue of vital concern to employees. The tribunals* stand 
on this matter would be justifiable if management acted responsibly 
in considering and making promotions. However, there is some doubt 
that this is the case. 
A survey^ of formal employee appraisal schemes in sixty-six 
Australian undertakings in 1966 revealed that 69.6% of the firms cited 
•promotion' as one of the purposes of their appraisal scheme. Thirty-rare 
per cent of the entire sample reported no training was given to the persons 
appraising the employees, and it appeared that none of the respondent 
firms had a formal training scheme specially designed for training 
personnel in rating procedures. Moreover less than half the union 
leaders surveyed by Walker felt that 'anyone with ability who is 
7 
willing to work can get to the top*, 
(b) Supervision 
Supervision is a frequent cause of plant-level friction. 
While 81% of the personnel officers and 89% of the employers interviewed 
by Walker agreed that 'most foremen treat their workers fairly', only g 72% of union leaders felt that the proposition was accurate. 9 
The supervisor plays a complex role at shop level. He is in 
close contact with employees under his charge and is usually responsible 
for seeing that a certain level of production or efficiency is 
maintained. He may play a part in the induction, placement, training 
and dismissal of employees. In some cases he will be consulted about 
an employee's suitability for promotion, 
A survey^^ of supervisory practices in industry in 1956 found 
that supervisors were generally selected on informal lines. While 70% 
of the organizations surveyed saw the need to train supervisors, the 
report concluded: 'it seems probable that the neglect of techniques of 
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proven worth, and reliance on the emergence of the right man with 
sometimes only sporadic or perfunctory assistance, must result, 
12 generally speaking, in supervision of lower calibre than need be*. 
It would appear that a more constructive approach to the training of 
13 
supervisors is warranted. In view of the key role played by a 
supervisor at the local level, it is rather surprising that the law 
does not require management to consider employees* views as to the 
suitability of the persons appointed to this position. 
(c) Control of method of work 
One feature which emerged from the Ford strike was the dis-
satisfaction of employees with the company's method of organising the 
work. When Mr Justice Moore heard the union's claim relating to wages 
he stated: *I do not consider that the question of payment for annual 
leave or extra relief periods come within the terms of the inquiry which 
14 
I undertook and I make no comment about them*. This statement implies 
that the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission could be 
given the task of inquiring into the employer's work methods but 
previous attempts of the union to obtain information about time 
measurement methods and the fatigue allowance built into the time cycle 
from companies in the vehicle building industry have failed.^^ As in 
other industries, management can stand behind the bulwark of managerial 
prerogatives. 
As demands that an employee be given the right to enjoy his 
work increase, the tribunals may be pressed to revise their attitude. 
The Australian work ethic is in the process of change. Young persons 
now entering the work force have attained a higher educational standard 
than their forebears,^^ and may expect more satisfaction from their 
jobs. The whole approach of tribunals in compensating workers for 
doing unsavoury, monotonous or tedious jobs by payment of *dirt money* 
or thr' allowance of extra recreational leave may bp challenped. Migrant 
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workers unaccustomed to the privileged status of managerial prerogatives 
may begin to exert an influence. The days when workers are prepared 
17 r T to be treated as 'human fodder* or 'mere animated cogLsJ in the 
18 capitalist's machinery* are numbered. In the years to come employees 
will demand to be consulted about decisions that directly affect them 
19 
in their working environment. 
The law would do well to develop a more receptive attitude 
to these demands. Even in 1920, Mr Justice Higgins saw that 'there can 
be no stable equilibrium in the present position ~ "Here is your work; 
there are your wages; it is not your business to discuss to what work Mt 20 you are to apply your powers *, 
(iv) Lack of Co-operation 
Lack of co-operation was listed as one of the main factors 
contributing to industrial strife in Australia by over 44% of the 
personnel officers, nearly 24% of the union leaders and just over 21% 
21 
of the executives surveyed by Walker. This lack of co-operation or 
common aim is to some extent inevitable. To quote Higgins J, again: 
*The war between the profit-maker and the wage-earner is always with 
US*. Much of the conflict between employer and employed stems 
from the latter's efforts to obtain a greater share of the fruits of 
production,^^ but much of the suspicion and distrust between the parties 
24 arises at plant level. 
It has often been observed that the compulsory arbitration 
systems obviate the need for employers and unions to negotiate 
responsibly. The parties are aware that arbitration can be 
sought if they fail to reach agreement on certain issues. On the 
other hand, there appears to be general agreement between the parties 
26 
that a greater degree of co-operation is desirable. 
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Part of the problem appears to be that the parties have 
little opportunity to engage in continuing consultation on a long term 
basis. Certainly informal consultation at plant level seems to be an 
adequate solution in some cases, but for the satisfactory handling of 
the many problems which arise at the work place a more formal arrange-
ment may be necessary, A continuing process of genuine communication 
could do much to remove the distrust which exists between the parties 
in many undertakings. 
CHAPTER 13 PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
1. Can Reform be left to Management? 
The inadequacy of traditional theory and the dimensions of 
plant-level problems show that reform is necessary. Some argue that 
corrective measures can be left to management.^ But one may doubt the 
efficacy of this approach. In the first place, management's view of 
its employees* interests and aspirations is often misguided. 
2 
A recent survey to ascertain the chief executive's view of 
what his employees want from their job was conducted among 150 
executives from firms of varying sizes throughout Australia, A 
preliminary mail questionnaire listed ten job aspects and the executives 
were asked to rank these in the order of importance they thought their 
employees would rank them. In addition, the executives were 
encouraged to suggest any other factors they considered important to 
their employees. The questionnaire was followed up by a short interview. 
The survey found a marked discrepancy between what the 
respondents ranked as important to their employees and what employees 
in other job satisfaction studies^ have repeatedly stated to be 
important job factors. In particular, the respondents over-emphasised 
the significance of wages and physical working conditions, under-
emphasised the importance of communication and interest and challenge, 
and all but overlooked such factors as recognition of individual efforts 
and status or extent of responsibility. Further, the majority of the 
executives who expressed an opinion thought that security, opportunities 
for advancement, interest and challenge and communication were more 
important to men than to w o m e n . T h i s finding appears to be inconsistent 
with several job satisfaction surveys in which women ranked these 
aspects highly.^ 
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In general, the results of the survey support earlier 
studies which suggested that management was unable to predict correctly 
their workers* rankings of certain job aspects.^ This lack of 
perception in identifying employees' interests and aspirations can 
be partly attributed to the informal and, at times, unreliable sources 
of information used by management.^ While management persists with 
these sources, they will continue to misinterpret workers* needs and 
wants. 
Even when management is fully aware of their workers* 
interests, it may doggedly refuse to respond. In other words, some 
managements will be content to cling to their prerogatives until they 
are forced to surrender by the law, trade union pressure or even public g 
opinion. Indeed the industrial arbitration systems will support 
managements who become intractable on this issue. 
Take an example of management*s resistance to an encroachment 
upon their domain. Despite the warning issued in the Clerks (Oil 
9 
Companies) Case, the National Survey of The Employment Effects of 
Technological Change reported in 1971 that the overwhelming majority of 
firms which had introduced technological changes in the relevant period 
had not consulted the appropriate unions prior to the change. Of the 
firms reporting displacement caused by technological changes, only 30% 
had consulted with the unions, while only 42% of the firms reporting 
retrenchments consulted the unions in a d v a n c e , T h i s example 
illustrates that management will not yield its prerogatives lightly. 
Thus, reform cannot be left to management. Since management 
is often oblivious of the importance of certain interests of its 
employees, its reforms could well be ill-conceived and ill-directed. 
Further, if the matter is left to management nothing will be done in 
some areas because it jealously guards its *divine right to manage*. 
Where proposals for reform do not coincide with its interests, it will 
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fight a stubborn rear-guard action. 
2. Would Reform Sabotage the Market Mechanism? 
Management has a good theoretical justification for this 
stand. It can assert that the traditional lore of economics - the law 
of the market place - commands them to make profit maximisation their 
primary objective. Only then will goods be produced and services 
provided efficiently. Only then will the price of their products and 
services be determined realistically and dispassionately.^^ 
When competition was perfect, when no one trader or group 
of traders could dominate the market, this approach may have been valid, 
12 Today, the increasing concentration in industry has made the law of 
the market place largely irrelevant. The vagaries of the market have, 
to a great extent, been replaced by a planned equation of supply and 
13 demand. The large modern corporation is no longer a slave of the 
market. In Wheelwright's words: 'Today the big corporation is much 
14 
more a determinant of the market than it is market determined*. 
While managers may still be pledged to profit maximisation, 
this is no longer necessary for survival. They now have sufficient 
latitude to fulfil responsibilities to groups other than shareholders. 
On the other hand, opponents of reform argue that an expansion of 
managerial responsibilities could distort the market mechanism and 
that there is no viable alternative to the competitive norm as a 
regulator of the economy.^^ Yet no one is denying that profit is 
important. Indeed, even the most ardent reformers would concede that 
management should be directed to make as much profit as possible after 
fulfilling its responsibilities to groups other than shareholders. 
The large corporation has a choice of goals. It need not compulsively 
pursue profit as an end in itself. 
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Many companies, however, are still subject to market 
pressures. The rash of liquidations which followed the Australian 
Government's decision in 1973 to lower tariffs puts this beyond dispute. 
These companies would have some difficulty implementing the reforms 
which will be proposed, especially where the measures involve increased 
costs or administrative expenses. This is a perennial obstacle to 
reform. But it should not follow that employment conditions in large, 
profitable enterprises must be maintained at the standard which 
impecunious companies can afford: the minima should not become the 
maxima. 
Rather, the Government should bear the responsibility for 
assisting certain companies to reach the prescribed standards by 
phasing in the proposals or by direct subsidy. Alternatively, companies 
with below, say, 100 employees could be exempted from compliance with 
the new measures, at least for an initial period. Such a provision 
would not, of course, be appropriate for all the proposals. For 
instance, there is no legitimate reason why small companies should 
be exempted from the proposals relating to unfair and wrongful dismissal. 
The ultimate solution will vary according to the nature of the proposal. 
The main point is that there are several strategies available to 
minimise the cost of the measures for those companies which cannot 
afford the burden. 
3. Would Reform Make Corporations Miniature Welfare States? 
Some commentators claim that if the rhetoric of reform is 
translated into practical form, this might invite increased government 
intervention.^^ By enlarging and socialising management's responsibilit-
ies, the law might blur the distinction between government and business. 
Yet even without a proper mandate management exerts a powerful influence 
upon employees* lives. And governments have not attempted to regulate 
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this influence by imposing rigid fetters upon management's powers. 
Why, then, should governments choose to intervene when the company's 
responsibilities to and relationship with its employees is put on a 
more legitimate basis? 
Further, despite the emergence of the large company as a 
major social phenomenon, the powers of these corporations is puny by 
comparison with those of government. Which modern company can, for 
example, print its own money, control immigration or tax its constit-
uents? Even Australia's largest public company, the Broken Hill 
Prop, Co. Ltd, seems relatively small beside the Postmaster General's 
Department which is the largest trading organization in Australia. 
As at 30 June 1971, the Department had 125,371 employees on its payroll. 
At the same date, B.H.P.'s workforce totalled 56,000. 
4, Traditional Resistance to Reform 
Management traditionally opposes reforms which will curtail 
their freedom of operation. Thus, when the Workrooms and Factories 
Law Amendment Bill was introduced in the Victorian Legislative Assembly 
on 18 November 1884, management's supporters described the Bill as 
17 
•repugnant to English instinct* and *in restraint of trade*. The 
main provisions of the Bill prescribed that the hours of all females 
and boys under sixteen were limited to forty-eight per week. This 
policy of limiting hours of work soon became an accepted part of our 
labour law, yet in 1884 it aroused fierce opposition from manufacturers. 
Again, in 1947 when the Commonwealth Arbitration Court reduced 
standard working hours from forty-four to forty hours per week, it 
stateds 
It has been the historic role of employers to oppose the workers* 
claims for increased leisure. They have, as is well known, 
opposed in Parliament and elsewhere every step in this direction, 
and this case is no exception. 
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The arguments have not changed much in 100 years. 
Employers have feared such things as a threat to profits; an 
added obstacle to production; a limitation upon industrial 
expansion; and a threat to internal and international trade 
relations ... 
And history has invariably proved the forebodings of employers 
to be unfounded.IS 
Although the Arbitration Court was there concerned with standard 
working hours, clearly its comment has a general significance to any 
proposal for reform. 
Management's right to manage is an evolutionary cmcept, not 
a sacrosanct, inviolate notion. As time goes by, it must be modified 
to meet the reasonable expectations of workers and the community. 
When this fact is realised, much of management's justification for 
opposing reform disappears. 
To sum up, reform is both necessary and possible, and it 
cannot be left to management's discretion. But simply because 
management cannot or will not implement reform is no reason for the 
law to leap into action. Management does not act in a vacuum. It is 
part of our pluralist society. It operates under a series of social, 
economic and political restraints. Are these enough to protect 
employees' interests? 
5. Countervailing Forces 
(i) Social Restraints ' 
Public opinion is one of the most significant social restraints 
against arbitrary action by management. Although public opinion is 
usually dormant and difficult to arouse, if it is ignored by company 
management, the public may press the state to interfere in company 
affairs. And there are many impartial and vigilant observers of the 
corporate system in the community, for example, the responsible press, 
politicians and academics, who may be able to stimulate the public into 
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But the inherent disadvantage of public opinion is that, 
once aroused, it tends to over-react to a situation. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how citizens could be regularly shaken from their 
inertia to police company management. 
Berle sees another restraint in the *corporate conscience* 
which he describes as follows: 
Corporate managements, like others, knowingly or unknowingly, 
are constrained to work within a frame of surrounding concept-
ions which in time impose themselves. The price of failure to 
understand and observe them is decay of the corporation itself. 
Such conceptions emerge in time as law 
Berle*s concept, by its very nature, defies legal consolidation. He 
admits it provides no criteria of responsibility. *There is no 
recognised body of doctrine by which [management] must test their 
20 
choices as they act from day to day.* The 'corporate conscience* 
then, is a form of incohate law. Until it finds its way into a 
concrete legal obligation, it will be only a theoretical fetter upon 
management, 
(ii) Economic Constraints 
Competition is now only a feeble restraint upon the power of 
the large corporation. In the modern context, competition among the 
larger firms tends to be ^imperfect*; it bears little resemblance to 
the law of the nineteenth century market place. Even if it did conform 
to the Victorian model, this would not guarantee that management would 
act responsibly. Rather it would simply give management an excuse for 
its failure to assume responsibilities towards its employees. 
(iii) Political Restraints 
The political intervention of the State in company affairs is 
only rarely invoked, and then only to correct the most flagrant abuses 
of corporate power. The threat of interference is too remote to be an 
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effective safeguard for employees* interests. Moreover, ad hoc 
intervention by the state would not give employees lasting protection. 
Professor Galbraith argues that the main regulators of the 
corporate system are the countervailing powers, such as the trade 
unions, which tend to neutralise the power of the modern company.^^ 
But as Galbraith himself admits, this theory of mutual restraint 
22 
depends upon a delicate balance of power in the economy. IVhen 
unemployment is high, the countervailing power of trade unions 
diminishes. This is a simple fact of industrial life. Thus, trade 
unions cannot always be relied upon to force new responsibilities upon 
management. 
Further, some employees prefer not to join a union. Why 
should their sole avenue of redress be through a union? This seems 
inconsistent: in order to preserve their personal autonomy in the 
face of their monolithic employer they are expected to submerge their 23 
individuality in a large union. Unions provide vital protection for 
their members against abuses of the employer's power but they are, in 
some cases, only poor substitutes for the safeguards which could be 
achieved through law. 
It is submitted that the social economic and political 
restraints are not sufficient to foster or protect employees* interests. 
They do not fill the gap left by the law. The restraints are informal 
and intermittent. In some instances, they are nothing more than pious 
hopes; in others they are difficult to activate. In all cases they are 
only general limitations; they confer no specific rights upon employees. 
CimPTER 14 WITY SHOULD THE LAW INTERVENE? 
Given that the countervailing forces in society cannot 
guarantee management will act responsibly towards its employees, why 
should the law intervene? Is there any theoretical justification for 
granting the law a more prominent role in regulating management's 
relationship with its work force? At the root of this question lies 
a perennial theme of jurisprudence - the role of the law. This is not 
the place to embark upon a discussion of the voluminous literature on 
this subject. It will be sufficient to touch upon the tenets of the 
sociological school of jurisprudence for, in this school, the law's 
purpose is central. Its main prophets are Rudolph von Jhering and 
Roscoe Pound. 
Jhering borrowed and modified Bentham's felicity calculus 
of pleasure and pain. He also expanded the notion that the law's 
objective is to achieve a delicate balance of rival interests. He 
saw law as an instrument for serving the needs of human society. In 
his view, social purposes were the mainspring of the law. Yet he 
realised that purpose is a relative standard; it adapts in response 
to the social needs of the time. This constant mutuation is, to 
Jhering, the essence of law's role as an instrument of social control. 
He also believed that law was only one means of achieving the end of 
social control. Altruistic motives were another social regulator but 
these were not sufficient to control society without the coercive 
backing of the law,^ On Jhering's view then, a legal sanction might 
be necessary to enforce management's social responsibilities to its 
employees. 
Jhering's concept of balancing conflicting interests looms 
large in Roscoe Pound's classic formula of 'social engineering*. This 
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formula provides a.n inunediate measure of social values corTipeting 
for recognition. It involves 
an idea of giving the most complete security and effect to the 
whole scheme of human demands or expectations, which have 
pressed or are pressing for recognition and securing, with the 
least sacrifice of the scheme as a whole, the least friction, 
and the least waste.^ 
Pound elaborated upon this concept by suggesting a catalogue 
of social interests, public and private interests, the reconciliation 
of which would result in legal progress. Paramount among the social 
interests was 'the claim or want or demand involved in social life in 
a civilised society that each individual be able to live a human life 
therein according to the standards of the society*. Pound saw this 
in freedom of vocation and the increasing emphasis on freedom in 
industry,^ 
Social engineering is an evolutionary process. The starting 
point is the * claim or want or demand of the individual human being to 
have something or do something, or, it may be, not to be coerced into 
doing what he does not want to do'.^ The law's function is then to 
decide which of these interests shall be recognised and within what 
limits. 
Pound himself conceded that his catalogue of interests was 
not closed. In 1942 he suggested three further 'jural postulates* 
7 
which warranted recognition. The first was the job holder*s claim to 
security in his job. Indeed, this claim has become so insistent that 
Meyers saw a widespread tendency to recognise workers* proprietary g 
rights in their employment. The second new postulate is the obligation 
of an enterprise in an industrialised society to bear the burden of 
human wear and tear caused by its operations. Clearly, workers* 
compensation legislation is the classic example of the way this 
interest is recognised. But the claim might also include proposals 
for dealing with dismissals, retrenchment, pensions, superannuation 
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and long service leave. Finally, Pound sees emerging a proposition 
which requires the risk of misfortune to individuals to be borne by-
society as a whole. Once again demands for reform of redundancy and 
superannuation law fall within this new postulate. 
Pound's additions to his catalogue are surely only tentative 
concessions to the major developments in industrial society. Indeed, 
Pound is open to the criticism that he framed his index *for a community 
of small owners such as the Middle West knew in the epoch first 
g 
following the Civil War*. It seems true that Pound*s classification 
does not place enough emphasis upon the emergence of the monolithic 
corporation and the consequential changes in the employer-employee 
relationship. Yet Pound did stress that social engineering was a 
dynamic technology. If his catalogue were revised to take account of 
modern developments it could scarcely omit the increasing demand by 
workers and their representatives for a say in certain managerial 
decisions. Nor, indeed, could it overlook employees* interests in 
job security, advancement, recognition and reasonable supervision. 
Both Pound and Jhering advocate a positive, functional 
approach for the law in pressing towards its objective of social 
control. In this, they both provide a theoretical platform for the 
role of the law in regulating company management's relationship with 
its employees. 
But there is one major challenge to this approach in the 
field of industrial relations. And the challenger. Professor Kahn-
Freund, is a formidable opponent. At times he appears to be a disciple 
of the school of sociological jurisprudence. Thus, he writes that 
labour law, like other branches of the law, is *a technique for the 
regulation of social p o w e r A n d he believes that labour is 
principally designed 'to regulate, to support, and to restrain the 
power of management and the power of organised labour'.^^ 
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On the other hand, he has often argued that the law should 
be cast in an abstentionist role in industrial relations,^^ This is 
not to say that the law should be banished from the stage but rather 
that it should set the stage for a voluntary system of negotiation 
between the parties. Law would still be required to establish a 
framework for this bargaining process, but beyond that law should take 
a back seat offering directions only when necessary. 
The *abstentionist theory* has not escaped criticism. Thus 
13 Sorrell soundly asserts that Kahn-Freund places too much enphasis 
14 
upon the sanctions of the law. The law also prescribes *norms of 
excepted behaviour*^^ and, to a large extent, Kahn-Freund»s view 
overlooks these norms. Further, the 'abstentionist theory* fixates 
upon the process of negotiation between employers and employees.^^ 
There may be ample justification for allowing the parties a measure of 
freedom from legal constraint during this bargaining process but why 
should the development of industrial law be circumscribed on this 
ground? Collective bargaining is just one part, albeit an important 
part, of industrial relations. When one turns to that part of labour 
law which may be loosely termed individual employment law, an abstention-17 ist role may be completely inappropriate. 
1 8 
Rideout also rejects the *abstentionist theory*. He argues 
that the thesis fosters an unjustified complacency with contemporary 
labour law. The kernel of his criticism is as follows: 'The law should 
refrain from industrial relations from a condescension born of strength 19 
and not from necessity engendered by feebleness*. He claims that 
the parties are not reaching workable solutions to their problems and 
that the law is not only unwilling to intrude but is also incapable at 
present of assisting the parties to settle their differences. While 
this comment was directed at the British system of labour relations, it 
is of more than passing relevance to Australia. The figures on the 
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incidence and settlement of industrial disputes verify this.^*^ 
Kahn-Freund*s thesis is as much an observation of history 
as a guide to further legislative action. Workers in Great Britain 
21 
achieved industrial power before they obtained political power. 
Generally they have tended to rely upon their industrial strength 
rather than legislation to advance their claims. Indeed, it seems a 
fair assessment that the British trade unions won their victories 22 
•without the assistance of and often in the face of the law*. Can 
the 'abstentionist theory*, then, really be of any guidance for 
legislative action in Australia, a country where the role of the law 
in labour relations is much more prominent and widely, if at times 23 
grudgingly, accepted? 
The writer believes that the law should play a dynamic role 
in industrial relations, particularly in that sector which deals with 
the individual employment relationship. Here the law might be able to 
avoid the more serious political overtones which sound whenever more 
extensive regulation of collective labour relations is mooted. 
Traditionally, law lags behind social change. And this should be so. 
The law should not reflect fashion and quirks of history. At the same 
time, the law should not become so distant from the realities of 
industrial organization that it ceases to be a major force of social 
regulation. When the gulf between law and social and economic facts 24 
becomes as wide as it is at present it is time to narrow the gap. 
CONCLUSION 
Once the concept of law as an instrument of social control 
is accepted, the legislature and the judiciary can set about the task 
of updating and improving the law. But clearly law will not be the 
panacea for all the ills of our industrial society. The problems of 
the modern company employee will not be removed by a slight wave of 
the legislative wand or by periodic judicial sorties. Mea ^ ures which 
do not build upon a healthy relationship between the parties are 
doomed to failure. Trust cannot be imposed; it must be given an 
opportunity to grow out of a stable relationship. The problem is how 
to translate the legal ideal of social control into practical reforms. 
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PART IV 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
INTRODUCTION 
Specific and general criticisms of the present law have 
been advanced. An analysis which rests there would be a sterile 
exercise. Cardozo once wrote: 
Existing rules and principles can give us our present location, 
our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters 
for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the 
traveller, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a 
principle of growth.! 
In the following chapters a programme for remedial action through the 
legislatures, the courts and the tribunals will be suggested. In 
evaluating proposals for reform, preference will, of course, be given 
to measures which appear to be compatible with our existing legal 
system and established principles. Nevertheless, it will be instructive 
to consider overseas developments and their implications for Australia. 
It is conceded that there may be obstacles to transposing overseas 
2 
developments into the Australian system. For this reason, any 
difficulties likely to be experienced by 'imported proposals' will be 
discussed. 
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SECTION l: EMPLOYEES' INTEREST IN RECOGNITION OF SERVICE 
CHAPTER 15 TOWARDS A DIRECTOR'S DUTY TO ACT BONA 
FIDE IN THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES 
One basic shortcoming of company law is the absence of a 
clear definition of directors' duties towards company employees.^ The 
authorities suggest that a director may take employees' interests into 
account only if they coincide with or benefit the long term interests 
of shareholders. This principle places a fetter upon the freedom of 
the board. In practice, a duty to take employees* interests into 
2 
account is widely recognised. It remains for the law to fall into 
step with managerial practice. There are several approaches which the 
law could adopt. 
1. Judicial Redefinition 
In Canada and the United States, at least, the director's duty 
to act bona fide in the interests of the company seems to be undergoing 
a metamorphosis. Two recent cases illustrate this development. 
In the first case, Herald Company v. Seawell,^ Hill, Circuit 
Judge, took an expanded view of the director's fiduciary duty. 
We are fully cognizant of the well established corporate rule of 
law which places corporate officers and directors in the position 
of fiduciaries for the stockholders. Basic in that rule of law 
is the profit motive of the corporate entity. In this case we 
have a corporation engaged chiefly in the publication of a large 
metropolitan newspaper, whose obligation and duty is something 
more than the making of corporate profits. Its obligation is 
threefold: to the stockholders, to the employees, and to the 
public. 
Similarly, in Teck Corporation Limited v. Millar^ Berger J. 
rejected the traditional notion that directors should be attentive only 
to shareholders' interests. In his view, directors would not offend 
their duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company if they 
considered the interests of employees or of the community on a 
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particular issue provided such consideration was not exclusive or in 
disregard of shareholders. 
These then, are two judicial precedents redefining direct-
ors* fiduciary duties. Whether they will be followed by Australian 
courts is a matter of speculation. But one thing is clear: a complete 
judicial about-face would be required before this development could be 
accepted into Australian company law. This would not happen overnight. 
It would be a slow process. This may not be such a bad thing as gradual 
change may be more palatable. In the meantime, however, directors 
would be under no obligation to take employees* interests into account 
in running the company, 
2. A Statutory Duty? 
An alternative method of formally recognising the breadth of 
directors* obligations is to devise an appropriate statutory duty. 
There are already a few precedents. 
Section 70 of the German Stock Corporations Act of 1937 
provided that the executive board of a company shall *on its own 
responsibility manage the company as the good of the business and its 
staff and the common good of the nation require*.^ Tlie section did not 
give any of these interests priority;^ nor did it impose an enforceable 
g 
duty upon management. Indeed, its terms were so vague that it was 
virtually meaningless. Whatever management did, it could hide behind 
the elusive standard of*public interest*, and the courts could do little 
to make it account for its decisions. Further, section 70 probably 
reflected Nazi philosophy'^ and this alone may account for its omission 
from the German Stock Corporation Law, 1965. 
The official commentary which accompanied the 1965 Act 
indicates that the executive board must take account of the interests 
of shareholders, employees, and the community.^^ In German practice. 
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this document is taken into account by the courts in interpreting the 
law, so employees' interests are still formally recognised by West 
12 
German company law. 
The Works Council Act of 1972^^ grants further recognition 
of employees* interests. Section 75 obliges the employer and the works 
council to ensure that all persons employed in the enterprise are 
treated according to the principles of law and equity. The employer 
and the works council are also directed to protect and promote the 
•free development of personality* of employees engaged in the enter-
14 
prise. 
In Holland, the Verdam Commission proposed that directors 
be reminded in positive terms that they are expected to 'fulfil their 
task, within the framework of the public interest, on behalf of the 
totality of interests in the company and of the enterprise attached to 
it*.^^ This direction would appear to be too broad. It does not 
specifically mention that the interests of employees are to be 
considered although this is implicit in the proposal. 
Again, section 203 (3) of the Companies Code of Ghana (1961) 
drafted by Professor L.C.B. Gower provides: 
In considering whether a particular transaction or course of 
action is in the best interests of the company as a whole a 
director may have regard to the interests of the employees, as 
well as the members, of the company 
The section does not create a mandatory obligation to consider employees* 
interests; its terms are permissive. Nor does it indicate any priority 
of interests or the weight to be attached to each interest. As yet, 
it has not been judicially considered, but one local commentator feels 
that *it is a welcome piece of innovation and one that is in keeping 
17 with a greater social responsibility on the part of companies'. 
With these examples in mind, it is possible to suggest a 
definition which reflects the real nature of the director's essential 
obligations. To Fogarty, 
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The ideal formula is probably one which begins by emphasising 
a company*s key role as a market enterprise for producing goods 
and services on economic terms, but then goes on to make clear, 
... that subject to this main purpose a wide range of public 
and social considerations have also to be taken into account.^ 
Consider the following definition of a director's duty: 
The director's primary duty shall be to manage the company 
honestly, efficiently and profitably. In discharging this duty 
directors shall balance the interests of the employees against 
the interests of shareholders of the company. 
This formula follows Fogarty*s suggestion by stressing the role of the 
company as a market enterprise but it goes on to create a positive 
obligation to balance the interests of employees and shareholders. 
At first sight, the notion of 'balance* appears to be 
imprecise. But the 'balance of interests® concept has gained wide 
acceptance among company boards and it appears repeatedly in managerial 
19 statements. To quote Mr J. C. McNeill, managing director of the 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited: 
It is by no means self-evident to me that it is in anyone's 
interest for the corporation to shoulder social responsibilities 
which go beyond its responsibilities to its customers, employees 
and shareholders. 
After all, it has a big enough job trying to keep all three 
parties more or less content.^^ 
21 
The results of the writer's survey give only lukewarm support 
to the traditional legal view that a company should be managed in the 
interests of the shareholders taking a long term view. The findings 
suggest that the majority of the respondents saw the role of management as 22 
that of an arbiter of different interests. Some of these interests 
are shareholders' interests but employees' interests are also taken 
into account. 
This curious mixture was described by one general manager as 
follows: 
I believe it would be wrong to put the objectives that you 
mention in an order of priority. All these objectives are very 
good in themselves but they are all equally part of the whole. 
I would find it difficult to go on record by saying that share-
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holders* interests would rank ahead of profit maximisation, 
with good products running third, fourth security of 
employees, and fifth welfare schemes, etc. I don't think 
it happens that way. I am inclined to put them all as ingred-
ients into a cake - probably after the cake has been cooked, 
the dividends are tasted by the shareholders but all the 
ingredients have to go in to obtain a dividend. That's what 
we are in business for - to provide a reasonable return, and 
as a result of that we have to use our best ability to produce 
good products or services at a competitive price because there 
is an obligation on the part of a responsible company not to 
defraud the customer. If the principle of making good products 
is used, profits tend to be maximised if efficient methods are 
applied, and a fair deal is given to the people who are working 
in the team. This naturally gives security to employees and 
the added benefit of additional welfare schemes and goodwill 
between all ranks in the company should result,^^ 
Further support for the 'balance of interests' notion can be 
found in overseas research. All but one of the directors interviewed 
by Shenfield accepted the notion of 'balance of interests'. On the 
other hand, some directors were apprehensive about the all-embracing 
24 
nature of the responsibilities this concept implied. 
The proposed formula requires directors to balance only two 
interests; the indefinite 'interest of the community' does not enter 
into calculation. This may remove some doubts about the extent of the 
directors' responsibilities. Employees' interests are favoured over 
the claims of other groups such as creditors, consumers and the 
community because the employees' investment in the company warrants 25 special consideration. Moreover, in practice, directors are expected 
to be able to harmonise the often-competing interests of different 
26 classes of shareholders and employees. 
3. Nature and Effect of the Proposed Formula 
Perhaps the significance of the suggested formula would lie 
in the fact that, at last, the law would have taken a 'stand* on this issue 
It would then have gone a long way towards bridging the gap between 
the theory and practice in company law. Unless the law accepts this 
basic development, many of the other proposals made in this thesis will 
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be still-born. The concept of balance is recommended because of its 
flexibility. No attempt has been made to rank the interests in order 
of priority as this might be a futile exercise.^^ 
During the life of the company the proposed definition would 
probably make little difference in the management of 1iie enterprise. Perhaps 
directors would be more inclined to divert a portion of profits for 
employees* interests. To quote one general manager interviewed by the 
writer: *We're conscious of employees* interests but we're not prepared 
to risk a shareholder challenge by going overboard on employees* 
ir t 28 well are*. 
It may also encourage the board to take more initiative in 
relation to employees* interests rather than simply respond to the 
external pressure of trade unions. For example, if a company plant 
was not operating efficiently, the board could, consistent with this 
formula, decide to postpone closure of the plant for a short period in 
the hope that the output or the market would improve. An ultimate 
decision to close the plant and compensate retrenched employees with 
a generous severance allowance would also be permitted. But these 
courses of action are probably open to directors under their present 
common law duty. 
The main effect of the proposed formula would be to diminish 
the threat of a shareholder challenge since it would give directors 
some latitude to depart from shareholders* interests. 
Where the company ceases to be a going concern, or is faced 
with liquidation or a take-over, the suggested formula would have more 
significance. The directors would be obliged to balance the interests 
of employees in reasonable severance payments and ample notice against 
the shareholders* interests in a return on their investment. It will 
29 
be recalled that in Hutton v. West Cork Railway Company, a proposed 
payment of less than 2% of the nett liquidation proceeds to tiie company afficers 
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was held invalid. Again, in Parke v. Daily News Ltd,^'^ the directors* 
attempt to divide the whole of the purchase price of the business 
among the employees was thwarted. Under the proposed formula an 
equitable payment, perhaps more than the 2% in Hut ton," but 
32 
substantially less than the 100% in Parke, would be permitted. 
Redundancy law would fix the minimum severance payment and notice 
period leaving the directors free to increase this minimum to a level 
consistent with their redefined company law duty towards employees. 
The proposed formula would avoid the delay and clumsiness of 
the procedure ultimately followed by Daily News Ltd's more generous share-
holders. Further, employees* interests would not depend upon the 
charity of individual shareholders, On dis=;olution of the company, 
the interests of employees and shareholder diverge, and it would be 
unjust and unrealistic to leave the employees* entitlement to the 
whim of shareholders. The typical shareholder might not be as altruistic 
as the majority of the shareholders of Daily News Ltd who agreed to 
forego their investment so that the displaced employees could be 
compensated. 34 An Hawaiian statute provides an alternative solution to 
35 
the problem in Parke v. Daily News Ltd. It permits the majority oJ 
the shareholders to decide whether, and, if so what amount, of the 
company*s assets shall be set aside on dissolution for redundancy pay. 
This would seem to allow the majority of shareholders to spend an 
unlimited amount of the company's money to which minority shareholders 
have a legitimate c l a i m . ' T h e suggested formula would avoid this 
result because the directors would only be required to devote a 
•balanced* amount towards a redundancy fund. Thus, the interests 
of minority shareholders would be better protected under the proposed 
formula than under the Hawaiian statute. 
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The suggested redefinition of directors* duties does not 
create a precise obligation; it is intended to provide a general 
guidance for directors in setting their goals. But the proposal should 
not be discarded simply because of this lack of precision. After all, 
the law *is not a series of calculating machines where definitions 
and answers come tumbling out when the right levers are pushed*.^' 
Perhaps the precise scope of the directors* obligations and authority 
will be determined only through experience with the new duty. It 
remains to consider whether the law should provide a remedy for 
employees who feel they have suffered from a director's decision which 
breaches the duty. 
Clearly, shareholders must be allowed a legal remedy as 
under the present law. All that has been changed is the terms on 
which the courts would consider the shareholders* claim: if the 
director's decision appears to have balanced employee interests 
against shareholder interests, the shareholders* challenge would be 
dismissed. 
It may be unwise to grant individual employees a remedy for 
an alleged breach of the statutory formula. Dutch legislation allows 
trade unions whose members are employees of the company, after 
consultation with the company's works council, to request a judicial 
investigation into the affairs of the company in cases of serious 
^ 38 mismanagement. 
A similar procedure could be devised for Australian company 
law although it would be advisable to extend the right to request an 
inquiry to any group of, say, twenty company employees. This 
extension would permit employees in non-unionised companies to 
initiate an inquiry. The court which considers the request could 
appoint an officer to conduct the inquiry if it were satisfied that 
mismanagement might have occurred. Employees have a vested interest 
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in the continued existence of the company, and this procedure would 
give them a measure of control over serious mismanagement which 
threatens this interest. Perhaps the mere threat of the employees* 
initiating an inquiry might be sufficient to secure compliance with 
the duty. 
Where directors have ignored employee interests or failed 
to balance these interests against those of shareholders, this would 
not necessarily amount to serious mismanagement. Let us now consider 
whether employees should be granted a remedy against this type of 
conduct by directors. Once again the appropriate trade unions or a 
certain number of employees could be given a right of complaint to a 
court. But this might expose directors to a multiplicity of suits. 
It might be more advisable to leave employees without a legal remedy 
in these cases. The purpose of the formula is not to confer a precise 
legal remedy upon employees; it is intended to give directors a degree 
of freedom to harmonise the competing interests of shareholders and 
employees without constant threat of a shareholder challenge. If 
experience shows that directors are blatantly disregarding employee 
interests, then a suitable remedy could be devised to curb this 
39 practice, A convenient way of controlling abuses of the duty to 
balance interests will be considered when the structural reform of 
40 company law is mooted in Chapter 20. 
SECTION 1: EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN RECOGNITION OF SERVICE 
CHAPTER 16 EQUITY FOR THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR 
1. Reform Through Case Law 
As mentioned earlier,^ there appear to be no Australian 
cases dealing with the rights of an employed inventor to his invention. 
This means that Australian courts are free to evolve their own 
principles on this issue. No doubt English decisions will be 
regarded as highly persuasive but our courts are not imperatively 
2 
bound to follow those decisions. One early English decision has a 
potential overlooked by later cases. 
(i) The Principle in Re Russell's Patent^ 
British courts are generally reluctant to apportion the 
4 
benefits to an invention but in Re Russell's Patent this seemed to 
be the only course open to Lord Cranworth L.C.. The case involved a 
contested application for letters patent for an invention of an 
improved method of manufacturing metal tubes. Muntz was employed as 
foreman or manager of the applicant's manufacturing plant. Both Muntz 
and the applicant were capable of making the invention but it was not 
clear who was the actual inventor. Lord Cranworth found that both 
parties were 'engaged in the manufacture to which the invention applied'/ 
and considered that both parties could be entitled to the invention. 
Accordingly, he ordered that the parties be treated as if they were 
joint grantees of the letters patent. He granted the letters patent to 
two trustees, one named by each party. He also gave a free licence 
to exploit the invention to each party and their partners Cif any). 
Re Russell's Patent^ is an interesting precedent. It provides 
a third alternative for British courts in cases involving employees* 
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inventions: the court may grant the beneficial ownership of the 
patent to the employer, to the employee or to the parties jointly. 
This final alternative could achieve a just result in marginal cases. 
If the courts are prepared to divide the rights to the 
patent equally between employer and employee, how can they refuse to 
recognise a lesser contribution by an employee to the invention? 
7 
Further, the employer in Re Russell's Patent was himself capable of 
making the invention and he made suggestions about the invention 
before the specification was completed. Yet he was given only a 
50% share in the beneficial ownership of the patent. Where an 
employer's only contribution consists of allowing the employee to use his 
materials and equipment, his share in the beneficial ownership might 
be even less than 50%. g 
Perhaps Re Russell's Patent can be regarded as an except-
ional case but it is a precedent which could introduce some flexibility 
into the law relating to employees' inventions. It is, however, only 
a minor improvement upon the general judicial approach, and it may be 
displaced by an express provision in the contract of service assigning 
all rights in the employee's inventions to the employer. 
In the absence of binding English authority, Australian 
courts might seek guidance from American decisions in this area. 
(ii) American Law on the Rights of the Employed Inventor 
In many respects. United States law governing the rights of 
the employed inventor runs parallel to British law. An employee who 
is hired to invent is bound to assign to his employer any patent he 
obtains during his term of service.^ Again, an employee may contract 
to assign to his employer all rights to inventions he may make during 
his employment.Moreover, where the employee is merely engaged to 
make suggestions or improvements to perfect the application of the 
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employer's invention, any suggestions or improvements made by the 
employee, which do not in themselves amount to a new invention, will 
not entitle the employee to claim any rights in the patent.^^ If the 
employer is entitled to beneficial ownership of an invention, it matters 
not that he is slow to claim his entitlement.^^ 
Like British law, American law recognises a •free invention* 
which will belong to an employee absolutely. Thus, where the employee 
conceives, designs and develops an invention in his own time without any 
1 3 
assistance from his employer, he will have sole rights to the patent. 
At two material points, American and English law in this area 
diverge. Where the eit^loyee is engaged in a general employment, for 
example, to design or devise methods of manvifacture, American courts 
are reluctant to construe the contract so as to require the employee 
to assign any invention made by him in the performance of his general 
14 
duties. This is a relatively minor departure from English principles. 
The major divergence is seen in the 'shop-right* doctrine. 
Perhaps the clearest statement of this rule and its rationale appears 
in the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corporation.^^ Romer J. stated the opinion of the 
Supreme Court as follows: 
where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with 
his master's tools and appliances, conceives and perfects an 
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his 
master a non-exclusive right to practise the invention.^^ This 
is an application of equitable principles. Since the servant 
uses his master's time, facilities and materials to attain a 
concrete result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that 
which embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often as 
he may find occasion to employ similar appliances in his 
business. 18 
This non-exclusive, irrevocable licence is called a 'shop-
right*. It allows the employer to use the invention in the business 
without payment of royalty,^^ While it cannot be assigned, it may be 20 transmitted to the purchaser of the employer's business. 
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It appears that a shop-right will only be implied where the 
invention was made in the course of the employment, and where it relates 
21 to the employer's business. Further, the equitable doctrine can only 
be invoked by an employer who has made some contribution to the 
22 
employee's creative effort. 
In their treatment of the rights of workers in a general 
employment and in the creation of the shop-right doctrine American 
courts have made substantial improvements upon British principles. 
But the shop-right rule itself has aroused some controversy. Its 
limits are ill-defined. Will any contribution, however slight, from 
an employer give rise to a shop-right? It seems that any substantial 23 
contribution will suffice. And what is the extent of the employer's 
non-exclusive licence? Is it confined to the needs of the employer's 
existing business or does it extend to any future businesses in which 
the employer may engage? As yet, there are no clear answers to these 
24 questions. Consequently, employers have preferred to displace the 
25 
rule by an express provision in the contract of service. This 
indirect incentive to regulate the matter by contract may well prejudice 
an employee's entitlement to an invention made during the course of his 
employment. 
Thus, although American law has made some attempt to safe-
guard the interests of the employed inventor, it still persists with 
the notion of freedom of contract in the employment relationship. 
For this reason American courts, like English courts, have been unable 
to provide adequate protection for the rights of the employed inventor. 
In contrast, West German law recognises the weaker bargaining position 
of the employed inventor and tries to off-set this imbalance by 
statutory protection of his interests. 
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2. Reform by Statute; The West German Model 
O A The West German Act on Employee Inventions of 25 July 1957 
and the complementary Directives on the Compensation to be Paid for 
27 Employees* Inventions Made in Private Employment of 20 July 1959 
codify the law relating to employees* inventions. A detailed analysis 
of these lengthy and comprehensive provisions is beyond the scope of 
28 
this paper. It will be sufficient to highlight the major advantages 
of the West German scheme compared with the English case law. 
(i) Advantages of the West German Model 
(a) Procedure 
The German Act on Employee Inventions 1957 distinguishes a 
service invention from a free invention. Service inventions are 
defined as 'inventions made during employment which either Cl) have 
arisen out of the activity of the employee in the enterprise ... or 
(2) are substantially based on the experience or activities of the 
e n t e r p r i s e * T h e *activity of the employee in the enterprise* means 
the sphere of work and duties allocated to the employee. Employees 
engaged in research, design or development departments are presumed to 
have a duty to 'look out for possibilities of improvements and 
inventions*.^^ Inventions which do not fall into the category of 
service inventions are free inventions. These belong to the employee 
exclusively. 
An employer is entitled to a prompt, written report of a 
32 
service invention made by an employee. The employer then has four 
months after receipt of the employee's report to claim the service 
invention in writing,^^ If the employer fails to observe this 
procedure, the service invention becomes a free invention. The 
employer may make a limited or an unlimited claim to a service 
invention. Unlimited claims are far more common'^ but they impose 
298 
more obligations upon the employer. For example, the employer is 
required to pay the employee reasonable compensation for the service 
invention and must file a domestic application for a patent.^^ 
Compensation must also be paid to the employee where the employer 
makes a limited claim but then only when the employer uses the 
37 invention. 
Disputes between employers and employees over rights to an 
invention or to compensation may be referred to an Arbitration Board 
in Munich, These proceedings are entirely free of cost and no fees 
3 8 
are payable. The Board comprises a legally qualified chairman 
appointed by the Federal Minister of Justice and two technical 
assistants who are chosen by the President of the Patent Office from 
the Patent Office examiners. These assistants are specialists with 
technical backgrounds, and their main function is to advise the 
chairman upon complicated matters such as the assessment of compensation. 
Their role is particularly important in cases where the employee's 
contribution to the invention is not clearly identifiable. 
The procedure prescribed by the German Act on Employees 
Inventions 1957 is a major advance upon the English system. The 
employed inventor in England is forced to incur considerable expense 
in litigating his claim to an invention. In addition, under English 
law, the entitlement to an invention may not be determined for some 39 
years after the invention was made. The West German law provides a 
prompt, inexpensive procedure for determining rights to an invention: 
if the employer fails to make a claim to the invention within a 
prescribed period (four months in the case of a service invention, three 
months in the case of an alleged free invention),ownership of the 40 invention reverts to the employed inventor. 
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(b) Compensation for the Employed Inventor 
When the employer makes an unlimited claim to a service 
invention, he is obliged to pay the employed inventor reasonable 
compensation. The parties may agree upon the type and amount of 
compensation •within a reasonable period* after the enployer makes his 
41 
claim to the invention. Failing agreement, the employer may fix 
the compensation by written declaration and pay that amount to the 
employee. If the employee does not contest this assessment within 
two months, both parties are bound by the declared f i g u r e . W h e r e 
the employee is dissatisfied with the employer's calculation, he may 
refer the matter to an Arbitration Board at any time within the two 
month period. 
The Board's assessment of compensation will take into account 
the commercial utility of the service invention, the duties and position 43 
of the inventor, and the enterprise's contribution to the invention. 
The Directives lay down detailed guidelines for this 
computation. The basic formula is simple. Compensation is calculated 
by the equation V = EA where V is the compensation payable, E is the 44 
value of the invention, and A is the 'participation factor'. 
The first step then is to calculate the value of the 
invention. Usually this is done by assessing what an independent 
inventor would receive for the sale or use of a similar invention. 
The Board may compute this figure by adopting a licence analogy or 
by estimating the benefit gained by the enterprise. In the first 
method, it assesses the royalty which would be paid under a licence 
agreement for a similar invention. 
The alternative method is much more complicated. It involves 
an analysis of the costs, expenditures, taxes and profits of the 
enterprise. Consequently, the licence analogy is the most common 
45 me thod of assessment. l^ Hiere neither method can be applied the Board 
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is permitted to make a general estimate of the compensation to be paid. 
The employed inventor is not, however, entitled to compens-
ation for the whole of the value of the invention. Compensation is 
based upon the amount of the benefit attributable to the employee's 
effort and initiative. Accordingly, the Directives provide a method 
of estimating the employee's contribution to the invention. 
The employee is rated on three variables: the origin of 
the invention, the means of solving the problem, and the position 
and function of the employee. Each variable is subdivided into 
categories and the employee is given a score for each variable 
depending on the category into which he falls. For example, on the 
third variable, a general manager would probably score one point 
while an unskilled worker would score the maximum of eight points. 
Again, where the idea for the invention is conceived by the employer, 
the employed inventor would rate a low score on the first variable but 
if the employee acts entirely on his own initiative he would score 
highly. The scores on the three variables are aggregated and the sum 
converted to a notional percentage according to a scale laid down in 
the Directives. This percentage is known as the 'participation 
factor*. 
The Arbitration Board then calculates the compensation payable 
by multiplying the value of the invention by the •participation factor 
In the result, th3 employee-inventor receives a percentage of the 
value of the invention, and this percentage roughly corresponds with 
his contribution to the invention. In most cases, the employee receives 
approximately 3 5-20% of the amount he would have received had the 
46 invention been a free invention. 
Compensation is normally payable within three months after 
47 
the industrial property right for the invention is granted. If the 
employer puts the invention to use before this time has elapsed he is 
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48 
obliged to pay the employee compensation in advance. The Federal 
Supreme Court has gone even further by requiring an employer to pay 
compensation for the duration of the grant procedure even if it is 
subsequently ruled that the invention is ineligible for industrial 49 
property protection, Schade concedes that this is a controversial 
decision but he points out that the compensation in these cases is 
assessed on a temporary basis and would be substantially less than 
full compensation.^^ 
The compensation provisions recognise that employees, what-
ever their rank, are entitled to be rewarded for their contributions 
to inventions. The assessment of this compensation involves a 
complicated calculation which may be imprecise in many cases. But 
the expert assessors who assist the chairman on the Arbitration Board 
are schooled in this type of calculation, and the compensation formula 
provides for some flexibility in the assessment. 
By contrast, English courts faced with the problem of 
apportioning the benefits to an invention give the patent rights either 
to the employer or the employee absolutely. And in doing this, English 
courts have skirted the fundamental issue. They achieve simplicity but 
only at the expense of justice: the courts find it difficult to 
estimate the employee's precise contribution to a service invention so 
they give him nothing? Surely the West German Act provides a more 
equitable and a more realistic division of the rights to an employee*s 
invention, 
(c) Reco^^nition of Employee's Weaker Bargaining Position 
The West German Act overrides any contractual provision which 
detracts from the statutory rights of the employed inventor. This 
is a principle of fundamental importance. If the employee's contract 
of service provides, in advance, that all rights of an employee to 
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inventions made during his employment are to be assigned to his 
employer, then this provision is invalid and unenforceable. Again, 
any agreement which purports to deprive an employee of his right to 
a free invention or his right to compensation for a service invention 
will have no effect. Even provisions seeking to avoid the procedural 
provisions for reporting and claiming inventions will be invalid. 
The statutory protection is not confined to agreements 
concluded in advance. After a service invention is made, the parties 
may agree upon the amount of compensation payable to the employee. 
If this compensation agreement is clearly inequitable it will be 
52 
invalid. Thus West German law has done something which English and 
American case law has been unable to accomplish: it has recognised 
the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and it 
has corrected this imbalance by providing statutory protection for 
the weaker party, 
(ii) Assessment of the West German Scheme 
In a recent assessment of the West German legislation, I-lans 
Schade, Chairman of the Arbitration Board in Munich from 1957 to 1971, 
concluded: 
The prevailing opinion appears to be that a realistic application 
of the Law permits it to function satisfactorily, ojntributes 
toward social peace and is also of service to employers.-53 
Schade also points out that the awards of compensation granted by the 
Arbitration Board have not been a burden to industry compared with 
5 4 other labour costs and taxes." Moreover, the West German governm=nt 
subsidises the payment of compensation by a 50% tax exemption on the 
55 amounts paid to inventors. 
It seems therefore that the West German Act reconciles the 
legitimate interests of employers, employees and the general public 
in relation to the rights to employees* inventions. In this it 
provides a complex,but not unworkable, model for reform. 
SECTION l; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN RECOGNITION OF SERVICE 
CHAPTER 17 LONG SERVICE LEAVE ; PLUGGING THE LOOPHOLES 
This chapter outlines proposals for reform of the law 
relating to long service leave. As in the current law section, the 
focal point of the discussion will be the employee's right to receive 
this benefit rather than the amount of leave provided. Thus, the 
basic inquiry is: how can the employee's right to receive long 
service leave be strengthened or extended? Chapter 4 revealed two 
general defects in long service leave law: the loopholes and short-
comings in the law itself, and the technical approach of certain 
tribunals in interpreting this law,^ The latter was considered in 
p 
passing in Chapter 4," Let us now turn to suggestions for legislative 
reforms, 
1. Legislative Reform 
(i ) Absences Excused 
Several problems appeared in the provisions excusing various 
interruptions in an employee's continuity of service. In many 
instances these can be resolved by simple amendments. Thus, for 
example, the relevant statute or award could provide that an absence 
of, say, nine to twelve months because of pregnancy would not break 
continuity of service or the contract of employment. Again, the 
relevant statutes might excuse absences through strikes whether they 
relate to industrial matters or not.^ And the Victorian and Tasmanian 
statutes'' could exempt any determination of employment arising out of 
an industrial dispute provided, of course, the striker was eventually 
re-employed by his original employer within, say, six months of his 
discharge. Further, continuity of the employment might be specifically 
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preserved where an employee dismissed because of slackness of trade 
is re-engaged, say, twelve months after his retrenchment. This 
extended period of grace would save the accruing entitlement of a 
worker dismissed through no fault of his own. 
An absence on grounds of legitimate union business or 
official industrial activities should be excused in all jurisdictions 
if the employer unreasonably refuses leave,^ While this exemption 
would be a great benefit to employees generally, it is essential for 
employees who hold an official or semi-official position in, for 
example, a wages board or conciliation committee, 
(ii) Interstate Service 
Legislative amendments and award variations could also 
remove some of the more obvious anomalies which appear when an 
employee claims long service leave based on interstate service. Reform 
should be founded on the premise that interstate service with a branch 
of the employer company or with a related company should not interrupt 
an employee•s continuous employment, nor break the employee's contract 
of employment. Accordingly, such an absence should be expressly 
excused. Yet this will not save an employee from all the pitfalls 
involved in this form of service. 
Further amendments extending the limitation period in each 
jurisdiction to, say, six years would greatly enhance an employee's 
chance of qualifying for long service leave in respect of his total 
period of service,^ Ancillary to these amendments, it would be 
necessary to require employers to keep records of employees* service 
in interstate branches or related companies.^ Considering the small 
number of employees who would be involved in interstate service, this 
would not be a particularly onerous obligation. 
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(iii) Transmission 
A change in the existing legislation and awards might also 
avoid the often unjust consequences which flow from the transfer of 
a business. It could be specifically provided that the technical 
break in the employees' service consequent upon the transfer would be 
disregarded if the employees were engaged by the transmittee within 
twelve months of the transfer of the business. This would be a vast 
g 
improvement on the existing law. There would then be less opportunity 
for collusion aimed at defeating employees* claims to long service 
leave. The transmittee would be liable for the full long service 9 
leave entitlement when it eventually accrued but this liability could 
be offset by an adjustment in the purchase price negotiated at the 
time of transmission. It might be thought that this proposal would 
encourage the transmittee not to employ long-serving employees 
dismissed by the transmittor. To some extent, this is true. But the 
purchaser would need capable staff to ensure the smooth transmission 
of the business, and the long-serving employees displaced by the 
transmission would provide a pool of talent from which the purchaser 
could draw, 
(iv) Onus of Proof 
One final problem might be remedied by legislative amendment. 
As stated in Chapter 4 an evidentiary obstacle faces an employee who 
asserts that he was dismissed in order to evade award or statutory 
obligations in respect of long service l e a v e . A revision of the 
provisions relating to the onus of proof could remove this obstacle. 
The claimant would carry a prima facie onus of raising a suspicion 
that his dismissal was effected for an illegitimate motive. This 
could normally be satisfied by evidence of the employee's length of 
service, ITie onus would then shift to the employer to establish that 
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the claimant was not dismissed in order to evade award or statutory-
obligations. There is a precedent for this type of provision in the 
victimisation sections of the industrial arbitration and wages 
board statutes.^^ 
If the employer is unable to discharge his onus the contract 
of service would remain unbroken,and the employee's service continuous 
notwithstanding the dismissal. This is a very effective sanction, 
2. Conclusion 
The measures outlined above are just some of the amendments 
which would safeguard an employee's right to receive long service leave 
and improve his chance of qualifying for this benefit. Coupled with 
a revised attitude by the courts and tribunals to the technical issues 
in long service leave claims, these amendments would ensure that an 
employee is not unjustly or unreasonably deprived of this form of 
recognition for his long term investment in the enterprise. 
Before closing this section it will be convenient to refer 
to the proposals advanced in Appendix 4 which deals with occupational 
superannuation schemes for, here again, recognition of service is 
involved. 
The major obstacle to effective and comprehensive reform in 
this area is the limited coverage of occupational superannuation 
1 2 
schemes- If industrial tribunals were given power to incorporate 
superannuation provisions in awards, this would take superannuation 
out of the sphere of managerial initiative and give it a recognised 
place at the bargaining table.^^ 
But it is not sufficient to extend the scope of occupational 
superannuation; the rights of the members must be adequately protected. 
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In particular, members should be given a written explanation of the 
terms and conditions of the scheme and their rights and duties 
14 
thereunder. In addition, private schemes should be required to prcA/ide a 
'vested* withdrawal benefit for employees who resign or who are 
dismissed or retrenched for reasons other than serious misconduct,^^ 
Without 'vesting* the basic purpose of superannuation is defeated. 
The appropriate form of •vesting* will depend largely upon the nature 
of the employer's scheme but the law should specify a range of 
acceptable alternatives.^^ 
An insolvent fund provides no security for members* benefits. 
The law should, therefore, exercise some control over the investment 
and management of superannuation funds.^^ This could be done by 
regular investigations of the fund coupled with certain restrictions 18 upon the investment policy of the managers. 
Finally, the law should take some steps to ensure that the 
19 
promised superannuation benefits are not eroded by inflation. A 
form of 'inflation-proofing* both before and after retirement is 
necessary. 
All these proposals would substantially increase the cost of 
occupational superannuation schemes. But much of this additional 
expense could be met if superannuation funds were freed of the 30/20 
requirement^*^ which, in effect, compels fund managers to invest nearly 
one-third of their funds* assets in low-yield, public securities. 
Measures designed to foster and safeguard employees* interest 
in recognition of service have been considered. Let us now turn to 
proposals for reform of job security law. 
SECTION 2; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
CHAPTER 18 REFORM OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
DISMISSAL AND REMEDIES 
1. Introduction 
An employee facing dismissal will find little solace in the 
law of job security. Three types of dismissal have been considered: 
dismissal with notice, summary dismissal and unlawful dismissal.^ 
Defects in the current law governing these dismissals can be grouped 
under four main headings: dismissal procedure, the right of an 
individual employee to challenge a dismissal, the kinds of dismissal 
that will be sustained, and, finally, the remedies. The following 
chapter will develop a series of proposals designed to correct these 
shortcomings. For convenience, proposals common to all three forms of 
dismissal will be examined first. Then special measures which relate 
to a particular form of dismissal will be discussed under the four 
major headings. 
2. Proposals Common to All Forms of Dismissal 
(i) Stated Reason for Dismissal 
This section is concerned merely with the issue of whether 
the law sanctions unexplained dismissals; the remedies available to an 
2 
aggrieved party are considered elsewhere. 
Common law courts and industrial tribunals have repeatedly 
affirmed that an employer is not obliged to give an employee a reason k o 
for dismissal.^ The law does not demand even this elementary mark of 
fairness and justice. Yet, in many countries, a dismissal for no stated 
reason will not be sustained, 
America n collective agreements usually provide that a discharge 
must be *for cause* or *for just causc*. I'ndcr this rubric arbitrators 
(i:; 
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have consistently ruled that an employer must give an employee a 
stated reason for the discharge at the time of dismissal.^ Failure 
to observe this requirement may lead to reinstatement.^ 
While the British Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974^ 
does not formally oblige employers to state a reason when discharging 
employees, this may be a practical consequence of its unfair dismissal g 
provisions. On the other hand, the remedies the Act prescribes would 
9 
not seem to be sufficient to deter unexplained dismissals. 
Under the Italian Law of 15 July 1966, an employee may 
inquire the reason for his discharge at any time within eight days 
after the communication of a written notice of dismissal. An employer 
may disregard a request made outside the prescribed period. But if a 
request is made within the time limit, the employer has to state a 10 
reason for the dismissal within five days following the inquiry. 
Although the Italian provision formalises the employee's right to be 
notified of the reason for his dismissal, the short time limit could 
work injustice in marginal cases. This minor shortcoming is eclipsed 
by the fact that Italian law now expressly provides a remedy of 
reinstatement for employees dismissed with no explanation.^^ 
In Great Britain, the fairness of a dismissal under the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) will be judged at the 
moment of the discharge; circumstances which come to light subsequently 
may not be taken into account in deciding whether the employer acted 12 
reasonably at the time of the dismissal. 
It is submitted that Australian employers should be obliged 
by law or award to state a reason for every dismissal on the request 
of the employee discharged. In those jurisdictions where industrial 
tribunals may award reinstatement, a similar result could be obtained 
by granting such an order to any employee dismissed for no express 
reason. This would encourage employers to furnish reasons for 
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dismissals. 
If employees were advised of the grounds for their dismissal 
they would at least know whether it is worthwhile to contest the 
discharge. At present they are left entirely in the dark. In addition, 
dismissal cases often involve conflicting evidence and the employee 
would be in a much stronger position if the employer's case could be 
tied to the expressed reason for the dismissal. 
As a corollary, the award or statute should provide that an 
employer may not rely upon grounds discovered since the original 
discharge. He should be required to justify the dismissal on grounds 
known to him when he decided to dismiss the worker. This proposal 
would deter an employer from the customary witch-hunt through his 
employee's service record in order to bolster his case. It would also 
prevent an employer provoking an employee to provide grounds for a 
dismissal which would otherwise be unjustified.^^ 
(ii) Dismissal Procedures Generally 
In contrast with Australian law, the law in several overseas 
countries provides formal dismissal procedures. 
In the United States of America, for example, collective 
agreements often oblige the employer to contact the union either before 
14 
or immediately following the dismissal. In addition, the great 
majority of these agreements allow employees to appeal against their 
discharge.^^ These complaints are processed through a series of 
procedural steps leading ultimately to arbitration. Not all grievance 
procedures require an employer to give the employee an opportunity to 
reply to the grounds of the proposed discharge but arbitrators will 
occasionally imply such a requirement from the labour contract 
In India, an elaborate procedure must be followed before 
industrial workers can be disciplined. The various steps in the 
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procedure ensure that the principles of natural justice are followed 
before management decides to dismiss an employee.^^ 
British law does not oblige employers to observe principles 
of natural justice in dismissing their employees but the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) will deter precipitate dismissals. 
The Act follows the pattern of the unfair dismissal provisions in the 
1 R 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (U.K.) closely, and decisions of the 
National Industrial Relations Court, and other courts under the repealed 
Act, will retain their significance. 
In recent proceedings, the Industrial Court decided that, in 
most cases, an employer should give an employee an opportunity to state 19 his case before resorting to dismissal. Indeed, discharge may be 
ruled 'unfair* solely on the ground that the dismissed employee was not 
20 
given a chance to answer his employer's charges. 
The German Works Councils Act 1972 obliges employers to 
consult the works council prior to any dismissal. Failure to observe 21 
this procedure invalidates the dismissal, and gives the employee 
concerned a right to sue for compensation. The works council may oppose 
a dismissal with notice upon certain grounds and within a certain 
period. If the employer disregards the works council's objection, he 
must provide the employee with a copy of the work council's comment 
along with the dismissal notice. Provided the works council's 
objection was made within the due time and in the proper manner, an 
employee who takes legal proceedings for a ruling that the employment 
contract has not been dissolved by the notice will normally be entitled 
to be retained by the employer at unchanged conditions until the 
matter is determined by the labour court. 22 
In France, the Act of 13 July 1973 prescribes a procedure 
which must be followed before individual dismissals. An employer who 
plans to dismiss an employee must summon the employee to a meeting and 
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23 give the employee the reasons for the interview in a letter. This 
notice indicates merely the purpose of the meeting, not the grounds for 
the proposed dismissal. At the interview the employer is obliged to 
24 state these grounds and he must give the employee a chance to explain. 
The employee may bring along a workmate to assist him to 
25 
state his case. Thus only a union representative who is an employee 
of the firm may counsel the interviewee during the conference. This is 
a major drawback. After the interview the employer must observe a 
period of reflection, a 'cooling off period*, before serving notice 
of dismissal: the letter of dismissal may not be sent less than one 2 6 
full day after the interview. 
It is perhaps too early to predict the impact of the French 
provisions but clearly they should discourage impulsive dismissals 
because of the formality of the procedure and the 'cooling off period*. 
Perhaps the main advantage of the provisions is the fact that the 
procedure must be followed prior to dismissal: it is much easier to 
avoid a discharge than to secure reinstatement of an employee after 
the employment is terminated. 
Statutory dismissal procedures are not confined to overseas 
countries. There are several examples of formal dismissal procedures 
in the various statutes governing public employment in Australia. 
Space prohibits a detailed analysis of these provisions. It will be 
sufficient for present purposes to examine the disciplinary procedure 
which operates in the Australian Public Service. 
^ ^ Public Service Act 1922-1973 (Cth) specifies certain 
offences for which officers may be liable to punishment. Before 27 
punishment may be imposed a certain procedure must be strictly observed. 
The basic principle underlying this procedure is simply that 'No 
officer may be punished or dismissed without a full inquiry and proper 2 8 consideration of the reasons for his offence*. 
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Caiden reports that the statutory dismissal procedure 
operating in the Australian Public Service enjoys •considerable 
29 confidence*. This support can be attributed in part to the formality 
30 
of the procedure . Although the scheme has defects, it does at 
least prevent impulsive dismissals on specious grounds. In the 
four years 1969/1970 to 1972/1973 only sixty-nine third and fourth 
division officers were dismissed from the Australian Public Service 31 
in pursuance of section 55 of the Public Service Act. 
Is the dismissal procedure prescribed for the Australian 
Public Service relevant to the private sector? Public employment is, 
after all, a career service with conditions which are not generally 
matched, and indeed probably cannot be matched, in private employment. 
The absence of a clear-cut profit motive and clearly»defined standards 
of efficiency may make the public service a bad yardstick. Yet these 
factors alone do not account for the relatively high standard of job 
security enjoyed by public employees. Part of the credit belongs to 
the dismissal procedure. Again, it is true that public employment 
lends itself to formal dismissal procedures but this is no excuse for 
rejecting its experience with this machinery as totally inappropriate 
to the private sector. White collar workers in the banking and 
insurance industries are certainly engaged in career services. Why 
should their job tenure be so dramatically different from that held 
by employees in the public sector? 
In private employment there are no statutory dismissal 
procedures. Some firms have established dismissal machinery on their 
own initiative but these schemes do not appear to provide adequate 32 protection against rash dismissal. 
There appears to be a need for formal dismissal procedures 
embodied in awards or statutes. The basic machinery should at least 
give the employee the opportunity to state his case with the assistance 
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of a union representative from within or outside the firm. Where a 
union representative or official is not available, the employee 
should be entitled to seek assistance from a workmate. The formal 
procedure should also provide that an appeal against the decision to 
dismiss should He to a higher level of management. This would ensure 
that an employee is not exposed to a hasty dismissal. This right to 
appeal could also involve a sufficient 'cooling off* period. 
Alternatively, it could be expressly provided, along the lines of 
the French provision, that a dismissal may not be effected until a 
short period after the higher level of management considers the 
employee's appeal. This internal appeal procedure should not disqualify 
an employee from resorting to an external appeal either to arbitration 
or at common law. 
Dismissal Procedure; Proposals relevant to Dismissal with Notice 
Ci) Formality and Length of Notice 
Under Australian law and award provisions, an employee nay be 
given an oral notice of dismissal. It is submitted that a greater 
degree of formality should be required in terminating an employee's 
33 
services. A written notice would dispel any doubts about the period 
of notice given or the date of the notice. This may be important if 
the employee wishes to contest the dismissal on grounds of inadequate 
notice. Further, if a remedy for unjust, though lawful, dismissals is 
conferred upon employees dismissed with notice, a formal requirement 
for written notice may assist the employee in proving his case. For 
example, it may be useful for the employee to establish that the 
dismissal occurred soon after he or she joined a religious or political 
group or shortly after marriage. The date of the notice may also be 
important in a claim for pro rata long service leave or superannuation 
entitlement. 
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Not only is notice informal, it is far too short. Moreover, 
it does not generally increase with the employee's age or length of 
service, 
34 
In Great Britain, the Contracts of Employment Act 1972 
prescribes certain minimum periods for notice of dismissal. These 
periods vary according to a person's length of continuous employment 
ranging from one week's notice for more than thirteen weeks', but less 
than two years' continuous service to eight weeks* notice for fifteen 35 or more years' continuous service. There are complicated rules for 
3 6 calculating the period of continuous employment and express provisions 
37 dealing with events which interrupt continuity. 
The statutory minimum periods of notice override any clause 
3 8 
in a contract of service providing a shorter period of notice. On 
the other hand, either party may waive his right to notice on any 39 
occasion and may accept a payment in lieu of the prescribed notice. 
Summary dismissals are not covered by the Act. Thus an 
40 
employer retains his right of instant dismissal for misconduct. 
With these qualifications, the Contracts of Employment Act 
1972 (U.K.) is a rudimentary recognition that an employee's 'equity* in 41 his job increases with length of service. 
Swedish employees are entitled to a minimum of one month*s 
A? ^ ^ • 43 ... notice of dismissal. After a qualifying term of service, this 
notice increases with age to a maximum of six months* notice at age 
f o r t y - f i v e . T h u s , Swedish law bases its notice periods on age of 
45 
the employee rather than seniority in the service of the employer. 
Australian law is backward in its failure to provide adequate 
periods of notice for employees. Notice should increase with the period 
of an employee's service. Further, the law should recognise that older 
employees may find it more difficult to obtain alternative employment 
after their dismissal. Accordingly, it should guarantee older workers 
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a longer period of notice. 
Employees* rights during an extended period of notice will 
require special protection. The Swedish"^^ and British statutes"^^ 
ensure that an employee under notice is not prejudiced in his employ-
ment or working conditions. Similar provisions would be necessary in 
Australia if the periods of notice were increased. 
Many overseas statutes governing notice of dismissal do not 
require a reciprocal period of notice from an employee who resigns. 
For example, notice of at least one week is required by the Contracts 
of Employment Act 1972 (U.K. while Swedish law"^^ demands at least 
one month's notice from an employee. These provisions do not prohibit 
an employee agreeing to give a longer period but they do recognise the 
basic inequality between employer and employed. Australian law or 
awards should also provide that, in the absence of agreement between 
the parties, notice of resignation should be a certain minimum period. 
Adequate notice does not, by itself, guarantee job security 
or even stability in employment. During the notice period, employees 
must be given time off to seek other employment. The Swedish Job 
Security Act 1974 provides a model. It states: 
During the period of notice the employee has the right to have 
time off with retained employment benefits to the extent that 
may reasonably be required to visit the labour exchange or 
otherwise try to find a job.^^ 
Some Australian awards already contain a similar clause"^^ but this 
opportunity to seek other employment should be available to all 
employees under notice of dismissal. 
4. Dismissal Procedure; Proposals relevant to Summary Dismissal 
A summary dismissal for cause carries a stigma which may make 
it difficult for the discharged employee to obtain other employment. 
Tn addition, such a dismissal may disentitle an employee to valuable 
accruing benefits. For these reasons it may be necessary to modify the 
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proposed dismissal procedure where misconduct is alleged. 
The law imposes a rather feeble restraint against the 
indiscriminate use of instant dismissal as a remedy for employee»s 
misconduct. In theory employers are expected to resort to this remedv 
only where the employee's conduct shows a clear intention to repudiate 
his contract of service. In practice summary dismissal is freely 
exercised for comparatively trivial offences.^^ The reason for this 
divergence between theory and practice seems clear: summary dismissal 
is swift, inexpensive, final and, in some cases, dramatic; it allows an 
employer to assert his right to discipline his employees and serves as 
a reminder to other employees that they face dismissal if they disregard 
their contractual obligations. 
Yet, in many cases, dismissal amounts to disproportionate 
punishment for an offence. In such instances, the employer has a 
limited range of options. He can either dismiss the employee or 
continue him in employment. Only rarely will an employer find it 
convenient or appropriate to seek damages or an injunction for an 
employee's breach of contract,^^ Disciplinary matters must be dealt 
with swiftly. And the delay inherent in litigation makes suits for 
dri.naijes or injunctioris Impractical forms of industrial discipline. 
In the United States, collective agreements convnoily provide 
54 
a series of graduated penalties. The gamut may include an oral 
caution, an oral warning noted in the employee's record, a written 
reprimand, disciplinary suspension for a stated period, cancellation 
of accruing benefits, demotion and ultimately discharge. In many 
agreements, dismissal is reserved for flagrant violations of the 
rules of the company, or of the law of the land. Discharge for venial 
first offences is sometimes expressly prohibited. 
As will be seen later, American arbitrators determining 
disputes over discipline almost invariably adopt the attitude that 
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punishment must fit the crime.^^ Thus the drastic remedy of dismissal 
will not be sustained where a lesser penalty would be more appropriate.^^ 
Similarly, in Australia, the Public Service Act 1922-1973 (Cth) 
gives the disciplining officer a variety of remedies other than 
58 dismissal. The nature and frequency of disciplinary action taken 
59 
in pursuance of section 55 of the Public Service Act over a four year 
period appears in the table below.^^ 
Section and Punishment imposed 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 
Section 55 -
Dismissal 19 11 24 15 
Reduction in salary and/or status 12 14 21 9 
Transfer 2 — 1 -
Fine (over $4) 291 354 295 263 
Fine ($4 and under) 836 875 1,201 1,120 
Reprimands (including cautions) 209 210 206 275 
Total 1,369 1,464 1,748 1,682 
It is a fair inference from these figures that the small number of 
dismissals can, at least in part, be attributed to the fact that alter-
native remedies were freely and easily available. Of these other 
remedies, fines were the most common. 
The advantage of providing a range of penalties in ascending 
order of severity is that discipline can be related to the gravity of 
the offence. Further, a broad spectrum of penalties gives an employer 
more flexibility in disciplinary measures. Management would be able to 
impose penalties designed to correct,rather than punish,employees. 
The problem is to decide what measures should be included in 
the range of permissible punishment. Clearly oral or written warnings, 
reprimands or cautions could be used for minor offences, but these are 
available to employers at present. What is needed is a more formidable 
penalty which would discipline the offender and deter other employees 
from similar conduct. 
A small fine would seem to be the ideal answer. One industrial 
tribunal has already regretted its lack of power to impose a fine as a 
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disciplinary measure.^^ Unfortunately, some unions are firmly opposed 
to fines as a form of discipline. This resistance might be overcome 
if the amount and limits of the fine for particular offences were 
specified in the award or statute. It might also be provided that a 
levy could be deducted from the ein)loyee*s pay packet in one or more 
instalments. The destination of the fine is likely to arouse much 
suspicion. It would be advisable, therefore, to stipulate that the 
amount collected should be donated to a charitable institution.^^ If 
this were done employers would have no incentive to abuse the remedy 
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as their predecessors did in nineteenth century England. 
There exists a further obstacle to the inclusion of fining 
provisions in awards. Fines prescribed in awards would only be 
recoverable if they were a genuine pre-estimate of the probable damage 
caused by the employee's breach of contract. Otherwise they would be 
treated as penalties and, therefore, unenforceable.^^ This difficulty 
is not insuperable. It could be avoided by a statutory provision 
authorising the imposition of fines for certain offences. 
Disciplinary suspensions avoid many of the problems encountered 
by fines, A contract of service may be suspended by an employer only 
where statute^^ or an express or implied term of the contract confers 6 7 a power to do so. Some awards already provide that an employee may 
68 be suspended for misconduct. This development should be extended 
69 since suspension is often a merciful alternative to discharge. However, 
70 an indefinite suspension may amount to a dismissal. If the law were 
otherwise, an employer could avoid giving notice or wages in lieu thereof 
71 
by indefinitely suspending the employee. Care should be taken, 
therefore, that a suspension without pay is imposed only for the limited 
period specified in the award. Disciplinary transfers or demotions 
could also be mentioned in awards as alternative sanctions. 
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Unions need not fear that these measures are beyond challenge. 
They could be limited to cases of misconduct, inefficiency, malignering 
or neglect of duty. Thus, the union could still argue that the employee 
concerned was not guilty of the offence alleged. 
An indiscriminate use of summary dismissal for misconduct 
could also be discouraged by treating an unwarranted discharge as unfair. 
73 
The remedies which will be recommended for unfair dismissals could 
then be invoked, 
5. Dismissal Procedure; Proposals relevant to Unlawful Dismissals 
In view of the special duties and responsibilities of union 
officers and delegates added protection should be afforded to them 
against arbitrary or unwarranted dismissal. If these employees are 
expected to protect the interests of their fellow-unionists and work-
mates, they should be insulated from victimisation. Under the present 
law a union officer or delegate may be dismissed in the same manner as 
any other company employee. Some countries recognise the special 
vulnerability of employees in this type of position. 
In West Germany, for example, summary dismissal of works 
councillors requires the consent of the works council or the labour 
court. If the works council withholds its consent, the employer must 
74 
apply to the labour court for approval, 
British law takes a softer line. Paragraph 133 (5) of the 
Code of Practice^^ recommends that 'no disciplinary action should be 
taken against a shop steward until the circumstances of the case have 
been discussed with a full-time official of the union concerned*. 
Failure to observe this procedure does not automatically render the 
dismissal unfair under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
(U.K.) but the recommendation is admissible in evidence in proceedings 
7 6 under that Act, 
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The additional protection afforded employees' representatives 
in these countries could well be adapted to Australian conditions. The 
approval of an arbitration commissioner or an industrial magistrate 
could be required prior to dismissal. 
If the proposal for a works council suggested in Chapter 20 
is adopted, then it might be more convenient to authorise this body-
to consent to the dismissal in the first instance. The employer could 
be allowed an appeal to an arbitration commissioner or an industrial 
magistrate if consent were withheld. 
6. The Type of Dismissals which the Law Will Sustain 
A. Dismissals with Notice 
77 
In the current law part, it was pointed out that in general 
a dismissal with notice is lawful notwithstanding a discriminatory 
motive. This section deals with proposals to remedy this situation. 
(i) Discriminatory Dismissals 
(a) The Racial Discrimination Bill; Its Scope 
The Australian Government hopes to secure the passage of the 
Racial Discrimination Bill 1974^^ early in 1975. The Bill will satisfy 
Australia's obligations under the International Convention on the 
79 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It prohibits 
discrimination in many matters other than employment but it is this 
80 field that concerns us here. 
Clauses 15-17 of the Bill relate to discrimination in employ-
ment and advertisements for en?)loyment. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that Clause 15 prohibits discrimination against an 
employee by reason of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of 
the employee or any relative of the employee. 
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The Bill also prohibits discrimination in employment on 
grounds that a person or any relative or associate of a person is or 
has been an immigrant. This ground for discrimination is made 
independent and severable from the rest of Clause 15. This is a 
prudent course to adopt for this additional ground falls outside the 
term 'racial discrimination* as defined in the International Convention, 
Thus if this portion of the clause is held invalid by the High Court 
81 
in a constitutional challenge based on the 'external affairs* power, 
the rest of the clause could survive. 
(b) I.L.O. Convention No. Ill 
The Australian Government ratified I.L.O. Convention No. 
Ill dealing with Discrimination in Employment and Occupation on 
82 15 June 1973. The definition of discrimination in this convention 
is much broader than the term 'racial discrimination' in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
83 Discrimination. 
A country ratifying I.L.O. Convention No. Ill is required to 
declare a national policy affirming its commitment to the objective of 
the Convention. In addition,a ratifying country is obliged to pursue 
a specified range of action designed to eliminate discrimination in 
employment and occupation. 
As one step in this range of action, it is required 'to 
enact such legislation and to promote such educational programmes as 
may be calculated to secure the acceptance and observance o± 
the declared national policy. But the Federal Government appears to 
be reluctant, at this stage, to pursue its anti-discrimination policy 
through legislation. It prefers to rely upon educational programmes 
and conciliation to promote a climate of opinion favourable to the 
85 national policy. 
323 
To this end it has established a National Committee on 
Discrimination in Employment, and Committees in each state. One of 
the main functions of this body is to consider complaints of 
discrimination in employment referred to it by the state committees. 
In their first year of operation these committees received 
nearly 600 complaints. Of the 312 complaints on grounds specified 
in the International Convention, the clear majority were on grounds 
of sex (164 or 53%), the next largest group being on the ground of 
national extraction (79 or 25%), Thirty-six complaints on grounds of 
race were received. By contrast, there were relatively few complaints 
of political or religious discrimination. Complaints of discrimination 
by reason of age and nationality were also reported but these are not 
8 6 covered by the Convention, 
The number of complaints should not be taken as an indication 
87 of the extent of discrimination in employment in Australia, A 
national advertising campaign launched in March 1974 trebled the number 
88 
of complaints being received by the committees. When the practice 
and procedure of the committees become widely known the number of 
complaints might be expected to rise sharply. 
Although these early figures suggest that there are few 89 
discriminatory dismissals in Australia, they do indicate that the 
grounds of discriminatory employment practices are broader than those 
covered by the Racial Discrimination Bill and, indeed, I.L,0, Convention 
No, 111 itself. Further, there is some independent evidence of 90 
discriminatory dismissal policies in Australia, 
The limited scope of the 1974 Bill may force the Federal 
Government to revise its attitude to legislation prohibiting all forms 
of discrimination in employment. The Bill does not prohibit 
discrimination in employment on grounds of sex, religion, religious 
belief or conviction, political opinion, social origin, age, marital 
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status or nationality. And since it is tied to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
it may not be amended to cover these forms of discrimination. 
Legislation implementing I.L.O. Convention No. Ill would 
91 
be able to prohibit all these forms of discrimination. And a 
general prohibition of all forms of discrimination would seem to be 
preferable to the Federal Government's policy of legislating on some 
forms of discrimination and providing conciliation as the only 
remedy against other forms. Yet even legislation in pursuance of 
Convention 111 would not provide a remedy against dismissals which, 
although not discriminatory, are simply unfair. 
(ii) Unfair Dismissals 
Australia is one of the few major industrialised countries 
of the world which has no general prohibition of capricious or 
malicious dismissal. It will be useful to consider briefly some of 
the overseas experience. 
(a) Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) 
The current unfair dismissal provisions in Great Britain 
appear in schedule 1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
92 
(UoK.). Paragraph 4 of the schedule states that every employee 
covered by the schedule shall have the right *not to be unfairly 
dismissed*. This provision gives a misleading impression. The 
employee's right is, in fact, restricted to complaining to an industrial 93 
tribunal that his employer has unfairly dismissed him. 
Paragraph 6 (2) lists certain reasons which will normally be 
regarded as fair grounds for dismissal: those related to the capability 
or qualifications of the employee; those related to his conduct; 
redundancy; or where the continued employment of the employee would 
involve a breach of statutory duty. Even if a dismissal is based on 
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one of these grounds it may still be unfair if the employer has not 
acted reasonably in treating the reason for dismissal as sufficient 
94 
justification for the discharge. 
The Act also regards certain dismissals as automatically 
unfair. A dismissal because of the employee's legitimate trade union 95 
activities falls in this category. Again, a dismissal for redundancy 
will be unfair where the persons discharged were victimised for their 
trade union activities or where the persons were selected for dismissal 96 
in breach of a customary arrangement or agreed procedure. 
In general, the protection afforded by the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) extends only to dismissals or 
'constructive dismissals'. 
Dismissal is defined in paragraph 5 of Schedule I. An 
employee shall be taken to be dismissed by his employer if his contract 97 
of employment is terminated by the employer with or without notice. 
Paragraph 5 (2)(c) incorporates the notion of 'constructive 
dismissal*. Thus, if the employee terminates his contract, with or 
without notice, in circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate 
it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct, he will be 98 deemed to be dismissed for the purposes of the Act. 
The 1974 Act also provides that an employee under notice may 
give his employer a counter-notice of termination of services without 
99 
forfeiting his claim against his employer for unfair dismissal. There 
are two potential traps in this provision. The employee's counter-
notice must be in writing and must be given at a time within the 
'obligatory period' of notice^required from the employer. Thus, if the 
employee gives an oral counter-notice, he forfeits his claim. Again, 
if the employer gives him one month's notice when in fact he is 
entitled to only one week's notice, a counter-notice must be given in 
the final week of the four week's notice. If not the employee's rights 
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to challenge the dismissal lapse. These two restrictions will cause 
gross injustice if the employee is not conversant with the correct 
procedure. It is surprising that these pitfalls which appeared in 
2 
the 1971 Act were not removed in the recent legislation. 
Further problems surround the concept of dismissal. Where a 
contract is terminated by notice, the dismissal dates from the day on 3 
which the notice expires or ought to expire. This can be altered 
if the parties agree to terminate the contract before the notice period 
elapses. In this case, the consensual termination dates from the date 
of the agreement, and there is no dismissal. Consequently, the 4 
agreement deprives the employee of the right to challenge the dismissal. 
There is, therefore, ample scope for an unscrupulous employer to defeat 
an employee's claim before it is litigated.^ 
If Australia were to adopt legislation prohibiting unfair 
dismissals it would do well to avoid these shortcomings. 
(b) Unfair Dismissal Law in Other Countries 
Britain is by no means the only country to devise a sanction 
against unfair dismissal. In the United States, arbitrators overrule 
unfair dismissals under the rubric of the »just cause* provisions in 
collective agreements.^ West German law states that 'socially 
unwarranted* dismissals are invalid.^ A 'socially unwarranted* dismissal 
is, in turn, defined as a dismissal 'not based on reasons connected 
with the person or conduct of the employee or on urgent operating 
g 
requirements precluding his continued employment in the undertaking*. 
In Italy, the Law of 1966 permits dismissal of an employee with prior 
notice only in the case of an 'obvious failure to fulfil his contractual 
obligations, or for reasons inherent in production, the organization of 9 
the work or the smooth running of the undertaking*. In France, a 
capricious or malicious exercise of the employer's power to dismiss 
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with notice may be challenged under an Act of 27 December 1890 as an 
abuse of right (abuse de droit).^^ 
Australia could draw on this overseas experience, particularly 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) in devising an 
appropriate form of legislation against unfair dismissal. 
B. Summary Dismissal 
As we have seen,^^ summary dismissal is often used indiscrim-
inately and illegitimately as a disciplinary measure. Proposals 
designed to correct this practice can be conveniently considered under 
the following headings: notice of company rules and essential terms of 
the contract; dismissal for trivial offences; dismissal in disregard of 
procedural rules; and, finally, severe or inconsistent discipline. 
(i) Notice of Company Rules and Essential Terms of the 
Contract 
One Australian tribunal has recognised that 'if workers are 
to be disciplined for non-observance of rules, it is fundamental that 
12 
such rules be brought home to the attention of the workers concerned*. 
But there is no positive obligation upon Australian employers to inform 
employees of the essential terms of the contract of service or the 
basic company rules. Although awards must be exhibited in a prominent 
position at the work place,^^ they do not tell the employee what is 
expected of him and the reasons for which he may be dismissed. For 
example, the award will normally state that the employee may be 
dismissed for misconduct but it does not indicate what the particular 
employer regards as misconduct. 
By contrast, West German law obliges an employer to inform an 
employee about 'his duties and responsibilities as well as the type of 
14 
his work and the way it fits into the operations of the enterprise*. 
Further, an employee is entitled to be informed within a reasonable 
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time of any changes in the scope of his work.^^ While these provisions 
are designed primarily to encourage employees to participate in and 
identify with the enterprise, they will ensure that an employee is 
made aware of his obligations, 
A similar duty to inform employees could be imposed upon 
Australian employers either by legislation or industrial awards. 
Alternatively, tribunals could refuse to sustain dismissal for breach 
of company rules if the employee was not made aware of these rules 
before his transgression.^^ 
(ii) Dismissal for Trivial Offences^^ 
The notion of •just cause* embodied in most American 
collective agreements implies that a dismissal will not be warranted 
unless it is related to the employee's incompetence or improper 
conduct.^^ In theory, this standard does not differ greatly from that 
applied by the common law courts and industrial tribunals in Australia, 
In practice, the application of the standard produces strikingly 
different results. It is sufficient to note that a dismissal for a 
19 
trivial matter will rarely be sustained by an American arbitrator. 
Australian tribunals could learn much from the principles evolved by 
these arbitrators in interpreting and applying the »just cause' 
provisions. 
(iii) Dismissal in Disregard of Procedural Rules 
American arbitrators almost invariably overrule dismissals 
which do not follow the procedure outlined in the relevant collective 
agreement.^® Thus, where the agreement requires an employer to give 
the employee a warning^^ or a right to explain his conduct before he 
decides to dismiss the employee, this procedure must be followed. Even 
where there is no set procedure, a denial of natural justice will 
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ordinarily persuade the arbitrator to overrule the discharge and 
22 order reinstatement. 
If the dismissal procedures proposed earlier are incorporated 
in Australian awards or legislation, industrial tribunals could ensure 
compliance by upsetting any dismissals which depart from the prescribed 
procedure. 
(iv) Severe or Inconsistent Discipline 
As stated earlier, one of the fundamental guidelines 
American arbitrators use in applying the 'just cause* provisions is 
23 
the principle that punishment should fit the crime. If a dismissal 
seems to be a severe reaction to the employee's misconduct, the 
dismissal will be ruled improper. Arbitrators will sustain corrective 
discipline but will not allow employers to exercise their right of 24 
dismissal in a vindictive manner. On these principles, arbitrators 
frequently overrule discharges for a first offence particularly if the 
employees concerned have good service records. Because the collective 
agreement provides the employer with a variety of disciplinary measures, 
the arbitrator will usually prescribe a less severe form of punishment 25 for first offences or for petty misconduct. American arbitrators 
also expect employers to apply disciplinary measures consistently. A 
2 6 
discriminatory use of the power of dismissal will not be upheld. 
This approach runs contrary to our law where the employer 
has an almost untrammelled right to decide whether he will dismiss an 
offender. But if awards gave employers a more flexible range of 
disciplinary measures, our tribunals could develop principles similar 
to those applied by American arbitrators. 
Harsh or capricious dismissals can also be discouraged by 
legislation. As seen earlier, the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Act 1974 (U.K.) provides that a dismissal related to an employee's 
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conduct, capability or qualifications may be unfair if the employer 
acted unreasonably in treating this ground as sufficient justification 
27 
for discharging the employee. Used judiciously, this provision 
could deter employers from severe or inconsistent applications of their 
remedy of dismissal.^^ 
C. Unlawful Dismissal 
As mentioned earlier, there are numerous loopholes in the 
•victimisation provisions* of the industrial arbitration and wages 
board statutes. Unless all these defects are corrected, employees who 
engage in some forms of legitimate trade union or industrial activity 
will have no legal protection from victimisation. Comprehensive 
safeguards are essential in this area. In most instances, all that is 
required is minor amendment of the existing legislation. 
It would also seem important for the legislation to stipulate 
the duration of the protection conferred. The recent Industrial 
29 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1972 (S.A.) specifies a two month 
period but this seems to be unnecessarily short.^^ A longer period 
of, say, six months would appear to be more appropriate.^^ 
7, Who may challenge the dismissal? Who has the onus of proof? 
A. Dismissal with Notice 
(i) Discriminatory Dismissal 
(a) Individual Remedy 
The Racial Discrimination Bill 1974 provides that a person 
aggrieved by an unlawful act of discrimination may institute civil 
32 
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. By providing an 
individual remedy the Bill recognises that some forms of discrimination 
are unlikely to generate collective action by unions.^^ But litigation 
may be expensive for the individual. Accordingly, the Bill gives 
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Australian Race Commissioners power to investigate complaints of 
discrimination and toinstitute proceedings on behalf of the aggrieved 
34 
party if attempts at conciliation fail. Such a procedure may be 
protracted but it saves the individual substantial costs. 
At the conciliation stage, a commissioner is directed to 
•use his best endeavours' to secure a settlement of any difference 
between the parties and to obtain an assurance against repetition of 
35 36 the discrimination. Unlike the equivalent New Zealand legislation, 
the Bill does not give a commissioner power to summon persons who 
may be able to assist his inquiry and require them to give evidence. 
Nor is a commissioner empowered to compel the production of any 
documents, papers or things which may relate to the alleged discrimin-
37 ation. This places a severe handicap upon the commissioner's ability 
3 8 
to achieve a settlement. Apparently he is expected to rely on his 
tact and powers of persuasion. 
(b) Onus of Proof 
Assuming the commissioner fails to negotiate a settlement 
and institutes proceedings on behalf of the aggrieved party, the 
question then arises: who has the onus of establishing that the employer 
has discriminated against the employee? Clause 25 (5) of the Bill 
merely states that the court may grant remedies •where ... it is 
established to the reasonable satisfaction of the court that the 
39 
defendant' has committed an unlawful act of discrimination. 
The court"^^ is given two guidelines. First, a company will 
be liable for the discrimination of its employees if it authorised 
the employees, either expressly or impliedly, to do the unlawful 
act."^^ The Race Relations Act 1968 (U.K. adopts a different 
approach. It makes an employer vicariously liable for any discrim-
ination practised by an employee in the course of his employment 
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unless the employer can •prove that he took such steps as were 
reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing in the course 
of his employment acts of the same description*'^^ as the act the 
subject of the complaint. The British Act then, casts an affirmative 
44 
duty upon the employer. This greatly strengthens the position of the 
complainant and it should be adopted in the Australian provisions. 
Second, the Bill, in its present form, recognises that an 
act may be unlawful even if it is only partly caused by discrimination."^^ 
Thus, where an act is discriminatory it matters not that the dominant 
reason for the act has nothing to do with discrimination. This 
principle may be readily applied to dismissals: if a discharge is 
partly motivated by discrimination but predominantly caused by an 
errployee*s inefficiency, the Bill may provide a remedy for the aggrieved 
party. 
Apart from these guidelines, it appears that the prosecuting 
party has the onus of satisfying the court that the defendant has done 
46 an unlawful act of discrimination. This is a cardinal error. The 
fact that the Australian Race Commissioner has no compulsory evidence-
47 
gathering power aggravates the problem. In these circumstances it 
will be extremely difficult for the complainant to establish that a 
dismissal was inspired by discriminatory motives. As Hepple points out, 
the real reason for the discriminatory act may lie hidden in the 48 
employer's filing cabinets. 
The only realistic course to adopt, at least in the civil 
proceedings, is to place the primary onus upon the defendant. The 
complainant could be required to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination in employment; he cannot, and should not, be expected 
to go further. 
These shortcomings of Racial Discrimination Bill must be 
corrected before the Bill becomes law otherwise the protection afforded 
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against a discriminatory dismissal will be largely illusory. If a 
more general prohibition of discrimination is enacted in pursuance 
of I.L.O. Convention No. Ill, care must be taken to avoid similar 
pitfalls. 
(ii) Unfair Dismissal 
(a) Individual Remedy 
As mentioned earlier, there is no procedure through which 
employees in Australia can challenge dismissals which are merely 
unfair. If jurisdiction to hear claims of this nature is conferred on 
industrial tribunals, the individual employee aggrieved by the 
dismissal should be allowed a remedy in his own right. 
An individual remedy is essential in these cases because it 
may not be possible for the discharged employee to persuade the union 
to take up his complaint. It may be instructive at this point to 
consider the British and American approaches to this key issue. 
49 
In Great Britain, employees clearly have an individual 
remedy against unfair dismissal under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act 1974 (U.K. 
In contrast, an individual employee may not sue for unfair 
dismissal even in the organised sector of the American work force. But 
this deficiency is offiset, to some extent, by the unions* duty of fair 
representation: the union is required to represent the interests of 
all the workers in the plant or work place covered by the collective 
51 agreement. 
(b) Onus of Proof 
The onus of proof in cases of unfair dismissal is of pivotal 
importance. The burden of establishing the fairness of a discharge 
should be placed squarely on the employer as he is well aware of the 
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motive or reason for the dismissal. 
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) deals 
with the problem in an interesting way. It obliges the employer to 
show the principal reason for the dismissal and also that it was a reason 
falling within one of the grounds classified by the Act as prima facie 
52 53 fair or «some other substantial reason* which would justify the 
dismissal of an employee holding the position held by the complainant.^"^ 
Further it is up to the employer to satisfy the tribunal hearing the 
complaint that he acted reasonably in treating this reason as a 
sufficient ground for discharging the employee.^^ This is a marked 
improvement upon the Industrial Relations Act 1971 (U.K.) which appeared 
to place this latter onus upon the employee. 
American arbitrators interpreting the phrase 'just cause* in 
collective bargaining agreements have made it clear that the employer 
57 
carries the onus of justifying his disciplinary measures. 
If Australian law is to fashion a remedy for unfair dismissal, 
it would be wise to follow the British or American example. 
B. Summary Dismissal 
(i) Individual Remedy 
At common law an employee can sue for wrongful dismissal but 
litigation may give him a pyrrhic victory. The remedy at common law is, 
in most cases, a meagre award of damages. A wrongful dismissal may be 
challenged before industrial tribunals but an individual employee may 
be unable to bring his case before these tribunals unless he can persuade 
the union to take up the cudgels for him. 
As mentioned earlier, unions in the United States have a 
legal duty to represent fairly all employees covered by the collective 
agreement whether they are unionists or not. Employees in the organised 
sector, therefore, have access to arbitrators in cases of wrongful 
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dismissal, 
In Britain, the position is not entirely clear. An employee 
may be able to claim that a summary dismissal for petty misconduct is 
unfair within the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.). 
Although the dismissal would be prima facie fair since it was "related 
58 
to the conduct of the employee*, it might be ruled unfair if the 
employer acted unreasonably in treating the employee's behaviour as 
a sufficient reason for dismissal. At this stage, it is difficult 
to predict whether this result will flow from the Act but it is 
consistent with the new provisions. 
An employee wrongfully dismissed has a personal grievance. 
He should not be forced to rely upon his union to advance his claim. 
The need for an individual remedy is more urgent for that half of the 
work force which is not unionised. A direct action along the lines of 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) is preferable to 
the circuitous method of imposing a duty of fair representation upon 
the unions. This individual remedy would not supplant the unions' role 
in processing their members*grievances. Rather, it would be a back-stop 
for the employee whose complaint is neglected by his union. In 
addition, it would give a non-unionist a remedy alternative to a common 
law action. As will be seen,^^ the statutory remedies are much more 
generous than those at common law. 
(ii) Onus of Proof 
In cases of alleged wrongful dismissal, the onus of justifying 
the discharge is already cast upon the employer as part of his defence. 
If employers were compelled to justify the dismissal on the grounds 
expressed at the time of the discharge, this onus would have much more 
significance. 
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C. Unlawful Dismissal 
(i) Individual Remedy 
The industrial arbitration and wages board statutes do not 
clearly indicate that the aggrieved employee has an individual remedy 
against all forms of •victimisation*. An individual remedy is needed 
under the present provisions and, if the statutes are amended as 
suggested earlier,^^ such a remedy will be essential. For example, it 
is futile to limit access to the remedies to a union in cases where 
the union is not yet registered or where the employee is dismissed 
because he tried to establish a new union in an unorganised work place. 
(ii) Onus of Proof 
The'victimisation provisions* should also place the onus upon 
the employer to establish that the dismissal was not motivated by the 
employee's legitimate trade union or industrial activities. If the 
employer were obliged to furnish a reason for each dismissal at the time 
of the discharge, it would be easier to identify an illicit motive. 
Alternatively, the employer could be obliged to show that the dismissal 
was caused by some substantial reason other than the reason alleged in 
4-u u 62 the charge. 
8. Remedies 
A. Dismissal with Notice 
(i) Discriminatory Dismissal 
At common law an employee is given no remedy for a discrimin-
atory dismissal with notice or wages in lieu of notice. Nor is a remedy 
6 3 freely available in most Australian industrial relations systems. 
The Racial Discrimination Bill 1974 provides a number of 
remedies all or any of which may be granted to the victim of a discrim-
, 6 4 xnatory dismissal. 
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Damages will probably be the normal remedy. They may 
include compensation for the loss of any benefit which the aggrieved 
party 'might reasonably have been expected to obtain if the relevant 
act had not been done'.^^ In addition, damages may be awarded to 
the aggrieved party for loss of dignity, humiliation and injury to 
feelings.^^ This is clearly an advance on the common law measure of 
damages. 
It is doubtful whether a complainant will be entitled to 
reinstatement. The court may order the defendant to do a specified 
act directed towards 'placing a person aggrieved ... as nearly as 
practicable in the position in which he would be if the discrimination 
had not occurred*. This is an extremely vague grant of power. If 
an employer asserts that it is impracticable to reinstate the employee 
will the court refuse reinstatement? The court is also empowered to 
grant «such other relief as the court thinks just*. Such broad 
discretionary power provides a welcome flexibility but the question 
remains: is reinstatement available for an aggrieved party? 
The Bill does not refer to this remedy expressly and it may 
well be that it will be denied to a complainant. Much will depend 
68 
upon judicial interpretation of the remedy provisions of the Bill. 
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In most cases an aggrieved employee will want his job back. 
Damages are a poor substitute. They will not make it easier for the 
employee to obtain other employment. Indeed the employee is back to 
square one since he may once again be the victim of discrimination, 
this time in the selection process of prospective employers. Reinstate-
ment is available in these cases in the United States,Italy, ^ ^ and 
possibly Great B r i t a i n . I t should also be available under the 
73 Australian Bill. 
The Attorney-General and Minister for Customs and Excise, 
Senator The Hon. L.K. Murphy, Q.C., declared in his Second Reading 
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Speech on the October Bill: 'Pious declarations of principle are of 
74 
little value unless they can be given practical expression*, 
Reinstatement is one form of enforcing a victim's rights with a 
practical remedy. Without this form of relief, Australian anti-
discrimination legislation may lose the confidence of those it is 
designed to protect. 
If the Australian Government changes its present policy and 
decides to legislate in pursuance of I.L.O. Convention No. Ill, the 
above proposals will be equally relevant. 
(ii) Unfair Dismissal 
In Australia there is no remedy readily and widely available 
75 
for employees unfairly dismissed. This is a major gap in the law's 
protection of employees* interest in job security. 
Overseas countries differ on the appropriate form of remedy 
for unfair dismissal. Some countries merely allow employees compensa-
76 77 tion while others provide for reinstatement or compensation. 
American arbitrators almost invariably award reinstatement to 
an employee unfairly dismissed in breach of the *just cause* provision 
78 in collective agreements. Compensation is normally limited to back-
79 pay since the discharge. 
(a) Remedies under The Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Act 1974 (U.K.) 
In Great Britain complaints of unfair dismissal are heard by 
industrial tribunals under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
1974 (U.K.). The tribunals are empowered to recommend the reinstatement 
or re-engagement of a complainant. Such a recommendation will only 
be made where the tribunal considers that *it would be practicable, and 
in accordance with equity' for the complainant to be reinstated or re-
engaged.^^ It may be open to the employer to argue that neither of 
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these measures is practicable if he is not prepared to re-employ the 
complainant. Further, the tribunal is only empowered to recommend 
reinstatement or re-engagement; the tribunal will be unable to compel 
an employer to comply with its recommendation. 
On the other hand, if an employer unreasonably refused to 
comply with the tribunal's recommendation, it may increase the award 
of compensation available to the employee by an amount which it considers 
op O T 
•just and equitable* in the circumstances. Kitchin suggested that 
this may encourage tribunals to make 'deterrent awards* of compensation 
to induce enployers to re-employ the complainants. However, the 84 maximum amount of compensation is set at £stg5,200. Employers may 
85 prefer to pay this sum rather than surrender their prerogative. More 
importantly, the tribunals* approach to assessment of condensation has 
86 
led to modest awards in some cases. And the National Industrial 
Relations Court has put the issue beyond doubt. It recently rejected 
an attempt by one tribunal to award compensation far in excess of the 
employee's actual loss in order to deter QTiployers from refusing to comply with 
its recommendations.^^ 
Reinstatement may yet be secured through industrial action 88 
by the employee*s union. Indeed, G. DE N. Clark predicted that 
organised enployees might prefer to rely upon their industrial strength 
rather than the unfair dismissal provisions. 
Compensation was the alternative, and apparently unusual, 
remedy under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 (U.K.). There is no 
reason to doubt that this will remain true of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.). If an industrial tribunal finds 
that the complaint is well-founded, it may award such amount as it 
considers *just and equitable in all the circumstances, having regard 
to the loss sustained by the aggrieved party in consequence of the 
matters to which the complaint relates, in so far as that loss was 
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attributable to action taken by or on behalf of the party in default*. 
The loss sustained by the aggrieved party includes *loss of any benefit 
which he might reasonably be expected to have had* but for the unfair 
dismissal. 
91 Although quite generous awards have been made in some cases, 
92 
it is clear that compensation may only be given for financial losses. 
Thus an employee dismissed without being given a chance to state his 
case is not entitled to compensation for this factor alone unless it 93 caused him pecuniary loss. Similarly, no allowance will be made for 
94 
injury to pride or feelings. In this, the compensation provisions 
reflect the common law. Traces of common law can also be seen in the 
provisions which allow the tribunal to reduce the compensation if the 
complainant did not attempt to mitigate his loss or if his own conduct 95 
contributed to the unfair dismissal. 
Given these qualifications, the compensation awarded by 
industrial tribunals may be substantially more than a settlement figure 
proposed by a conciliation officer prior to the hearing. Such an 
officer is, in certain circumstances, under a duty to promote a 96 
settlement of the complaint. In his eagerness to reach an agreement 
between the parties, he may persuade the employee to accept a compromise 
figure. It remains to be seen whether this will happen but the 
possibility should not be discounted. The employee has little bargaining 
power in these pre-hearing negotiations. He may be prepared to settle 
for a lower amount than he would have received from an industrial 
tribunal. 
The remedies provided by the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Act 1974 (U.K.) have grave shortcomings. Nevertheless, they are an 
advance upon the common law. 
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(b) Italian Law of 15 July 1966 
In Italy, under the Law of 15 July 1966, an employer who 
dismisses an employee without sufficient grounds or a just motive 
may be obliged either to reinstate the employee or pay compensation 
97 
ranging from five to twelve months' remuneration. The size of the 
undertaking, the employee's length of service and the behaviour of the 
parties are considered in assessing compensation. 
Under the Law of 1966, reinstatement was at the option of 
the employer. Now the court is expressly empowered to order reinstate-
98 ment. The sanction for non-compliance with such an order is 
interesting: the employer is obliged to continue paying the employee 
99 his wages? 
(c) Lessons? 
The lesson to be learnt from the overseas experience is 
clear: if reinstatement is to be provided as a remedy for unfair 
dismissal, it should be available to the employee at his option, not 
the option of the employer. There is no evidence to suggest that 
reinstatement is not a viable remedy for employees unfairly dismissed. 
Indeed, it appears that reinstatement has met with considerable success 
at least in the organised sector of the American work force.^ Italian 
law also permits reinstatement but it is difficult to ascertain how 
well this remedy works in practice. However, one would think that the 
sanction for non-compliance withtte reinstatement order would guarantee 
the success of the remedy. 
There remains the problem of reinstatement in a small 
enterprise where personality clashes are likely to recur after reinstate-
ment. G. DE N. Clark^ suggests that much of this difficulty can be 
overcome by interim or probationary reinstatement orders. This seems 
to be a workable solution. If continued employment appears to be 
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impossible after a trial period, the reinstatement order could be 
reviewed and compensation awarded. 
If the complainant does not wish to be reinstated, he should 
be entitled to compensation for his dismissal. This should not be 
tied to common law notions such as contributory negligence or the duty 
to mitigate damages. Rather it should reflect the concept of 'job 
property*. And an employee should be compensated for any humiliation 
and indignity caused by his dismissal.^ 
B. Wrongful Dismissal; Remedies 
It is most unlikely that the common law will develop a remedy 
akin to reinstatement for employees wrongfully dismissed. Yet reinstate-
ment is a remedy which should be available. This policy has already 
been accepted in New Zealand, Italy and the United States of America. 
(i) New Zealand's Personal Grievance Provisions 
The New Zealand model warrants close attention because its 
basic scheme could be easily followed in Australian industrial systems. 
4 
The personal grievance provisions outlined in the 1970 Amendment to 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 (N.Z.) prescribe 
a standard procedure which is automatically included in the instrument 
governing the worker's conditions of employment unless the parties to 
the instrument agree that the procedure will not apply.^ Even if this 
procedure is not so incorporated, the Minister for Labour may, in 
certain circumstances, declare that it shall apply to a dispute.^ 
The final stage of the prescribed procedure involves either 
private or official arbitration of the dispute. In each case the 
arbitrator may grant one or more of the following remedies: reimburse-7 ment of lost wages, reinstatement and compensation. 
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The New Zealand provision is a substantial improvement upon 
Australian arbitral provisions for handling complaints of wrongful 
dismissal. Firstly, it formalises the processing of the grievance and 
encourages pre-arbitration negotiation between the employee's union and 
the employer. Secondly, and more importantly, the arbitrator may award 
compensation to the employee. Those industrial tribunals in Australia 
which have jurisdiction to order reinstatement do not have this option 
open to them: they must either reinstate, or deny the employee's claim. 
Unfortunately, the basis for calculating compensation under 
the New Zealand provision is not made clear. Common law principles 
will undoubtedly guide arbitrators in awarding compensation. In 
addition, the standard procedure does not allow an individual employee 
to refer his grievance to arbitration. A complaint of wrongful dismissal 
is essentially a personal grievance and it may be difficult for the 
employee to convince his union to proceed with his claim. Further, a 
non-unionist may be unable to invoke the grievance procedure, 
(ii) The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U,K.) 
The British unfair dismissal provisions avoid some of these 
problems but encounter others. As mentioned earlier, the Act appears 
to give a remedy to an employee dismissed for petty or trivial reasons 
g 
related to his conduct. Moreover, the complaint may be made by the 
9 
employee himself. If the Act empowered industrial tribunals to order 
reinstatement and the compensation provisions were altered to reflect 
a concept of job property, individual employees wrongfully dismissed 
in Great Britain would be in a much more secure position than their 
New Zealand counterparts. With these modifications, the British scheme 
would be a useful model for local legislation. 
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C. Unlawful Dismissal 
An employee dismissed in breach of the victimisation 
provisions of the industrial arbitration statutes is already entitled 
to reinstatement. In the wages board states, the victimisation 
provisions make no mention of reinstatement. Reinstatement should be 
available in all jurisdictions to employees dismissed for any form 
of legitimate and lawful industrial activity. 
(i) American experience with reinstatement in victimisation 
cases 
A recent study^*^ of the reinstatement remedy under the 
National Labor Relations Act casts doubt upon the efficacy of this 
form of relief in victimisation cases. Of the seventy employees 
reinstated in pursuance of the Act, sixty had subsequently left their 
anployment. CX^ er sixty-six per cent of 1ho® vAto had rdinquishoi their job gave 'unfair 
company treatment* as their reason for leaving. This is an astonishing 
figure. Of even greater significance was the finding that 59% of those 
ordered to be reinstated refused to return to their position, ^ ^ And over 
887o of the employees who turned down reinstatement gave *fear of company 
12 
backlash* as the reason for their refusal. 
Around 40% of America's work force in the private sector is 
organised but employers staunchly resist the spread of unionism. This 
may explain why reinstatement has met with such limited success. There 
is a tendency among employers, in the unorganised sector particularly, 
to victimise union activists even after reinstatement,^^ Another reason 
for the failure of the reinstatement remedy in many cases could be the 
delays involved in obtaining an o r d e r , W h i l e his dismissal is being 
challenged, an employee will find it necessary to seek other work. When 
the reinstatement order ultimately issues, the aggrieved party may 
prefer to stay in his new position rather than risk victimisation in 
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his former position. 
The American study is instructive for two reasons. Firstly, 
it shows that protection against victimisation should continue for a 
period after reinstatement. Secondly, it suggests that reinstatement 
may not be appropriate in all cases. 
If an employee does not wish to have his job back he should 
not be denied compensation. Yet compensation is not available in these 
cases in any Australian jurisdiction. One way of correcting this defect 
would be to expand the scope of the unfair dismissal proposals put 
forward earlier. 
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (U.K.) treats 
victimisation dismissals as automatically unfair.^^ And the same 
remedies are provided for an employee dismissed for trade union 
activities as are available to an employee otherwise unfairly dismissed. 
This pattern could be followed by legislation in each state. 
In the Commonwealth sphere it would be possible to include 
compensation within the range of remedies which may be granted by the 
17 
Australian Industrial Court in victimisation cases. 
Basically, then, the remedy available to employees dismissed 
because of their legitimate industrial activities should be reinstate-
ment or compensation at the employee's option. 
SECTION 2; EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN JOB SECURITY 
CHAPTER 19 REDUNDANCY LAW REFORM 
1, Introduction 
Industrial tribunals have taken the first few halting steps 
towards dealing with redundancy but much more remains to be done. In 
this chapter, proposals for reform of selection criteria, redundancy 
procedures and the assistance and compensation provided for retrenched 
workers will be examined. Since take-overs, liquidation and receivership 
all involve potential redundancy they are dealt with here rather than 
in a separate chapter. 
2. Criteria for Selection 
Once a company decides that retrenchments are necessary it 
faces the problem of who to dismiss and who to retain. In many cases, 
an employer's freedom of selection is restricted by the qualified 
seniority principle which is often incorporated in industrial awards 
or agreements or implied from a trade custom.^ 
The seniority rule helps to overcome resistance to change and 
2 
is readily understood by employees but it can create difficulties. 
It directs attention primarily to the employee's length of service even 
though this may have little bearing upon the cost of redundancy for 
a particular employee.^ Moreover, it takes account of the age of the 
employee only indirectly. Yet there is a wealth of evidence to suggest 4 
that older workers have more to lose through redundancy: in general, 
they find it more difficult to obtain new employment, and they are 
often reluctant to undertake retraining. Again, the seniority formula 
gives no weight to family responsibilities and commitments: a middle-
aged worker with six children and nine years' service may be retrenched 
before a thirty-five year old employee with ten years' credit. 
"46 
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French law attempts to strike a balance by requiring employers 
to establish rules governing the order of retrenchments. Seniority, 
qualificat ions, and the number of" dependants must be considered in 
planning retrenchments.^ The law does not fix any priority among these 
factors. Nor do the plant rules which often msrely restate the 
statutory criteria. Despite this lack of clear guidance, French law 
does at least remind employers that their decision is not a purely 
economic one. Its major advantage is that it highlights the wider 
implications of redundancy; its major shortcoming is that it largely 
ignores the age of the employee. 
By contrast, Swedish law^ treats the age of employees facing 
redundancy as an important, although secondary, factor. Seniority is 
the paramount consideration but where the employer must choose between 
two employees of equal seniority, he must retain the older employee. 
Swedish law also demands that employees be given up to five years*extra 
seniority at the rate of one month for each month service after age 
forty-five. Thus, an employee who joined a company on his forty-fifth 
birthday and served for ten years would be credited with fifteen years' 
seniority. This formula has an attractive simplicity. It could also 
be used to convert other variables such as number of dependants into 
units of seniority. 
Probably the best course would be to convert age and family 
responsibilities into notional seniority units. These could be added 
to actual seniority, and selection for redundancy could be determined in 
reverse order of seniority (actual and notional) »all other things being 
equal*. This rider would still allow management to retain a foreman or 
supervisor over an unskilled worker with a higher seniority rating. 
The costs of progress through technological changes and 
rationalisations in industry should not be borne solely by the workers 
management is prepared to sacrifice. The community has a responsibility 
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to ensure that the burden of redundancy is distributed in a humane 
manner. Ultimately, it is the community which benefits from these 
changes in the structure of employment. Moreover, in the short term, 
the impact of redundancy upon a local labour market can be devastating. 
It is not just workers themselves who are affected by the displacement. 
Their dependants and their creditors - all citizens of the community -
are also involved. In short, redundancy is a community problem. The 
criteria for selecting employees for retrenchment should reflect this 
fact. 
3, Redundancy Procedures 
(i) Prior Consultation with Vforkers* Representatives. 
Under French law,^ an employer is obliged to consult the 
works committee before retrenching employees. It must advise the 
committee of the timetable for lay-off and the steps taken to arrange 
for internal transfers, alternative employment or retraining. The 
committee is also entitled to a special report on what will be done 
to assist older workers who will be made redundant. While the 
committee's role is purely consultative, it can suggest alterations 
to the list of employees selected for retrenchment. 
The period of advance notice which must be given is set by 
centrally-negotiated agreements which bind all employers. Its length 
varies with two factors: the cause of the redundancy and the number 
to be retrenched. Where the redundancy is caused by a fall-off of 
product demand, the notice ranges from eight days(where ten to forty-
nine persons face retrenchment)to one month (where over one hundred 
employees are involved"). For redundancies attributable to structural 
or technological changes, the notice period starts at one montii, v\4iere ten 
to 200 are to be retrenched, and rises to three months where over 300 
are involved. 
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In contrast, there is no set period of advance warning 
required from a West German employer. He is simply obliged to inform 
the works council 'within a reasonable time and in detail' about 
g 
planned structural or technological changes or plant shutdowns. The 
works councils, however, rarely receive less than six weeks* notice of 9 
redundancies. 
Thus, both French and German law recognise the right of 
workpeople's representatives to be notified in advance of an impending 
redundancy. A similar requirement could easily be imported into our 
law. 
Employees need time to adjust to the impact of redundancy, 
to plan their future, and to obtain other employment or retraining. 
It may take some time to explain the reasons for the retrenchment to 
the employees. This is essential if the lay-off is to be carried out 
in a compassionate manner. The great advantage of the French and West 
German provisions is that they allow time for adequate arrangements to 
be made for the employees retrenched. 
A definite period of collective notice is preferable to a 
vague direction to notify workers' representatives 'as soon as possible' 
or 'within a reasonable time'. The latter requirement would seem too 
imprecise to be of any real value. 
In cases of technological changes and major re-organizations 
such as plant shutdowns, three months' notice might be appropriate,^^ 
Where the retrenchment is caused by a decline in product demand or an 
economic recession, the employer does not have the same degree of control 
over the situation. He cannot programme the change: it just happens. 
In these circumstances a shorter notice of, say, two weeks would seem 
reasonable. In both cases, the warning periods should be in addition 
to the individual notice to which an employee is entitled. Further, 
the advance warning should contain a statement of the reasons for the 
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proposed retrenchment. This might prevent rumours having an 
unsettling effect upon the staff. 
Take-overs, receivership and liquidation raise special 
problems. In its evidence before the Jenkins Committee, the British 
Trades Union Congress made two submissions on the subject of take-overs. 
Firstly, it suggested that employees' representatives should be given 
a copy of the offer when the take-over circulars are filed with the 
Registrar. Secondly, it recommended that these circulars state the 
offeror's identity and its intentions as to the future of the company 
and the employees.^^ 
The Committee saw merit in the second proposal but felt that 
12 a statutory requirement to that effect would be impractical. Ifowe\er, British 
Stock Exchange requirements provide that such a statement shall be 
13 included in the take-over offer. But, as Weinberg points out, the 
statement is 'obviously not meaningful and is honoured in the breach 
14 
rather than in the observance'. 
Unfortunately, the Jenkins Committee did not comment upon 
the TradesUnion Congress' first proposal. It felt that its terms of 
reference prevented it from considering the 'broader economic and social 
questions'often raised in take-over bids.^^ 
A statutory provision requiring directors to provide conpany 
employees and their representatives with copies of the formal take-over 
offer would save employees from the indignity of first hearing about 
the take-over bid through the press,^^ Clearly, secrecy must be 
maintained during the discussions preceding a take-over offer: a 
premature disclosure could cause considerable fluctuation in the price 
1 7 
of shares. But after the offeror makes a formal take-over bid 
employees should be advised forthwith. It may be argued that giving 
early notice of the take-over offer to employees might well unsettle the staff and prejudice the offeree's chances of selling the business 
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as a going concern. On the other hand, an early disclosure of the 
formal offer to employees will force the parties to consider the 
interests of employees. What was once a matter of collusion and 
secrecy would become a matter of bargaining. 
Since voluntary and compulsory winding up and the appointment 
of a receiver or a receiver and manager may effect employees' job 
security, employees and their representatives should be notified of 
these developments at the time of the resolution or order,as the case 
may be. In addition, in a compulsory winding up, management should be 
obliged by law to advise employees forthwith that the winding up order 
automatically terminates their contract of service. This would avoid 
the situation where an employee unwittingly works out his period of 
18 notice in the service of the liquidator. 
(ii) Notice to Government Employment Services 
French law requires employers to obtain the approval of the 
Ministry of Labour before discharging any workers on grounds of 
r e d u n d a n c y . T h i s is a significant fetter on managerial rights. 
The French officials are entitled to a detailed report of the 
reasons for the proposed lay-off. They may also inquire whether the 
works committee has been consulted and direct the employer to consider 
the committee's proposals for mitigating the hardship of the redundancy. 
In addition, the authorities may encourage the employer to adopt work-
sharing measures such as restriction of overtime and reduction in the 
working week. 
If retrenchment cannot be avoided, the Ministry has a number 
of strategies at its disposal. It may recommend alterations to the list 
of persons selected for retrenchment; it may stagger the timetable for 
lay-offs; it may propose relocation or internal transfers; it may 
persuade the employer to establish a training scheme with the help of 
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government subsidies. More importantly, the Ministry may withhold 
its approval until it is satisfied that all retrenched workers are 
placed in other employment. And even if approval is granted, it may 
insist that redundant workers be given priority in re-employment at 
a future date. 
The approach of the French authorities differs from locality 
to locality. If there is a heavy demand for labour in the area, the 
officials may grant their approval as a matter of course. Where work 
is scarce, their approach may be more stringent. At one time, the 
state of the local labour market was their main guideline but a 
circular of the Ministry of Labour in late 1962 stressed that officials 
should attempt to avoid the 'often unhappy* consequences workers face 
•even when the general employment situation is such as to permit a 
rapid re-employment*.^^ 
If an employer does not abide by the procedure, the dismissals 
will nevertheless stand. Thus the employer retains the ultimate right 
to retrench employees regardless of the legal formalities: failure to 
seek the approval of the Ministry of Labour merely attracts a criminal 
sanction. Yet, as Mukherjee points out, the Ministry of Labour does 
21 
not need to coerce employers for it has positive strategies to offer. 
Employers are prepared to allow the Ministry its watchdog role in return 
for government-subsidised retraining or relocation schemes. 
Unlike his French counterpart, the German employer need not 
seek the approval of the public authorities for his proposed retrench-
ments. His obligation is limited to giving the officials advance 
notice.^^ The German authorities cannot prevent the redundancy although 
they can delay it for one month. This *breathing space* gives the 
authorities time to arrange other employment for the workers to be 
retrenched. Having given the advance notice, the employer must promptly 
proceed with the cut-back. If the retrenchments have not been finalised 
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within four weeks, the employer must give the public authorities 
another advance notice and the procedure starts over again. Not only 
is the employer obliged to give notice of impending lay-offs, he must 
advise the public authorities a year in advance if he can foresee 
any changes within the enterprise which are likely to affect his 
demand for labour. 
If an employer does not comply with the advance notice 
provisions, he is liable to pay the costs of retraining the retrenched 
workers for a maximum of six months. This is the deterrent for myopic 
manpower policies. 
To sum up, both French and West German public employment 
authorities have an established right to be consulted prior to 
collective dismissals on grounds of redundancy. As noted earlier- a 
similar requirement may at present be inserted in New South Wales and 
South Australian awards dealing with the duties of employers upon the 
introduction or proposed introduction of automation in the industry 
concerned. The scope of these provisions should be extended to cover 
all forms of redundancy. They could then serve as a model for the 
other states. Once again, the period of advance notice would vary 
depending on the cause of the proposed retrenchment. The periods 
suggested for prior consultation with workpeople's representatives 
would seem appropriate here also. 
Advance notice to local employment offices is an essential 
part of the manpower planning involved in a retrenchment. It allows 
the officials time to interview the employees retrenched and ascertain 
23 
whether they will be suitable for retraining. It also enables the 
authorities to place the retrenched employee in other work if retraining 
is impractical or if the employee is unwilling to undertake retraining. 
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(iii) Should the Decision to Retrench be Unilateral? 
As stated earlier, the Ministry of Labour in France is 
empowered to review and investigate the employer's reasons for the 
proposed retrenchment. In effect, the officials assess whether there 
is a need for a cut-back in staff; employers are not the sole judges 
of the need for retrenchment. 
On the other hand, West German employers retain more of 
their prerogative. The West German Public Employment Service may 
postpone retrenchments but it cannot prevent them taking place. This 
authority, however, is not the only body with a recognised role in 
redundancy procedures. 
West German employers are required to negotiate with the 
24 
works council over structural changes in the enterprise. Where the 
parties cannot reach agreement, either side may appeal for mediation 
by the president of the statewide labour office. If no action is taken or if 25 
mediation fails, the matter may be referred to the conciliation board. 
Here again, the board is cast as a mediator. It is not empowered to 
arbitrate; its sole function is to bring the parties together and 
promote discussion. 
If the matter in dispute between the parties is not the 
structural change itself but rather the arrangements to be made for 
employees affected by the change, the conciliation board can arbitrate. 
Thus, where the parties fail to agree upon the compensation to be paid 
to the employees facing retrenchment, the conciliation board may decide 
upon an appropriate 'social plan' for these workers. The board is, 
however, expressly directed to take into account the economic implica-
27 
tions of its decision on the enterprise. 
In sum, although West German employers retain the right to 
decide upon retrenchment, it is now a negotiable issue. It is not 
safely within the realm of managerial prerogatives. Nor is it a matter 
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for co-determination. Commenting on the role of German works councils 
in redundancy procedures, Mukherjee observes: 
What is already established is a clear right of those whose jobs 
are going to be at stake to join in consideration of ways and 
means of averting or reducing the upheaval of redundaacy,28 
In general, Australian tribunals regard the decision to 
retrench as a matter for management, a unilateral decision not open to 
review. Is this one managerial prerogative that needs to be modified? 
The French and German provisions suggest an affirmative 
answer. But some matters must remain within the realm of management. 
And a decision to cut-back staff is essentially a business decision. 
This is not to say that management's right to reduce its payroll should 
be absolute and unfettered. The impact of management's decision upon 
29 
its workers should clearly be a negotiable issue. This would enable 
the unions to bargain over severance pay, retraining and relocation 
schemes and allowances, internal transfers and attrition programmes. 
The union should also be entitled to challenge anomalies and inconsist-
encies in the list of employees selected for retrenchment, 
4. Assistance and Compensation Provided for Retrenched Workers 
The Australian Government recently declared its commitment 
to an active manpower policy,^^ In accordance with the recommendations 
31 
of the Cochrane Committee existing training schemes were rationalised 
and replaced by the National Employment and Training Scheme (N.E.A,T.). 
This scheme which came into operation on 1 October 1974 is financed 
out of general revenue,^^ 
The success of a training scheme may be judged by the quality 
of training or the success in placing its graduates. But perhaps the 
most important criterion is the ability of the scheme to attract 
applicants. 
356 
The Cochrane Committee pointed out that the 778 persons 
undertaking training in existing schemes at the end of 1973 was »an 
extremely low percentage compared with other developed industrial 
33 
nations'. With this in mind, the Committee put forward several 
proposals designed to improve training facilities and encourage workers 
to enter retraining,^^ In particular, it recommended that the average 
adult male award wage be adopted as the basic living allowance for 
full-time trainees.^^ In December 1973 this wage was $76.28 per week. 
In the Committee's view, retrainees under eighteen years of age should 
receive 50% of this figure, while retrainees over eighteen years but 
under twenty-one years with no dependants would be entitled to 75% of 
the basic living allowance.^^ The Committee proposed that further 
allowances be paid to trainees who were required to live away from 
their normal homes during training.^^ The new training scheme would 
also pay a trainee's tuition fees and provide a fixed annual allowance 
^ Q for books and equipment necessary for training. 
The Committee also recommended that employees displaced 
by structural changes induced by government policy measures should not 
forfeit his entitlement under the Australian Government's adjustment 
39 
assistance scheme. It proposed that these employees be allowed to 
retrain on the adjustment grant for six months after their retrenchment. 
Then they would be eligible for the more modest training allowance under 
N.E.A.T."^*^ 
The suggested full-time training allowance has one fundamental 
flaw: it is simply not sufficient to attract large numbers of retrenched 
41 
employees to retraining. Employees base their financial commitments 
on their wages. They might not be able to afford a drop of even $10 
per week in order to retrain. More likely, a redundant employee will 
take the first job offered to him so that he will have time to look 
around for a more suitable position. He may even take a second job 
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working nights as a barman, or week-ends as a pump-attendant in a 
garage. Any job will do as long as he does not suffer a loss of 
income. Income maintenance is the »name of the game*. 
Some overseas countries have realised that employees must 
be given an incentive to retrain. In France, for instance, persons 
over thirty can undertake retraining for a full year on an allowance 
equal to 1107o of the earnings in their previous jobs provided certain 
42 conditions are satisfied. 
Compared with the French provision, the training allowance 
43 proposed by the Cochrane Report is a miserly sum. The reasons for 
44 
the Committee's recommendation of a uniform allowance tied to the 
average adult male award wage are not material in the present analysis. 
The point is that the training allowance will not be enough to induce 
all, or even a majority, of the workers retrenched to enter full-time 
retraining. The importance of this limitation cannot be overstressed. 45 In Daniel's survey of workers displaced by the closure of 
the A.E.I. Woolwich factory in South East London, only 12% of the 
46 
respondents considered retraining under a government scheme. Of 
this group, 29% advised that they did not go ahead and apply for 47 
retraining because the training allowance offered was too frugal. 
This was by far the most common reason for rejecting the idea of 
retraining. To persons considering retraining, the level of training 
grant is of paramount importance. 
The unions are also unlikely to be enthusiastic about the 
level of training allowance. As one union official from a prominent 
white collar union put it: *We were adamant about this in our evidence 
to the Cochrane Committee. The training allowance must be related to 
the trainee's previous income. Many of our members are earning in 48 excess of $120 per week'. 
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But even if income maintenance were guaranteed, there 
will still be redundant workers who either do not know about the 
retraining scheme or who, for some reason, are reluctant to retrain. 
To quote Mr G.W. Ford, special adviser to the Australian Government 
on training schemes: 
Research has shown that even in small communities, and using 
radio, television, endless terminating announcements and all 
the rest of it, 50 per cent of the people in some places who 
were eligible for retraining did not know that there was any 
programme available for them.'^ '^  
The Cochrane Committee itself conceded that some potential trainees 
may be ignorant of training facilities or may lack the confidence and 
knowledge to seek training assistance.^^ 
Some workers will not even consider training as a possible 
strategy. Daniel's survey elicited several reasons for this attitude. 
If a worker feels he is too old for retraining or if he has already 
acquired a set of skills or a trade, he will often be unwilling to 
retrain. Again, a retrenched worker who has found, or is confident of 
finding, other employment will commonly dismiss the idea of retraining.^^ 
The N.E.A.T. scheme is still in its infancy and its teething 
problems are serious. As Mr Cameron, Minister for Labour and 
Immigration, adtiitted in November 1974: 'The pressures on the scheme 
at a time of high unemployment are i m m e n s e ' I n the same month, it 
was reported that some applicants for retraining would have to wait up 
to four-and-a-half months before being interviewed by N.E.A.T. 
officials.^^ Moreover, many waited in vain. At least 9,000 of the 
first 20,000 people to apply for retraining under the scheme were 
refused. One of Mr Cameron's advisers explained: 'The Government has 
to take a realistic look at the employment market and provide assistance 
to those who will be fairly sure of getting a job. Anything else would 
S4 
be a waste of time*.^ 
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Retraining, then, is not a panacea for retrenched workers.^^ 
It must be combined with other measures over a broad front to cushion 
the impact of redundancy. And employers must assume some responsibility 
in this area. 
5. The Role of the Employer 
When an employer decides to retrench staff he will usually 
face strong opposition from the union's involved. The unions' initial 
strategy is often to close their ranks and resist any reduction in the 
work force. But once it appears that a cut-back in staff is inevitable 
the parties settle down to hard-line bargaining over the assistance and 
compensation to be given to the retrenched workers. 
Some companies have already formulated detailed policies on 
redundancy and these may form the starting point in negotiations. But 
an abstract retrenchment policy may be changed significantly in response 
to union pressure and public opinion. The ultimate solution may be a 
56 
•package deal' involving a variety of measures. 
Not all negotiated agreements on redundancy are generous or 
even comprehensive. When Leyland (Australia) dismissed over 1,000 
employees at its Waterloo plant in late June 1974, it was reported 
that the retrenched workers received one week's pay in lieu of notice 
and pro-rata four weeks' annual leave. ^ ^ The company attributed the 
5 8 
retrenchments to the 'credit squeeze* and a shortage of components. 
Yet, less than a fortnight later, the Prim2 Minister, Mr Whitlam, 
denied that the government's economic policies were responsible for 
the Leyland cut-back. Mr Whitlam stated: 'It is not the government's 
fault if Leyland finds it more difficult to sell its products than 
other companies find to sell t h e i r s ' . I t would appear then, that 
the workers dismissed by Leyland would not be eligible for the 
Australian CTOvernment* s adjustment assistance. They would be forced 
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to fall back on their rather meagre severance pay until they found 
another job. And jobs were not easy to find in July 1974. 
6. The Role of Industrial Tribunals 
To this point, industrial tribunals have provided little 
guidance for unions and employers negotiating a redundancy agreement. 
Indeed, in some cases the tribunals have flatly refused to award 
severance pay to the retrenched workers.^^ When the tribunals do 
commit themselves on the level of severance pay, they are quick to 
stress that their findings should not be used as a precedent.^^ In 
1967 the then President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 
Sir Richard Kirby, claimed that the time had not come for federal 
industrial tribunals to devise a redundancy *code*. The rash of 
retrenchments particularly in 1974 suggests that this view must be 
revised. 
Not all employers will be generous or humane in their treatment 
of redundant employees. The industrial tribunals must be prepared to 
intervene if the unions are unable to negotiate a reasonable redundancy 
agreement with an employer who retrenches workers. The timorous 
approach evinced by some tribunals on the issue of redundancy can be 
traced to doubts about jurisdiction. Much of this doubt can be removed 
by a specific provision in the definition of 'industrial matters' 
confirming the tribunals* jurisdiction in these cases. 
But more than this, the tribunals must reassess their attitudes 
to managerial rights. Some tribunals have already accepted the need to 
restrict managerial prerogatives in redundancy situations. This 
approach must be extended. 
Once the basis of the tribunals* jurisdiction is established, 
they would have much more control over the dispute and could hammer 
out workable solutions to some of the problems faced by retrenched 
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workers. There are now a number of guidelines for the calculation 
of severance pay. It remains for the tribunals to broaden their 
approach to the problem so that other strategies for displaced 
employees are not neglected. 
Yet, even if industrial tribunals assume an active role in 
handling redundancy disputes, there will still be workers retrenched 
with no severance pay or any other assistance. Employees whose 
contracts of employment are not regulated by the arbitration systems 
would be left without any protection against redundancy. For these 
employees, a solution must be sought in legislation, and one pattern of 
legislative action is the British Redundancy Payments scheme, 
7. British Redundancy Payments Scheme 
(i) Mechanics 
With the Redundancy Payments Act 1965,^^ Britain forged a 
distinctive model. Basically, the scheme is designed to provide 
compensation for certain employees dismissed by reason of redundancy. 
This compensation is paid from a fund established by the Act and 
financed by employer contributions. The levy upon employer's is 
collected by the Department of Health and Social Security along with 
National Insurance contributions. Employers pay a fixed sum for each 
employee working a minimum of twenty-one hours per week. 
When the employer declares a redundancy he must pay the 
retrenched workers the amount of compensation prescribed by the Act. 
He is then entitled to a rebate from the Redundancy Fund.^^ If the 
employer is insolvent, the fund pays the compensation direct to the 
workers dismissed. 
(ii) Dismissal 
Under the Act, a redundant employee becomes entitled to 
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6 7 severance pay upon dismissal. Dismissal involves the unilateral 
6 8 
act of an employer. If the employee agrees to a variation in the 
terms of his contract of employment which would, if imposed upon him, 
amount to a redundancy, and later resigns because he is disillusioned 
with the new arrangement, he has not been dismissed. Thus, he forfeits 
his 'right* to a redundancy payment, 
Again, an employee who is allowed to resign after his 
employer has issued an advance warning of an impending redundancy is 
not entitled to statutory compensation, for an advance warning does not 70 constitute a notice of dismissal. The Code of Industrial Relations 
Practice recommends that employees be given as much warning as 
71 
practicable. Yet, an enlightened management following this 
advice could defeat the entitlement of employees who took advantage 
of the early warning to secure other employment. 
An employee under notice of dismissal may give a counter-72 notice to his employee without sacrificing his redundancy payment. 
Yet, here again, as in the British uafair dismissal provisions, there 
73 are two potential pitfalls in the procedure to be followed. Not 
surprisingly, employees have already run foul of these intricate 
^ 74 requirements. 
Another trap for the unwary exists in the provisions dealing 
75 
with 'constructive dismissal*. An employee is deemed to be dismissed 
if, because of his employer's conduct, he justifiably terminated his 
employment without notice. Thus, an employee who is courteous enough 
to give his employer notice in these circumstances forfeits his 
entitlement.^^ 
(iii) Redundancy 
It is incumbent upon the employee to establish that he was 
dismissed.^^ The onus then shifts to the employer to show that the 
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78 dismissal was not caused by redundancy. 
In discharging his onus, the employer faces a statutory 
presumption that a dismissal is by reason of redundancy unless the 
79 contrary is proved. But an employer'^s evidence that he dismissed 
an employee for miscondiict will rebut this presumption even if there 
80 
is objective evidence that a redundancy has occurred. Thus, while 
the tribunal must examine the facts objectively to determine the real 
cause of the dismissal, the employer's evidence of the reason for the 
discharge will carry great weight. 
(iv) Compensation 
Only employees who have been continuously employed for at 
least 104 weeks with one employer are entitled to a redundancy payment 
81 if they are dismissed by reason of redundancy. The amount of 
compensation depends upon the length of an employee's continuous service 
82 
for one employer, the employee's age and his weekly wages. Certain 
83 
interruptions do not break an employee's continuous service. 
Workers aged between eighteen and twenty-one are compensated 
at the rate of one-half of a week's pay per year of continuous service. 
Workers in the twenty-two to forty age bracket are credited with one 
week's pay per year of continuous service, while workers between forty-
one and sixty-four years of age receive one-and-a-half week's pay per 
84 
year of service if they are retrenched. Men over sixty-four and 
women over fifty-nine suffer an erosion of potential benefits at the 
rate of one-twelfth per month.^^ Thus a male employee, six months before 
his sixty-fifth birthday would be entitled to only half the benefit he r would have received had he been dismissed at age sixty-four. 
(v) Contracting out 
87 With the exception of certain types of fixed term contracts, 
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individaal employees are not permitted to contract out of their 
88 
entitlement under the Act. On the other hand, collective agreements 
providing for voluntary severance pay in lieu of the statutory benefits 
may be approved oy order of the Minister upon the joint application 
89 
of the parties. There is no express provision requiring the 
Minister to withhold the exemption unless the benefits under the 
agreement are as generous or more generous than those available under 
the statutory scheme. On the other hand, he will not approve a private 
scheme unless the collective agreement gives the industrial tribunals 
90 jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the agreement. 
(vi) General assessment 
As a measure to improve job security the Redundancy Payments 
Act 1965 scores very lowly. This is not surprising. One of its 
principal objectives was to reduce resistance to changes in workforce 
91 
so that management would be able to make more effective use of itsmanpower; 
< 
The Act rests on an underlying philosophy that labour mobility is good 
92 
for the economy. Accordingly, it does nothing to secure a worker's 
93 
hold on his job. On the contrary, it encourages workers to surrender 
94 
their security of tenure for cash compensation. 
Nor does the Act do much to assist a retrenched worker obtain 
another job at a suitable level. The statutory compensation was 
intended to encourage retrenched workers to be more relaxed and selective 
95 96 
in their search for another position. But Daniel found that the 
lump sum payments are commonly set aside as savings while employees 
often take the first job they can find. Further, lump sum payments are 
not regarded as income because employees find it difficult to relate 
them to their weekly pay. In Daniel's survey, 28% of the workers who 
were still out of work over six months after their retrenchment had not 
97 
drawn on their lump sum for living expenses. 
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It is possible to argue that British employees have not lost 
job security through the statutory scheme. Rather they have sold it 
for adequate co.npensation. This argument implies that a worker makes 
a rational decision to exchange his job for a lump sum representing the 
capitalised value of his position. In fact, the worker plays no role 
in the decision to cut back the workforce. Nor does he have any choice 
if his employer selects him for redundancy. 
Moreover, the cash compensation payable under the statutory 
scheme is based upon two criteria: length of continuous service and 
age. Do these criteria accurately reflect the costs of redundancy? It 
appears that there is a direct relationship between age and period of 
98 unemployment after redundancy but long service with another employer 
99 
may, in fact, be an advantage for a job-seeker. 
In addition, the statutory formula mikes no allowance for 
the employee's loss of a sense of security in his job or promotion 
prospects, for a decline in intrinsic interest in the new job, for the 
forfeiture of pensions and fringe benefits or for the period of unemploy-
ment. It ignores all these factors which are part of the real costs of 
redundancy. A firm majority (59%) of the respondents in Daniel's 
survey stated that they would prefer their old jobs to their current 
occupation even allowing for the redundancy payment they received.^ 
This suggests that the statutory severance pay is far from adequate 
compensation for a compulsory transition from one job to another. The 
lump sum benefits are merely statutory minima. To regard them as even 
a rough estimate of the retrenched worker's loss is to mistake rhetoric 
for fact. 
Not only is the statutory compensation inadequate, it is 
simply not available for the great majority of workers retrenched in 
Britain. It was estimated that in 1971 only oas-third of those dismissed 2 by reason of redjndancy received statutory payments. On this estimate, 
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nearly three-quarters of a million retrenched workers failed to 
3 
qualify for compensation. This is a staggering figure aad a grim 
reminder of the limited coverage of the Act. 
Why are so many employees outside the statutory scheme? The 
ansv^ er probably lies in section H of the Act. Only workers retrenched 
after two years* continuous service with one employer are entitled to 
a redundancy payment. The majority of workers declared redundant have 
not apparently served that qualifying period. Employers probably 
select these short-term employees to avoid incurring the expense of 
a redundancy payment. 
This is a recurrent worry for a retrenched worker. The sense 
of insecurity he feels after his first dismissal is aggravated by the 
knowledge that his new position is even more vulnerable. As more and 
more persons are made redundant, fewer people will have sufficient 
service to qualify for a redundancy payment. Tlie problem is 'snow-
balling* . 
Thus even if the drafting flaws in the Redundancy Payments 
Act were avoided, its shortcomings would not disappear. It does not 
enhance job security. Nor does it adequately compensate for a 
redundancy. If it can be regarded as a statutory minima for retrenched 
workers som3 of its defects can be excused. But there remains the 
problem of extending the coverage of the Act. This could be done by 
shortening the period of continuous service required before a displaced 
worker qualifies for a redundancy payment. Only with substantial 
modifications could the British Redundancy Payments scheme be a model 
for local legislation to protect those employees who are not safeguarded 
by the arbitration system. This legislation would provide a statutory 
•floor* on which negotiated agreements and arbitrated awards could build, 
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8, Conclusion 
Severance pay is not a magic formula for solving the 
problems of redundancy. But together with other measures it can do much 
to cushion the blow of retrenchment especially if the compensation 
accurately reflects the worker's loss. It should be designed to 
tide the employee over until he is able to obtain other suitable 
4 
employment. Periodic instalments are, therefore, preferable to 
lump sum payments. The significance of this form of compensation 
should not be underestimated: for many employees unemploymsnt 
benefits are simply inadequate and retraining is neither feasible nor 
attractive. 
SECTION 3; EMPLOYEES* INTERESTS IN PARTICIPATION, ADVANCEMENT 
AND REASONABLE SUPERVISION 
CHAPTER 20 EMPLOYEES* INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION 
1. Participation in the Decision-Making Process: Introduction 
Responsibility and participation go hand-in-hand. To increase 
workers* responsibility over their work inevitably involves some 
extension of their participation in the decision-making process which 
affects that work. There are several ways of achieving this form of 
participation. Only one, the West German scheme of Mitbestimmung^ 
('co-determination*need concern us here. 
This section focuses on the West German model for a number 
of reasons. First, Germany has perhaps the longest history of formal 
2 
worker participation of any of the major industrialised countries. 
Second, advocates of co-determination see it as a major factor contrib-
uting to the 'economic miracle* of German post-war reconstruction. 
Third, the West German scheme has had a pervasive influence on the 
labour law of many Western European countries^ and the Draft Statute 
for the European Stock Corporation relies heavily on the West German 
cadre.^ Fourth, like Australia, Germany has a tradition of resolving 
its industrial relations problems through machinery established by 
legislation.^ Finally, the West German scheme of co-determination has 
attracted more comment and controversy than worker participation schemes 
6 in other countries. 
This section then, will concentrate upon the law and 
practice, the merits and demerits of co-determination. It will also 
be instructive to consider whether the West German model would be viable 
in the present climate of Australian industrial relations. 
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(i) Meaning of the terms *Full* and *Partial* Co-determination 
The terms 'full* and 'partial* co-determination can be 
explained by reference to the two-tier structure of the German board. 
Each firm^ has two boards: a supervisory hoard (Aufsichtsrat) and a 
managing board (Vorstand). 
The supervisory board may elect and remove the members of 
the managing board and may nominate the chairman of the managing board.^ 
Its primary function, as its name implies, is to supervise the executive 
9 
board. It is entitled to regular business reports from the managing 
board and may demand additional information, for example, on resolutions 
at the shareholders* m e e t i n g s . T h e executive board is also obliged 
to submit the corporation's annual financial statements, the report of 
management, and the auditor's examination report to the supervisory 
11 board. 
Despite these broad powers, the supervisory board may not 
itself manage.^^ This is the exclusive province of the executive board. 
Thus, the typical executive functions carried out by an Australian board 
of directors would in West Germany be undertaken by the managing board, 
not the supervisory board. 
13 Ca) Full Co-determination 
In the full co-determination model established by the Co-
14 
determination Law of 1951 there are normally eleven members of the 
supervisory board, with an equal number of employee and shareholder 
representatives,^^ The managing board has only three members, one o1 
whom is a labour director approved by a majority of the employee 
representatives on the supervisory board.^^ Labour directors usually 
have a background in works council, political or trade union affairso 
A commercial manager and a production manager usually make up the 
complement. 
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17 Each member of the executive board has equal status. The 
labour director is expected to participate objectively in the formulation 
and administration of general executive policy. While he is not intended 
to concentrate exclusively upon personnel matters, he would be unwise 
to neglect them: his authority is undoubtedly enhanced if he has the 
backing of the works council and the labour members of the supervisory 
board. 
To sum up, there are two distinctive features of full co-
determination: parity of representation on the supervisory board and 
a labour directorship on the executive board. At present, full co-
determination exists only in the coal, iron and steel industries (about 
18 7% of industry as a whole), and there only in enterprises employing at 
19 least 1,000 employees. 
20 
(b) Partial Co-determination 
The partial co-determination introduced by the Works Consti-
tution Act of 1952 gave employees one-third representation on the 
supervisory board. The maximum number of members on the supervisory 
board varies with the amount of the firm's basic capital. The absolute 21 maximum is twenty-one, the minimum three. The employee representatives 
22 
are elected by all the employees in the enterprise in a secret ballot. 
At least two of these delegates should be employed in the firm. 
Additional candidates may be recruited from the appropriate union. 
The Works Constitution Act of 1952 also provided for works 
councils in each plant above a certain size. Councillors are selected 
in triennial elections by a secret ballot of all the workers in the 
undertaking. The 1952 Act gave works councils the right to be 
consulted about a wide range of personnel and economic matters, and on 2 3 
some measures the council had the power to veto managerial decisions. 
On the recommendation of the Biedenkopf Report, the co-determination 
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24 rights of works councils were extended in 1972. 
The West German scheme is an interesting model for involving 
employees in a company*s decision-making process. There is, however, 
considerable doubt about the effects of co-determination upon the 
participants and the economy generally. 
(ii) Effects of Co-determination 
One must be cautious in sifting through commentators* 
accounts of co-determination. In the first place, it seems that some 
25 
observers have approached their studies with pre-conceived notions. 
Secondly, and more importantly, second-hand accounts inevitably involve 
a certain degree of distortion: a commentator must, in many cases, 
rely on what the participants say they are doing rather than what they 2 6 
are, in fact, doing. For the student with no grasp of the German 
language, the dangers are heightened. To avoid these pitfalls the 
following account takes a conservative view of the benefits attributed 
to co-determination. 
(a) Impact on Management 
The consensus of opinion appears to be that management has 
27 learned to live with co-determination. The expected deadlocks within 
28 the supervisory council have not eventuated. Indeed, most decisions 
29 
of the supervisory board are unanimous. 
In partial co-determination, employee representatives are in 
a minority on the supervisory board. While they may influence the 
board«s decisions, the overriding power rests with the shareholder 
representatives. To quote one worker representative on the supervisory 
board of Ford-Werke in Cologne on his experience with issue of investment 
policy: *I don't get anywhere. I'm in the minority. We state our 
point of view, but we always lose the vote'.^^ 
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Nor has co-determination unduly hampered the executive board.^^ 
On the other hand, it seems that the 'style' of management has changed, 
particularly in the full co-determination sector. Gone is the 
autocratic, almost para-military style of entrepreneurial leadership 
which typified much of German industry before and during World War II. 
32 
Hartmann sees this as a clear achievement of co-determination. But in 
view of the recriminatory mood of workers and the occupation authorities 
after the war, some modification in management's attitudes was politic 
and, indeed, unavoidable. 
German management's ability to survive under co-determination 33 
can be partly attributed to the devices it has used to cushion the 
impact of the scheme. It is too early to predict whether the Works 
Council Act 1972 will improve this position but an employer is now 
obliged to negotiate with the works council on a wider range of issues 
and disclosure requirements have been strengthened. It would seem 
that the works council, at least, can no longer be ignored or side-
stepped. 
The attitude of German management is perhaps best 
illustrated by their reaction to plans to extend full co-determination 
beyond the coal and iron and steel industries. While tolerating the 
present system of co-determination, management is bitterly opposed 34 to its extension. As one German manager complained: 
You can no more have democracy in industry than in the army ... 
The workers get a fixed wage whether or not the firm is doing 
well. What right therefore have they to a say in the running 
of it?35 
The effect of co-determination upon lower levels of management 
is difficult to estimate. Some thought it would undermine the position 
of the foreman. An early account^^ found no evidence to support this 
prediction. On the contrary, it claimed that under co-determination 
a foreman's job was more attractive because he was less concerned with 
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discipline and detailed instruction. Foremen reported that co-
determination gave employees a feeling of responsibility which made 
37 them more reliable and attentive. 
On the other hand, lower and middle management tends to be 
3 8 neglected by the co-determination scheme. The German Works Council 
39 Act 1972 will not changi^ this. 
(b) Impact on the Unions 
The unions have gained a great deal through co-determination, 
40 
It grants them formal recognition within plants; it gives them a 
major role in selecting the labour director and the worker represent 
atives on the supervisory board; it provides a rallying point for the 
factions in the labour movement; and it gives their officials experience 
and confidence through participation in management. 
Since unions share responsibility in co-determination, they 41 
are not as free to make extortionate demands. But there is little 
evidence to suggest that the rank and file wish their unions to become 
more militant. 
The works council with its independent legal status and 
extensive co-determination powers has, of course, etched into the 42 traditional role of the unions. On the other hand, many works 
43 
councillors have union backgrounds, and section 74 (3) of the German 
Works Council Act 1972 teclares that councillors are not prevented from 
promoting the activities of their union within the establishment. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the councillors are becoming increasingly 44 
independent of the unions. 
On some fronts, it seems that union status under co-
determination has been enhanced rather than reduced. German unions 45 
recently lobbied for an extension of full co-determination. This 
is not really surprising for in the German scheme unions enjoy a *lop-
sided* influence. 
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(c) Impact on the Ordinary Workers 
At the close of the w a r , German workers were demoralised and, 
in many cases, destitute. Co-determination helped the rank and file 
back on its f e e t . This is an historical f a c t . Whether German workers 
could have gained similar benefits under an alternative system of 
47 
industrial relations is a contentious matter. The important point 
for the present is that German workers have improved their economic 
48 
and strategic positions under co-determination. In Vagt's conservative 
estimate: 
full co-determination has somewhat spurred the rise of wages 
in the coal and steel industries, in comparison both with other 
German industries and with the coal and steel industries in the 
rest of Europe. 
Clegg and Spiro, on the other h a n d , regard the evidence attributing 
increased wages to co-determination as inconclusive.^^ Spiro points 
out that coal and steel workers have always been the best-paid 
industrial workers in Germany.^^ And Germany's labour shortage and 
economic boom could well account for the higher wages obtained since 
co-determination was introduced. Thus, the evidence as to co-
determination's effect on wages is equivocal. 
Workers* fringe benefits have improved under co-determination 
but this might also have been caused by other factors. It could, for 
instance, reflect the attitudes of different managements or simply 
52 
the different economic capacities in certain industries. In any 
event, Clegg observes that the improvement in welfare services 'has 
not clearly outpaced other industries in similar economic circum-
stances'.^^ On the other h a n d , Vagts concludes that the labour 
representatives have secured more fringe benefits for workers through 
• 54 
co-de termination. 
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The effect of co-determination in this area is difficult to 
discern. German management, particularly in industries covered by 
full co-determination, have a tradition of paternalism.^^ And German 
workers generally expect a degree of paternalism from their 
employers.^^ In addition, management is obliged to offer better fringe 
benefits to retain a work force in what has been a labour-starved 
economy. On balance, it appears that co-determination has had no 
significant effect upon fringe benefits. 
While co-determination has not guaranteed job security for 
workers the scheme has enabled management and labour representatives 
59 to cushion the impact of plant shut-downs and retrenchment. 
Labour representatives have successfully negotiated retraining and 
58 
relocation schemes for retrenched workers. The Works Council Act 
1972 gives the works council much greater control over hiring and 
firing and this will provide increased job security for workers. 
There is little evidence that co-determination enhances 59 
employees* participation in the enterprise. But the Works Council 
Act 1972 will improve this position. The Act gives the ordinary 
worker the right to periodic reports from his employer and the works 
council.^^ He is encouraged to take the initiative in certain 
matters which directly affect his position and status within the 
firm.^^ The new Act also tightens the provisions dealing with works 
council elections and provides for minority representation on the 
council.^^ More importantly, a certain number of works councillors 
must be freed from work.^"^ And council meetings may now be convened 
during working hours.^^ These innovations cannot fail to increase 
the extent of rank and file participation at plant level. 
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(d) Impact on Shareholders 
While the ordinary employee's involvement in co-determination 
atrophied prior to the 1972 Act, shareholders have retained considerable 
control over their enterprises through the general meeting^^ and their 
representatives on the supervisory board. Hartmann reports that 
property rights have become less significant, particularly in coal and 
6 7 
steel industries, but there is no evidence that shareholders' interests 
are ignored. 
After an investigation in 1955, a committee of the Deutscher 
Juristentag reported that the investing public 'appears to see' nothing 
in co-determination which diminishes the value of shares.^^ This is 
now rather dated, and it may not be a reliable guide to the effect of 69 
co-determination on share prices. Moreover, there is some evidence 
that employee representatives adopt an unorthodox approach to investment 
p o l i c y . T h i s policy could well prove detrimental to shareholder 
interests. Opponents of the proposed extension of full co-determination 71 have been quick to point this out. 
On balance, it appears shareholders have not been oppressed 
by co-determination but, of the participants, they have gained least 
of all. 
(e) Effect of Co-determination upon the West German Economy 
The macro-economic effects of co-determination are perhaps 
72 
the least significant. Co-determination has not prevented West 
Germany from enjoying a post-war economic boom. Indeed, it may have 
made a substantial contribution to Germany's miraculous development by 73 institutionalising industrial discontent and curbing strikes. West 
74 
Germany's export trade is highly competitive in the world market and 
the envy of its neighbours. ITiere appears to be no difficulty in 
attracting foreign investment in West Germany, or in the full co-
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75 determination sector of the Ruhr. Nor has co-determination clearly 
7 6 disturbed the balance of domestic competition. It may have 
contributed slightly to wage-push inflation because of the parochial 
77 
way in which it operates but there are other features of the West 
German economy, such as the acute labour shortage, which could be 
blamed for this development. In any event, reduced industrial strife 78 
has, to some extent, compensated for the slight wage increases. 
There is little evidence to suggest that co-determination 
has improved the productivity or efficiency of workers.^^ On the 
other hand, even Clegg*s sceptical account of co-determination concedes; , 80 it cannot be shown that co-determination has done any harm'. 
(f) Conclusion 
The origins of co-determination are rooted in German history 
81 and tradition. The mechanics of the scheme are relatively complex 
but the real controversy surrounds its effects. On the whole, the 
results of co-determination, in the favourable post-war economic 
82 
climate, are a little disappointing. Perhaps its major achievements 
are the provision of effective channels of communication and its 
beneficial effect upon industrial relations. Entrepreneurial leader-
ship appears to be more legitimate and better-informed. Co-
determination has increased the number of participants in the decision-
making process and enhanced the status of the worker participants. 
Above all, co-determination has survived. And it has survived for 
twenty years in some German industries. Moreover, the Bonn Government 
plans to extend the scheme, not abandon it. Hiese facts alone justify 
an examination of the lessons of the West German experience with the 
mod el. 
378 
(iii) Lessons from the German Model 
(a) Participation at Plant and Company Level 
The first and most important lesson from the co-determination 
model is that worker participation in decision-making is most effective 
if it is introduced at a level close to the employees' working 
environment. At this level employees are more inclined and better 
83 able to participate in the decision-making process. 
Some commentators have argued that ordinary employees will 
not gain a sense of participation, responsibility and self-fulfilment 
84 
through representation of works councillors. True, works councillors 
and labour representatives in general stand to gain more satisfaction 
and esteem from the scheme than the rank and file. But though 85 representation is by the few, it can work for the many. 
(b) Works Council Must Have Decision-Making Power 
An effective scheme of co-determination has a local base, 
preferably at shop or plant level. Low-level participation will not, 
however, guarantee success unless the local body has some decision-
making authority. After reviewing the failures of the works councils 
established under the Works Constitution Act 1952, the Biedenkopf 
Commission recommended a substantial increase in the co-determination 
8 6 rights of works councils. Accordingly, the Works Council Act of 
8 7 1972 gave the councils extended authority over a wide range of issues. 
88 
(c) A Role for Lower and Middle Management? 
An ideal co-determination scheme would provide a framework 
within which this group could ventilate grievances and influence 
management decisions. Indeed, a viable system of worker participation 
in management would provide representation for all levels of employees 
in the enterprise. 
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(d) Is Parity of Representation Essential? 
At the top of this pyramidal structure, labour representatives 
may encounter difficulties. The West German experience with partial 
co-determination shows that the workers* representatives suffer from 
their minority position. They are out-numbered, out-manoeuvred, out-
voted and, in some cases, over-awed. 
The Bonn Government has announced plans to extend parity of 
representation on supervisory councils to firms having at least 2,000 
89 employees on the payroll. It hopes to introduce this innovation 
90 through legislation to take effect from 1 January 1975. 
Parity of representation will not solve all the problems 
91 
of worker representatives on the supervisory board. What is needed 
is a prohibition of collusive practices. The management board and the 
shareholder members of the supervisory board should be enjoined from 
using tactics such as caucus meetings and sub-committees designed to 
by-pass the labour representatives and starve them of information, 
(e) The Labour Representatives* Divided Loyalties 
The labour director on the executive board has an unenviable 
position. To the foreign observer, the labour director in full co-
determination seems to face an insurmountable problem of conflict of 
interests. To whom does he owe responsibility? How can he reconcile 
his executive duties on the management board with the interests of his 
constituents? 
German law has taken a firm stand on this issue. Labour 
members of the supervisory board are required to exercise their functio ? 
•solely for the good of the corporation and its employees while taking 
92 
account of the common welfare'. This principle is equally relevant 
to the position of the labour director on the executive board. 
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Labour directors have somehow managed to juggle the competing 
interests. Indeed, many commentators assert that they have done this 
93 
with reasonable success. But even if labour directors have resolved 
the problems of their position, there are dangers in expecting a labour 
director to 'walk a tightrope* in his day-to-day activities. If he 
loses his balance he may be accused of violating his duty to act in 
the interests of the company as a whole. Alternatively, he may be 94 branded a quisling by his constituents. There is, however, some 
evidence that the rank and file appreciate the labour director*s 
95 
difficult position. 
The fact remains that the labour manager works under great 
pressure. In Hartmann's view this is a 'built in weakness of 
codetermination*.^^ A labour director's reaction to the demands of 
his position may be counter-productive. On the one hand, he may take 
what appears to be the line of least resistance and become a docile 
partner in management. If he is completely imbued with the management 
philosophy his judgment may become clouded. He may lose the object-
ivity required of a good labour representative. Fortunately, there is 97 
little evidence that this has happened in the German scheme. On 
the other hand, fear of union or rank and file recriminations may 
force a labour director into an adversary role disrupting the smooth 
functioning of the board. 
The labour director's task would be easier if the law were 
98 
to reflect the complex nature of his duties. A director's duty 
formula based upon a 'balance of interests' concept might well provide 
the solution. By expanding the breadth of his duties, the law would 
minimise the conflict between his duty and his interests.^ 
It might be thought that the institution of labour director 
raises more problems than it solves. It could, however, be a useful 
limb in the company's structure if only for its symbolic influence.^ 
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Through the labour director the employees gain representation at 
the level which makes decisions - decisions which may ultimately 
affect their working lives. 
(f) The Flow of Information to Rank and File 
The final lesson to be learned from the German experience 
is that there must be a continuous flow of information from one level 
of employee representation to another, and more importantly, from all 
levels to the ordinary workers. 
Strauss and Rosenstein'^ point out that members of the 
supervisory board are prohibited by German law from disseminating 
business secrets revealed to them at meetings of the supervisory 
council,^ This may well prevent information on certain economic and 
production matters sifting down to the rank and file. 
The labour director in the full co-determination sector 
could easily become remote from the rank and file workers. For this 
reason, it is vital for him to maintain a close contact with the ordinary 
workers and the other organs of employee representation within the 
enterprise. What little evidence there is suggests that labour 
directors have not become isolated from the ordinary workers.^ But 
communication with the supervisory board members, the works council 
and the ordinary workers is too important to be left to the disposition 
of the individual labour director. Regular contact with these groups 
should be required by statute. The Works Council Act 1972 acknowledged 
this fact and strengthened the disclosure requirements.^ 
Works councillors are, however, subject to some restrictions 
in their use of the information they receive from the employer. They 
are prohibited from divulging or utilising technological or business 
g 
information which the employer has classified as secret. The 
_ 9 obligation applies even after they leave the council. 
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Under the Works Council Act 1972 the employees themselves 
are entitled to certain information from their employer.^^ Ihis 
information may give the ordinary employee a greater appetite for 
participation in company affairs. If employees do become interested 
in the management of the company, the restrictions placed upon the 
disclosure of 'confidential information* to ordinary workers are likely 
to stifle their interest. It seems then, that an effective system of 
co-determination requires a clear definition of what matters may and 
may not be disclosed to employees.^^ 
The lessons of co-determination show that it is far from an 
ideal model. But that does not rjan that the German experience should 
be dismissed out of hand. With certain modifications, the German scheme 
could provide an effective means of employee participation in company 
decision-making. It remains to consider the obstacles that would be 
encountered if it were attempted to transplant a modified form of 
co-determination into Australian law. 
(iv) Local Obstacles 
(a) Management's Opposition 
Management's opposition to the West German model of worker 
participation in management could be based upon a number of grounds. 
Firstly, Australian management views worker participation 
in management as an encroachment upon their jealously-guarded 
prerogatives.^^ This intrusion upon management's 'right to manage' 
will be strongly resisted. Worker control or even participation beyond 
a mild form of joint consultation was anathema to all the executives 
interviewed by the writer,^^ One personnel officer stated: 'worker 
participation is simply a catch-phrase, like job enrichment. It is 
nothing more than a topical i s s u e . A managing director commented 
in a similar vein: 'Phrases such as "Worker Participation" and "Worker 
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Control" are in common use today. The customary way in which to take 
control of a company is to buy it (they all have their price - that's 
business!). 
On the other hand, Mr Max Dillon, deputy managing director of 
Metal Manufactures Ltd and a former chairman of the National Employers 
Policy Committee, recently came out in support of worker participation 
in the decision-making process in areas which affect individuals in 
their work environment - job restructuring, personnel re-organization, 
16 safety measures, training programmes and technological changes. 
Moreover, pressure for increased worker participation is increasing 
17 rather than diminishing. 
18 Taken as a whole, Australian management is conservative. 
It does not welcome changes which restrict its freedom or affect its 
19 
delicate balance of power with the unions. Yet a recent international 
survey of worker participation suggests that it does not erode the 20 
influence of managers; indeed, it may even enhance their position. 
Management might complain that worker participation would 
retard the decision-making process when, in some cases, there is an 
urgent need for streamlined discussion and prompt action. But what 
management loses in speed it may make up in legitimacy and improved 
industrial relations. A management fully-informed of the likely 
reaction of workers to its policies will be in a better position to 
make a constructive appraisal before reaching a decision. Further, 
management is less likely to encounter administrative snags if the 
implications of a policy have been fully considered. 
Similarly, management may argue that worker participation 
cannot remove the conflict between groups within the enterprise; it 
merely institutionalises the conflict. Indeed, it allows the conflict 
PI 
to erupt in the vital organs of the company. But surely it is better 
to allow the various interested groups to press their views before a 
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decision is made. Where problems are anticipated, solutions can be planed 
in advance and the issue can be considered dispassionately. If 
management simply confronts its workers with an unfavourable decision 
as a fait acconyli, the parties are likely to take up polarised 
positions. In these circumstances, it is difficult to reach a balanced 
solution. 
Further, if formal procedures for employee participation are 
established, acute conflicts can be discovered in time and resolved 
before a deadlock develops. Australian management would do well to 
note that German management is not hamstrung by co-determination. 
Australian management is reluctant to disclose confidential 
information to labour representatives lest this information be 'leaked* 
22 to competitors. Their fears should be allayed by the German 
experience. There is no evidence that labour representatives in the 
23 
German model have breached the confidence of management. 
Management also points out that employees lack the expertise 
to play a role in the decision-making process, particularly on technical 24 
and financial issues. To quote one executive of a large manufacturing 
company: *It amazes me how anyone can believe a company of this size 
can be managed by a committee of employees. They would simply not 25 
understand what is involved.* Yet, this is more an argument in 
favour of adequate training for employees* representatives than a 
reason for rejecting participation under any circumstances. 
Moreover, specialist training and instruction of employees* 2 6 representatives has already begun on a modest scale. The Federal 
Government plans to launch a national training school for trade 
unionists in 1975. The programme will cost an estimated $3 million a 
27 year. As Mr P. Matthews, Education Officer with the A.C.T.U. and 
National Director of the proposed national training school, puts it: 
28 •Management has schools like this - why can*t we?'. 
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Management could also quite rightly claim that, at present, 
they are legally responsible to shareholders for their decisions. If 
employee representatives were allowed to participate in decisions, 
management might be liable for the representatives' errors of judgment. 
This argument can be countered by broadening the ordinary director's 
duty and clarifying the labour representative's role. 
(b) Union Opposition 
Like management, unions may fear that their traditional role 
29 
is challenged by worker participation. The statutory bodies created 
by a co-determination scheme may be viewed as rivals competing for the 
support and loyalty of the rank and file. Unions' status and prestige 
may suffer if workers align themselves with works councils. Further, 
participation short of control may be regarded as 'tokenism' or a 
•confidence trick'. The official policy of the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers' Union reflects this attitude. 
At all times it is absolutely essential for the workers and 
their Unions to remain independent of all forms of accommodation 
within capitalist society which is based on private ownership 
and exploitation so as to always be in a position of most 
effectively taking action for both workers' day to day interests 
and the objective of social ownership. 
The Vehicle B u i l d e r s * Employees'Federation, on the other hand, 
31 
is a strong advocate of worker participation even at board level. 
Would co-determination really be a threat to Australian 
unions? The Australian trade union movement enjoys an entrenched 
position in our industrial relations system. It is unlikely that its 
influence would be significantly reduced by worker participation in 
management. 
Moreover, employees' interests can be roughly divided into 
two categories: on the one hand, there are those interests which have 
been traditionally protected by the unions; on the other, there are 
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the interests in achievement, recognition, responsibility and 
participation. Unions could, of course, foster and protect this latter 
group of interests but is this necessarily the best way of approaching 
the issue? 
Clegg believes that trade unions should be the sole channel 
32 of employees* involvement in the company. Blumberg challenges this 
view on the ground that workers need more than one set of representatives 
33 
to protect and advance their various interests. Just as there is a 
plurality of interests, then so too there should be a plurality of 
means to represent those interests. 
Once it is recognised that employees have a wide range of 
interests which deserve protection, and that co-determination can be 
reserved for those interests falling outside the traditional role of 
the unions, then union opposition should diminish. 
The two systems of representation are complementary, not in 
34 competition. This does not mean that unions should be excluded from 
a system of worker participation in management. On the contrary, the 
expertise and support of the unions will be crucial to the success of 
35 the scheme. 
Even Clegg concedes that strong and independent-minded unions 
can weather the storm of managerial responsibility.^^ Many Australian 
unions are powerful and self-reliant but there are a multitude of 
small, weak unions in Australia. Would these weaker unions lose their 
independence through involvement in worker participation? Blumberg 
argues that any union can survive involvement provided it carefully 
37 
distinguishes its union functions from its managerial functions. If 
the union and other labour representatives in a worker participation 
scheme are kept aware of the opinions of the rank and file before 
participating in decisions, then they will not find it necessary to 
abdicate responsibility for decisions. Even now a union which does 
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not understand the mood of its rank and file cannot escape responsibility 
3 8 for certain decisions. Participation in decision-making has not 
compromised the position of German unions nor has it alienated them 
39 
from the rank and file. Australian unions* doubts and fears are 
understandable but they may be partly attributable to ignorance of the 
mechanics of co-determination. 
If worker participation is to work in Australia, there must, 
of course, be a sufficient number of people who can fulfil the extremely 
complex role of labour representatives. This is likely to be the major 40 
obstacle facing a co-determination scheme. Union personnel are 
already hard-pressed to keep up with their normal duties. For many 
small unions which are poorly-organised at plant level, the problem is 
compounded. 
In general, the Australian trade unions have discouraged the 
growth of the shop steward movement. Where shop stewards are recognised, 41 
their functions are extremely limited. This movement could not, therefore, 
be treated as a reservoir of talent on which a co-determination scheme 
could draw. 
Rather, the answer lies in a massive education and training 
programme for labour representatives and potential delegates. As 
mentioned earlier, this campaign has already begun. It would 
be quite simple to include in the basic training programme 
instruction courses on worker participation in management. Employees 
could be given paid educational leave to attend these courses. This 
42 is required by statute in West Germany. 
(c ) Lack of Co-operation 
One of the main factors contributing to the success of co-
determination in West Germany has been the union's respect for the 
43 44 law - law which embodies a principle of mutual trust and co-operation. 
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Although Australia, like West Germany^ has a history of 
45 
regulating industrial relations through a legal framework, there the 
conparison ends. There is no official policy of co-operation between 
employers and unions in Australia. Indeed, some of the more powerful 
unions like the A.M.W.U, believe that they can make more gains outside 
the arbitration system by direct, coercive action against employers. 
Mr J. Devereaux, Federal President of the union, put it simply: 'We don't 
46 
need the arbitration system. We can get what we want through strikes?. 
Further, the legalism of the arbitration system itself has made some 
unions suspicious of further legal intervention in industrial relations. 
The industrial arbitration systems themselves have indirectly 
contributed to this lack of co-operation between management and unions. 
When the parties enter into negotiations they know that arbitration may 
be the ultimate solution. As a result they play their cards close to 
their chests and concede very little in the early stages of bargaining. 
In addition, bargaining in the industrial relations systems 
takes place on an industry, state or national level. By diverting 
attention away from the work place the industrial arbitration systems 
hamper the growth of plant-level bargaining which is itself a good 
47 foundation for worker participation. Yet, ironically, the fact that 
unions are often poorly-organised at workplace level might give a works 
48 council more room to operate. 
Cd) Legal Complications 
Although co-determination poses no threat to the industrial 
arbitration systems, substantial changes in other areas of law might be 
required to accommodate the West German model. 
49 
In Bennetts v. Board of Fire Commissioners of New South Wales 
Street J. reprimanded a director of a statutory board who used his 
position as a board member to serve the group who elected him. This 
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principle could hamper labour representatives in a co-determination 
scheme. But if the scope of directors' duties is broadened to include 
the interests of employees, it would seem that Mr Justice Street's 
objection to disclosure would fall: employee's interests would then be 
part of the directors' responsibilities.^^ 
The dissemination of confidential information presents 
another problem. Some restriction upon disclosure by the employee's 
representatives is necessary but it should be possible to balance the 
legitimate interests of the employer against the need to keep the rank 
and file fully informed. Times are changing. Once a balance sheet 
was regarded as almost a trade secret.^^ Now Britain's new Industry 
52 
Bill proposes to abolish corporate privacy. 
If employers are completely free to classify as confidential 
all material disclosed to labour representatives, the flow of information 
in the enterprise could dry up. It may be advisable, therefore, to 
allow a court, in exceptional cases, to determine whether it would be 
detrimental to the company to disclose certain information to ordinary 
employees. The possibility of a judicial review might encourage 
management to take a reasonable line on disclosure. In any event, this 
problem would possibly resolve itself in practice when labour represent-
atives earn management's trust. 
The Donovan Commission saw a further problem in the position 
of a labour director: should he bear personal responsibility jointly 
with other members of the board for their decisions or for any mis-
feasances on their part?^^ The short answer is 'no'. A labour 
director is a specialist; he should not be accountable for board 
decisions which fall outside his range of competence. How, then, is 
he to be excused? 
Section 365 U.C.A. provides a ready-made solution. It gives 
a court power to relieve a director from liability for breach of duty. 
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breach of trust, negligence or default on such terms as it thinks fit. 
But this discretionary relief may only be granted where it appears to 
the court that the director has 'acted honestly and reasonably, and 
that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including those 
connected with his appointment, he ought fairly to be excused for the 
54 
negligence default or breach*. These conditions are cumulative. 
Provided the labour director acts as a man of affairs dealing with his 
own affairs with reasonable care and circumspection could reasonably be 
expected to act in similar circumstances, he will be entitled to 
1 • r 55 relief. 
None of the foregoing obstacles is insuperable. They could 
all be overcome if there was a sufficient demand for worker participation. 
(e) Employee Apathy 
At present, there is little evidence of a popular movement 
among employees towards workers participation. Further, some workers 
would be reluctant to become involved in participation,^^ But apathy 
is not a sufficient reason for disregarding the proposal for co-
determination, ^ ^ 
Local experience with joint consultation shows that some 
58 
committees have failed through lack of employee interest. But then 
why should employees be interested in a joint consultation committee? 
It has no executive authority; it is usually merely anadvisory body. 
In fact, one of the lessons from the jDint consultation case studies is that 59 
committees should be given important functions. Then, it seems, 
employees* interest is sustained. 
These findings should not, however, cloud the issue. It will 
be necessary to educate the rank and file to the advantages of co-
determination, As the general level of education of persons entering 
the work force becomes higher, there will be more people looking for 
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more from their job than good wages, safety and reasonable working 
conditions. This new group of worker will look for status in their 
60 
work, and one way to satisfy this need is through participation. 
While many blue-collar workers are, at present, »consumption-oriented, 
acquisitive, privalistic and family-centred'^^ impetus for partici-
pation in management may well come from white-collar employees, 
technicians and executives themselves.^^ 
(v) Positive Factors 
Despite all the obstacles discussed above, there is growing 
support for some form of worker participation in management on both 
sides of industry^^ and in the political a r e n a . M o r e o v e r , the success 
of several local worker participation schemes may give a fillip to 
further experiment. 
The South Australian Government has taken the initiative in 
experiment and education on this subject. Indeed the South 
6 8 
Australian Theatre Company Act, 1972 introduces a mild form of 
worker participation. One of the six governors of the Board charged 
with the powers, duties and functions of the Theatre Company must be a 
representative of the company of players. If the players do not elect 
such a representative within a certain period, the Board must appoint 
one of the players as the delegate. 
The Act also makes a bold attempt to avoid the problem of 
conflicting interests for the players* representative. The delegate 
is not obliged to declare his financial interest in any matter 
relating to the terms and conditions of employment of any person 
(including himself) comprised in the company of players. Nor is he 
obliged to refrain from acting in his capacity as a governor of the 
Board on any such matter. In each case he is excused if his only 
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financial interest in the issue arises by reason of the fact that he 
is a subscriber. Should he have a more substantial financial 
interest in the issue, however, he must observe the disclosure 
69 
requirement and refrain from acting on the matter. 
On 17 February 1972, the South Australian Government 
appointed a committee to examine the advantages and disadvantages 
of direct worker participation within industry and commerce in the 
state. The committee*s one hundred page report was published in 
April 1973. It reviewed the experience of overseas countries with 
worker participation schemes but concluded that this experience 'is 
not crucial in order to form conclusions and make recommendations as 70 to what should be done in South Australia*. 
71 From the results of its comprehensive survey of joint 
consultation in South Australia, the committee identified several 
72 
factors on which the success of this form of worker participation 
depended. One of the committee's final recommendations was that joint 
consultation be fostered on a voluntary basis in all South Australian 73 companies with more than fifty employees. 
This proposal is somewhat surprising. In spite of the 
74 
overwhelming evidence of the failure of joint consultation overseas, 
the committee concluded that this type of worker participation in 
management was 'reasonably successful*.^^ Moreover, it gave no 76 indication of what results might be gained through joint consultation. 
Even the committee itself alluded to the criticism of joint 
consultation as an effective form of worker participation,^"^ And the 
78 
benefits which it did attribute to a successful joint consultation 
scheme appeared to be more gains for management than the ordinary 
employees. Indeed, one of its express reasons for favouring joint 
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consultation was that it did *not remove managements* ultimate 
decision-making power, and because no substantial alterations in the 
79 
structure of management in the companies would be necessary*. 
Although worker satisfaction with joint consultation might be implied 
from some of the benefits the committee saw in a successful joint 
consultation scheme, one is given the impression that joint consult-
ation is more a management technique than an effective means of 
worker participation. This impression is reinforced when the committee 
goes on to discuss the apathy of workers towards joint consultation 
schemes. The committee, itself, admits that some schemes have been 
abandoned because the joint consultation council adopted a purely 
80 advisory or consultative role. 
The Report is, then, essentially conservative. Certainly 
joint consultation would be more palatable to management, and possibly 
the unions, at this time but that is not the point. The committee's 
proposal calls for a viable form of worker participation rather than 
an effective scheme. The danger here is that the South Australian 
Government might be encouraged to endorse joint consultation as an end 
in itself, rather than as a means of preparing the ground for a more 
effective form of worker participation. If experience with joint 
consultation proves to be unrewarding, this may dampen interest in a 
more meaningful form of worker participation. 
Experiment with forms of worker participation is not confined 
O 
to South Australia, nor is it restricted to the public sector. And 
further research into worker participation schemes is planned. One of 
the principal resolutions arising from the Industrial Peace Conference 
arranged by the Minister for Labour was that a comprehensive inquiry 
be conducted into the extent and prospects of worker participation in 
. 82 Australia. 
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Workers* participation in management was introduced in other 
83 
countries as a reaction to a crisis. But this does not mean that co-
determination would be unworkable in more stable conditions. In any 
event, while Australia's industrial relations are not at crisis point, 
they are considerably strained. The industrial arbitration system seems 
unable to provide a satisfactory solution. 
Australia's spiralling rate of inflation may force employers 
and the government to win the support of unions and employees in a 
drive for greater productivity. The co-operation of unions and employees 
will not be won easily. Employers may be compelled to bargain away some 
of their prerogatives in return for wage restraint and co-operation. 
In these circumstances worker participation in management becomes a 
distinct possibility. 
The fifth draft directive issued by the European Commission 
in October 1972 proposed forms of co-determination largely modelled on 
German and Dutch law,^'^ If Great Britain alters its company law to 
conform with the directive, Australia would have a model on which to 
base further discussion and experiment. In particular, the British 
model would give some guidance on ways of modifying traditional company 85 
law principles to accommodate co-determination. 
(vi) Conclusion 
Worker participation in management has not developed beyond 
the embryonic stage in Australia but our belated interest in this concept 
could give us certain advantages. We are, at least, in a position to 
draw on a wealth of overseas experience and to avoid some of the obvious 
shortcomings in the overseas schemes. Co-determination is not a panacca 
but on some issues it may be a viable alternative to confrontation and 
arbitration. Clearly, as Dr Cairns says, worker participation is still 
•far off*^^ but mounting interest in the concept^^ and the pressure for 
improved procedures'to deal with displacement and redundancy^^ will 
prompt a closer examination'of j co-determination as a proposal for 
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SECTION 3: EMPLOYEES* INTERESTS IN PARTICIPATION, ADVANCEMENT 
AND REASONABLE SUPERVISION 
CHAPTER 21 PROMOTION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH SUPERVISOR 
Measures to enhance and protect employees' interests in 
promotion can be grouped under three headings: selection procedure, 
criteria for selection and right of appeal, 
1. Promotion 
(i) Selection Procedure 
Collective agreements in the United States commonly require 
permanent job vacancies to be advertised by a notice published on the 
plant bulletin board. Employees are then given a fixed period of time, 
say forty-eight hours, within which to file an application for the 
1 
vacancies* 
A similar selection procedure exists in West Germany, Works 
Councils are empowered by statute to demand that all or certain types 2 
of vacancies be advertised within the enterprise prior to appointment. 
In addition, job application forms require the consent of the works 
council. If this approval is not forthcoming the conciliation board 3 is empowered to decide disputes as to content of the forms. 
4 
Formal selection procedures are not unknown in Australia but 
there is no requirement similar to the West German provision. By first 
advertising vacancies within the enterprise employers give their 
employees early notice of the opportunities for advancement within the 
firm. Nevertheless, this tells an employee nothing about his prospects 
of promotion. 
West German law has, therefore, gone further. It provides 
that an employee is entitled to inspect his personnel file and add 
7 0 5 
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his own comment to this record.^ A works council member may assist 
the employee with the inspection.^ What is perhaps more important, 
the employee may demand an evaluation of his services as well as his 
opportunities for vocational development in the enterprise.^ Once 
g 
again, a works councillor may join in the discussion. 
(ii) Guidelines for Selection 
In Australia, seniority is often the basis for promotions 
9 
although employers are reluctant to concede this openly. 
By contrast, the overwhelming majority of American collective 
agreements formally recognise seniority as a factor for consideration 
in selecting employees for promotion,^^ Indeed, in 31% of the 
agreements surveyed by the Bureau of National Affairs in 1965 seniority 
was the 'determining factor*.^^ In 29% of the agreements seniority was 
a subsidiary factor to be considered when other matters such as ability 
and work experience were evenly balanced; 97o of the agreements placed 12 
seniority on an equal footing with other factors. These figures 
underestimate the importance arbitrators attach to seniority. At 
arbitration, it will often be the paramount consideration. In 
practice, the selection of a junior employee over a senior employee 
will only be upheld if the junior employee has far more ability and 13 work experience. 
In West Germany, guidelines for selection and assessment of 
personnel must be approved by the works council. If an agreement on 
these guidelines cannot be reached, the conciliation board is empowered 
1 4 
to set the general standards. Works councils in enterprises having 
more than 1,000 employees are entitled to demand the formulation of 
guidelines on the professional and personal qualifications and social 
aspects to be taken into account in selecting personnel. Once again, 
the conciliation board arbitrates in the event of a disagreement.^^ 
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The selection criteria prescribed by the Public Service Act 
1922-1973 (Cth) are a reasonable compromise between the employee's 
interest in advancement and the employer's interest in efficiency. 
There, seniority prevails only if applicants are equal in their 
relative efficiency, 'Efficiency* encompasses special qualifications 
and aptitude for the discharge of the duties of the office to be filled, 
together with merit and good conduct.^^ 
This is a reasonable selection standard. It avoids the 
vagueness of the West German legislation. It also indicates that 
seniority is not the paramount factor. By making length of service 
secondary, it ensures that junior employees with initiative and ability 
are not frustrated by the seniority obstacle. The importance of this 
point should not be overlooked. Young persons taking up their 
17 first job are, in the main, better educated than their predecessors 
18 
and more eager for advancement, A rigid application of the seniority 
principle could easily stifle their incentive. 
(iii) Right of Appeal 
In some countries, the law recognises that employees may 
have a vested interest in challenging their employer's decision to 
promote another employee. 
In the United States, for example, any employee or group of 
employees is entitled to present promotion grievances to his employer 
and have them settled without interference from the union. On the 
other hand, the union has a right to be present and the settlement must 
19 
be consistent with the current collective agreement. 
Alternatively an employee may enlist the aid of the union 
to process his grievance. Union officials elected by the majority of 
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are given exclusive 
statutory authority to bargain with respect to wages, hours and 
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conditions of employment for all unit employees whether they are 
20 union members or not. As a corollary of this privilege of exclusive 
representation, the union is required to represent all unit employees 
21 fairly and impartially. 
Under its duty of fair representation a union may not refuse 
to process a grievance simply because the aggrieved employee is not a 
unionist: the duty of fair representation is owed to all unit employees, 
22 
unionists and non-unionists. But despite the potential breath of 
the union's duty, it appears that it is extremely difficult for an 
employee to enforce. Several obstacles (some substantive, others 23 
procedural) stand in his way. Nevertheless, the union's duty gives 
employees a right, albeit circumscribed, to challenge promotions. 
When a West German worker has a grievance over promotion, he 24 has two avenues of redress: a personal complaint to his employer and 
25 action through the works council. The employer and the works council 
2 6 
are obliged not to discriminate amongst employees on certain grounds. 
In particular,discrimination on grounds of sex and age is prohibited. 
This prohibition could be quite important in relation to oromotion 
grievances. 
Perhaps the best example of an entrenched right to appeal 
against promotions lies not overseas but in the public sector of the 
work force. Under the Public Service Act 1922-1973 (Cth) an officer 
may challenge the provisional promotion of another officer if he 
considers that he is more entitled to the appointment on grounds of 27 superior efficiency or, where efficiency is equal, seniority. The 
appellant must lodge an appeal with the Public Service Board within a 
28 certain period. The board then forwards the appeal and particulars 
of the officers concerned to the Promotions Appeal Committee in the 
29 appropriate state. 
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The appeal is determined by majority decision of the 
committee after hearing the submissions of the officers. If the 
appeal is allowed, the appellant is promoted to the vacant position and 
the provisional promotion of the respondent is annulled. Where the 
appeal is dismissed or out of time the provisional promotion must be 
confirmed by the Permanent Head (in the case of intra-departmental 
promotions) or the Public Service Board (where an inter-departmental 
30 transfer is involved). 
31 
In his comprehensive analysis of promotion practices in 
the Commonwealth Public Service, Subramaniam saw two main advantages 
in the appeals procedure: first, it was a safeguard against error, and 32 second, it was a safety valve for discontent. He also reported that 
•there is evidently more satisfaction in the service with the promotion 
, 33 system than in the inter-war years 
Unfortunately, there is little hard data with which to test 
this assessment. In the period 1967 to 1971 less than 12% of the 
appeals lodged against provisional promotions in the Australian Public 
Service were successful. Does this mean that the appeals committees 
meekly »rubber-stamp* the initial decisions of the Permanent Head of 
the Department or the Public Service Board, as the case may be? 
This is not necessarily so. Many of the unsuccessful appeals 
35 
were, no doubt, frivilous grievances. Again, some appellants may 
simply have been interested in publicising their qualifications and 
credentials with a view to future promotions.^^ Another explanation 
is that the promotion procedure has been operating for a long time and 
the various departments have reasonably well-settled selection criteria. 
As one Public Service Board Commissioner put it: 'In these circum-1 37 stances one would not expect a large number of successful appeals . 
In any event, perhaps the main significance of the Promotion 
Appeals Committees is that they deter discrimination in promotions: 
401 
the promoting authority knows that an arbitrary and capricious 
decision will be reviewed and overruled by an impartial appeal board. 
(iv) A Suggested Procedure for the Private Sector 
The first step towards safeguarding employees* interests in 
advancement is to establish selection procedure and criteria for 
selection. Without these a right of appeal is virtually meaningless 
since the reviewing authority has no standards on which to consider the 
appeal. The basic purpose of selection criteria is to eliminate 
38 
discrimination in promotions. Certainly subjective factors will 
continue to play a part in promotions but these should be kept to a ' 
minimum. Objective criteria such as are prescribed in the public service 
statutes leave little scope for arbitrary or capricious promotions. 
One side effect of the proposal for selection standards would 
be that management would find it advisable to maintain service records. 
If this is the case, employees should be allowed to inspect their 
personnel file and make written comments thereon along the lines of the 
West German provision. 
Secondly, companies,like their counterparts in the public 
sector, should be obliged to publicise provisional promotions within 
the firm. Employees should then be allowed a short period of, say, 
five working days to appeal against the provisional appointment. If 
the appeal is upheld by the reviewing authority, be it an industrial 
tribunal or works council, the provisional promotion could be cancelled 
and the appellant promoted to the position. 
Would this measure interfere with management's freedom to 
run its business in an efficient manner? The selection criteria would 
stress efficiency as the cardinal factor in promotions so it seems that 
this would not be a great handicap for management. 
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The snag lies ip the appeal procedure. Would management be 
flooded with appeals against routine promotions? In the Australian 
Public Service over the period 1968-1972 only 25% of provisional 
promotions were challenged. The promotions appealed against 
attracted an average of around eight appeals each. These figures 
suggest that appeals are relatively common in the public service. But 
there, one would think the work force is relatively homogeneous. 
Moreover, there were around forty-seven promotions per 500 employees 
39 
in the Australian Public Service in 1972. While there is no 
empirical evidence on this point, it seems fair to say that this rate 
of promotion would not be matched in the private sector. This, in 
itself, would reduce the potential number of promotion appeals. In 
addition, the diversity of occupations in the private sector would 
automatically rule out a large number of appeals on the ground that 
the appellant was not qualified to perform the duties of the new position. 
The law can do little to encourage employers to make promotion 
opportunities available to their employees. By prescribing selection 
procedures, criteria for selection and a right of appeal against 
promotions, it would be making a start. 
2, Relationship with Supervisor 
As an incident of its right to select employees for particular 
positions management is free to decide who it will appoint as a 
supervisor. In view of the intimate relationship which exists between 
supervisors and employees should this freedom remain unbridled? 
(i) Consultation prior to /^jpointment 
Employees cannot rightly expect to select their own supervisor. 
40 
Ttiis could lead to a chaotic working relationship. On the other hand, 
workers do have a legitimate claim to be consulted prior to the 
403 
41 appointment. 
As mentioned earlier, in West Germany, guidelines for 
selection of employees in hiring and changes in classification are not 
valid unless approved by the works council. Without such approval, 
management has the option of abandoning its draft guidelines or 
submitting the dispute to a conciliation board. In large establishments 
the works council is in a much stronger position. It may demand guide-
lines for professional and personal qualifications in hiring and 
classification changes. The conciliation board resolves any dispute 
4-u- • 42 on this issue. 
The German measure is aimed at establishing selection criteria 
for supervisors well in advance. Joint consultation could, however, 
be achieved through the appropriate union or a works council. Either 
body could canvass the views of the rank and file and advise management 
of the employees* opinions of the candidates within a specified period 
of, say, five working days. The role of the union or the works council 
would be purely consultative. There would be no question of workers* 
electing their owii supervisors. By the same token, management would be 
unwise to disregard the views of the majority of people who will work 
under the supervisor on a day-to-day basis. 
(ii) Removal of Unsuitable Supervisors 
A say in the appointment of a supervisor is not enough to 
safeguard employees' interests. West German works councils are given 
the power to co-determine disputes involving employees* relationship 
with their supervisor.^^ This relationship can generate problems for 
individual employees. They should be given the right to complain to 
their employer about their supervisor without fear of discrimination 
• •• 44 or reprisal. 
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Moreover, the union or the works council should be permitU I 
to challenge the continued employment of a person as a supervisor il 
that person is discriminating among employees or treating them unfairly. 
A complaint could be made before an industrial tribunal. The union 
could be required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination or 
unfair treatment. This would be a difficult, but not impossible, 
task,'^^ 
In regulating employees* relationship with their supervisors 
the law has a very limited role. But if the law gave employees or 
their representatives the right to be consulted before the selection 
of a supervisor and the right to petition for the removal of an 
unsuitable supervisor, it would at least have acknowledged the importance 
of this issue. 
PART V 
CONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES FOR REFORM 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposals for reform outlined in the preceding 
chapters will be brutum fulmen unless they can survive a constitutional 
challenge. This section, therefore, will examine ways of implementing 
those measures within the present constitutional framework. 
In matters which have not been specifically assigned to the 
Federal Parliament, the states have plenary legislative power within 
their territorial boundaries. Theoretically, they could implement all 
the proposed reforms. But it would be politically naive to believe 
that this would come to pass. Apart from the lack of uniformity 
which would inevitably result if state legislatures devise their own 
solutions,^ it is unrealistic to expect all the states to introduce 
the recommended measures. 
Federal Parliament's legislative power is, of course, bounded 
2 
by the Constitution. If the proposals for reform are to be viable it 
will be necessary to chart a course around the constitutional 
restrictions. This Part examines the limits and potential of a broad 
range of federal powers. 
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CHAPTER 22 THE CORPORATIONS POWER^ 
So controversial is section 51 Cxx) of the Constitution, 
so far-reaching are its implications, that a detailed discussion of 
the placitum is beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet without the 
corporations power many of the proposals mentioned earlier might be 
beyond the competence of Federal Parliament. Clearly this topic 
cannot be excised but limitations of space demand a compromise. This 
chapter, therefore, outlines the potential of the power, leaving 
2 supporting argument to Appendix 5. 
(i) The Described Corporations 
There are many grounds for believing that the subjects of 
the power - in particular * trading corporations* - will be interpreted 
3 broadly. It appears that a trading corporation is a particular form 
4 
of corporation with special inherent characteristics. But the well-
established principle of generic interpretation ensures that the term 
will be given a much wider meaning than it conveyed in 1900.^ Today, 
it could include manufacturing and mining companies which market 
their products. 
The other subjects of the paragraph, foreign corporations 
and financial corporations, are more easily defined. The former are 
corporations formed outside Australia; the latter include all financial 
institutions in corporate form with the exception of banks.^ 
A corporation may be identified by the purposes outlined in 
its constitution or, possibly, by its sole, predominant or characteristic 
activity.^ 
(ii) Scope of the Power 
The scope of paragraph (xx) is shrouded in uncertainty. Wliile 
the preponderance of judicial and academic opinion suggests that 
'107 
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Federal Parliament has no power to incorporate the described g 
corporations, the arguments in favour of this view are not wholly 
convincing. 
The controversy focuses upon the words, 'formed within the 
9 
limits of the Commonwealth*. Those who argue for an expansion of 
federal power through placitum (xx) contend that these words do not 
necessarily imply an anterior creation of the corporations to which 
the power attaches. In other words, 'formed' may mean 'to be formed* 
and, indeed, *to be formed under a federal law founded upon section 
51 (xx)*.^^ Their opponents maintain that the key words mean 'already 
formed* under the laws of a state or a territory. 
If the High Court decides that the Commonwealth has power 
over incorporation (and there are, at present, no real obstacles to 
such a finding), Federal Parliament would be able to introduce the 
proposed structural reforms and, indeed, most of the other measures 
suggested earlier. It could do this by making incorporation conditional 
upon compliance with certain requirements as to company structure, co-
determination, dismissal procedures and redundancy. If these require-
ments were not satisfied, incorporation could be denied or withdrawn 
by compulsory liquidation. 
If federal control may not be exercised at the incorporation 
stage, can it be applied to the internal management of the companies? 
This is also a controversial issue. Those who argue that paragraph 
(xx) does not authorise the Commonwealth to regulate this aspect of 
the corporations assume that incorporation and internal management are 
interwoven, that an absence of authority to control incorporation 
automatically denies control over internal management,^^ There is no 
compelling reason why this should follow. The judicial observations 
on this issue^^ are now nearly seventy years old. Moreover, even when 
they were expressed they were not definitive. 
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Control over internal management may be quite important for, 
on one view,^^ this involves control over the corporations relationship 
with their employees. Assuming for the present that this view is 
correct, what would federal control over internal management authorise? 
A complete co-determination model providing participation at all levels 
in the enterprise could be provided and the matters for co-determination 
specified. This would enable the Australian Parliament to implement 
many of the proposals outlined earlier. In particular, participation, 
promotion, supervision, dismissal procedures and redundancy could be 
regulated. If employees are classified as outsiders (and one would 
think that the law is estopped from denying this in view of its approach 
to the director's duty to act bona fide in the interests of the 
company),^^ direct federal regulation of the corporations* relationship 
with their employees would be possible.^^ This would give the 
Australian Parliament ample power to implement the measures suggested 
earlier. 
It is now too late for the High Court to deny that the 
Australian Parliament may indirectly control some matters which are 
beyond its express legislative powers.^^ For this reason the Concrete 
Pipes Case^^ is immensely important. Because of this case, one thing 
is crystal clear: Federal Parliament may regulate the trading activities 
of the corporations described.^^ This power might enable the 
Commonwealth to determine the conditions on which the corporations will 
be allowed to carry on trading activities in Australia. In this way 
Federal Parliament could effectively compel the corporations to intro-
duce a complete co-determination model and to observe certain industrial 
standards, for example, in dismissals, retrenchments, and promotions. 
The 'sanction* of withdrawing the »privilege» of trading would be a 
powerful inducement for the corporations to comply with the federal 
requirements. 
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To sum up, it appears that the 'corporations power* either 
directly or indirectly grants the Australian Parliament power to 
implement many of the proposals for reform. 
CHAPTER 23 THE INDUSTRIAL POWER 
Federal power to regulate industrial relations stems 
principally^ from section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution. 
1. Conciliation and Arbitration 
This placitum authorises the Commonwealth to make laws with 
respect to 'Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and 
2 
settlement ...* of certain industrial disputes. After some hesitation 
the High Court rejected a reddendo singular singulis construction of 
this phrase.^ Thus, both conciliation and arbitration may be used to 4 prevent as well as to settle industrial disputes. 
2. Industrial Disputes 
Federal legislative power is further limited by reference to 
the words 'industrial disputes*. 
(i) Dispute Must Arise in An Industry 
To be an 'industrial dispute* a disagreement must, first of 
all, arise in an industry,^ The High Court's interpretation of this 
requirement has followed a tortuous line.^ An account of this develop-
7 
ment is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is sufficient to note that the badge of industrialism is 
generally the character of the individual duties which the employees 
actually perform.^ If the nature of this work is industrial, then the 
s 
disputants are engaged in an industry regardless of the classification 
of the employer's undertaking.^ In general, the High Court has adopted 
a fairly broad interpretation of this requirement.^*^ Nearly all the 
employees the subject of this thesis would indisputably satisfy the 
'industry' requirement.^^ 
4 1 1 
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(ii) Disputants Must Stand in An Industrial Relationship 
The second ingredient of an 'industrial dispute', that the 
disputants stand in an industrial relationship, derives from case law.^^ 
The interpretation of this requirement has not greatly-
hampered the expansion of federal jurisdiction. About 45% of employees 
in the private sector affected by awards and determinations and 
13 registered collective agreements fall within federal jurisdiction, 
14 
Despite Whybrow's Case, it is possible to obtain an award which 
operates for most practical purposes as a common rule.^^ Perhaps the 16 
most glaring defects in the law in this area are the cumbrous procedure 
which must be followed in order to achieve this result and the fact 
that a non-uaionist employee who is affected by an award may have no 17 personal right to enforce its provisions. 
(iii) Dispute Must Pertain to An Industrial Matter 
An 'industrial dispute* within section 51 (xxxv) must also 
18 relate or pertain to an 'industrial matter'. Although this term is 
1 9 defined in broad terms, the High Court has frequently denied the 
federal tribunal jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute did not 
20 concern an 'industrial matter'. 
Not only has the High Court, at times, refused to apply a 
literal construction of the various paragraphs of the statutory 
definition, it has often concentrated on one rather than another 
paragraph which would appear to be equally, if not more, appropriate 
to the claim.^^ 
The wide purport of the statutory definition is, therefore, 
not always the decisive factor. Ironically, the breadth of the phrases 
in the definition section has allowed the High Court to develop supple-
mentary tests for determining whether a dispute relates to an industrial 
matter. It was once thought that a dispute about any matter which 
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•touched* the employment and affected the mutual business relationship 
22 connecting the parties was within federal jurisdiction. This early 
23 test was rejected and replaced by a narrower criterion. The dispute 
24 
need not arise out of a contractual relationship but it appears that 
it must concern a matter directly relating to an existing industrial 25 relationship of an employer as an employer to employees as employees. 
This requirement may, however, be relaxed where the matter in dispute 
26 
has a clear nexus with the performance of work by the employees. 
These refined tests contain a fairly flexible standard. The 
question arises: what factors influence the High Court in conceding or 
denying jurisdiction, 27 Sykes and Glasbeek examine this issue in depth. Despite 
the judicial suggestion that *it is useless to attempt to go behind the 
28 
principles* established by the High Court in interpreting the industiial 
power, they argue that all the cases dealing with the industrial matter 
requirement can be explained by an unarticulated policy consideration 29 - respect for managerial prerogatives. 
While this thesis explains a large number of decisions^*^ it 
does not account for all the cases. There are instances where the High 
Court has declared that the Commission has jurisdiction even though 
management*s rights are intimately involved.^^ Moreover, the managerial 
32 
sphere is not the only area relatively free from federal control. 
Respect for managerial prerogatives must, therefore, be 
relegated to the position of a firm guideline; it is not an absolute 
criterion. This does not deny that the policy has had an impact upon 
individual judges^^ and several decisions?"^ Clearly it has played a 
significant, if not dominant, role in refining federal jurisdiction over 
industry. 
If it is conceded that many of the limitations placed upon 
federal arbitral jurisdiction stem from a reluctance to interfere with 
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management, is there really any constitutional impediment to an increase 
in jurisdiction at the expense of managerial prerogatives.^^ Certainly 
the wording of the Constitution and the implementing statute would 
permit such an extension. All that is necessary under the 'industrial 
matter' requirement is a direct connection with the industrial relation-
ship of an employer as employer to an employee as employee.^^ It is, 
however, extremely unlikely that managerial freedom will be substantially 
eroded by an extension of federal arbitral jurisdiction: the policy of 
non-interference is too firmly entrenched in the practice of the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 
3. 'Interstateness* 
The final requirement of section 5l (xxxv) is that the dispute 
must extend beyond the limits of one state. Here there are really two 
overlapping elements: 'genuineness* and 'interstateness*. In its 
interpretation of these two elements the High Court has enlarged federal 
jurisdiction far beyond the boundaries contemplated by the Founding 
37 Fathers. 
3 8 The difficulty caused by the 'interstateness requirement' 
can be ascribed to the fact that the dispute which is an abstract 
thing must be measured by reference to 'states' which have definite 
39 
boundaries. While the dispute itself must have an interstate 
character, the parties need not be two-state employers or two-state 
unions. The essential element of an interstate industrial dispute is 
that the disagreement must cover Australian territory that is not 40 confined to the limits of any one state. For present purposes, it 
is sufficient to note that the High Court has on the whole adopted 
41 
an expansive interpretation of this requirement. 
The same is true of the 'genuineness requirement*. State 
rightist delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1898 feared 
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that the scope of the industrial disturbance would be deliberately 
42 extended to attract federal jurisdiction. The High Court's general 
43 approach to the genuineness requirement has vindicated those fears. 
4. Consequences of the Jurisdictional Limitations 
The major consequence which flows from the limitations of 
the industrial power is that the Commonwealth has no power under 
section 51 (xxxv) to regulate conditions of employment directly through 
a labour code. Thus, one fact is inescapable: Federal Parliament 
could not rely upon the 'industrial power* to implement all the 
proposals outlined earlier. In particular, it could not establish 
44 machinery for the hearing and settlement of local intra-state disputes 
45 
or individual grievances. Thus, it would be unable to provide for 
works councils or to exercise any effective control over plant-level 
disputes such as promotion and supervision. Further, the High Court's 
interpretation of the industrial matter requirement suggests that the 
Commonwealth could not establish a co-determination scheme under 
pa ragr aph (xxxv). 
What proposals, then, are within the scope of the 'industrial 
power'? Firstly, the federal long service leave 'code' could be 
amended where necessary to comply with the measures mentioned earlier. 
This would be no problem. Similarly, superannuation proposals could 46 
be implemented through federal awards although this would not be the 
most appropriate manner of effecting reform. 
In the field of job security, federal awards could probably 
47 
prescribe general criteria for selecting employees for retrenchment. 
They could require advance warning of redundancy for the unions and 
A O 
employees but a clause demanding prior notification of planned 
retrenchments to the Commonwealth Employment Service would probably be 
49 beyond power. Severance pay could be provided by the general award 
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or by an arbitrated decision before the employees are retrenched. 
By contrast, federal jurisdiction in dismissal cases appears 
to be relatively hamstrung. In a series of decisions^^ discussed 
52 
earlier the High Court firmly rejected attempts to confer upon the 
federal tribunal jurisdiction to order reinstatement. It is, however, 
possible to avoid the main obstacles by taking a circuitous route. 
If a federal union included in a log of demands served upon 
an employer a claim that he should not dismiss his employees wrongfully, 
harshly, unjustly or unreasonably and the employer rejected this 
demand, would this be a dispute as to an 'industrial matter*? The 
emphatic answer is •yes'. The first paragraph of the union's demand in 
R. v. Gough; Ex parte Meat and Allied Trades Federation of Australia^^ 
contained a similar provision. Commenting on this clause, Windeyer J. 
declared: 
It is not denied - and in face of par. (k) of the definition 
of "industrial matters" it could not be questioned - that if 
the first paragraph stood alone it could properly have a place 
in an award. 
It is possible, then, to insert such a clause in an award settling an 
original interstate industrial dispute. 
But when an employee covered by the award is dismissed will 
this individual discharge satisfy the 'interstateness requirement'? In 
essence, the dismissal would be a local matter. It would, nevertheless, 
be within the ambit of the original interstate industrial dispute.^^ 
Individual employees could, therefore, complain that their dismissals 
were in breach of the original award. 
But who could hear their complaints? Clearly the Commission 
could not entertain their claims as this would involve an exercise of 
judicial power, or at least non-arbitral power. Re Association of 
Professional Engineers^^ puts this beyond doubt. 
The Australian Industrial Court, on the other hand, is 
57 empowered to exercise judicial functions. For example, it can impose 
417 
58 
afine of up to $1,000 for a breach of a term of an order or award. 
This penalty could be used to deter an employer from infringing the 
proposed dismissal clauses in an award. More importantly, the 
Australian Parliament could give the Court jurisdiction to grant re-
instatement or compensation to employees dismissed in breach of the 
59 award. Legislation along these lines could be upheld under the 
•incidental power* since it would ensure the practical efficacy of 
60 
the award. 
Unions might prefer to keep dismissal cases in the arbitral, 
rather than judicial, arena suspecting that their chances of success 
would be better in a tribunal more familiar with the industrial realities 
of the situation. But the point is that any de facto jurisdiction 
exercised by the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission is 
open to challenge.^^ In any event, the unions* fears may be unfounded. 
In South Australia, the Industrial Court has exercised its reinstate-6 2 
ment jurisdiction in a sensible and humane manner. Indeed, in one 
recent case,^^ it expressly took the industrial realities of the 
situation into account. 
If the Australian Industrial Court were given the proposed 
jurisdiction it would be able to develop basic guidelines for determining 
whether a dismissal was wrongful, harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In 
this way nearly all the proposals outlined in Chapter 18 could be 
indirectly implemented. For example, the court could insist that 
employees be given a warning and an opportunity to state their case 
prior to dismissal. Since the procedure would provide an individual 
remedy for employees, it would be a vast improvement on the current law. 
CHAPTER 24 ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF POWER TO IMPLEMENT 
THE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
1. The 'External Affairs* Power^ 
2 3 There is both judicial and academic support for the view 
that legislation in pursuance of I.L.O. Conventions and even 
Recoininendations would be within the scope of the 'external affairs* 
power. At present, this proposition is neither firmly established nor 
untenable; it is simply untested. However, the very existence of the 
I.L.O. testifies to the mutuality of international interest in labour 
4 
relations and working conditions. Furthermore, there is a growing 
awareness of the need to control the operations of multinational 
corporations.^ No longer can employment be regarded as a matter of 
purely domestic concern. 
Most forms of discrimination in employment could be prohibited 
by legislation in pursuance of I.L.O. Convention No. 111. The same 
legislation could grant an aggrieved party the remedies discussed 
earlier. The proposals relating to unfair dismissal and dismissal for 
petty misconduct^ might also be implemented through federal legislation 7 following I.L.O. Recommendation 119, 
The present Australian Government has made it clear that the 
g 
*external affairs' power will no longer remain dormant. And the 
Minister for Labour and Immigration has expressed interest in curbing 
g 
management's right to hire and fire. In these circumstances the scope 
of placitum (xxxix) is unlikely to remain merely an academic issue. 
2. The 'Trade and Commerce* Power 
The dimensions of the 'trade and commerce' power, like those 
of the 'external affairs' power, are largely u n k n o w n . S o m e idea of 
the potential of placitum in the field of labour law can be gained from 
nn 
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Mr Justice Fullagar's judgment in 0*Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd 
(No. His Honour stated: 
By virtue of that power all matters which may affect beneficially 
or adversely the export trade of Australia in any commodity 
produced or manufactured in Australia must be the legitimate 
concern of the Commonwealth.^^ 
And later, referring to a system of inspection at the point 
of export, Full agar J, remarked: 
It may very reasonably be thought necessary to go further back, 
and even to enter the factory or the field or the mine,^ 
He also observed: 
I would think it safe to say that the power of the Commonwealth 
extended to the supervision and control of all acts or processes^^ 
which can be identified as being done or carried out for export. 
It seems a fair inference from these and other dicta^^ that 
the conditions of employment in companies engaged in manufacturing or 
mining products for export either interstate or overseas may fall within 
16 the scope of the trade and commerce power. 
3, The Taxation Power 
17 
In Fairfax -v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the High 
Court held that a provision granting a taxation exemption upon the 
income of superannuation funds which invested a certain proportion of 
their assets in public securities was a valid exercise of the taxation 18 
power. If one takes the reasoning in Fairfax's Case one step further, 
a law imposing a special rate of tax upon companies which did not, for 
example, allow workers to participate in management, or which did not 
provide a redundancy fund or a retraining scheme for retrenched workers 
would be valid: the only duty or obligation created by the provision 
would be a liability to pay tax.^^ In this clumsy, but nevertheless 
legitimate, way many of the proposals outlined earlier could be 
introduced. 
4 20 
4, The Patents Power 
Section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution gives the Australian 
Parliament power to make laws with respect to 'patents of inventions 
and designs*. This placitum must surely include power to determine 
21 
the conditions on which a patent may be granted. If the patent is 
to be granted to the employed inventor then he could be obliged to 
grant a licence analogous to a 'shop right* to his employer. If, on 
the other hand, the employer is granted the patent he could be required 
to pay reasonable compensation to the actual inventor or team of 
inventors. 
While the Australian Parliament might not be competent to 
enact that a particular person was the inventor of an invention thereby 22 excluding judicial inquiry into the matter, it would certainly be 
able to establish machinery and tribunals for the hearing and settlement 
23 
of claims relating to patentable inventions. 
Federal legislation requiring employees to make prompt reports 
to their employers of any inventions made during the course of their 
employment, and giving employees exclusive rights to such inventions 
if the employer does not claim title within a specified period, would 24 
also appear to be valid under placitum (xviii). The same is true of 
provisions which render invalid or unenforceable, clauses in contracts 
of service which give employers exclusive rights to all inventions 25 made by thexr employees. 
There is therefore ample power within paragraph (xviii) to 
implement the basic features of the West German legislation dealing 
with the rights of enployed inventors. 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, has the law failed to impose adequate 
duties and responsibilities upon company management for the protection 
of employees* interests? It is submitted that the law has so failed 
at least in relation to the interests examined in this thesis. 
Evidence in support of this conclusion has already been presented. 
It remains to consider the reasons for this failure. 
It is possible to draw four main conclusions from this thesis. 
The first is that part of the law*s failure can be attributed to 
problems of its own creation. By its classification of certain employees* 
interests the law builds its own obstacles to reform. For example, the 
lynch-pin of the law relating to termination of employment is the 
contract of service. Once the law accepts this proposition, it has 
great difficulty protecting employees* job security. To be consistent, 
it is forced to allow the employer to exercise his contractual rights 
no matter how harsh the consequences. 
Secondly, having placed employees* interests in various 
pigeon-holes, the law rarely steps back to look at the overall effect 
of its categorisation. Take one of the many examples. Contract law 
in certain circumstances allows an employee to recover superannuation 
benefits as damages for wrongful dismissal. The employee will be 
entitled to the benefits he would have received if he were lawfully 
dismissed. All this is logical and consistent from the contract law 
standpoint. It is immaterial that another branch of the law allows an 
employer to dismiss an employee without a refund of the employee*s own 
superannuation contributions. Indeed, such an employer is still 
entitled to claim taxation deductions for his contributions to the 
superannuation fund. 
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Thirdly, some of the law's inability to recognise changes in 
the nature of enqjloyees* interests can be ascribed to the Constitution 
itself. The constitutional obstacles to reform are certainly formidable 
but once again the solution lies in a revision of traditional 
assumptions which colour the interpretation of the Constitution, It 
is possible to implement most, if not all, of the proposals outlined 
earlier without relying on the industrial power. Yet that shackled 
placitum is treated as the main repository of federal power to regulate 
industry. 
Finally, it appears that the law is not yet ready to recognise 
and protect the interests selected. To borrow Pound's concept of 
balancing social interests,^ the law attaches insufficient weight to 
the employees' interests. Only when it accepts that they are as 
important as, say, management's freedom to manage will reform become 
a definite possibility. The process is gradual and evolutionary. It 
is already developing in the field of job security and, to a lesser 
extent, promotion. This thesis indicates how far the law has yet to 
go before certain employees' interests will be adequately recognised 
and protected. 
